The NEW YORK TIMES Bestseller THE SWORD AN D THE SHIELD "THE SWORO AND THE SHIELD will stand as an indispensable reference work on Soviet espionage tor years to come.' — THE WASHINGTON POST By the Authors of THE WORLD WAS GOING OUR WAY CHRISTOPHER ANDREW AND VASILI MITROKHIN Table of Contents BY CHRISTOPHER ANDREW Title Page Dedication ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS THE EVOL UTION OF THE KGB. 191 7-1991 THE TRANSLITERA TION OF R US SIAN NAMES Foreword Introduction ONE - THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE TWO - FROM LENIN’S CHEKA TO STALIN’S Q GPU THREE - THE GREAT ILLEGALS FOUR - THE MAGNIFICENT FIVE FIVE - TERROR SIX - WAR SEVEN - THE GRAND ALLIANCE EIGHT - VICTORY NINE - FROM WAR TO COLD WAR TEN - THE MAIN ADVERSARY ELEVEN - THE MAIN ADVERSARY APPENDIX - SOME FAVORITE KGB YAVKAS IMEETING PLACESI IN THE I960’S TWELVE - THE MAIN ADVERSARY THIRTEEN - THE MAIN ADVERSARY FOURTEEN - POLITICAL WARFARE FIFTEEN - PROGRESS OPERATIONS SIXTEEN - PROGRESS OPERATIONS SEVENTEEN - THE KGB AND WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES EIGHTEEN - EUROCOMMUNISM NINETEEN - IDEOLOGICAL SUBVERSION TWENTY - IDEOLOGICAL SUBVERSION APPENDIX - THE INTERROGATION OF YURI ORLOV ON DECEMBER 29. 1977 TWENTY-ONE - SIGINT IN THE COLD WAR TWENTY - TWO - SPECIAL TASKS APPENDIX I - INSTRUCTIONS FOR DISARMING THE MOLNIYA ["LIGHTNING”! EXPLOSIVE DEVICE APPENDIX 2 - EXAMPLE OF BOOBY- TRAPPED RADIO CACHE PUT IN PLACE BY THE BERNE RESIDENCY APPENDIX 3 - EXAMPLES OF RADIO CACHES PUT IN PLACE BY THE ROME RESIDENCY TWENTY - THREE - SPECIAL TASKS APPENDIX - "SPECIAL POLITICAL ACTION” PROPOSED BY THE ATHENS RESIDENCY TO THE ... TWENTY - FOUR - COLD WAR OPERATIONS AGAINST BRITAIN TWENTY - FIVE - COLD WAR OPERATIONS AGAINST BRITAIN TWENTY - SIX - THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TWENTY - SEVEN - FRANCE AND ITALY DURING THE COLD WAR TWENTY - EIGHT - THE PENETRATION AND PERSECUTION OF THE SOVIET CHURCHES TWENTY - NINE - THE POLISH POPE AND THE RISE OF SOLIDARITY THIRTY - THE POLISH CRISIS AND THE CRUMBLING OF THE SOVIET BLOC CONCLUSION: FROM THE ONE -PARTY STATE APPENDIX A - KGB CHAIRMEN. 1 9 17-9 1 APPENDIX B - HEADS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. 1920-99 APPENDIX C - THE ORGANIZATION OF THE KGB APPENDIX D - THE ORGANIZATION OF THE KGB FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE IFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE! APPENDIX E - THE ORGANIZATION OF A KGB RESIDENCY NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX Copyright Page BY CHRISTOPHER ANDREW THEOPHILE DELCASSE AND THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE THE FIRST WORLD WAR: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (VOLUME 19 OF THE HAMLYN HISTORY OF THE WORLD) FRANCE OVERSEAS: THE GREAT WAR AND THE CLIMAX OF FRENCH IMPERIAL EXPANSION (WITH A.S. KANYA-FORSTNER) THE MISSING DIMENSION: GOVERNMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (WITH DAVID DILKS) HER MAJESTY’S SECRET SERVICE: THE MAKING OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CODEBREAKING AND SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1900-1945 (WITH JEREMY NOAKES} KGB: THE INSIDE STORY OF ITS FOREIGN OPERATIONS FROM LENIN TO GORBACHEV (WITH OLEG GORDIEVSKY) INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE: TOP SECRET FILES ON KGB FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 1975-1985 (PUBLISHED IN THE USA AS: COMRADE KRYUCHKOV’S INSTRUCTIONS) (WITH OLEG GORDIEVSKY) MORE ‘INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CENTRE’: TOP SECRET FILES ON KGB GLOBAL OPERATIONS, 1975-1985 (WITH OLEG GORDIEVSKY) FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH ETERNAL VIGILANCE? FIFTY YEARS OF THE CIA (WITH RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES) CHRISTOPHER AND VHSILI iniTRDHHin BASIC B BOOKS A MEMBER OF THE PERSEUS BOOKS GROUP THE SmORD AND THE SHIELD ARCHIVE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE IN MEMORY OF ‘‘MA ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFSA AKEL Amtorg Armed Forces Security [SIGINT] Agency [USA] Cyprus Communist Party American- Soviet Trading Corporation, New York ASA Army Security [SIGINT] Agency [USA] AVH Hungarian security and intelligence agency AVO predecessor of AVH BfV FRG security service BND FRG foreign intelligence agency CDU Christian Democratic Union [FRG] All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Cheka Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage: predecessor KGB (1917-22) CIA Central Intelligence Agency [USA] COCOM Coordinating Committee for East- West Trade Comecon [Soviet Bloc] Council for Mutual Economic Aid Comintern Communist International CPC CPC CPCz CPGB CPSU CPUSA CSU DCI DCS DOSE DIA DLB DRG DS DST F Line FAPSI FBI FCD FCO Christian Peace Conference Communist Party of Canada Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Communist Party of Great Britain Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of the United States of America Christian Social Union [FRG: ally of CDU] Director of Central Intelligence [USA] Portuguese security service French foreign intelligence service Defense Intelligence Agency [USA] dead letter-box Soviet sabotage and intelligence group Bulgarian security and intelligence service French security service “Special Actions” department in KGB residencies Russian (post-Soviet) SIGINT agency Federal Bureau of Investigation [USA] First Chief [Foreign Intelligence] Directorate, KGB Foreign and Commonwealth Office [UK] FRG GCHQ GDR GPU GRU GUGB Gulag HUMINT HVA ICBM IMINT INO INU IRA JIG K-231 Federal Republic of Germany Government Communications Head-Quarters [British SIGINT Agency] German Democratic Republic Soviet security and intelligence service (within NKVD, 1922-3) Soviet Military Intelligence Soviet security and intelligence service (within NKVD, 1943-43) Labour Camps Directorate intelligence from human sources (espionage) GDR foreign intelligence service intercontinental ballistic missile imagery intelligence foreign intelligence department of Cheka/GPU/OGPU/ GUGB, 1 920- 1941; predecessor of INU foreign intelligence directorate of NKGB/GUGB/MGB, 1941-54; predecessor ofFCD Irish Republican Army Joint Intelligence Committee [UK] club of former political prisoners jailed under Article 23 1 of the Czechoslovak criminal code KAN KGB KHAD KI KKE KKE-es KOR KPO KRLine LLB MGB MGIMO MI5 MI6 MOR NLine Club of Non-Party Activists [Czechoslovakia] Soviet security and intelligence service (1954- 1991) Afghan security service Soviet foreign intelligence agency, initially combining foreign intelligence directorates of MGB and GRU (1947-51) Greek Communist Party breakaway Eurocommunist Greek Communist Party Workers Defence Committee [Poland] Austrian Communist Party Counter-intelligence department in KGB residencies live letter box Soviet Ministry of State Security (1946-54) Moscow State Institute for International Relations British security service alternative designation for SIS [UK] Monarchist Association of Central Russia (“The Trust”) Illegal support department in KGB residencies NATO NKGB NKVD NSA NSC NSZRiS NTS Okhrana OMS OSS OT OUN OZNA PCF PCI PCP PFLP PIDE North Atlantic Treaty Organization People’s Commisariat for State Security (Soviet security and intelligence service, 1941 and 1943-6) People’s Commisariat for Internal Affairs (incorporated state security, 1922-3, 1934-43) National Security [SIGINT] Agency [USA] National Security Council [USA] People’s [anti-Bolshevik] Union for Defence of Country and Freedom National Labour Alliance (Soviet emigre social-democratic movement) Tsarist security service, 1881-1917 Comintern International Liaison Department Office of Strategic Services [USA] Operational Technical Support (LCD) Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists Yugoslav security and intelligence service French Communist Party Italian Communist Party Portuguese Communist Party Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Portuguese Liberation Organization PLO POUM PR Line PSOE PUWP RCMP ROVS RYAN SALT SAM SB SCD SDECE SDI SED SIGINT SIS SK Line SKP Palestine Liberation Organization Workers Unification Party (Spanish Marxist Trotskyist Party in 1930s) political intelligence department in KGB residences Spanish Socialist Party Polish United Workers [Communist] Party Royal Canadian Mounted Police [White] Russian Combined Services Union Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie (Nuclear Missile Attack) Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Soviet surface-to-air missile Polish Security and intelligence service Second Chief [Internal Security and Counter- Intelligence] Directorate, KGB French foreign intelligence service; predecessor of DGSE Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars’) Socialist Unity [Communist] Party [GDR] intelligence derived from interception and analysis of signals Secret Intelligence Service [UK] Soviet colony department in KGB residencies Communist Party of Finland SOE SPD Spetsnaz SR S&T Stapo Stasi Stavka StB SVR TUC UAR UB UDBA VPK VVR WCC WPC XLine Special Operations Executive [UK] Social Democratic Party [ERG] Soviet special forces Socialist Revolutionary scientific and technological intelligence Austrian police security service GDR Ministry of State Security Wartime Soviet GHQ/high command Czechoslovak security and intelligence service Russian (post-Soviet) foreign intelligence service Trades Union Congress [UK] United Arab Republic Polish security and intelligence service; predecessor of SB Yugoslav security and intelligence service; successor to OZNA Soviet Military Industrial Commission Supreme Military Council [anti-Bolshevik Ukranian underground] World Council of Churches World Peace Council S&T department in KGB residencies THE EVOLUTION OF THE KGB, 1917- 1991 December 19 17 Cheka i February 1922 Jncor^so-rared iuTO NKVD (a$ GPU) 4 July 1923 OGPU i July 1934 Reiacorporaced hi NKVD (as GUGB) 4 Febmar)' 1941 NKGB 4 July 1941 Rehicorporaccd hi NKVD (as. GUGB) 4 April 1943 NKGB 4 March 1946 MGB 4 October 1947- Noven^ber 1951 Foreign Intelligence trail sfertcd to KI 4 March 1953 Combined with M\TD to tbrin enlarged M\'T) 4 March 1954 KGB The term KGB is used both generally to denote the Soviet State Security organisation throughout its history since its foundation as the Cheka in 1917 and, more specifically, to refer to State Security after 1954 when it took its final name. THE TRANSLITERATION OF RUSSIAN NAMES We have followed a simplified version of the method used by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names and BBC Monitering Service. Simplifications include the substitution of “y” for “iy” in surnames (Trotsky rather than Trotskiy) and of “i” for “iy” in first names (Yuri rather than Yuriy). The “y” between the letters “i” and/or “e” is omitted (for example, Andreev and Dmitrievich — not Andreyev and Dmitriyevich), as is the apostrophe used to signify a soft sign. In cases where a mildly deviant English version of a well-known Russian name has become firmly established, we have retained that version, for example: Beria, Evdokia (Petrova), Izvestia, Joseph (Stalin), Khrushchev, Nureyev and the names of Tsars. FOREWORD I have written this book in consultation with Vasili Mitrokhin, based on the extensive top secret material (described in Chapter 1) which he has smuggled out from the KGB foreign intelligence archive. For the past quarter of a century, Mitrokhin has passionately wanted this material, which for twelve years he risked his life to assemble, to see the light of day. He wished to reveal “how thin the thread of peace actually was during the Cold War.” From that passion this book has been bom. I have felt it my duty to ensure that this material, which offers detailed and often unique insights into the workings of the Soviet State and the history of the Soviet Union, achieves the level of public awareness and recognition that it deserves. Like all archives, those of the KGB require interpretation in the light of previous research and related documents. The end notes and bibliography provide full details of the additional sources used to place Mitrokhin’ s revelations in historical context. These sources also provide overwhelming corroborative evidence for his genuineness as a source. Codenames (also known as “worknames” in the case of KGB officers) appear in the text in capitals. Many KGB codenames were used more than once. In such cases, the text and index make clear which individual is referred to. It is also important to note that, although certain individuals were targeted by the KGB, and may have been given codenames, this does not mean that the persons named were conscious or witting agents or sources — or even that they were aware that they were being targeted for recruitment or political influence operations. Similarly, the fact that an individual may have endorsed a position that was favorable to the Soviet Union does not necessarily mean that this person was working as an agent, or agent of influence, for the KGB. The KGB frequently gave prominent policymakers codenames in order to protect the identity of their targets, and to order recruited KGB agents to target such individuals. For legal reasons, some of the Soviet agents identified in KGB files can be referred to in this book only by their codenames. In a limited number of cases, chiefly because of the risk of prejudicing a possible prosecution, no reference can be made to them at all. These omissions do not, so far as I am aware, significantly affect the main conclusions of any chapter. Christopher Andrew INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION On October 17, 1995, 1 was invited to the post-modem London headquarters of the Secret Intelligence Service (better known as SIS or MI6) at Vauxhall Cross on the banks of the Thames to be briefed on one of the most remarkable intelligence coups of the late twentieth century. SIS told me how in 1992 it had exfiltrated from Russia a retired senior KGB archivist, Vasili Mitrokhin, his family and six large cases of top-secret material from the KGB’s foreign intelligence archive. Mitrokhin ’s staggering feat in noting KGB files almost every working day for a period of twelve years and smuggling his notes out of its foreign intelligence headquarters at enormous personal risk is probably unique in intelligence history. When I first saw Mitrokhin’ s archive a few weeks after the briefing, both its scope and secrecy took my breath away. It contained important new material on KGB operations around the world. The only European countries absent from the archive were the pocket states of Andorra, Monaco and Liechtenstein. (There was, however, some interesting material on San Marino.) It was clear that Mitrokhin had had access to even the most highly classified KGB files - among them those which gave the real identities and “legends” of the Soviet “illegals” living under deep cover abroad disguised as foreign nationals.- Soon after my first examination of the archive, I met Vasili Mitrokhin over tea in a conference room at SIS headquarters and discussed collaborating with him in a history based on his material. Mitrokhin said little about himself Indeed it later required some persuasion to convince him that it was worth including his own story at the beginning of our book. But Mitrokhin was passionate about his archive and anxious that as much of it as possible be used to expose the record of the KGB. Early in 1996 Mitrokhin and his family paid their first visit to Cambridge University, where I am Professor of Modem and Contemporary History. I met them outside the Porters’ Lodge at Corpus Christi College, of which I’m a Fellow, and we had lunch together in a private room overlooking the medieval Old Court (the oldest complete court in Cambridge). After lunch we went to the College Hall to look at what is believed to be the only surviving portrait of the College’s first spy and greatest writer - the Elizabethan dramatist Christopher Marlowe, who had been killed in a pub brawl in 1593 at the age of only twenty-nine, probably while working for the secret service of Queen Elizabeth I. Then we walked along the Backs through King’s and Clare colleges to visit Trinity and Trinity Hall, the colleges of the KGB’s best-known British recmits, the “Magnificent Five,” some of whose files Mitrokhin had noted.- Mitrokhin had long ago mastered the art of being inconspicuous. The friends and colleagues whom we met as we walked round Cambridge did not give him a second glance. In March 1996 the then Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, gave approval in principle (later confirmed by his successor, Robin Cook) for me to write a book based on Mitrokhin’s extraordinary archive.- For the next three and a half years, because the archive was still classified, I was able to discuss none of it with colleagues in Corpus Christi College and the Cambridge History Faculty-or even to reveal the nature of the book that I was writing. In Britain at least, the secret of the Mitrokhin archive was remarkably well kept. Until The Mitrokhin Archive went to the publishers, who also successfully avoided leaks, the secret was known, outside the intelligence community, only to a small number of senior ministers and civil servants. Tony Blair was first briefed on Mitrokhin while Leader of the Opposition in January 1995. Three years later, as Prime Minister, he endorsed the publication project.- The secret of the Mitrokhin archive was less rigorously preserved by some of Britain’s allies. But though there were a few partial leaks by foreign governments and intelligence agencies which had been given access to parts of the archive, none had much resonance in Britain. In December 1998, I received out of the blue a phone call from a German journalist who had discovered both the codename by which Mitrokhin was known in Germany and the contents of some fragments of Mitrokhin’s German material. He told me he knew I was completing a first volume based on the Mitrokhin archive and had already planned a second. For the next few months I expected the story to break in the British press. Somewhat to my surprise, it did not do so. On Saturday, September 11, 1999, after three and a half years of secrecy and silence. The Mitrokhin Archive suddenly became front-page news when serialization began in The Times. Between Friday night and Saturday morning I moved from a long period in which I had not talked at all about The Mitrokhin Archive in public to a month in which I seemed to talk about little else. Unsurprisingly, the revelations which captured media attention were human-interest stories about Soviet spies in Britain rather than the more important but less parochial disclosures about KGB operations against NATO as a whole and against democratic dissent within the Soviet Bloc. Hitherto the media stereotype of a major Soviet spy in Britain, modeled on Kim Philby and his friends, had been of a bright but subversive Cambridge graduate, preferably from a good public school and with an exotic sex life. In September 1999 the stereotype changed almost overnight with Mitrokhin’s unmasking of Melita Norwood, an 87-year-old great-grandmother from Bexleyheath memorably described by The Times as “The Spy Who Came In from the Co-op” (where, for ideological reasons, she does most of her shopping), as the longest-serving of all Soviet spies in Britain. A Times reporter was with Mrs. Norwood early on the morning of September 11 as she listened to John Humphrys on the Today program first recount some of the contents of her KGB file noted by Mitrokhin, then interview myself and Ann Widdecombe. “Oh dear!” she told the Times reporter. “This is all so different from my quiet little life. I thought I’d got away with it. But I’m not that surprised it’s finally come out.” Within a few hours, a media scrum had gathered expectantly outside Mrs. Norwood’s end-of- terrace house, interviewing friends and neighbours about how she drank tea from a Che Guevara mug, put “Stop Trident” posters in her window, sold home-made chutney in aid of Cuban support groups, and delivered more than thirty copies of the Morning Star every Saturday morning to veterans of the Bexleyheath Old Left. Mrs. Norwood behaved with extraordinary composure when she emerged later in the day to face the media for the first time in her life. The image of the greatgranny spy walking down her garden path between well-tended rose bushes to make a confession of sorts to a large crowd of reporters caught the imagination of millions of television viewers and newspaper-readers. “I’m 87 and unfortunately my memory is not what it was,” Mrs. Norwood began. “I did what I did not to make money but to help prevent the defeat of a new system which had, at great cost, given ordinary people food and fares which they could afford, given them education and a health service.” As well as being a media sensation, Mrs. Norwood’s guarded public confession was a remarkable historical document. What had captured her imagination before the Second World War, like that of most other Soviet agents of the time, was not the brutal reality of Stalin’s Russia but the idealistic myth- image of the world’s first worker- peasant state which had abolished unemployment and for the first time enabled working people to realize their full potential - the “new system” nostalgically recalled by Mrs. Norwood when she spoke to reporters. In the mid 1930s that myth-image was so powerful that, for true believers who, unlike Melita Simis (as she then was), were able to go on pilgrimage to the Soviet Union, it survived even the contrary evidence of their own eyes. Malcolm Muggeridge, probably the best of the British journalists then in Moscow, later wrote of the British pilgrims he encountered: Their delight in all they saw and were told, and the expression they gave to that delight, constitute unquestionably one of the wonders of our age. There were earnest advocates of the humane killing of cattle who looked up at the massive headquarters of the OGPU [later the KGB] with tears of gratitude in their eyes, earnest advocates of proportional representation who eagerly assented when the necessity for a Dictatorship of the Proletariat was explained to them, earnest clergymen who reverently turned the pages of atheistic literature, earnest pacifists who watched delightedly tanks rattle across Red Square and bombing planes darken the sky, earnest town-planning specialists who stood outside overcrowded ramshackle tenements and muttered: “If only we had something like this in England!” The almost unbelievable credulity of these mostly university educated tourists astounded even Soviet officials used to handling foreign visitors... - When Melita Simis became a Soviet agent in 1937, the Soviet Union was in the midst of the Great Terror - the greatest peacetime persecution in modem European history.- Mrs. Norwood, however, still does not seem to grasp the depravity of the Stalinist regime into whose service she entered. “Old Joe [Stalin],” she acknowledges, “wasn’t a hundred percent, but then the people around him might have been making things awkward, as folks do.” At the end of her press statement, she was asked if she had any regrets about her career as a Soviet agent. “No,” she replied, then went back inside her house. In another interview she declared, “I would do everything again. - Another former Soviet spy identified in The Mitrokhin Archive who made front-page news in Britain was ex- Detective Sergeant John Symonds. Like Norwood, Symonds gave a number of interviews. Symonds confessed to being, as Mitrokhin’s notes reveal, probably the first British “Romeo spy” recruited by the KGB. He said that he had admitted as much almost twenty years earlier to MI5 and Scotland Yard but had been disbelieved. Though Mitrokhin’s notes give no statistics of the number of women seduced by Symonds during his career as a KGB illegal, Symonds claims that there were “hundreds” of them. Initially the KGB decided that his sexual technique was deficient and, to his delight, sent “two extremely beautiful girls” to act as his instructors. Symonds ’s recollection of his subsequent career as a Romeo spy is rather rosier than suggested by his KGB file: I just had a nice life. I’d say join the KGB, see the world - first class. I went all over the world on these jobs and I had a marvellous time. I stayed in the best hotels, I visited all the best beaches. I’ve had access to beautiful women, unlimited food, champagne, caviar, whatever you like, and I had a wonderful time. That was my KGB experience. “The only people I hurt,” Symonds now claims, “was the Metropolitan Police.”- Many of the women he seduced on KGB instructions would doubtless disagree. Media reaction to Mitrokhin’s revelations was as parochial in most other countries as it was in Britain. The public appeal of the Russian agents identified by Mitrokhin is curiously similar to that of Olympic medal- winners. In espionage as in athletics, most of the world’s media are interested first and foremost in the exploits of their own nationals. The human- interest stories which aroused most interest in the United States were probably the KGB “active measures” designed to discredit the long-serving Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, and the great civil rights leader Martin Luther King. The KGB was among the first to spread stories that Hoover was a predatory homosexual. King, whom the KGB feared might avert the race war it hoped would be ignited by the long hot summers which began in 1965, was probably the only American to be the target of both KGB and FBI active measures. The topic in The Mitrokhin Archive (published in the USA as The Sword and the Shield) which attracted most attention in Congress concerned KGB preparations for sabotage operations against American targets during the Cold War. On October 26, 1999, I gave televised testimony on these preparations to a packed hearing of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Mitrokhin’ s material identifies the approximate locations of a number of the secret sites in the United States selected for KGB arms and radio caches for use in sabotage operations. On present evidence, it is impossible to estimate the number of these caches which were put in place. However, the former KGB general Oleg Kalugin, who was stationed in New York and Washington during the 1960s and early 1970s, has confirmed the existence of some KGB arms caches in the United States.- As in Europe, some caches were probably booby-trapped and may now be in a dangerous condition. For reasons of public safety. The Mitrokhin Archive gave no clues to the location of any of the American sites selected for KGB arms caches. ABC TV News, however, revealed that one of the sites is located in the region of Brainerd, Minnesota.— Later press reports, citing “congressional sources,” claimed that the FBI had carried out a search of the Brainerd area.— In western Europe, The Mitrokhin Archive generated more front-page stories in Italy than it did even in Britain - though almost all the stories, unsurprisingly, were on Italian topics. In October 1999 an Italian parliamentary committee released 645 pages of reports (codenamed IMPEDIAN) on the Italians mentioned in the Mitrokhin archive which had been supplied several years earlier by SIS to Italian intelligence. Most KGB contacts were identified in the reports by name as well as codename. The Italian Foreign Ministry was said to be investigating the cases of thirty employees referred to in Mitrokhin ’s notes. Much of the furore aroused by The Mitrokhin Archive in Italy, however, consisted of a revival of Cold War points-scoring which produced more political heat than historical light. Opponents of the government headed by the former Communist Massimo D’Alema seized on the references to Armando Cossutta, leader of the Communist PDCI which was represented in D’Alema’s coalition government. The Left retaliated by pointing to the identification in an IMPEDIAN report of a senator of the right-wing Forza Italia. The debate became further confused by conspiracy theorists on both right and left. A cartoon in La Repubblica, which D’Alema denounced as libellous, showed him blanking out a series of (presumably left-wing) names from the IMPEDIAN reports before their release. L 'Unitd, by contrast, claimed that left-wing ministers were increasingly convinced that the reports were the result of a plot by MI5 (which it apparently confused with SIS): “What has arrived is not a dossier from the KGB but one about the KGB constructed by British counter-espionage agents based on the confession of an ex-agent, if there is one, and ‘Mitrokhin’ is just a codename for an MI5 operation.”— The political controversy provoked in Britain by the publication of The Mitrokhin Archive centred chiefly on the behaviour of ministers and the intelligence community. Why, it was asked, had Melita Norwood not been prosecuted when her treachery had been known at least since Mitrokhin’s defection in 1992? And why had ministers not been better briefed about her and other traitors identified in the Mitrokhin archive by the intelligence and security agencies? It emerged, to my surprise, that I had known about the Norwood case for considerably longer than either the Home Secretary or the Prime Minister. Jack Straw was informed in December 1998 that Mitrokhin’s information might lead to the prosecution of “an 86-year-old woman who spied for the KGB forty years ago,” but was not told her identity until some months later. Tony Blair was not briefed about Mrs. Norwood until shortly before her name appeared on the front page of The Times.— The failure to prosecute Mrs. Norwood combined with the delays in briefing ministers aroused deep suspicion in some of the media. The Express denounced “an appalling culture of cover-ups and incompetence in Britain’s secret services.” The Guardian suspected an MI5 plot: We need to know whether Melita Norwood made a deal with the security services. Remember Blunt.— Was the decision not to prosecute her based on compassion, or a desire to cover up security service incompetence? Less than a decade earlier there would have been no mechanism for investigating these charges capable of inspiring public and parliamentary confidence. Until 1992 successive British governments refused even to admit SIS’s existence on the extraordinary, though traditional, grounds that such an admission would put national security at risk. Had SIS still been officially taboo seven years later, no official inquiry could possibly have produced a credible public report on the handling of the Mitrokhin archive. In 1999, however, there was an obvious body to conduct an inquiry: the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), established under the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 to examine “the expenditure, administration and policy” of the intelligence and security agencies. Since it began work in 1994, the ISC has been a largely unsung success story.— Though not technically a parliamentary committee, since it reports to Parliament only through the Prime Minister, eight of its nine members are MPs. (The ninth is a member of the House of Lords.) Under the chairmanship of the former Conservative Defense Secretary, Tom King, its membership spans the political spectrum. Its founder members included Dale Campbell-Savours, previously a leading Labour critic of the intelligence community, who still serves on it. Largely because its members have failed either to divide on party lines and fall out among themselves or to find evidence of major intelligence abuses, the ISC has attracted relatively little media attention. Its generally positive reports on the performance of the intelligence community, however, have inevitably been dismissed by some conspiracy theorists as evidence of a cover-up. On Monday, September 13, 1999, only two days after The Times had begun serialization of The Mitrokhin Archive, Jack Straw announced in a statement to the Commons that the ISC had been asked to conduct an inquiry into “the policies and procedures adopted within the Security and Intelligence Agencies for the handling of the information supplied by Mr Mitrokhin.” Over the next nine months the ISC heard evidence from Jack Straw, Robin Cook and four former Conservative ministers, from the heads and other senior officers of MI5 and SIS, from the previous head of MI5, and from the Cabinet Secretary, Permanent Under Secretaries at the Home and Foreign Offices and other officials. Among the final witnesses were Mitrokhin and myself, who gave evidence to the ISC in the Cabinet Office at 70 Whitehall one after the other on the morning of March 8, 2000. While writing The Mitrokhin Archive, I had wrongly assumed that the Committee had been informed about the project. Some of the confusion which followed publication might well have been avoided if the ISC had been properly briefed well beforehand. The ISC report in June 2000 identified a series of administrative errors which, as usual in Whitehall, had more to do with cock-up than with conspiracy. The first “serious failure” identified by the ISC was the failure of the Security Service to refer the case of Mrs. Norwood to the Law Officers in 1993: This failure... resulted in the decision whether or not to prosecute Mrs. Norwood effectively being taken by the Security Service. The Committee is concerned that the Service used public interest reasons to justify taking no further action against Mrs. Norwood, when this was for the Law Officers to decide. We also believe that the failure of the Security Service to interview Mrs. Norwood at this time prevented her possible prosecution. For the next five years, owing to “a further serious failure by the Security Service,” the Norwood case “slipped out of sight.”— MI5 may not deserve a great deal of sympathy for its oversight, but it does deserve some. The first priority of any security service are actual, followed by potential, threats. Among the mass of material provided by Mitrokhin in 1992, the case of the eighty-year-old Mrs. Norwood, who had last been in contact with the KGB over a decade earlier and no longer posed any conceivable danger to national security, must have seemed a very low priority - particularly given the strain on MI5’s resources caused by cutbacks at the end of the Cold War and the threat from Irish terrorist groups. Arguably, however, MI5 underestimated Mrs. Norwood’s past importance. In evidence to the ISC, the Security Service concluded that her “value as an atom spy to the scientists who constructed the Soviet bomb must have been, at most, marginal.”— That was not the view of the NKGB (as the KGB was then known) in the final months of the Second World War. In March 1945 it described the atomic intelligence she had provided as “of great interest and a valuable contribution to the development of work in this field.”— Though Mrs. Norwood was not, of course, an atom spy in the same class as Ted Hall and Klaus Fuchs, both of whom provided intelligence from inside the main nuclear laboratory at Los Alamos, the NKGB and the Soviet scientists with whom it was in close touch plainly regarded her intelligence as somewhat better than “marginal.” The intelligence she was able to provide on uranium fuel cladding and post-irradiation corrosion resistance was probably applicable to weapons development as well as to the construction of nuclear reactors.— Until the final months of the War, the NKGB rated the atomic intelligence obtained in Britain almost as highly as that from the United States.— As Jack Straw told the Commons when announcing the ISC inquiry, “There is no reason to doubt... that the KGB regarded Mrs. Norwood as an important spy.” Nor is there reason to doubt that she was both the KGB’s longest- serving British agent and its most important female British spy. From early in her career, the KGB had high expectations of her. It maintained contact with her in 1938-39 at a time when the shortage of foreign intelligence officers, many of whom were executed during the Terror, led it to lose touch with many other agents - including some of the Magnificent Five. Since the publication of The Mitrokhin Archive, Viktor Oshchenko, a former senior officer in the KGB scientific and technological intelligence (S&T) directorate, has kindly given me his recollections of the Norwood case. While stationed at the London residency in 1975, Oshchenko recruited Michael Smith, the KGB’s most important British S&T agent during the later Cold War.— He remembers Mrs. Norwood’s career as a Soviet agent as “a legendary case in the annals of the KGB - an important, determined and very valuable agent,” and was deeply impressed both by her ideological commitment and by her remarkable access to her boss’s papers. Among the intelligence which Oshchenko believes Mrs. Norwood supplied were “valuable papers relating to the materials involved in missile production.”— Details of the use made of Mrs. Norwood’s intelligence within the Soviet Union, however, remain scarce. Mitrokhin’s notes from her file, though giving precise information on Mrs. Norwood’s controllers and other operational matters, give little indication of the doubtless complex intelligence she supplied in the course of her long career as a Soviet agent. It is highly unlikely that the SVR will reveal any details of this intelligence until after Mrs. Norwood’s death. As well as criticizing MI5 for allowing the Norwood case to “slip out of sight,” the ISC also considered it “a serious failure of the Security Service not to refer Mr. Symonds’ case to the Law Officers in mid- 1993.” This too was plainly the result of cock-up rather than conspiracy - probably somewhere in MI5’s middle management. Even the Director-General of the Security Service from 1992 to 1996, Stella Rimington, was not informed by her staff of either the Norwood or the Symonds case, and was thus unable to brief Michael Howard, Home Secretary in the Major government, and his Permanent Under Secretary. Further confusion arose as a result of the fact that the “interdepartmental working group” in Whitehall responsible for monitoring the progress of the publication project was itself “unaware of the significance of [Mitrokhin’s] UK material until late 1998.”— My own direct contact with the working group was limited to an enjoyable lunch with its Chairman shortly before Christmas 1998. I was asked, when giving evidence to the ISC, whether, while writing The Mitrokhin Archive, I would have liked greater contact with the group. I would indeed. The ISC’s Mitrokhin inquiry found much to praise as well as criticize: Carrying the initial contact with Mr. Mitrokhin right through to his and his family’s successful exfiltration together with all his material represents a major achievement by SIS. In addition the management of the material and its dissemination, as appropriate, to foreign liaison [intelligence] services was well handled. The Committee wish to pay tribute to this outstanding piece of intelligence work.— I was heartened by the ISC’s endorsement of the 1996 decision to authorize me to write The Mitrokhin Archive in collaboration with Mitrokhin, as well as by the Committee’s conclusion (which I hope it is not too immodest to quote) that the book is “of tremendous value, as it gives a real insight into the KGB’s work and the persecution of the dissidents.”— The ISC’s greatest praise was, quite rightly, reserved for Vasili Mitrokhin: The Committee believes that he is a man of remarkable commitment and courage, who risked imprisonment or death in his determination that the truth should be told about the real nature of the KGB and their activities, which he believed were betraying the interests of his own country and people. He succeeded in this, and we wish to record formally our admiration for his achievement. The ISC report regrets that “poor media handling [presumably by Whitehall] of the publication of The Mitrokhin Archive, which allowed the emphasis to fall on the UK spies, detracted from the brave work of Mr. Mitrokhin and the importance of the revelations about the KGB’s work he wanted to expose.”— In the initial media coverage, there was little mention of the fact that vastly more of the book is devoted to the KGB’s war against the dissidents and its attempts to stifle dissent throughout the Soviet Bloc than to the careers of Melita Norwood and John Symonds. The chief problem in understanding both Mitrokhin and his archive, which was evident in much of the media coverage, is that neither is truly comprehensible in Western terms. The very notion of the hero, familiar to all other cultures and all previous Western generations, arouses greater scepticism in the early twenty- first century West than at any other time or place in recorded history. For those whose imaginations have been corroded by the cynicism of the age, the idea that Mitrokhin was willing to risk his life for twenty years for a cause in which he passionately believed is almost too difficult to grasp. Almost equally hard to comprehend is Mitrokhin’ s willingness to devote himself throughout that period to compiling and preserving a secret archive which he knew might never see the light of day. For any Western author it is almost impossible to understand how a writer could devote all his or her energy and creative talent for many years to secret writing which might never be publicly revealed. Yet, as Chapter 1 seeks to show, some of the greatest Russian writers of the Soviet era did precisely that.— No biography of any Western writer contains any death-bed scene comparable to the description by the widow of Mikhail Bulgakov of how she helped him out of bed for the last time so that he could satisfy himself before he died that his great, unpublished masterpiece. The Master and Margarita, arguably the greatest novel of the twentieth century, was still in its hiding place. The Master and Margarita survived to be published a quarter of a century later. It is a sobering thought, however, that for every forbidden masterpiece of the Soviet era which survives, there must be a larger number which have failed to survive or which, even now, are mouldering in their forgotten hiding places - as the Mitrokhin archive might well have done if Mitrokhin and SIS had not succeeded in removing it to Britain. The Mitrokhin archive is no more comprehensible in purely Western terms than Mitrokhin himself. The commonest error in interpreting the KGB is to suppose that it was roughly equivalent to its main Western rivals. There were, of course, similarities in the operational techniques employed by intelligence agencies in East and West, as well as in the importance which each side attached to the other as an intelligence target. The fundamental difference between the Soviet one-party state and the Western democracies, however, was reflected in fundamental differences between their intelligence communities. The differences were greatest in the Stalinist era. At the outbreak of the Second World War, Stalin regarded the NKVD’s pursuit in Mexico of the great, though harmless, heretic, Leon Trotsky, as a higher priority than collecting intelligence on Adolf Hitler. In the middle of the War, the paranoid strain which regularly distorted Soviet intelligence assessment persuaded Soviet intelligence chiefs - and no doubt Stalin himself - that the Magnificent Five, probably its ablest group of foreign agents, were part of a gigantic British intelligence deception. During his final years Stalin was sometimes obsessed with the hunting down of often imaginary Titoists and Zionists. His chief foreign policy objective at the end of his life may well have been the plan for an MGB (later KGB) illegal to assassinate Marshal Tito, who had succeeded Trotsky as the leading heretic of the Soviet Bloc. Stalin once called Lavrenti Beria, the most powerful of his intelligence chiefs, “my Himmler.” But there was no Western intelligence chief with whom Beria - or Himmler, the head of the SS - could be credibly compared. Even after Stalin’s death and Beria’ s execution in 1953, there remained basic differences between intelligence priorities in East and West. Perhaps the simplest way of judging whether any intelligence report is of critical importance is to ask the question: If it arrives in the middle of the night would you wake the relevant government minister? The answer to that question in Moscow was often quite different from that in Western capitals. On October 27, 1978, for example, the KGB resident in Oslo, Leonid Makarov, rang Mikhail Suslov, the member of the Politburo chiefly responsible for ideological purity, in the early hours. Why? Not to tell him that some great international crisis was about to break but to report that the Russian dissident Yuri Orlov had failed to win the Nobel Peace Prize. The Oslo residency was warmly congratulated for its supposed “operational effectiveness” in achieving this entirely predictable result.— It is simply not possible to imagine any Western minister being woken for any comparable reason. The KGB’s domestic obsession with the detection and suppression of “ideological subversion” spilled over into its foreign operations. It sought to impress the Party leadership by its zeal in discrediting dissidents abroad as well as at home. In the summer of 1978 the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) and Fifth (Ideological Subversion) Directorates jointly arranged the secret screening in Moscow to an audience of KGB and Party notables of the commencement address by the dissident writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn at Harvard University. The purpose of this extraordinary (by Western standards) evening was to seek to demonstrate that, thanks to the efforts of the KGB, Solzhenitsyn was now a largely discredited figure in the United States.— The KGB’s mission to discredit dissidents who had emigrated to the West extended even to dissident ballet dancers, musicians and chess players. For Western media used to interpreting the secret Cold War in terms of spy versus spy, Mitrokhin’s material on the KGB’s war against ideological subversion, unlike the revelations about individual spies, had little interest. There was, predictably, greater interest in this material in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc - reflected, for example, in the number of translations of The Mitrokhin Archive into Eastern European languages. The priority given by the KGB to maintaining the ideological orthodoxy of the Soviet Bloc was reflected by the fact that it deployed more of its elite group of illegals to Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968 than, so far as is known, were ever used in any operation against a Western target. The Cold War chapters of The Mitrokhin Archive give equal weight to KGB operations against the United States and to those against ideological subversion. Mitrokhin smuggled out of the KGB foreign intelligence headquarters important material on operations against some of the leaders of the struggle for democracy within the Soviet Bloc whose extraordinary moral courage eventually prevailed over the immense coercive force of the KGB and its allies. Two examples stand out. The first is the great Russian dissident and nuclear scientist Andrei Sakharov, dubbed “Public Enemy Number One” by Yuri Andropov (successively KGB Chairman and Soviet leader), who survived persecution and internal exile by the KGB to become, in Gorbachev’s words, “unquestionably the most outstanding personality” at the 1989 Congress of People’s Soviets. One of the most striking visual images of the crumbling of the Soviet system, which deserves to be as well known as the destruction of the Berlin Wall, is of Gorbachev and other members of the Politburo standing bareheaded by Sakharov’s open coffin after his sudden death in December 1989. The second outstanding case is that of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, Archbishop of Krakow, whom the KGB seems to have identified in the early 1970s as its most dangerous opponent in the Soviet Bloc. Wojtyla, however, was protected by his moral authority and eminence. The KGB, like the Polish SB, shrank from the immense public outcry which his arrest would provoke. Seen in hindsight, Wojtyla’ s election in 1978 as Pope John Paul II marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Bloc. Though the Polish problem was, with difficulty, contained for the next decade, it could not be resolved. The organization which has studied The Mitrokhin Archive with the closest attention since its publication is the SVR, which is deeply concerned by its contents. No intelligence agency can expect either to recruit new agents or to maintain the loyalty of its existing agents unless it can convince them that it can keep their secrets indefinitely. The SVR is now ill-placed to do so. Thanks to Mitrokhin, no one who spied for the Soviet Union at any period between the October Revolution and the eve of the Gorbachev era can now be confident that his or her secrets are still secure. Mitrokhin’ s material also contains information on Cold War operations conducted by the current head of the SVR, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, and other former senior KGB officers. Volume Two will contain a chapter on KGB activities in India, where Trubnikov made his reputation. If the past secrets of the SVR leadership have proved insecure, SVR agents may well conclude that theirs are also. From the moment the Mitrokhin archive arrived in Britain, SIS realized that its contents were “of exceptional counter-intelligence significance, not only illuminating past KGB activity against Western countries but also promising to nullify many of Russia’s current assets.” The CIA similarly found the archive “the biggest Cl [counter- intelligence] bonanza of the post-war period.” The FBI agreed. As the ISC report reveals, other Western intelligence agencies have also been “extremely grateful” for the numerous Cl leads provided by the Mitrokhin archive.— Some insight into the turmoil inside the SVR which must have been provoked by the publication of The Mitrokhin Archive is provided by the file (noted by Mitrokhin) on the book on the KGB published by the American journalist John Barron a quarter of a century ago. KGB headquarters ordered no fewer than 370 reports in an attempt to assess the damage to its interests caused by various sections of Barron’s book.— Mitrokhin’ s revelations have doubtless led to even more damage assessments than Barron’s. There is already unattributable evidence of efforts by the SVR to ensure that no archivist ever again has the unrestricted access to files enjoyed by Mitrokhin. Like the KGB First Chief Directorate, the SVR contains an “active measures” section. Department MS, specializing in disinformation, which was inevitably instructed to try to undermine the credibility of The Mitrokhin Archive?^ On two occasions since the publication of the book, it has sent apparent Russian defectors to Western intelligence agencies, each with the same story about The Mitrokhin Archive. The SVR, claimed the “defectors,” had decided on a massive clear- out of redundant and retired agents which it had inherited from the KGB, and had therefore chosen a retired KGB archivist - Vasili Mitrokhin - to transmit their names to the West.— This poorly conceived active measure proved counter-productive for two reasons. First, a series of Western intelligence agencies had already been able to establish that Mitrokhin ’s material was far too valuable to them for the SVR to have willingly made it available. Secondly, both the bogus “defectors” were quickly and conclusively exposed as SVR plants. The whole episode has merely served to underline the SVR’s deep anxiety at the damage to its agent operations caused by Mitrokhin’ s material. Its mood will not have been lightened by the knowledge that there are many more revelations still to come in Volume Two. Mitrokhin’ s ambition - unchanged for almost thirty years - remains to publish as much as possible of the top-secret material which he risked his life to collect. NOTES 1 By the time I gained access to the archive, the greater part had been translated and carefully checked by SIS officers working in close collaboration with Mitrokhin. The Security Service and US intelligence officers also assisted in the translation. The translated archive was made available to me in an SIS office both in hard copy and on a computer database with sophisticated indexing and search software. While I was writing the book, Mitrokhin worked three days a week with an SIS officer completing the translation and checking process. 2 On the Magnificent Five, see below. Chapter 4. 3 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, Cm 4764, June 13, 2000, pp. 44-5, 47. The authorization doubtless had something to do with the fact that I had earlier written a KGB history and edited two volumes of KGB documents (listed in the Bibliography) with Oleg Gordlevsky, a former KGB colonel who for eleven years had been one of the most important SIS agents of the Cold War. 4 Some details of the briefing of senior ministers and civil servants are given in Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, Annex E. 5 Hollander, Political Pilgrims, p. 102. 6 See below. Chapter 5. 7 David Rose, “‘I would do everything again,’ says the agent from suburbia,” Sunday Telegraph, September 12, 1999. While interviewing Mrs. Norwood on August 10 for a BBC2 documentary based on The Mitrokhin Archive, Rose had obtained the first confession that she had been a Soviet spy. 8 John Symonds (interviewed by David Rose), “I told you I was a spy,” Guardian (G2), September 14, 1999. Cf. below, pp. 559-63. 9 Interview with Oleg Kalugin on ABC Nightline, September 9, 1999. 10 ABC News report by John McWethy, September 9, 1999. 11 New York Post, 1 November 1999. Philadelphia Daily News, 8 November 1999. 12 For a selection of Italian newspaper articles, see: Dossier Stampa: L ’Affare Mitrokhin (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, Ufficia Stampa, October 22, 1999). Some of the IMPED IAN reports are published in the Italian edition of The Mitrokhin Archive: L ’Archivio Mitrokhin (Milan: Rizzoli, 1999), Appendix F. 13 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, pp. 48, 52-5. 14 In 1963, after a long investigation had failed to find enough usable evidence to secure a conviction, the Soviet spy Sir Anthony Blunt had been offered immunity from prosecution in return for a full confession (not a bargain he seems to have completely honoured). It was later alleged, on no adequate evidence, that the real reason for the decision not to prosecute had been an establishment or MI5 coverup. 15 In stating this conclusion, I should perhaps declare an interest. Since the late 1970s I had argued the case for the establishment of a parliamentary intelligence committee with roughly the role of the present Intelligence and Security Committee. (See, for example, the introduction to Andrew and Dilks [eds.]. Missing Dimension, and the conclusion to Andrew, Secret Service.) The proposal was initially given a frosty reception in Whitehall. 16 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report,^. 12. 17 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 69. 18 See below, p. 168. It is difficult to see how Mrs. Norwood could have provided atomic intelligence of such “great value” in March 1945 if, as claimed by Phillip Knightley, she did not return to work in the British Non- Ferrous Metals Research Association (BN-FMRA) after extended maternity leave until 1946 (Knightley, “Norwood: the spy who never was,” New Statesman, December 13, 1999). MI5 evidence to the ISC confirms that in 1945 Mrs. Norwood was secretary to the Chairman of the BN-FMRA (Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 67). 19 This is the view of a government scientist who prefers not to be identified. Precise details of the atomic intelligence provided by Mrs. Norwood are unavailable. Not until they have been carefully analyzed and compared with the other atomic intelligence obtained by Soviet intelligence will it be possible to form a final judgement on the importance of her role as an atom spy. Atomic intelligence provided by Mrs. Norwood after 1945 was irrelevant to the construction of the Soviet bomb which, thanks chiefly to Hall and Fuchs, was an exact replica of the American - not the British - bomb. It remained, however, of some significance. Probably the most important secret in post-war Britain - a secret so sensitive that Prime Minister Clement Attlee withheld it from most of his cabinet - concerned the construction of the British atomic bomb. Mrs. Norwood’s intelligence must have provided some insight into the highly classified progress of British atomic scientists. (See below, pp. 518-19.) 20 According to a file noted by Mitrokhin (vol. 7, ch. 2, item 19), up to November 1944 the NKGB obtained 1,167 documents on “nuclear secrets” from the USA and UK. Of these 88 from the USA and 79 from the UK were rated as “very valuable.” Mitrokhin’ s notes contain no similar statistics for the period after November 1944. Further atomic intelligence was received from the GRU. 21 See below, pp. 550-53, 567-8. 22 In 1992, while head of Line X (S&T) at the Paris residency, Oshchenko defected to Britain, where he now lives. 23 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, pp. 13, 20, 26. 24 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 4. 25 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, pp. 4, 16. The government’s response welcomed the ISC’s endorsement. 26 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 4. 27 See below, pp. 13-14. 28 See below, pp. 429-30. 29 See below, pp. 418-19. 30 Intelligence and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 4. 31 See below, p. 25. 32 The KGB had similarly sought to discredit Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story, after its publication in 1990, by claiming that its best-publicized revelation - the identification of John Cairncross as the “Fifth Man” and the first agent to provide warning of plans to build the atomic bomb - was wrong. The SVR now acknowledges that the identification was correct on both counts. 33 In devising this ill-advised active measure. Department MS may have been encouraged by the fact that two somewhat similar suggestions had surfaced independently in the Western media. A writer in Le Monde had suggested that “...The Mitrokhin archive operation was organized in Moscow either by an undisciplined Stalinist faction in the KGB or by the provisional leadership of the [intelligence] agencies between November 1991 and February 1992.” (“Voyages en memoire sovietique,” Le Monde, November 5, 1999.) In her review of The Mitrokhin Archive in The Times Literary Supplement (November 26, 1999), Dr. Amy Knight also could not “help but wonder whether [Mitrokhin] had a little help from his former employers in making known the KGB’s archival secrets.” “This,” she added, “is by no means a farfetched suggestion.” Dr. Knight’s earlier review of my book with Oleg Gordlevsky, KGB: The Inside Story, had included the eccentric suggestion that I might not have written the lengthy introduction {TLS, December 7, 1990). My own review of Dr. Knight’s book. Spies Without Cloaks, makes clear my respect for her research on Russian intelligence. There is, however, occasionally a mild element of conspiracy theory in her work - as evidenced, for example, by her suggestion in Spies Without Cloaks that Gorbachev was complicit in the attempted coup against him in August 1991. ONE THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE This book is based on unprecedented and unrestricted access to one of the world’s most secret and closely guarded archives — that of the foreign intelligence arm of the KGB, the First Chief Directorate (FCD). Hitherto the present Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki), has been supremely confident that a book such as this could not be written. When the German magazine Focus reported in December 1996 that a former KGB officer had defected to Britain with “the names of hundreds of Russian spies,” Tatyana Samolis, spokeswoman for the SVR, instantly ridiculed the whole story as “absolute nonsense.” “Hundreds of people! That just doesn’t happen!” she declared. “Any defector could get the name of one, two, perhaps three agents — but not hundreds!”^ The facts, however, are far more sensational even than the story dismissed as impossible by the SVR. The KGB defector had brought with him to Britain details not of a few hundred but of thousands of Soviet agents and intelligence officers in all parts of the globe, some of them “illegals” living under deep cover abroad, disguised as foreign citizens. No one who spied for the Soviet Union at any period between the October Revolution and the eve of the Gorbachev era can now be confident that his or her secrets are still secure. When the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) exfiltrated the defector and his family from Russia in 1992, it also brought out six cases containing the copious notes he had taken almost daily for twelve years, before his retirement in 1984, on top secret KGB files going as far back as 1918. The contents of the cases have since been described by the American FBI as “the most complete and extensive intelligence ever received from any source.” The KGB officer who assembled this extraordinary archive, Vasili Nikitich Mitrokhin, is now a British citizen. Bom in central Russia in 1922, he began his career as a Soviet foreign intelligence officer in 1948, at a time when the foreign intelligence arms of the MGB (the future KGB) and the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) were temporarily combined in the Committee of Information.^ By the time Mitrokhin was sent on his first foreign posting in 1952,^ the Committee had disintegrated and the MGB had resumed its traditional rivalry with the GRU. His first five years in intelligence were spent in the paranoid atmosphere generated by the final phase of Stalin’s dictatorship, when the intelligence agencies were ordered to conduct witch-hunts throughout the Soviet Bloc against mostly imaginary Titoist and Zionist conspiracies. In January 1953 the MGB was officially accused of “lack of vigilance” in hunting down the conspirators. The Soviet news agency Tass made the sensational announcement that for the past few years world Zionism and Western intelligence agencies had been conspiring with “a terrorist group” of Jewish doctors “to wipe out the leadership of the Soviet Union.” During the final two months of Stalin’s rule, the MGB struggled to demonstrate its heightened vigilance by pursuing the perpetrators of this non-existent plot. Its anti-Zionist campaign was, in reality, little more than a thinly disguised anti-Semitic pogrom. Shortly before Stalin’s sudden death in March 1953, Mitrokhin was ordered to investigate the alleged Zionist connections of the Pravda correspondent in Paris, Yuri Zhukov, who had come under suspicion because of his wife’s Jewish origins. Mitrokhin had the impression that Stalin’s brutal security supremo, Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria, was planning to implicate Zhukov in the supposed Jewish doctors’ plot. A few weeks after Stalin’s funeral, however, Beria suddenly announced that the plot had never existed, and exonerated the alleged conspirators. By the summer of 1953 most of Beria’ s colleagues in the Presidium were united in their fear of another conspiracy — that he might be planning a coup d'etat to step into Stalin’s shoes. While visiting a foreign capital in July, Mitrokhin received a top secret telegram with instructions to decipher it himself, and was astonished to discover that Beria had been charged with “criminal anti- Party and anti-state activities.” Only later did Mitrokhin learn that Beria had been arrested at a special meeting of the Presidium on June 26 after a plot organized by his chief rival, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. From his prison cell, Beria wrote begging letters to his former colleagues, pleading pathetically for them to spare his life and “find the smallest job for me”: You will see that in two or three years I’ll have straightened out fine and will still be useful to you... I ask the comrades to forgive me for writing somewhat disjointedly and badly because of my condition, and also because of the poor lighting and not having my pince-nez. No longer in awe of him, the comrades simply mocked his loss of nerve. On December 24 it was announced that Beria had been executed after trial by the Supreme Court. Since neither his responsibility for mass murder in the Stalin era nor his own record as a serial rapist of under-age girls could be publicly mentioned for fear of bringing the Communist regime into disrepute, he was declared guilty instead of a surreal plot “to revive capitalism and to restore the rule of the bourgeoisie” in association with British and other Western intelligence services. Beria thus became. following Yagoda and Yezhov in the 1930s, the third Soviet security chief to be shot for crimes which included serving as an (imaginary) British secret agent. In true Stalinist tradition, subscribers to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia were advised to use “a small knife or razor blade” to remove the entry on Beria, and then to insert a replacement article on the Bering Sea.^ The first official repudiation of Stalinism was Khrushchev’s now-celebrated secret speech to a closed session of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956. Stalin’s “cult of personality,” Khrushchev declared, had been responsible for “a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality.” The speech was reported to the KGB Party organization in a secret letter from the Central Committee. The section to which Mitrokhin belonged took two days to debate its contents. He still vividly recalls the conclusion of the section’s chairman, Vladimir Vasilyevich Zhenikhov (later KGB resident in Finland): “Stalin was a bandit!” Some Party members were too shocked — or cautious — to say anything. Others agreed with Zhenikhov. None dared ask the question which Mitrokhin was convinced was in all their minds: “Where was Khrushchev while all these crimes were taking place?” In the aftermath of the secret speech Mitrokhin became too outspoken for his own good. Though his criticisms of the way the KGB had been run were mild by Western standards, late in 1956 Mitrokhin was moved from operations to the FCD archives, where his main job was answering queries from other departments and provincial KGBs.^ Mitrokhin discovered that Beria’s personal archive had been destroyed on Khrushchev’s orders so as to leave no trace of the compromising material he had collected on his former colleagues. Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, chairman of the KGB from 1954 to 1958, dutifully reported to Khrushchev that the files had contained much “provocative and libelous” material.^ Mitrokhin was an avid reader of the Russian writers who had fallen out of favor in the final years of Stalinist rule and began to be published again during the mid- 1950s. The first great literary event in Moscow after Stalin’s death was the publication in 1954, for the first time since 1945, of new poems by Boris Pasternak, the last leading Russian author to have begun his career before the Revolution. Published in a literary magazine under the title “Poems from the Novel Doctor Zhivago T they were accompanied by a brief description of the epic but still unfinished work in which they were to appear. However, the completed text of Doctor Zhivago, which followed the meandering life of its enigmatic hero from the final phase of Tsarist rule to the early years of the Soviet regime, was judged far too subversive for publication and was officially rejected in 1956. In the novel, when Zhivago hears the news of the Bolshevik Revolution, “He was shaken and overwhelmed by the greatness of the moment, and thought of its significance for the centuries to come.” But Pasternak goes on to convey an unmistakable sense of the spiritual emptiness of the regime which emerged from it. Lenin is “vengeance incarnate” and Stalin a “pockmarked Caligula.” Pasternak became the first Soviet author since the 1920s to circumvent the banning of his work in Russia by publishing it abroad. As he handed the typescript of Doctor Zhivago to a representative of his Italian publisher, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, he told him with a melancholy laugh: “You are hereby invited to watch me face the firing squad!” Soon afterwards, acting on official instructions, Pasternak sent a telegram to Feltrinelli insisting that his novel be withdrawn from publication; privately, however, he wrote a letter telling him to go ahead. Published first in Italian in November 1957, Doctor Zhivago became a bestseller in twenty-four languages. Some Western critics hailed it as the greatest Russian novel since Tolstoy’s Resurrection, published in 1899. Official outrage in Moscow at Doctor Zhivago'^ success was compounded by the award to Pasternak of the 1958 Nobel Prize for Literature. In a cable to the Swedish Academy, Pasternak declared himself “immensely thankful, touched, proud, astonished, abashed.” The newspaper of the Soviet Writers’ Union, the Literaturnaya Gazeta, however, denounced him as “a literary Judas who betrayed his people for thirty pieces of silver — the Nobel Prize.” Under immense official pressure, Pasternak cabled Stockholm withdrawing his acceptance of the prize “in view of the significance given to this award in the society to which I belong.”^ Though Pasternak was not one of his own favorite authors, Mitrokhin saw the official condemnation of Doctor Zhivago as typifying Khrushchev’s cultural barbarism. “The development of literature and art in a socialist society,” Khrushchev boorishly insisted, “proceeds... as directed by the Party.” Mitrokhin was so outraged by the neo- Stalinist denunciations of Pasternak by Moscow’s literary establishment that in October 1958 he sent an anonymous letter of protest to the Literaturnaya Gazeta. Though he wrote the letter with his left hand in order to disguise his handwriting, he remained anxious for some time that his identity might be discovered. Mitrokhin knew from KGB files the immense resources which were frequently deployed to track down anonymous letter- writers. He was even worried that, by licking the gum on the back of the envelope before sealing it, he had made it possible for his saliva to be identified by a KGB laboratory. The whole episode strengthened his resentment at Khrushchev’s failure to follow his secret speech of 1956 by a thoroughgoing program of de-Stalinization. Khrushchev, he suspected, had personally ordered Pasternak’s persecution as a warning to all those inclined to challenge his authority. As yet, however, Mitrokhin pinned his faith not on the overthrow of the Soviet regime but on the emergence of a new leader less tainted than Khrushchev by his Stalinist past. When, late in 1958, Serov was replaced as KGB chairman by one of his leading critics, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin, Mitrokhin believed that the new leader had emerged. Aged only forty, Shelepin had made his reputation as a guerrilla commander during the Second World War. As head of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) from 1952 to 1958, he had mobilized thousands of young people from Khrushchev’s “Virgin Lands” campaign to turn vast areas of steppe into arable farmland. Though many of the new collective farms were later ruined by soil erosion, in the short term the campaign seemed a spectacular success. Soviet newsreels showed endless lines of combine-harvesters as they advanced through prairies rippling with grain and stretching as far as the eye could see. As Mitrokhin had hoped, Shelepin rapidly established himself as a new broom within the KGB, replacing many veteran Stalinists with bright young graduates from Komsomol. Mitrokhin was impressed by the way that when Shelepin gave televised speeches, he looked briefly at his notes, then spoke directly to the viewer — instead of woodenly reading from a prepared text like most Soviet leaders. Shelepin sought to give the KGB a new public image. “Violations of socialist legality,” he claimed in 1961, “have been completely eliminated... The Chekists [KGB officers] can look the Party and the Soviet people in the eye with a clear conscience.” Mitrokhin also remembers Shelepin for an act of personal kindness to a close relative. Like Beria before him and Andropov after him, Shelepin’ s ambitions stretched far beyond the chairmanship of the KGB. As a twenty-year-old university student, he was once asked what he wanted to become. According to the Russian historian Roy Medvedev, he instantly replied, “A chief! Shelepin saw the KGB as a stepping stone in a career which he intended to take him to the post of First Secretary of the CPSU. In December 1961 he left the KGB but continued to oversee its work as chairman of the powerful new Committee of Party and State Control. The new KGB chairman was Shelepin’ s youthful but less dynamic protege, thirty- seven-year-old Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny. On Khrushchev’s instructions, Semichastny resumed the work of pruning the archives of material which too vividly recalled the Presidium’s Stalinist past, ordering the destruction of nine volumes of files on the liquidation of Central Committee members, senior intelligence officers and foreign Communists living in Moscow during the Stalin era.^ Mitrokhin continued to see Shelepin as a future First Secretary, and was not surprised when he became one of the leaders of the coup which toppled Khrushchev in 1964. Memories of Beria, however, were still too fresh in the minds of most of the Presidium for them to be prepared to accept a security chief as Party leader. For most of his colleagues, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, who had succeeded Khrushchev as First (later General) Secretary, was a far more reassuring figure — affable, lightweight and patient in reconciling opposing factions, though skillful in outmaneuvering his political rivals. By 1967 Brezhnev felt strong enough to sack the unpopular Semichastny and sideline the still-ambitious Shelepin, who was demoted from heading the Committee of Party and State Control to become chairman of the comparatively uninfluential Trade Union Council. On arriving in his spacious new office, Shelepin found that his predecessor, Viktor Grishin, had what Medvedev later euphemistically described as “a specially equipped massage parlor” in an adjoining room. Shelepin took revenge for his demotion by circulating stories about Grishin’s sexual exploits around Moscow. The main beneficiary of the downfall of Semichastny and the sidelining of Shelepin was Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, who became chairman of the KGB. Andropov had what some of his staff called a “Hungarian complex.” As Soviet ambassador in Budapest during the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, he had watched in horror from the windows of his embassy as officers of the hated Hungarian security service were strung up from lampposts. Andropov remained haunted for the rest of his life by the speed with which an apparently all-powerful Communist one-party state had begun to topple. When other Communist regimes later seemed at risk — in Prague in 1968, in Kabul in 1979, in Warsaw in 1981 — he was convinced that, as in Budapest in 1956, only armed force could ensure their survival. Since leaving Hungary in 1957 Andropov had been head of the Central Committee Department responsible for relations with Communist parties in the Soviet Bloc. His appointment in 1967 as the first senior Party official brought in to head the KGB was intended by Brezhnev to secure political control of the security and intelligence systems. Andropov went on to become the longest-serving and most politically astute of all KGB chiefs, crowning his fifteen years as chairman by succeeding Brezhnev as General Secretary in 1982. THE FIRST GREAT crisis of Andropov’s years at the KGB was the attempt by the Czechoslovak reformers of the Prague Spring to create what the Kremlin saw as an unacceptably unorthodox “socialism with a human face.” Like Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the forces of the Warsaw Pact in August 1968 was an important staging post in what Mitrokhin calls his “intellectual odyssey.” Stationed in East Germany during the Prague Spring, Mitrokhin was able to listen to reports from Czechoslovakia on the Russian-language services of the BBC World Service, Radio Liberty, Deutsche Welle and the Canadian Broadcasting Company, but had no one with whom he felt able to share his sympathy for the Prague reforms. One episode about a month before Soviet tanks entered Prague left a particular impression on him. An FCD Department V (“special tasks”) officer, Colonel Viktor Ryabov, said to Mitrokhin that he was “just off to Sweden for a few days,” but made clear by his expression that Sweden was not his real destination. A few days after Ryabov’s return, he told Mitrokhin there would be an interesting article in the following day’s Pravda, implying that it was connected with his mission. When Mitrokhin read the report the next day that an “imperialist arms dump” had been discovered in Czechoslovakia, he realized at once that it had been planted by Ryabov and other Department V officers to discredit the reformers. Soon after the crushing of the Prague Spring, Mitrokhin heard a speech given by Andropov in the KGB’s East German headquarters at Karlshorst in the Berlin suburbs. Like Shelepin, Andropov spoke directly to the audience, rather than — like most Soviet officials — sticking to a prepared platitudinous text. With an ascetic appearance, silver hair swept back over a large forehead, steel-rimmed glasses and an intellectual manner, Andropov seemed far removed from Stalinist thugs such as Beria and Serov. His explanation for the invasion of Czechoslovakia was far more sophisticated than that given to the Soviet public. It had, he insisted, been the only way to preserve Soviet security and the new European order which had emerged from the Great Patriotic War. That objective political necessity, Andropov claimed, was accepted even by such unorthodox figures as the great physicist Pyotr Kapitza, who had initially shown some sympathy for the Prague revisionists. Mitrokhin drew quite different conclusions from the Warsaw Pact invasion. The destruction of Czechoslovak “socialism with a human face” proved, he believed, that the Soviet system was unreformable. He still vividly recalls a curiously mythological image, which henceforth he saw increasingly in his mind’s eye, of the Russian people in thrall to “a three-headed hydra”: the Communist Party, the privileged nomenklatura and the KGB. After his return to Moscow from East Germany, Mitrokhin continued to listen to Western broadcasts, although, because of Soviet jamming, he had frequently to switch wavelengths in order to find an audible station. Often he ended up with only fragments of news stories. Among the news which made the greatest impression on him were items on the Chronicle of Current Events, a samizdat journal first produced by Soviet dissidents in 1968 to circulate news on the struggle against abuses of human rights. The Chronicle carried on its masthead the guarantee of freedom of expression in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, daily abused in the Soviet Union. As the struggle against “ideological subversion” intensified, Mitrokhin saw numerous examples of the way in which the KGB manipulated, virtually at will, the Soviet justice system. He later copied down the sycophantic congratulations sent to Andropov by A. F. Gorkhin, chairman of the Soviet Supreme Court, on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Cheka in December 1967: The Soviet Courts and the USSR Committee of State Security [KGB] are of the same age. But this is not the main thing which brings us together; the main thing is the identity of our tasks ... We are glad to note that the State Security agencies and the Courts solve all their complicated tasks in a spirit of mutual understanding and sound professional relations. Mitrokhin saw mounting evidence both in the classified in-house journal, KGB Sbornik, and in FCD files of Andropov’s personal obsession with the destruction of dissent in all its forms and his insistence that the struggle for human rights was part of a wide-ranging imperialist plot to undermine the foundations of the Soviet state. In 1968 Andropov issued KGB Chairman’s Order No. 0051, “On the tasks of State security agencies in combating ideological sabotage by the adversary,” calling for greater aggression in the struggle against both dissidents at home and their imperialist supporters. One example of this greater aggression which left Mitrokhin, as an ardent admirer of the Kirov Ballet, with a sense of personal outrage was the plan which he discovered in FCD files to maim the ballet’s star defector, Rudolf Nureyev.^^ By the beginning of the 1970s Mitrokhin’s political views were deeply influenced by the dissident struggle, which he was able to follow both in KGB records and Western broadcasts. “I was a loner,” he recalls, “but I now knew that I was not alone.” Though Mitrokhin never had any thought of aligning himself openly with the human rights movement, the example of the Chronicle of Current Events and other samizdat productions helped to inspire him with the idea of producing a classified variant of the dissidents’ attempts to document the iniquities of the Soviet system. Gradually the project began to form in his mind of compiling his own private record of the foreign operations of the KGB. Mitrokhin’s opportunity came in June 1972 when the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate left its overcrowded central Moscow offices in the KGB headquarters at the Lubyanka (once the pre-Revolutionary home of the Rossiya Insurance Company) and moved to a new building south-east of Moscow at Yasenevo, half a mile beyond the outer ringroad. Designed by a Finnish architect, the main Y-shaped seven-story office building was flanked on one side by an assembly hall and library, on the other by a polyclinic, sports complex and swimming pool, with pleasant views over hills covered with birch trees, green pastures, and — in summer — fields of wheat and rye. To the other KGB directorates, most of which worked in cramped conditions in central Moscow, Yasenevo was known — ^with more envy than condescension — as “The Woods.” For the next ten years, working from private offices both in the Lubyanka and at Yasenevo, Mitrokhin was alone responsible for checking and sealing the approximately 300,000 files in the FCD archive prior to their transfer to the new headquarters. While supervising the checking of files, the compilation of inventories and the writing of index cards, Mitrokhin was able to inspect what files he wished in one or other of his offices. Few KGB officers apart from Mitrokhin have ever spent as much time reading, let alone noting, foreign intelligence files. Outside the FCD archives, only the most senior officers shared his unrestricted access, and none had the time to read more than a fraction of the material noted by him. Mitrokhin ’s usual weekly routine was to spend each Monday, Tuesday and Friday in his Yasenevo office. On Wednesdays he went to the Lubyanka to work on the FCD’s most secret files, those of Directorate S which ran illegals — KGB officers and agents, most of Soviet nationality, working under deep cover abroad disguised as foreign citizens. Once reviewed by Mitrokhin, each batch of files was placed in sealed containers which were transported to Yasenevo on Thursday mornings, accompanied by Mitrokhin who checked them on arrival. Unlike the other departments, who moved to the new FCD headquarters in 1972, Directorate S remained based in the Lubyanka for a further decade. Mitrokhin thus found himself spending more time dealing with the files of Directorate S, the most secret in the FCD, than with those of any other section of Soviet foreign intelligence. The illegals retained a curious mystique within the KGB. Before being posted abroad, every illegal officer was required to swear a solemn, if somewhat melodramatic, oath: Deeply valuing the trust placed upon me by the Party and the fatherland, and imbued with a sense of intense gratitude for the decision to send me to the sharp edge of the struggle for the interest of my people... as a worthy son of the homeland, I would rather perish than betray the secrets entrusted to me or put into the hand of the adversary materials which could cause political harm to the interests of the State. With every heartbeat, with every day that passes, I swear to serve the Party, the homeland, and the Soviet people. The files showed that before the Second World War the greatest foreign successes had been achieved by a legendary group of intelligence officers, often referred to as the “Great Illegals.” After the Second World War, the KGB had tried to recreate its pre-war triumphs by establishing an elaborate network of “illegal residencies” alongside the “legal residencies” which operated under diplomatic or other official cover in foreign capitals. The records of Directorate S revealed some remarkable individual achievements. KGB illegals successfully established bogus identities as foreign nationals in a great variety of professions ranging from Costa Rican ambassador to piano tuner to the Governor of New York. Even in the Gorbachev era, KGB propaganda continued to depict the Soviet illegal as the supreme embodiment of the chivalric ideal in the service of secret intelligence. The retired British KGB agent George Blake wrote in 1990: Only a man who believes very strongly in an ideal and serves a great cause will agree to embark on such a career, though the word “calling” is perhaps appropriate here. Only an intelligence service which works for a great cause can ask for such a sacrifice from its officers. That is why, as far as I know, at any rate in peacetime, only the Soviet intelligence service has “illegal residents. The SVR continues the KGB tradition of illegal hagiography. In July 1995, a month after the death of the best-known American-bom illegal, Morris Cohen, President Yeltsin conferred on him the posthumous title of Hero of the Russian Federation. The files of Directorate S noted by Mitrokhin reveal a quite different kind of illegal. Alongside the committed FCD officers who maintained their cover and professional discipline throughout their postings, there were others who could not cope when confronted by the contrast between the Soviet propaganda image of capitalist exploitation and the reality of life in the West. An even darker secret of the Directorate S records was that one of the principal uses of the illegals during the last quarter of a century of the Soviet Union was to search out and compromise dissidents in the other countries of the Warsaw Pact. The squalid struggle against “ideological subversion” was as much a responsibility of Directorate S as of the rest of the FCD. MITROKHIN WAS UNDERSTANDABLY cautious as he set out in 1972 to compile his forbidden FCD archive. For a few weeks he tried to commit names, codenames and key facts from the files to memory and transcribe them each evening when he returned home. Abandoning that process as too slow and cumbersome, he began to take notes in minuscule handwriting on scraps of paper which he crumpled up and threw into his wastepaper basket. Each evening, he retrieved his notes from the wastepaper and smuggled them out of Yasenevo concealed in his shoes. Gradually Mitrokhin became more confident as he satisfied himself that the Yasenevo security guards confined themselves to occasional inspections of bags and briefcases without attempting body searches. After a few months he started taking notes on ordinary sheets of office paper which he took out of his office in his jacket and trouser pockets. Not once in the twelve years which Mitrokhin spent noting the FCD archives was he stopped and searched. There were, however, some desperately anxious moments. From time to time he realized that, like other FCD officers, he was being tailed — probably by teams from the Seventh (Surveillance) or Second Chief (Counter-intelligence) Directorates. On one occasion while he was being followed, he visited the Dynamo Football Club sports shop and, to his horror, found himself standing next to two English visitors whom his watchers might suspect were spies with whom he had arranged a rendezvous. If he was searched, his notes on top secret files would be instantly discovered. Mitrokhin quickly moved on to other sports shops, hoping to convince his watchers that he was on a genuine shopping expedition. As he approached his apartment block, however, he noticed two men standing near the door to his ninth-floor flat. By the time he arrived, they had disappeared. FCD officers had standing instructions to report suspicious incidents such as this, but Mitrokhin did not do so for fear of prompting an investigation which would draw attention to the fact that he had been seen standing next to English visitors. Each night when he returned to his Moscow flat, Mitrokhin hid his notes beneath his mattress. On weekends he took them to a family dacha thirty-six kilometers from Moscow and typed up as many as possible, though the notes became so numerous that Mitrokhin was forced to leave some of them in handwritten form. He hid the first batches of typescripts and notes in a milk-chum which he buried below the floor. The dacha was built on raised foundations, leaving just enough room for Mitrokhin to crawl beneath the floorboards and dig a hole with a short-handled spade. He frequently found himself crawling through dog and cat feces and sometimes disturbed rats while he was digging, but he consoled himself with the thought that burglars were unlikely to follow him. When the milk-chum was full, he began concealing his notes and typescripts in a tin clothes-boiler. Eventually his archive also filled two tin tmnks and two aluminum cases, all of them buried beneath the dacha.^^ Mitrokhin’ s most anxious moment came when he arrived at his weekend dacha to find a stranger hiding in the attic. He was instantly reminded of the incident a few years earlier, in August 1971, when a friend of the writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn had called unexpectedly at his dacha while Solzhenitsyn was away and surprised two KGB officers in the attic who were probably searching for subversive manuscripts. Other KGB men had quickly arrived on the scene and Solzhenitsyn’s friend had been badly beaten. Andropov cynically ordered Solzhenitsyn to be “informed that the participation of the KGB in this incident is a figment of his imagination.”^^ The incident was still fresh in Mitrokhin’s mind when he arrived at the dacha because he had recently noted files which recorded minutely detailed plans for the persecution of Solzhenitsyn and the “active measures” by which the KGB hoped to discredit him in the Western press. To his immense relief, however, the intruder in the attic turned out to be a homeless squatter. During summer holidays Mitrokhin worked on batches of his notes at a second family dacha near Penza, carrying them in an old haversack and dressing in peasant clothes in order not to attract attention. In the summer of 1918 Penza, 630 kilometers southeast of Moscow, had been the site of one of the first peasant risings against Bolshevik rule. Lenin blamed the revolt on the kulaks (better-off peasants) and furiously instructed the local Party leaders to hang in public at least one hundred of them so that “for hundreds of kilometers around the people may see and tremble... By the 1970s, however, Penza’s counter- revolutionary past was long forgotten, and Lenin’s bloodthirsty orders for mass executions were kept from public view in the secret section of the Lenin archive. One of the most striking characteristics of the best literature produced under the Soviet regime is how much of it was written in secret. “To plunge underground,” wrote Solzhenitsyn, “to make it your concern not to win the world’s recognition — Heaven forbid! — ^but on the contrary to shun it: this variant of the writer’s lot is peculiarly our own, purely Russian, Russian and Soviet! Between the wars Mikhail Bulgakov had spent twelve years writing The Master and Margarita, one of the greatest novels of the twentieth century, knowing that it could not be published in his lifetime and fearing that it might never appear at all. His widow later recalled how, just before his death in 1940, Bulgakov “made me get out of bed and then, leaning on my arm, he walked through all the rooms, barefoot and in his dressing gown, to make sure that the manuscript of The Master was still there” in its hiding place.^^ Though Bulgakov’s great work survived, it was not published until a quarter of a century after his death. As late as 1978, it was denounced in a KGB memorandum to Andropov as “a dangerous weapon in the hands of [Western] ideological centers engaged in ideological sabotage against the Soviet Union. When Solzhenitsyn began writing in the 1950s, he told himself he had “entered into the inheritance of every modem writer intent on the tmth”: I must write simply to ensure that it was not forgotten, that posterity might some day come to know of it. Publication in my own lifetime I must shut out of my mind, out of my dreams. Just as Mitrokhin’s first notes were hidden in a milk- chum beneath his dacha, so Solzhenitsyn’s earliest writings, in minuscule handwriting, were squeezed into an empty champagne bottle and buried in his garden.^^ After the brief thaw in the early years of “de-Stalinization” which made possible the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s story of life in the gulag, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, he waged a timeconsuming struggle to try to prevent the KGB from seizing his other manuscripts until he was finally forced into exile in 1974.^^ It did not occur to Mitrokhin to compare himself with such literary giants as Bulgakov and Solzhenitsyn. But, like them, he began assembling his archive “to ensure that the truth was not forgotten, that posterity might some day come to know of it.” THE KGB FILES which had the greatest emotional impact on Mitrokhin were those on the war in Afghanistan. On December 28, 1979 Babrak Karmal, the new Afghan leader chosen by Moscow to request “fraternal assistance” by the Red Army which had already invaded his country, announced over Kabul Radio that his predecessor, Hafizullah Amin, an “agent of American imperialism,” had been tried by a “revolutionary tribunal” and sentenced to death. Mitrokhin quickly discovered from the files on the war which flooded into the archives that Amin had in reality been assassinated, together with his family and entourage, in an assault on the Kabul presidential palace by KGB special forces disguised in Afghan uniforms. The female clerks who filed KGB reports on the war in the archives after they had been circulated to the Politburo and other sections of the Soviet hierarchy had so much material to deal with that they sometimes submitted to Mitrokhin thirty files at a time for his approval. The horrors recorded in the files were carefully concealed from the Soviet people. The Soviet media preserved a conspiracy of silence about the systematic destruction of thousands of Afghan villages, reduced to forlorn groups of uninhabited, roofless mud-brick houses; the flight of four million refugees; and the death of a million Afghans in a war which Gorbachev later described as a “mistake.” The coffins of the 15,000 Red Army troops killed in the conflict were unloaded silently at Soviet airfields, with none of the military pomp and solemn music which traditionally awaited fallen heroes returning to the Motherland. Funerals were held in secret, and families told simply that their loved ones had died “fulfilling their internationalist duty.” Some were buried in plots near the graves of Mitrokhin ’s parents in the cemetery at Kuzminsky Monastery. No reference to Afghanistan was allowed on their tombstones. During the Afghan War Mitrokhin heard the first open criticism of Soviet policy by his more outspoken colleagues at Yasenevo. “Doesn’t the war make you ashamed to be Russian?” an FCD colonel asked him one day. “Ashamed to be Soviet, you mean!” Mitrokhin blurted out. When Mitrokhin retired in 1984, he was still preoccupied with the Afghan War. He spent the first year and a half of his retirement sorting through his notes. extracting the material on Afghanistan, and assembling it in a large volume with a linking narrative. Despite Gorbachev’s call for glasnost after he became Party leader in 1985, Mitrokhin did not believe the Soviet system would ever allow the truth about the war to be told. Increasingly, however, he began to think of ways of transporting his archive to the West and publishing it there. One novel method suggested itself on May 28, 1987, when a single-engine Cessna piloted by a nineteen-year- old West German, Matthias Rust, crossed the Finnish border into Soviet airspace and flew undetected for 450 miles before landing in Red Square. After an hour of confusion, during which Kremlin security guards wondered whether Rust was an actor in a film, he was taken away to the KGB’s Lefortovo Prison. Mitrokhin briefly considered but quickly abandoned the idea of using a microlite from a KGB sports club to fly with his archive in the opposite direction to Finland. The most practical of the various schemes considered by Mitrokhin before the collapse of the Soviet Union was to get a position on the local Party committee which issued permits for foreign travel, obtain permits for himself and his family, then book reservations on a cruise from Leningrad to Odessa in the Black Sea. At one of the cruise’s West European ports of call, Mitrokhin would make contact with the authorities and arrange to leave his archive in a dead letter-box near Moscow for collection by a Western intelligence agency. He eventually abandoned the idea because of the difficulty of separating himself from the Soviet tour group and the ever-watchful group leaders for long enough to tell his story and arrange the hand-over. As the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989 and the Soviet Bloc began to disintegrate, Mitrokhin told himself to be patient and wait for his opportunity. In the meantime he carried on typing up his handwritten notes in his Moscow flat and at the two family dachas, assembling some of them in volumes covering the FCD’s chief target countries — first and foremost the United States, known in KGB jargon as the “Main Adversary.” He shared the relief of most Muscovites at the failure of the hardline coup in August 1991 to depose Gorbachev and reestablish the one-party Soviet state. It came as no surprise to Mitrokhin that the chief ringleader in the failed coup was Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, head of the FCD from 1974 to 1988 and chairman of the KGB from 1988 until the coup. Though Kryuchkov proved better at public relations than most previous KGB chairmen, he had long represented much of what Mitrokhin most detested in the FCD. As a young diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Budapest, Kryuchkov had caught the eye of the ambassador, Yuri Andropov, by his uncompromising opposition to the “counter-revolutionary” Hungarian Uprising of 1956. When Andropov became KGB chairman in 1967, Kryuchkov became head of his personal secretariat and a loyal supporter of his obsessive campaign against “ideological subversion” in all its forms. The files seen by Mitrokhin showed that, as head of the FCD, Kryuchkov collaborated closely with the KGB Fifth (Ideological Subversion) Directorate in the war against dissidents at home and abroad.^^ He had made a senior member of the Fifth Directorate, 1. A. Markelov, one of the deputy heads of the FCD with responsibility for coordinating the struggle against ideological subversion.^^ The failed coup of August 1991 marked an appropriately discreditable end to Kryuchkov’s KGB career. Instead of shoring up the Soviet Union and the one-party state, it served only to hasten their collapse. On October 11, 1991, the State Council of the disintegrating Soviet Union abolished the KGB in its existing form. The former FCD was reconstituted as the SVR, the foreign intelligence service of the Russian Federation, independent of the internal security service. Instead of repudiating its Soviet past, however, the SVR saw itself as the heir of the old FCD. Mitrokhin had seen the FCD file on the SVR’s newly appointed head. Academician Yevgeni Maksimovich Primakov, previously Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations and one of Gorbachev’s leading foreign policy advisers. The file identified Primakov as a KGB co-optee, codenamed MAKSIM, who had been sent on frequent intelligence missions to the United States and the Middle East.^^ Primakov went on to become Boris Yeltsin’s Foreign Minister in 1996 and Prime Minister in 1998. IN THE FINAL months of 1991, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the relative weakness of frontier controls at the new borders of the Russian Federation at last opened the way to the West for Mitrokhin and his archive. In March 1992 he boarded an overnight train in Moscow bound for the capital of one of the newly independent Baltic republics. With him he took a case on wheels, containing bread, sausages and drink for his journey on top, clothes underneath, and — at the bottom — samples of his notes. The next day he arrived unannounced at the British embassy in the Baltic capital and asked to speak to “someone in authority.” Hitherto Mitrokhin had had an image of the British as rather formal and “a bit of a mystery.” But the young female diplomat who received him at the embassy struck him as “young, attractive and sympathetic,” as well as fluent in Russian. Mitrokhin told her he had brought with him important material from KGB files. While he rummaged at the bottom of his bag to extract his notes from beneath the sausages and clothes, the diplomat ordered tea. As Mitrokhin drank his first cup of English tea, she read some of his notes, then questioned him about them. Mitrokhin told her they were only part of a large personal archive which included material on KGB operations in Britain. He agreed to return to the embassy a month later to meet representatives from the Secret Intelligence Service. Emboldened by the ease with which he had crossed the Russian frontier in March, Mitrokhin brought with him on his next trip to the Baltic capital 2,000 typed pages which he had removed from the hiding place beneath his dacha near Moscow. Arriving at the British embassy on the morning of April 9, he identified himself to the SIS officers by producing his passport. Communist Party card and KGB pension certificate, handed over his bulky typescript and spent a day answering questions about himself, his archive and how he had compiled it. Mitrokhin accepted an invitation to return to the embassy about two months later to discuss arrangements for a visit to Britain. Early in May the SIS Moscow station reported to London that Mitrokhin planned to leave Moscow on an overnight train on June 10. On June 11 he arrived in the Baltic capital carrying a rucksack containing more material from his archive. Most of his meeting with SIS officers was spent discussing plans for him to be debriefed in Britain during the following autumn. On September 7, escorted by SIS, Mitrokhin arrived in England for the first time. After the near chaos of post- Communist Moscow, London made an extraordinary impression on him — “the model of what a capital city should be.” At the time, even the heavy traffic, dotted with the black cabs and red doubledecker buses he had seen only in photographs, seemed but proof of the capital’s prosperity. While being debriefed at anonymous safe houses in London and the countryside, Mitrokhin took the final decision to leave Russia for Britain, and agreed with SIS on arrangements to exfiltrate himself, his family and his archive. On October 13 he was infiltrated back into Russia to make final arrangements for his departure. On November 7, 1992, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mitrokhin arrived with his family in the Baltic capital where he had first made contact with SIS. A few days later they arrived in London to begin a new life in Britain. It was a bittersweet moment. Mitrokhin was safe and secure for the first time since he had begun assembling his secret archive eighteen years previously, but at the same time he felt a sense of bereavement at separation from a homeland he knew he would probably never see again. The bereavement has passed, though his attachment to Russia remains. Mitrokhin is now a British citizen. Using his senior citizen’s railcard to travel the length and breadth of the country, he has seen more of Britain than most who were bom here. Since 1992 he has spent several days a week working on his archive, typing up the remaining handwritten notes, and responding to questions about his archive from intelligence services from five continents. Late in 1995 he had his first meeting with Christopher Andrew to discuss the preparation of this book. Though The Sword and the Shield could not have been written in Russia, Mitrokhin remains as convinced as he was in 1972 that the secret history of the KGB is a central part of the Soviet past which the Russian people have the right to know. He also believes that the KGB’s worldwide foreign operations form an essential, though often neglected, part of the history of twentieth-century international relations. NO WORD LEAKED out in the British media about either Mitrokhin or his archive. Because material from the archive was passed to so many other intelligence and security services, however, there were, unsurprisingly, some partial leaks abroad. The first, slightly garbled reference to Mitrokhin ’s archive occurred in the United States nine months after his defection. In August 1993 the well-known Washington investigative journalist Ronald Kessler published a bestselling book on the FBI based in part on sources inside the Bureau. Among his revelations was a brief reference to a sensational “probe by the FBI into information from a former KGB employee who had had access to KGB files”: According to his account, the KGB had had many hundreds of Americans and possibly more than a thousand spying for them in recent years. So specific was the information that the FBI was quickly able to establish the source’s credibility... By the summer of 1993, the FBI had mobilized agents in most major cities to pursue the cases. A top secret meeting was called at Quantico [the FBI National Academy] to plot strategy. Kessler did not name any of the “many hundreds of Americans” identified by the defector. An unnamed “US intelligence official” interviewed by the Washington Post “confirmed that the FBI had received specific information that has led to a ‘significant’ ongoing investigation into past KGB activities in the United States,” but declined to be drawn in on “how many people are implicated. Time reported that “sources familiar with the case” of the KGB defector had identified him as a former employee of the First Chief Directorate, but had described Kessler’s figures for the number of “recenf’ Soviet spies in the United States as “highly exaggerated.”^^ Mitrokhin’s notes do indeed contain the names of “many hundreds” of KGB officers, agents and contacts in the United States active at various periods since the 1920s. Kessler, however, wrongly suggested that this number applied to “recent years” rather than to the whole history of Soviet espionage in the United States. Though his figures were publicly disputed, the suggestion that the KGB defector had gone to the United States rather than to Britain went unchallenged.^^ When no further information on the unidentified defector was forthcoming, media interest in the story quickly died away. There was no further leak from Mitrokhin’s archive for over three years. In October 1996, however, reports in the French press alleged that Charles Hemu, Defence Minister from 1981 to 1985, had worked for Soviet Bloc intelligence services from 1953 until at least 1963, and that, when informed by the French security service, the DST, President Francois Mitterrand had hushed the scandal up.^^ Le Monde reported that from 1993 onwards British intelligence had passed on to the DST “a list of about 300 names of diplomats and officials of the Quai d’Orsay alleged to have worked for Soviet Bloc intelligence.”^^ In reality, French diplomats and Foreign Ministry officials made up only a minority of the names in Mitrokhin’s notes supplied by the SIS to the DST. Charles Hemu was not among them.^^ None of the media reports on either side of the Channel related the SIS lists of Soviet agents in France to Kessler’s earlier story of a defector with extensive access to KGB files. In December 1996 the German weekly Focus reported that, according to “reliable sources,” SIS had also provided the BfV, the German security service, with the names of several hundred German politicians, businessmen, lawyers and police officers who had been involved with the KGB. On this occasion the SIS source was identified as a Russian defector who had had extensive access to the KGB archives. A later article in Focus reported: The Federal Prosecutor has been examining numerous detailed new leads to a hitherto undiscovered agent network of the former Soviet secret service, the KGB, in Germany. The researchers in Karlsruhe are primarily concentrating on Moscow sources who were taken on by the successors to the KGB and have probably been reactivated since the end of the Cold War. The basis for the research is extensive information on agents which a Russian defector smuggled into London from the Moscow secret service. After intensive analysis, the British secret service passed all information on KGB connections in Germany to the BfV in Cologne in early 1996.^^ In July 1997 another leak from Mitrokhin’s archive occurred in Austria. Press reports quoted a KGB document giving directions for locating a secret arms dump of mines, explosives and detonators, codenamed GROT, hidden in a dead letter-box near Salzburg in 1963, which had been intended for use in sabotage operations: Leave the town of Salzburg by the Schallmoser Haupstrasse leading to Highway No. 158. At a distance of 8 km from the town limit, in the direction of Bad Ischl-Graz, there is a large stone bridge across a narrow valley. Before reaching this bridge, leave the federal highway by turning right on to a local road which follows the valley in the direction of Ebenau; then go on 200 meters to the end of the metal parapet, which stands on the left-hand side of the road. On reaching the end of the parapet, turn left at once and follow a village road leading in the opposite direction. The DLB is located about 50 meters (60 paces) from the turn-off point leading from the main road on to the village road ...^^ Though the Austrian press did not mention it, the document came from Mitrokhin’s archive, which also revealed that in 1964 road repair works had covered the entrance to the DLB, raised the ground level, and changed the layout of the surrounding area. The KGB had decided not to try to recover and relocate the GROT arms dump. Attempts by the Austrian authorities to find the dump in 1997 also failed.^^ Mitrokhin’s notes reveal that similar KGB arms and radio caches, some of them booby- trapped, are scattered around much of Europe and North America.^^ The press leak which came closest to revealing the existence of Mitrokhin’s archive was a further article in the German weekly Focus, in June 1998. Focus reported that a colonel in the FCD registry with access to “all the files on Moscow’s agents” had smuggled handwritten copies of them out of KGB headquarters to his dacha near Moscow. In 1992 he had defected to Britain and, according to Focus, SIS agents had brought the “explosive” notes hidden in the dacha back to London.^^ Four years later, in an operation codenamed WEEKEND, SIS had allegedly briefed the BfV on the German material in the archive. According to Focus, “The defector has presented the BfV with hundreds of leads to Moscow’s spy network in the Federal Republic of Germany.” A “high-ranking BfV official” was said to have commented, “We were quite shocked at how much [the defector] knew. Moscow clearly possesses tons of blackmail material.” The BfV was reported to have received new leads on fifty espionage cases and to have begun twelve new investigations.^^ The Focus article, however, inspired widespread skepticism — ^partly because the story of a top secret KGB archive exfiltrated from a Russian dacha seemed inherently improbable, partly because the only detailed example given by Focus of the intelligence it contained was the sensational allegation that the former Chancellor, Willy Brandt, “the icon of Germany’s Social Democrats,” had been a Soviet spy during the Second World War. The Brandt story was instantly dismissed as “completely absurd” by Yuri Kobaladze, head of the SVR press bureau. When asked why in this instance the SVR was abandoning its usual practice of not commenting on individuals alleged to be Russian spies, Kobaladze replied: It would naturally be very flattering to have such a high-ranking politician on our list of credits, but in the interests of preserving historical truth we felt it necessary to reject this fiction, which could be misused for political purposes. Kobaladze also dismissed the story of the secret archive in a KGB colonel’s dacha as a myth. The source of the Brandt story, he insisted, could only be a former KGB major in the Oslo residency, Mikhail Butkov, who had defected to Britain in 1991.^^ Though wrong about the secret archive, Kobaladze was right to reject the allegation that Brandt had been a Soviet spy. Mitrokhin’s notes reveal that the KGB archives do indeed contain a file on Brandt (codenamed POLYARNIK), which shows that while in Stockholm during the Second World War he passed on information to the NKVD residency. But, as the file makes clear, Brandt was also in touch with British and American intelligence officers — as well as with the Norwegian former secretary of Leon Trotsky, regarded by the NKVD as the greatest traitor in Soviet history. Brandt’s overriding motive was to provide any information to all three members of the wartime Grand Alliance which might hasten the defeat of Adolf Hitler. In the case of the Soviet Union, he calculated — accurately — that his best channel of communication with Moscow was via the Stockholm residency. The real embarrassment in the POLYARNIK file concerns the role not of Brandt but of the KGB. In 1962, almost certainly with Khrushchev’s personal approval, the KGB embarked on an operation to blackmail Brandt by threatening to use the evidence of his wartime dealings with the Stockholm residency to “cause unpleasantness” unless he agreed to cooperate. The attempted blackmail failed.^^ LIKE THE BFV and Austrian counter intelligence, a number of other security services and intelligence agencies around the world from Scandinavia to Japan have been pursuing leads from Mitrokhin’s archive for several years — usually unnoticed by the media. Most of the leads have been used for counterintelligence purposes — to help resolve unsolved cases and neutralize SVR operations begun in the KGB era — rather than to mount prosecutions. There have, however, been a number of convictions which derive from Mitrokhin’s evidence. On one occasion, Mitrokhin himself was almost called to give evidence in court. The case concerned Robert Lipka, an army clerk assigned in the mid-1960s to the National Security Agency (NS A, the US SIGINT service), whom Mitrokhin had identified as a KGB agent.^^ In May 1993 FBI agent Dmitri Drouj insky contacted Lipka, posing as “Sergei Nikitin,” a GRU officer based in Washington. Lipka complained that he was still owed money for his espionage over a quarter of a century earlier, and was given a total of $10,000 by “Nikitin” over the next few months. He appeared confident that he could no longer be prosecuted. “The statute of limitations,” he told “Nikitin,” “has run out.” “Nikitin” corrected him: “In American law the statute of limitations for espionage never runs out.” Lipka replied that, whatever the legal position, he “would never admit to anything.” After a lengthy FBI investigation, Lipka was arrested in February 1996 at his home in Millersville, Pennsylvania, and charged with handing classified documents to the Soviet Union.^^ Since Lipka denied all charges against him, Mitrokhin expected to give evidence at his trial in the U.S. District Court, Philadelphia, in May 1997. But, in what the Philadelphia Inquirer termed “a surprising turnaround” in the courtroom, Lipka “exploded into tears as he confessed that he had handed over classified information to KGB agents.” Lipka had been persuaded by his lawyer, Ronald F. Kidd, to accept a prosecution offer of a plea bargain which would limit his sentence to eighteen years’ imprisonment with time off for good behavior, rather than continue to plead not guilty and face the prospect of spending the rest of his life in jail. Though Mitrokhin ’s name was never mentioned in court, it was the evidence he had obtained from KGB files which seems to have prompted Lipka’ s change of heart. “We saw how significant the evidence was,” his lawyer told reporters. “But the government also realized they couldn’t go through a full trial and not have the mystery witness exposed.” The “mystery witness” was Mitrokhin. After Lipka’s confession, U.S. Assistant Attorney Barbara J. Cohan admitted, “We had a very sensitive witness who, if he had had to testify, would have had to testify behind a screen and under an assumed name, and now we don’t have to surface him at all.”^^ “I feel like Rip Van Spy,” said Lipka when he was sentenced in September 1997. “I thought I had put this to bed many years ago and I never dreamed it would turn out like this.” As well as being sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment and fined 10,000 dollars, Lipka was ordered to repay the further 10,000 dollars from FBI funds given him by “Nikitin.”^^ There are many other “Rip Van Spies” whose memories of Cold War espionage are likely to be reawakened by Mitrokhin’s archive. Some will recognize themselves in the pages which follow. About a dozen important cases which are still being actively pursued — including several in leading NATO countries — cannot be referred to for legal reasons until they come to court. Only a small minority of the Soviet agents whose codenames appear in this volume, however, are likely to be prosecuted. But, as the SVR embarks on the biggest and most complex damage assessment in Russian intelligence history, it has to face the unsettling possibility that some of the spies identified by Mitrokhin have since been turned into double agents. After each of the revelations from Mitrokhin’s archive mentioned above, the SVR undoubtedly conducted the usual damage assessment exercise in an attempt to determine the source and seriousness of the leak. Its official statement in 1996 (effectively reaffirmed as recently as June 1998), which dismissed as “absolute nonsense” the suggestion that the names of several hundred Soviet agents could possibly have been given by a defector to any Western intelligence agency, demonstrates that the conclusions of these exercises were very wide of the mark. Not until the publication of this book was announced in 1999 did the SVR seem to begin to grasp the massive hemorrhage of intelligence which had occurred. SOME OF THE files noted by Mitrokhin give a vivid indication of the ferocity with which the Centre (KGB headquarters) has traditionally responded to intelligence leaks about its past foreign operations. The publication in 1974 of John Barron’s KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents based on information from Soviet defectors and Western intelligence agencies, generated no fewer than 370 KGB damage assessments and other reports. The resident in Washington, Mikhail Korney evich Polonik (codenamed ARDOV), was instructed to obtain all available information on Barron, then a senior editor at Reader's Digest, and to suggest ways “to compromise him.”^^ Most of the “active measures” used by the KGB in its attempts to discredit Barron made much of his Jewish origins, but its fabricated claims that he was part of a Zionist conspiracy (a favorite theme in Soviet disinformation) appear to have had little resonance outside the Middle East.^^ The active measures employed against some of the journalists who wrote articles based on Barron’s book were more imaginative. Doctored versions of blank “information cards” from the Austrian Stapo (security police) registry previously obtained by KGB agents were used to compromise Austrian journalists judged to have used material from KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents to undermine the “peaceloving” policies of the USSR. Fabricated entries on the cards prepared by Service A, the FCD active measures specialists, purported to show that the Stapo believed the journalists concerned to be hand-in-glove with the CIA. Photocopies of the cards were then circulated among the Austrian media. The files noted by Mitrokhin list other KGB countermeasures against Barron’s book in countries as far afield as Turkey, Cyprus, Fibya, Febanon, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Somalia, Uganda, India, Sri Fanka and Afghanistan.^^ The other study of the KGB which did the most to arouse the ire of the Centre was the history published in 1990 by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordlevsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, which drew on KGB documents and other information obtained by Gordlevsky while working as a British agent inside the KGB from 1974 to 1985.^^ The Centre predictably responded with active measures against both the book and its authors. (Some indication of its continuing hostility to Gordievsky is provided by the fact that, at the time of this writing, he is still under sentence of death in Moscow.) There was, however, one important new element in the reaction of the KGB, and of its chairman Kryuchkov in particular, to the publication of the history by Andrew and Gordievsky. In a top secret “Chairman’s Order” of September 1990 emphasizing the importance of influence operations and other active measures (“one of the most important functions of the KGB’s foreign intelligence service”), Kryuchkov instructed that “wider use should be made of archive material” to publicize a “positive” image of the KGB and “its more celebrated cases. The first approach to a Western writer offering material from KGB archives intended to create this “positive” image was to the mercurial John Costello, a freelance British historian who combined flair for research with a penchant for conspiracy theory. In 1991 Costello published a book on the mysterious flight to Britain fifty years previously of Hitler’s deputy Fiihrer, Rudolf Hess, which drew on KGB records selected by the SVR as well as Western sources, and argued (implausibly, in the view of most experts on the period) that the key to the whole affair was a plot by British intelligence.^^ Two years later, in collaboration with the SVR consultant (and former FCD officer) Oleg Tsarev, Costello published a somewhat less controversial biography of the inter-war Soviet intelligence officer Aleksandr Orlov which was described on the dustjacket as “The first book from the KGB archives — the KGB secrets the British government doesn’t want you to read.” The book began with tributes to the disgraced former chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, and the last head of the FCD, Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin, for initiating the project. Costello added a note of “personal gratitude” to the SVR “for the ongoing support that they have given to this project which has established a new precedent for openness and objectivity in the study of intelligence history, not only in Russia, but the rest of the world. The Costello-Tsarev combination set the pattern for other collaborations between Russian authors selected or approved by the SVR and Western writers (who have included both well-known historians and a senior retired CIA officer): a project initially sponsored, but later abandoned, by Crown Books in the United States. For each volume in the series, which covers topics from the inter- war period to the early Cold War, the SVR has given the authors exclusive access to copies of previously top secret documents selected by it from KGB archives. All the books published so far have contained interesting and sometimes important new material; several are also impressive for the quality of their historical analysis. Their main weakness, for which the authors cannot be blamed, is that the choice of KGB documents on which they are based has been made not by them but by the SVR.63 The choice is sometimes highly selective. During the 1990s, for example, the SVR has made available to Russian and Western authors four successive tranches from the bulky file of the KGB’s most famous British agent, Kim Philby.^^ In order to preserve both Philby’s heroic image and the reputation of Russian foreign intelligence, however, the SVR has been careful not to release the record of Philby’s final weeks as head of the SIS station in the United States (the climax of his career as a Soviet spy), when money and instructions intended for Philby were mislaid, and he fell out with his incompetent controller who was subsequently recalled to Moscow in disgrace. Mitrokhin’s notes on those parts of the Philby file still considered by the SVR unsuitable for public consumption reveal this farcical episode for the first time.^^ The SVR has publicly denied even the existence of some of the files which it finds embarrassing. While writing a history of KGB-CIA rivalry in Berlin before the construction of the Wall, based partly on documents selected by the SVR, the Russian and American authors (one of them a former deputy head of the FCD) asked to see the file of the KGB agent Aleksandr Grigoryevich Kopatzky (alias Igor Orlov). The SVR replied that it had no record of any agent of that name. Its only record of “Igor Orlov” was, it claimed, of a visit made by him to the Soviet embassy in Washington in 1965, when he complained of FBI harassment and enquired about asylum in the USSR.^^ Though still officially an unperson in the SVR version of Russian intelligence history, Kopatzky was in reality one of the KGB’s most highly rated agents. His supposedly non-existent KGB file, noted by Mitrokhin, reveals that he had no fewer than twenty-three controllers.^^ As well as initiating an unprecedented series of collaborative histories for publication in the West, the SVR has produced a number of less sophisticated works for the Russian market. In 1995, to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the Soviet foreign intelligence service, of which it sees itself as the heir, the SVR published a volume on the careers of seventy-five intelligence officers — all, it appears, sans peur et sans reproche — which differs little from the uncritical hagiographies of the KGB era.^^ In 1995 the SVR also began the publication of a multi-volume official history of KGB foreign operations which by 1997 had reached the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.^^ Though a mine of mostly reliable factual information, it too presents a selective and sanitized view of Soviet intelligence history. It also preserves, in a mercifully diluted form, some of the traditional conspiracy theories of the KGB. The literary editor of the official history, Lolly Zamoysky, was formerly a senior FCD analyst, well known within the Centre and foreign residencies for his belief in a global Masonic-Zionist plot7^ In 1989 he published a volume grandly entitled Behind the Fagade of the Masonic Temple, which blamed the Freemasons for, inter alia, the outbreak of the Cold War The underlying rationale for the SVR’s selection of topics and documents for histories of past operations is to present Soviet foreign intelligence as a dedicated and highly professional service, performing much the same functions as its Western counterparts but, more often than not, winning the contest against them.^^ Even under Stalin, foreign intelligence is presented as the victim rather than the perpetrator of the Terror^^ — despite the fact that during the later 1930s hunting down “enemies of the people” abroad became its main priority Similarly, the SVR seeks to distance the foreign intelligence operations of the FCD during the Cold War from the abuse of human rights by the domestic KGB. In reality, however, the struggle against “ideological subversion” both at home and abroad was carefully coordinated. The KGB took a central role in the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the pressure on the Polish regime to destroy Solidarity in 1981. Closely linked to the persecution of dissidents within the Soviet Union were the FCD’s PROGRESS operations against dissidents in the rest of the Soviet Bloc and its constant harassment of those who had taken refuge in the West7^ By the mid-1970s the BCD’s war against ideological subversion extended even to operations against Western Communist leaders who were judged to have deviated from Moscow’s rigid Party line7^ On these and many other operations, Mitrokhin’s archive contains much material from KGB files which the SVR is still anxious to keep from public view. Unlike the documents selected for declassification by the SVR, none of which are more recent than the early 1960s, his archive covers almost the whole of the Cold War. Most of it is still highly classified in Moscow. The originals of some of the most important documents noted or transcribed by Mitrokhin may no longer exist. In 1989 most of the huge multi-volume file on the dissident Andrei Sakharov, earlier branded “Public Enemy Number One” by Andropov, was destroyed. Soon afterwards, Kryuchkov announced that all files on other dissidents charged under the infamous Article 70 of the criminal code (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) were being shredded. In a number of cases, Mitrokhin’s notes on them may now be all that survives. Vasili Mitrokhin has thus made it possible to extend what John Costello praised in 1993 as the “new precedent for openness and objectivity in the study of intelligence history” set by Kryuchkov and his SVR successors far beyond the limits any of them could have envisaged. TWO FROM LENIN’S CHEKA TO STALIN’S OGPU For most of Mitrokhin’s career in the KGB, the history of its domestic operations was something of an embarrassment even to its own historians. During the late 1930s the KGB (then known as the NKVD) had been the chief instrument of Stalin’s Great Terror, the greatest peacetime persecution in European history. The KGB officers club in the Lubyanka, its Moscow headquarters, lacked even the usual boardroom photographs of past chairmen; most were more suited to a chamber of horrors than to a hall of fame. Three had been shot after being found guilty of horrific crimes (some real, others imaginary): Genrikh Yagoda in 1938, Nikolai Yezhov in 1940 and Lavrenti Beria in 1953. A fourth — Ivan Serov — blew his brains out in 1963. KGB historians in the post- Stalin era tended to take refuge from the blood-stained reality of their Stalinist past and homicidal former chairmen by returning to an earlier, mostly mythical, Leninist golden age of revolutionary purity. The KGB traced its origins to the foundation on December 20, 1917, six weeks after the Bolshevik Revolution, of the Cheka, the first Soviet security and intelligence agency. Throughout Mitrokhin’s career, KGB officers styled themselves Chekists (Chekisty) and were paid their salaries not on the first but on the twentieth of each month (“Chekists’ Day”) in honor of the Cheka’s birthday. The KGB also adopted the Cheka symbols of the sword and the shield: the shield to defend the revolution, the sword to smite its foes. Outside the Lubyanka, the KGB’s Moscow headquarters, stood a huge statue of the Polish-bom head of the Cheka, Feliks Dzerzhinsky, venerated in countless official hagiographies as the selfless, incormptible “Knight of the Revolution” who slew the dragon of counter-revolution which threatened the young Soviet state. He had been a professional revolutionary for over twenty years before the Revolution, spending eleven of those years in Tsarist prisons, penal servitude or exile. KGB training manuals quoted his description of the Chekist as a man with “a warm heart, a cool head and clean hands.” Like Lenin, he was an incormptible workaholic, prepared to sacrifice both himself and others in the defense of the Revolution. ^ In the headquarters of the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate at Yasenevo, the main object of veneration was a large bust of Dzerzhinsky on a marble pedestal constantly surrounded by fresh flowers. The KGB’s effusive public tributes to its saintly founding father concealed the degree to which Dzerzhinsky derived his intelligence tradecraft from the Cheka’s much smaller Tsarist predecessor, the Okhrana. The Bolsheviks had extensive first-hand experience of the Okhrana’ s expertise in the use of penetration agents and agents provocateurs. In July 1913 Lenin had discussed the difficult problem of Okhrana penetration with two of his chief lieutenants, Lev Kamenev and Grigori Zinovyev, and the leader of the Bolshevik deputies in the Duma, Roman Malinovsky. All were agreed that there must be an unidentified Okhrana agent in close contact with the Bolshevik deputies. The agent was in even closer contact than Lenin realized. It was Roman Malinovsky. After Okhrana files later revealed his identity, he was shot in the Kremlin gardens on the first anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.^ The Cheka’s success in penetrating its opponents derived in large part from its imitation of the techniques employed by Malinovsky and other Tsarist agents. Dmitri Gavrilovich Yevseyev, the author of two of the Cheka’s earliest operational manuals, Basic Tenets of Intelligence and Brief Instructions for the Cheka on How to Conduct Intelligence, based his writings on detailed study of Okhrana tradecraft. Though the Cheka was “an organ for building the dictatorship of the proletariat,” Yevseyev insisted — like Dzerzhinsky — that it must not hesitate to learn from the experience of “bourgeois” intelligence agencies.^ The Cheka’s early priorities were overwhelmingly domestic. Dzerzhinsky described it as “an organ for the revolutionary settlement of accounts with counterrevolutionaries,” ^ a label increasingly applied to all the Bolsheviks’ opponents and “class enemies.” Within days of its foundation, however, the Cheka had also taken its first tentative steps in foreign intelligence collection. The career of the first agent sent on a mission abroad, Aleksei Frolovich Filippov, was sadly at variance with the heroic image which KGB historians struggled to maintain in their descriptions of the Leninist era. Bom in 1870 and trained as a lawyer, Filippov had made a career before the Revolution as a newspaper publisher. At the end of 1917 he was recmited by Dzerzhinsky to go on intelligence assignments to Finland under cover as a journalist and businessman. Before departing on his first mission in January 1918, Filippov gave a written undertaking “on a voluntary basis, without receiving payment, to pass on all the information which I hear in industrial, banking and particularly in conservative [nationalist] circles.”^ On January 4 Lenin publicly recognized the independence of Finland, formerly part of the Tsarist Empire, then immediately set about trying to subvert it. A putsch at the end of the month by Finnish Communists, supported by the Russian military and naval garrison in Helsinki, seized control of the capital and much of southern Finland. The Communists were quickly challenged by a defense corps of Finnish nationalists led by the former Tsarist officer General Karl Mannerheim.^ Filippov’s main Cheka assignment was to report on Mannerheim, his dealings with the Germans, and the mood of the sailors who had supported the putsch. Early in April 1918, however, German forces intervened in Finland, and by the end of the month both the Communist putsch and Filippov’s brief career as the first Soviet foreign agent were at an end.^ DURING THE CIVIL war, which began in May 1918 and continued for two and a half years, the Bolshevik regime had to fight for its survival against powerful but divided White Russian armies. Behind all the forces arraigned against them, the Bolshevik leaders saw a vast conspiracy orchestrated by Western capitalism. “What we are facing,” declared Lenin in July, “is a systematic, methodical and evidently long-planned military and financial counter-revolutionary campaign against the Soviet Republic, which all the representatives of Anglo- French imperialism have been preparing for months.”^ In reality, though the young Soviet regime had many enemies both at home and abroad, there was no carefully planned, well coordinated imperialist plot to bring it down. The illusion that such a plot existed, however, helped to shape the Cheka’s early operations against its imperialist foes. In the course of the civil war, the Cheka claimed to have uncovered and defeated a series of major conspiracies by Western governments and their intelligence agencies to overthrow the Bolshevik regime. The first such conspiracy in the summer of 1918 was the “envoys’ plot,” also known as the “Lockhart plot” (after its instigator, Robert Bruce Lockhart, a junior British diplomat). According to a KGB history published in 1979, “One could say without exaggeration that the shattering blow dealt by the Chekists to the conspirators was equivalent to victory in a major military battle.”^ That is what the Cheka had claimed in 1918 and what most of Mitrokhin’s colleagues continued to believe over half a century later. In reality, however, the “envoys’ plot” was mounted not by a coalition of capitalist governments but by a group of politically naive Western diplomats and adventurous secret agents who were left largely to their own devices during the chaotic early months of the Bolshevik regime and became involved in farcically inept attempts to overthrow it. The best-known of the secret agents was Sidney Reilly of the British Secret Intelligence Service (then known as Mile), whose exploits oscillated between high adventure and low farce, and whose increasing tendency to fantasy later led to his exclusion from SIS. Reilly announced his arrival in Moscow on May 7, 1918 in bizarre but characteristic fashion by marching up to the Kremlin gates, announcing that he was an emissary from the British prime minister, Lloyd George (who had probably never heard of him), and unsuccessfully demanding to see Lenin. By far the most sophisticated part of the “envoys’ plot” was devised not by the envoys themselves or their secret agents but by the Cheka, possibly at Lenin’s suggestion, as a trap for Western conspirators. In August 1918 the Cheka officer Yan Buikis, posing as an anti-Bolshevik conspirator named Shmidkhen, succeeded in persuading Lockhart, Reilly and the French consul-general that Colonel Eduard Berzin, commander of a Latvian regiment in the Kremlin (in reality a Cheka agent provocateur), was ready to lead an anti-Bolshevik rising. To finance Berzin’s proposed coup, Reilly gave him 1,200,000 roubles which Berzin promptly passed on to the Cheka. Reilly’s schemes for the coup varied. At one point he imagined himself leading a detachment of Latvian troops on to the stage of the Bolshoi Theatre during the Congress of Soviets, seizing Lenin, Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders, and shooting them on the spot. ^ ^ However, Reilly was also attracted by an alternative scheme not to execute Lenin and Trotsky, but instead to remove their trousers, parade them in their underpants through the streets of Moscow, and so “hold them up to ridicule before the world.”^^ Reilly’s fantasies however were overtaken by events. On August 30 the head of the Petrograd Cheka, Moisei Solomonovich Uritsky, was assassinated by a former member of the moderate Workers’ Popular Socialist Party, Leonid Kannegiser.^^ In an unrelated attack on the same day, Lenin was shot and seriously wounded by the Socialist Revolutionary, Fanya (Dora) Kaplan. “I shot Lenin because I believe him to be a traitor [to Socialism],” Kaplan told her Cheka interrogators.^^ In the aftermath of both shootings, Dzerzhinsky decided to wind up the “envoys’ plot,” which the Cheka itself had been largely responsible for orchestrating. On September 2 it was announced that the Cheka had “liquidated... the conspiracy organized by Anglo-French diplomats... to organize the capture of the Council of People’s Commissars and the proclamation of military dictatorship in Moscow; this was to be done by bribing Soviet troops.” Predictably, the statement made no mention of the fact that the plan to bribe Soviet troops and stage a military coup had been devised by the Cheka itself and that the diplomats had been drawn into the conspiracy by agents provocateurs relying on Okhrana tradecraft. On September 5 Dzerzhinsky and Zinovyev, the Petrograd Party boss, issued a further statement declaring that the Anglo-French conspirators had been the “organizers” of the attempt on Lenin’s life and the “real murderers” of Uritsky. Dzerzhinsky did not, however, reveal Reilly’s plan to remove Lenin’s and Trotsky’s trousers. Though happy to publicize, or invent. Western involvement in assassination plots against Lenin, the Cheka dared not disclose a plot to hold him up to ridicule. The attempt on Lenin’s life, the killing of Uritsky and the announcement of the “liquidation” of “the envoys’ plot” were quickly followed by the declaration of the Red Terror. With the Bolsheviks engaged in a bitter civil war against their White enemies, the Cheka set out to terrorize the regime’s opponents. Lenin himself, only three weeks before the attempt on his own life, had written to the Bolsheviks in Penza, and probably elsewhere, urging them to organize public executions to make the people “tremble” “for hundreds of kilometers around.” While still recovering from his wounds, he instructed, “It is necessary secretly — and urgently — to prepare the terror.” On October 15 Uritsky ’s successor in Petrograd, Gleb Ivanovich Boky, proudly reported to Moscow that 800 alleged counterrevolutionaries had been shot and another 6,229 imprisoned. Among those arrested, and probably executed, in Petrograd was the Cheka’s first foreign agent, Alexei Filippov. His liquidation was due, in all probability, not to the failure of his Finnish missions but to his “bourgeois” origins, which marked him down as an enemy of the people in the paranoid atmosphere of the Red Terror. Twenty years later Boky was himself to fall victim to the even greater paranoia of Stalin’s Terror. Berzin and Buikis, the Cheka agents provocateurs who had helped orchestrate the “envoys’ plot,” subsequently became victims of their own deception. Berzin’s career initially prospered. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for his role as agent provocateur, joined the Cheka and later became head of a forced labor camp in the Kolyma goldfields which had one of the highest death rates in Stalin’s gulag. In 1937, however, he was arrested and shot as an enemy of the people. The exact charges leveled against Berzin are not known, but it is likely that they included accusations that he had actually collaborated with Western plotters in 1918. In the somewhat paranoid Stalinist interpretation of the “envoys’ plot,” his collaborator Buikis (alias “Shmidkhen”) was portrayed as a covert counter-revolutionary rather than a Cheka officer carrying out his orders. That remained the accepted interpretation even in classified KGB histories during Mitrokhin’s early career. Buikis survived the Terror only by concealing his identity. Not until the mid- 1960s did research in the KGB archives reestablish “Shmidkhen’s” true identity and his real role in 1918.^^ Throughout Mitrokhin’s career, KGB historians continued to interpret all plots and attacks against the young Soviet regime as “manifestations of a unified conspiracy” by its class enemies at home and the “imperialist powers” abroad.^ ^ The reality was very different. Had there been “a unified conspiracy,” the regime would surely have lost the civil war. If two or three divisions of Western troops had landed in the Gulf of Finland in 1919, they could probably have forced their way to Moscow and overthrown the Bolsheviks. But in the aftermath of the First World War not even two or three divisions could be found. Those American, British, French and Japanese troops who intervened against the Red Army served mainly to discredit the White cause and thus actually to assist the Bolsheviks. They were too few to affect the military outcome of the civil war but quite sufficient to allow the Bolsheviks to brand their opponents as the tools of Western imperialism. Most Bolsheviks were, in any case, sincerely convinced that during the civil war they had faced a determined onslaught from the full might of Western capitalism. That illusion continued to color Soviet attitudes to the West throughout, and even beyond, the Stalin era. THE CHEKA’S INTELLIGENCE operations both at home and abroad were profoundly influenced not merely by the legacy of the Okhrana but also by the Bolsheviks’ own pre-Revolutionary experience as a largely illegal clandestine underground. Many of the Bolshevik leadership had become so used to living under false identities before 1917 that they retained their aliases even after the Revolution: among them the Russian nobleman Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov,^^ who kept the pseudonym Lenin, and the Georgian Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, who continued to be known as Stalin. Both Lenin and Stalin retained many of the habits of mind developed during their underground existence. On highly sensitive matters Lenin would insist no copy be made of his instructions and that the original either be returned to him for destruction or destroyed by the recipient. Happily for the historian, his instructions were not always carried out.^^ Stalin continued to doctor his own pre-Revolutionary record during the 1920s, changing even the day and year of his birth; the correct date (December 6, 1878) was not made public until 1996.^^ During a visit to the secret section of the Moscow Main Archives Directorate (Glavarkhiv), Mitrokhin was once shown an Okhrana file on Dzhugashvili. The file cover and title followed standard Okhrana format, but, on looking inside, Mitrokhin discovered that the contents had been entirely removed. The probability is that the Okhrana had compromising materials on the young Dzhugashvili, and that at the first opportunity Stalin arranged for the file to be gutted. In typical Soviet bureaucratic fashion, however, the cover was preserved since the existence of the file was indelibly recorded in the secret registers. Mitrokhin suspects that whoever emptied the file, presumably on Stalin’s instructions, was later eliminated to preserve the dark secret of its missing contents. What Stalin was most anxious to destroy may well have been evidence that he had been an Okhrana informer. Though it falls well short of conclusive proof, a possible trace of that evidence still survives. According to reports from an Okhrana agent discovered in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, Baku Bolsheviks before the First World War “confronted Dzhugashvili- Stalin with the accusation that he was a provocateur and an agent of the Security Police. And that he had embezzled Party funds. From almost the beginning of the civil war in 1918, in keeping with the Bolshevik tradition of operating under false identities, the Cheka began sending officers and agents under various disguises and pseudonyms behind enemy lines to gather intelligence. By June 1919 the number of these “illegals” was sufficiently large to require the foundation of an illegals operations department (later to become Directorate S of the KGB First Chief Directorate).^^ KGB classified histories note that henceforth “illegal” operations became “an inseparable part of foreign intelligence.” On December 20, 1920, the third anniversary of the Cheka’s foundation, a new foreign department (Innostranyi Otdel or INO) was set up to direct all operations beyond Soviet borders. During the early years of Soviet Russia, when the Communist regime remained an international pariah, it had few official missions abroad capable of providing official cover for “legal” intelligence stations (“residencies” in Cheka jargon) and thus relied chiefly on illegals. As diplomatic and trade missions were established in foreign capitals, each was given a “legal residency” headed by a “residenf’ whose identity was officially communicated only to the ambassador or head of the mission. Illegals, sometimes grouped in “illegal residencies,” operated without the benefit of diplomatic or official cover and reported directly to INO in Moscow.^^ During the civil war of 1918-20, foreign intelligence collection was of minor importance by comparison with the Cheka’s role in assisting the victory of the Red Army over its White enemies. Like the KGB later, the Cheka liked to quantify its successes. In the autumn of 1919, probably the turning point in the civil war, it proudly claimed that during the first nineteen months of its existence it had discovered and neutralized “412 underground anti-Soviet organizations.”^^ The Cheka’s most effective method of dealing with opposition was terror. Though its liking of quantification did not extend to calculating the number of its victims, it is clear that the Cheka enormously outstripped the Okhrana in both the scale and the ferocity of its onslaught on political opposition. In 1901, 4,113 Russians were in internal exile for political crimes, of whom only 180 were on hard labor. Executions for political crimes were limited to those involved in actual or attempted assassinations. During the civil war, by contrast, Cheka executions probably numbered as many as 250,000, and may well have exceeded the number of deaths in battle. At the time of the October Revolution, it had never occurred to Lenin that he and the Bolshevik leadership would be responsible for the rebirth of the Okhrana in a new and far more terrible form. In The State and Revolution, which he had almost completed in the summer of 1917, he had claimed that there would be no need for a police force, let alone a political police, after the Revolution. Though it would be necessary to arrange for “the suppression of the minority of exploiters by the majority of wage slaves of yesterday,” such suppression would be “comparatively easy.” The “proletarian dictatorship” which would preside over the rapid destruction of the bourgeois order would require a minimum of rules, regulation and bureaucracy. Lenin had never foreseen the possibility of mass opposition to a revolution carried out in the name of the people.^ ^ But, once in power, he used whatever methods were necessary to retain it, claiming always that the Bolsheviks were defending “the people’s power” and refusing to accept the reality that he had made himself the infallible leader (Vozhd) of the world’s first one-party state. APPROPRIATELY, THE MEMORIAL erected next to the Lubyanka in the closing years of the Soviet era to commemorate “the victims of totalitarian repression” consists of a large block of granite taken not from Stalin’s gulag but from a concentration camp established by Lenin on the shores of the White Sea in the autumn of 1918. Many Chekists regarded brutality against their class enemies as a revolutionary virtue. According to a report from the Cheka in Morshansk: He who fights for a better future will be merciless towards his enemies. He who seeks to protect poor people will harden his heart against pity and will become cruel. Even at a time when the Soviet regime was fighting for its survival during the civil war, many of its own supporters were sickened by the scale of the Cheka’s brutality. A number of Cheka interrogators, some only in their teens,^^ employed tortures of scarcely believable barbarity. In Kharkhov the skin was peeled off victims’ hands to produce “gloves” of human skin; in Voronezh naked prisoners were rolled around in barrels studded with nails; in Poltava priests were impaled; in Odessa, captured White officers were tied to planks and fed slowly into furnaces; in Kiev cages of rats were fixed to prisoners’ bodies and heated until the rats gnawed their way into the victims’ intestines. Though Lenin did not approve of such sadism, he was content to leave “excesses” to be corrected by Dzerzhinsky. Brushing aside complaints of Cheka brutality, he paid fulsome tribute to its role in helping to win the civil war. The Cheka, he claimed, had proved a “devastating weapon against countless conspiracies and countless attempts against Soviet power by people who are infinitely stronger than us”: Gentlemen capitalists of Russia and abroad! We know that it is not possible for you to love this establishment. Indeed, it is not! [The Cheka] has been able to counter your intrigues and your machinations as no one else could have done when you were smothering us, when you had surrounded us with invaders, and when you were organizing internal conspiracies and would stop at no crime in order to wreck our peaceful work.^^ Some of the most secret documents in Dzerzhinsky’s archive carry a note that only ten copies were to be made: one for Lenin, the rest for Cheka department chiefs. Lenin’s absorption in the affairs of the Cheka extended even to operational detail. He sent Dzerzhinsky advice on how to carry out searches and conduct surveillance, and instructed him that arrests were best carried out at night. Lenin also took a somewhat naive interest in the application of new technology to the hunt for counterrevolutionaries, telling Dzerzhinsky to construct a large electromagnet capable of detecting hidden weapons in house-to-house searches. Though the experiment was tried and failed, Dzerzhinsky had some difficulty in persuading Lenin that, “Magnets are not much use in searches. Far more important than Lenin’s sometimes eccentric interest in intelligence techniques and technology was his belief in the central importance of the Cheka to the defense of the Bolshevik one-party state against imperialism and counter-revolution. The extent of Lenin’s and Dzerzhinsky’s fear of imperialist subversion is well illustrated by their deep suspicion of the aid which they felt forced to accept in August 1921 from the American Relief Association (ARA) to feed millions of starving Soviet citizens. Lenin was convinced that the ARA was a front for United States intelligence, and ordered the closest surveillance of all its members. Once the ARA began work, he was equally convinced that it was using food as an instrument of subversion. He complained to Dzerzhinsky’s deputy, Iosif Stanislavovich Unshlikht, that foreign agents were “engaged in massive bribery oj hungry and tattered Chekists [Lenin’s emphasis]. The danger here is extremely great.” Lenin insisted that urgent steps be taken to “feed and clothe the Chekists” in order to remove them from imperialist temptation. Though the United States still had no peacetime espionage agency, the Cheka reported that over 200 of the 300 ARA staff, who were devoting all their energies to dealing with one of the most terrible famines in modem European history, were in reality undercover intelligence officers who “could become first-class instmctors for a counter-revolutionary uprising.” The Cheka also alleged that the ARA was building up a large food supply in Vienna so that “in the event of a coup [it] could provide immediate support to the White government. Lenin was far more exercised by the ARA’s non-existent intelligence operations than by the approximately five million Russians and Ukrainians who starved to death. Without the massive aid program of the ARA, which in 1922 was feeding up to eleven million people a day, the famine would have been far worse. Even after the ARA had departed, however, Soviet intelligence remained convinced that it had been, first and foremost, an espionage rather than a humanitarian agency. A quarter of a century later, all surviving Russian employees of ARA were made to sign confessions that they had been American spies. The priorities of Soviet intelligence under Lenin, and still more under Stalin, continued to be shaped by greatly exaggerated beliefs in an unrelenting conspiracy by Western governments and their intelligence agencies. To understand Soviet intelligence operations between the wars, it is frequently necessary to enter a world of smoke and mirrors where the target is as much the product of Bolshevik delusions as of real counter-revolutionary conspiracy. The Soviet propensity to conspiracy theory derived both from the nature of the one-party state and from its Marxist-Leninist ideology. All authoritarian regimes, since they regard opposition as fundamentally illegitimate, tend to see their opponents as engaged in subversive conspiracy. Bolshevik ideology further dictated that capitalist regimes could not fail to be plotting the overthrow of the world’s first and only worker- peasant state. If they were not visibly preparing an armed invasion, then their intelligence agencies must necessarily be secretly conspiring to subvert Soviet Russia from within. INO’S FIRST TWO heads served between them for a total of barely eighteen months. The first foreign intelligence chief to make his mark was Mikhail Abramovich Trilisser, appointed as head of INO in 1922 — ^undoubtedly with Lenin’s personal approval. Trilisser was a Russian Jew who had become a professional revolutionary in 1901 at the age of only eighteen. Like Dzerzhinsky, he had spent much of his early career in exile or in Tsarist prisons. Before the First World War, he had specialized in tracking down police spies among Bolshevik emigres. While serving with the Cheka in 1918, he was reputed to have been caught by “bandits” and hung from a tree, but to have been cut down just in time by Red forces who successfully revived him. Unlike any of his successors, Trilisser sometimes traveled abroad to meet INO agents. At least until Lenin was incapacitated by his third stroke in March 1923, he continued to take an active, though sometimes ill- informed, interest, in INO reports. He noted, for example, that somewhat inaccurate information received in 1922 from one of the Cheka’s few early British sources, the journalist Arthur Ransome (later famous as a children’s novelist), was “very important and, probably, fundamentally true.”^^ The early priorities of INO foreign operations, approved by Lenin, were: the identification, on the territory of each state, of counter-revolutionary groups operating against the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic; the thorough study of all organizations engaged in espionage against our country; the elucidation of the political course of each state and its economic situation; the acquisition of documentary material on all the above requirements.^^ The “counter-revolutionary groups” which were of most immediate concern to Lenin and the Cheka after the civil war were the remnants of the defeated White armies and the Ukrainian nationalists. After the last White forces left Russian soil late in 1920, they stood no realistic chance of mounting another serious challenge to Bolshevik rule. That, however, was not Lenin’s view. “A beaten army,” he declared, “learns much.” He estimated that there were one and a half to two million anti-Bolshevik Russian emigres: We can observe them all working together irrespective of their former political parties... They are skillfully taking advantage of every opportunity in order, in one way or another, to attack Soviet Russia and smash her to pieces ... These counter- revolutionary emigres are very well informed, excellently organized and good strategists.^^ In the early and mid- 1920s INO’s chief target thus became the emigre White Guards, based mainly in Berlin, Paris and Warsaw, who continued to plot — far less effectively than Lenin supposed — the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. The other “counter-revolutionary” threat which most concerned Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership came from Ukrainian nationalists, who had fought both Red and White forces in an attempt to win their independence. In the winter of 1920 and the spring of 1921 the entire Ukrainian countryside was in revolt against Bolshevik rule. Even after the brutal “pacification” of Ukraine by the Red Army and the Cheka, partisan groups who had taken refuge in Poland and Romania continued to make cross- border raids.^^ In the spring of 1922 the Ukrainian GPU received intelligence reports that Simon Petlyura’s Ukrainian govemment-in-exile had established a “partisan headquarters” under General Yurko Tutyunnik which was sending secret emissaries to the Ukraine to establish a nationalist underground.^^ The GPU was ordered not merely to collect intelligence on the emigre White Guards and Ukrainian nationalists but also to penetrate and destabilize them.^^ Its strategy was the same against both opponents — to establish bogus anti-Bolshevik undergrounds under GPU control which could be used to lure General Tutyunnik and the leading White generals back across the frontier. The first step in enticing Tutyunnik back to Ukraine (an operation codenamed CASE 39) was the capture of Zayamy, one of his “special duties” officers, who was caught crossing the frontier in 1922. Zayamy was successfully turned back by the GPU and sent to Tutyunnik’ s headquarters with bogus reports that an underground Supreme Military Council (Vysshaya Voyskovaya Rada or VVR) had been established in Ukraine and was anxious to set up an operational headquarters under Tutyunnik’ s leadership to wage war against the Bolsheviks. Tutyunnik was too cautious to return immediately but sent several emissaries who attended stage-managed meetings of the VVR, at which GPU officers disguised as Ukrainian nationalists reported the rapid growth of underground opposition to Bolshevik mle and agreed on the urgent need for Tutyunnik’ s leadership. Like Zayamy, one of the emissaries, Pyotr Stakhov, a close associate of Tutyunnik, was recmited by the GPU and used as a double agent. Attempts to persuade Tutyunnik himself to return to Ukraine finally succeeded on June 26, 1923.^^ Tutyunnik, with his bodyguard and aides, arrived at a remote hamlet on the Romanian bank of the river Dniester, where Zayamy met him with the news that the VVR and Pyotr Stakhov were waiting on the other side. At 1 1 p.m. a light from the Ukrainian bank signaled that it was safe for Tutyunnik and his entourage to cross the river. Still cautious, Tutyunnik sent his bodyguard to make sure that no trap had been laid for him. Stakhov returned with the bodyguard to reassure him. According to an OGPU report, Tutyunnik told him, “Pyotr, I know you and you know me. We won’t fool each other. The VVR is a fiction, isn’t it?” “That is impossible,” Stakhov replied. “I know them all, particularly those who are with me [today]. You know you can rely on me...” Tutyunnik got into the boat with Stakhov and crossed the Dniester. Once he was in the hands of the OGPU, letters written by Tutyunnik or in his name were sent to prominent Ukrainian nationalists abroad saying that their struggle was hopeless and that he had aligned himself irrevocably with the Soviet cause. He was executed six years later.^^ OPERATIONS AGAINST THE White Guards resembled those against Ukrainian nationalists. In 1922 the Berlin residency recruited the former Tsarist General Zelenin as a penetration agent within the emigre community. A later OGPU report claimed, possibly with some exaggeration, that Zelenin had engineered “a huge schism within the ranks of the Whites” and had caused a large number of officers to break away from Baron Peter Wrangel, the last of the White generals to be defeated in the civil war. Other OGPU moles praised for their work in disrupting the White Guards included General Zaitsev, former chief of staff to the Cossack Ataman A. 1. Dutov, and the ex- Tsarist General Yakhontov, who emigrated to the United States.^ ^ The OGPU’s greatest successes against the White Guards, however, were two elaborate deception operations, codenamed SINDIKAT (“Syndicate”) and TREST (“Trusf ’), both of which made imaginative use of agents provocateurs.^^ SINDIKAT was targeted against the man believed to be the most dangerous of all the White Guards: Boris Savinkov, a former Socialist Revolutionary terrorist who had served as deputy minister of war in the provisional government overthrown in the Bolshevik Revolution. Winston Churchill, among others, was captivated by his anti-Bolshevik fervor. “When all is said and done,” Churchill wrote later, “and with all the stains and tarnishes there be, few men tried more, gave more, dared more and suffered more for the Russian people.” During the Russo-Polish War of 1920, Savinkov was largely responsible for recruiting the Russian People’s Army which fought under Polish command against the Red Army. Early in 1921 he founded a new organization in Warsaw dedicated to the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime: the People’s Union for Defence of Country and Freedom (NSZRiS), which ran an agent network inside Soviet Russia to collect intelligence on the Bolsheviks and plan uprisings against the regime. The first stage of the operation against Savinkov, SINDIKAT-1, successfully neutralized the NSZRiS agent network with the help of a Cheka mole within his organization. Forty-four leading members of the NSZRiS were paraded at a show trial in Moscow in August 1921.^^ SINDIKAT-2 was aimed at luring Savinkov back to Russia to star in a further show trial and complete the demoralization of his emigre supporters. Classified KGB histories give the main credit for the operation to the head of the OGPU counter-intelligence department, Artur Khristyanovich Artuzov (later head of INO), the Russian son of an immigrant Swiss-Italian cheesemaker, assisted by Andrei Pavlovich Fyodorov and Grigori Sergeyevich Syroyezhkin.^^ Though SINDIKAT-2 made skillful use of agents provocateurs, however, KGB records fail to acknowledge how much they were assisted by Savinkov’ s own increasing tendency to fantasize. During a visit to London late in 1921 he claimed improbably that the head of the Russian trade delegation had suggested that he join the Soviet government. Savinkov also alleged that Lloyd George and his family had welcomed him at Chequers by singing “God Save the Tsar”; in reality, the song was a hymn sung in Welsh by a Welsh choir at a pre-Christmas celebration. In July 1923 Fedorov, posing as a member of an anti-Bolshevik underground, visited Savinkov in Paris, where he had installed his headquarters after the collapse of the NSZRiS, and persuaded him to send his aide. Colonel Sergei Pavlovsky, back to Russia with Fedorov for secret talks with the non-existent underground. Once in Moscow, Pavlovsky was turned in by the OGPU and used to lure Savinkov himself to Russia for further talks. On August 15 Savinkov crossed the Russian border with some of his supporters and walked straight into an OGPU trap. Under OGPU interrogation Savinkov’ s resistance swiftly collapsed. At a show trial on August 27 Savinkov made an abject confession of his counter-revolutionary sins: I unconditionally recognize Soviet power and no other. To every Russian who loves his country I, who have traversed the entire road of this bloody, heavy struggle against you, I who refuted you as no one else did, I tell you that if you are a Russian, if you love your people, you will bow down to worker- peasant power and recognize it without any reservations.^^ The deception of Savinkov continued even after he was sentenced to fifteen years in jail. He failed to realize that his cellmate, V. I. Speransky, was an OGPU officer, later promoted for his success in gaining Savinkov’ s confidence and surreptitiously debriefing him over a period of eight months. Savinkov did not long survive Speransky ’s final report on him. KGB files appear to contain no contemporary record of how he met his death. According to the SVR’s implausible current version of events, Savinkov fell or jumped from an upper-story window after a congenial “drinking bout with a group of Chekists” — despite a heroic attempt to save him by Grigori Syroyezhkin.^^ It seems more likely that Syroyezhkin pushed him to his death.^^ Even more successful than SINDIKAT was operation TREST, the cover name given to a fictitious monarchist underground, the Monarchist Association of Central Russia (MOR), first invented by Artuzov in 1921 and used as the basis of a six-year deception.^^ By 1923 the OGPU officer Aleksandr Yakushev, posing as a secret MOR member able to travel abroad in his official capacity as a Soviet foreign trade representative, had won the confidence during visits to Paris of both Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, cousin of the late Tsar Nicholas II, and General Aleksandr Kutepov of the [White] Russian Combined Services Union (ROVS). The leading victim of the deception, however, was the former SIS agent Sidney Reilly, an even greater fantasist than Savinkov. Reilly had become a tragicomic figure whose hold on reality was increasingly uncertain. According to one of his secretaries, Eleanor Toye, “Reilly used to suffer from severe mental crises amounting to delusion. Once he thought he was Jesus Christ.” The OGPU, however, failed to grasp that Reilly was now of little significance, regarding him instead as a British masterspy and one of its most dangerous opponents. On September 26, 1925 it succeeded in luring him, like Savinkov a year before. across the Russian frontier to a meeting with bogus MOR conspirators.^^ Reilly’s resistance after his arrest did not last much longer than Savinkov’s. His KGB file contains a letter, probably authentic, to Dzerzhinsky dated October 30, 1925, in which he promised to reveal all he knew about British and American intelligence as well as Russian emigres in the West. Six days later Reilly was taken for a walk in the woods near Moscow and, without warning, shot from behind. According to an OGPU report, he “let out a deep breath and fell without a cry.” Among those who accompanied him on his final walk in the woods was Grigori Syroyezhkin, the probable assassin of Savinkov a year earlier. Reilly’s corpse was put on private display in the Lubyanka sickbay to allow OGPU officers to celebrate their triumph.^ ^ Appropriately for a career in which myth and reality had become inextricably confused, rumors circulated for many years in the West that Reilly had escaped execution and adopted a new identity. The TREST deception was finally exposed in 1927, to the embarrassment of the intelligence services of Britain, France, Poland, Finland and the Baltic states who had all, in varying degrees, been taken in by it.^^ AS WEFF AS engaging in permanent conflict with counter-revolution, both real and imagined, Soviet intelligence between the wars also became increasingly successful in penetrating the main imperialist powers. It had two major operational advantages over Western intelligence agencies. First, while security in Moscow became obsessional, much Western security remained feeble. Secondly, the Communist parties and their “fellow travelers” in the West gave Soviet intelligence a major source of ideological recruits of which it took increasing advantage. While operation TREST was at its height, INO, the OGPU’s foreign intelligence service, succeeded in making its first major penetration of the British foreign service. The penetration agent was an Italian messenger in the British embassy in Rome, Francesco Constantini (codenamed DUNCAN), who was recruited in 1924 by the OGPU residency with the help of an Italian Communist, Alfredo Allegretti, who had worked as a Russian embassy clerk before the Revolution. Despite his lowly status, Constantini had access to a remarkable range of diplomatic secrets. Until the Second World War, the Foreign Office did not possess a single security officer, let alone a security department. Security in many British embassies was remarkably lax. In Rome, according to Sir Andrew Noble, who was stationed at the embassy in the mid- 1930s, it was “virtually non-existent.” Embassy servants had access to the keys to red boxes and filing cabinets containing classified documents, as well as — probably — the number of the combination lock on the embassy safe. Even when two copies of a diplomatic cipher were missing in 1925, it did not occur to British diplomats that they might have been removed by Constantini — as they almost certainly were.^^ For more than a decade Francesco Constantini handed over a great variety of diplomatic documents and cipher material. Probably from an early stage he also involved his brother, Secondo, who worked as an embassy servant, in the theft of documents. In addition to despatches on Anglo-Italian relations exchanged between London and the Rome embassy, Constantini was often able to supply the “confidential print” of selected documents from the Foreign Office and major British missions designed to give ambassadors an overview of current foreign policy. By January 1925 he was providing, on average, 150 pages of classified material a week. Constantini made no secret of his motives. The Rome residency reported to the Centre, “He collaborates with us exclusively for money, and does not conceal the fact. He has set himself the goal of becoming a rich man, and that is what he strives for.” In 1925 the Centre pronounced Constantini its most valuable agent. Convinced of a vast, nonexistent British plot to destroy the Soviet state, it counted on agent DUNCAN to provide early warning of a British attack, and instructed the Rome residency: England is now the organizing force behind a probable attack on the USSR in the near future. A continuous hostile cordon [of states] is being formed against us in the West. In the East, in Persia, Afghanistan and China we observe a similar picture ... Your task (and consider it a priority) is to provide documentary and agent materials which reveal the details of the English plan. The Rome residency’s pride in running the OGPU’s leading agent is reflected in its flattering descriptions of him. Constantini was said to have the face of “an ancient Roman,” and to be known to his many female admirers as “the handsome one.”^^ By 1928 the OGPU suspected him — accurately — of also supplying documents to Italian intelligence. Despite suspicions about Constantini ’s honesty, however, there was no mistaking the importance of the material he supplied. Maksim Litvinov, who by the late 1920s was the dominating figure in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, pronounced it “of great use to me.”^^ THE OGPU’S FIRST successful penetration of the British foreign service was overshadowed in 1927 by an embarrassing series of well-publicized intelligence failures. The security of the rapidly expanding foreign network of OGPU and Fourth Department (Military Intelligence) residencies was threatened by the vulnerability of early Soviet cipher systems to Western cryptanalysts, by the inexperience of some of the first generation of INO officers, and by errors in the selection and training of foreign Communists as agents. The International Liaison Department (OMS) of the Communist International provided a ready pool of enthusiastic volunteers for Soviet intelligence operations. Some, such as the German Richard Sorge, were to be numbered among the greatest spies of the century. Others ignored orthodox tradecraft and neglected standard security procedures. In the spring of 1927 there were dramatic revelations of Soviet espionage in eight different countries. In March a major OGPU spy ring was uncovered in Poland; a Soviet trade official was arrested for espionage in Turkey; and the Swiss police announced the arrest of two Russian spies. In April a police raid on the Soviet consulate in Beijing uncovered a mass of incriminating intelligence documents; and the French Surete, arrested members of a Soviet spy ring in Paris run by Jean Cremet, a leading French Communist. In May Austrian foreign ministry officials were found passing classified information to the OGPU residency, and the British Home Secretary indignantly announced to the House of Commons the discovery of “one of the most complete and one of the most nefarious spy systems that it has ever been my lot to meet.”^^ Following this last discovery, Britain — still regarded in the Soviet Union as the leading world power and its most dangerous enemy — formally broke off diplomatic relations, and senior ministers read out to the Commons decrypted extracts from intercepted Soviet telegrams. To tighten the security of Soviet diplomatic and OGPU communications after the dramatic revelation of British codebreaking successes, the laborious but virtually unbreakable “one-time pad” cipher system was introduced. As a result, Western cryptanalysts were able to decrypt almost no further high-grade Soviet communications until after the Second World War.^^ THE MOST WORRYSOME as well as the most plentiful foreign intelligence in 1927 concerned Japan. Since 1925 INO had been able to intercept the secret communications of both Japan’s military mission and its consulate-general in the northeast Chinese city of Harbin. Remarkably, instead of using diplomatic bags and their own couriers, Japanese official representatives in Harbin corresponded with Tokyo via the Chinese postal service. The OGPU recruited the Chinese employees who were used to take Japanese official despatches to the Harbin post office, and sent expert teams of letter-openers to examine and photograph the despatches, before sending them on their way in new envelopes with copies of Japanese seals. Professor Matsokin, a Japanese specialist from Moscow,^^ was employed by INO in Harbin to peruse the despatches and send translations of the most important promptly to the Centre. There was ample evidence in the intercepts forwarded to Moscow of designs by the Japanese military on China and the Soviet Far East. But the most troubling document, intercepted in July 1927, was a secret memorandum written by Baron Gi-ishi Tanaka, the Japanese prime minister and foreign minister, which advocated the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia as a prelude to Japanese domination over the whole of China, and predicted that Japan “would once again have to cross swords with Russia.”^ ^ A second copy of the memorandum was obtained in Japanese-occupied Korea by the residency at Seoul, headed by Ivan Andreevich Chichayev (later wartime resident in London). A Japanese interpreter, codenamed ANO, recruited by the INO residency, succeeded in extracting the document, along with other secret material, from the safe of the Japanese police chief in Seoul. A copy of the Tanaka memorandum was later leaked by INO to the American press to give the impression that it had been obtained by an agent working for the United States. As recently as 1997 an SVR official history continued to celebrate the simultaneous acquisition of the memorandum in Harbin and Seoul as “an absolutely unique occurrence in intelligence operations. Though somewhat exaggerated, this judgment accurately reflects the enormous importance attached at the time to the discovery of Tanaka’s prediction of war with Russia. The acute anxiety in Moscow caused by the breach of diplomatic relations with Britain and the apparent threat from Japan was clearly reflected in an alarmist article by Stalin, published a few days after he received the Tanaka memorandum: IT IS HARDLY open to doubt that the chief contemporary question is that of the threat of a new imperialist war. It is not a question of some indefinite and immaterial “danger” of a new war. It is a matter of a real and material threat of a new war in general, and war against the USSR in particular.^^ The fact that Constantini had failed to provide anything remotely resembling a British version of the Tanaka memorandum did not lead either Stalin or the conspiracy theorists of the Centre to conclude that Britain had no plans to attack the Soviet Union. They believed instead that greater efforts were required to penetrate the secret councils of the Western warmongers. Stalin, who had emerged as the clear victor in the three-year power struggle which followed Lenin’s death, demanded more intelligence on the (mostly imaginary) Western plots against the Soviet Union which he was sure existed. In an effort to make Soviet espionage less detectable and more deniable, the main responsibility for intelligence collection was shifted from “legal” to “illegal” residencies, which operated independently of Soviet diplomatic and trade missions. In later years the establishment of a new illegal residency became an immensely timeconsuming operation which involved years of detailed training and the painstaking construction of “legends” to give the illegals false identities. The largely improvised attempt to expand the illegal network rapidly in the late 1920s and early 1930s, without the detailed preparation which later became mandatory, brought into OGPU foreign operations both unconventional talent and a number of confidence tricksters. Among the secret scandals discovered by Mitrokhin in KGB files was that of the illegal residency established in Berlin in 1927 with the Austrian Bertold Karl Ilk as resident and Moritz Weinstein as his deputy. A later investigation concluded that the Centre should have noted the “suspicious speed” with which the Ilk- Weinstein residency claimed to be expanding its agent network. Within two months it was reporting operations in Britain, France and Poland as well as in Germany. Ilk refused to provide more than sketchy information on his agents’ identity on security grounds. His failure to supply detailed biographies was reluctantly accepted by the Centre, which was still reeling from the widespread unmasking of OGPU networks in the spring of 1927. It gradually became clear, however, that the core of the Ilk- Weinstein illegal network consisted of their own relatives and that some elements of it were pure invention. Its agent operations in Britain and France were discovered to be “plain bluff,” though an effective way of obtaining funds from the Centre for Ilk and Weinstein. The network in Germany and Poland, while not wholly fictitious, was under surveillance by the local police and security services. The Centre closed down the entire residency in 1933, though without attracting the publicity occasioned by the intelligence failures of 1927.^^ THE MAIN INFLUENCE on the evolution of the OGPU and its successors during the Stalinist era was the change in the nature of the Soviet state. Much of what was later called “Stalinism” was in reality the creation of Lenin: the cult of the infallible leader, the one-party state and a huge security service with a ubiquitous system of surveillance and a network of concentration camps to terrorize the regime’s opponents. But while Lenin’s one-party state left room for comradely debate within the ruling party, Stalin used the OGPU to stifle that debate, enforce his own narrow orthodoxy and pursue vendettas against opponents both real and imagined. The most vicious and long-lasting of those vendettas was against Leon Trotsky, Lenin’s former Commissar for War. In its early stages at least, the OGPU’s campaign against Trotsky and his supporters was characterized by a bizarre combination of brutality and farce. When Trotsky refused to recant and admit his “crimes against the Party,” he was sent into internal exile at Alma-Ata, a town in a remote comer of Kazakhstan on the Chinese border. The OGPU detachment which came to his Moscow flat on the morning of January 17, 1928 to take him into exile found Trotsky still in his pajamas. When he refused to come out. the OGPU broke down the door. Trotsky was surprised to recognize the officer leading the detachment as one of his former bodyguards from the civil war. Overcome with emotion at the sight of the ex-Commissar for War, the officer broke down and sobbed, “Shoot me. Comrade Trotsky, shoot me.” Trotsky calmed him down, told him it was his duty to obey orders however reprehensible, and adopted a posture of passive resistance while the OGPU removed his pajamas, put on his clothes and carried him to a car waiting to transport him to the Trans-Siberian Express. Save for a few hunting trips, Trotsky spent most of his time in Alma-Ata at his desk. Between April and October 1928 he sent his supporters about 550 telegrams and 800 “political letters,” some of them lengthy polemical tracts. During the same period he received 700 telegrams and 1,000 letters from various parts of the Soviet Union, but believed that at least as many more had been confiscated en route. Every item in Trotsky’s intercepted correspondence was carefully noted by the OGPU, and monthly digests of them were sent both to Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky (Dzerzhinsky’s successor) and to Stalin. Stalin, who never failed to overreact to opposition, cannot but have been unfavorably impressed by letters which regularly described him and his supporters as “degenerates.” OGPU reports on Trotsky and his followers were written in a tone of selfrighteous outrage. No counter- revolutionary group since the October Revolution, it declared, had dared to behave “as insolently, boldly and defiantly” as the Trotskyists. Even when brought in for interrogation, Trotsky’s supporters refused to be intimidated by their interrogators. Most declined to reply to questions. Instead they submitted impudent written protests, such as: “I consider the struggle I am engaged in to be a Party matter. I shall explain myself to the Central Control Commission, not to the OGPU.” Early in 1928 the OGPU carried out its first mass arrests of Trotskyists, incarcerating several hundred of them in Moscow’s Butyrka prison. The Butyrka, however, had not yet descended into the brutal squalor for which it became infamous during the Great Terror a decade later, nor had the spirit of Trotsky’s followers been broken. On their first night in prison the Trotskyists staged a riot, kicking down doors, breaking windows and chanting politically incorrect slogans. “Such,” reported the OGPU indignantly, “was the behavior of the embittered enemies of the Party and Soviet power. The liquidation of the Trotskyist heresy and the maintenance of ideological orthodoxy within the Communist one-party state required, in Stalin’s view, Trotsky’s removal from the Soviet Union. In February 1929 the great heretic was deported to Turkey and given 1,500 dollars by an OGPU escort to enable him to “settle abroad.”^ ^ With Trotsky out of the country, the tone of OGPU reports on the destabilization and liquidation of his rapidly dwindling band of increasingly demoralized followers became more confident. According to one report, “a massive retreat from Trotskyism began in the second half of 1929.” Some of those who recanted were turned into OGPU agents to inform on their friends. The same report boasts of the subtlety of the methods used to undermine the credibility of the “counter-revolutionary” hard core. Individual Trotskyists were summoned to OGPU offices from their workplaces, left standing around in the corridors for several hours, then released without explanation. On returning to work they could give no credible account of what had happened. When the process was repeated their workmates became increasingly suspicious and tended to believe rumors planted by the OGPU that they were employed by them as informers. Once the “counter-revolutionaries” were discredited, they were then arrested for their political crimes. Stalin, however, was far from reassured. He increasingly regretted the decision to send Trotsky abroad rather than keep him in the Soviet Union, where he could have been put under constant surveillance. One episode only six months after Trotsky was sent into exile seems to have made a particular impression on Stalin. In the summer of 1929 Trotsky received a secret visit from a sympathizer within the OGPU, Yakov Blyumkin. As a young and impetuous Socialist Revolutionary in the Cheka in 1918, Blyumkin had assassinated the German ambassador in defiance of orders from Dzerzhinsky. With Trotsky’s help, however, he had been rehabilitated and had risen to become chief illegal resident in the Middle East. Blyumkin agreed to transmit a message from Trotsky to Karl Radek, one of his most important former supporters, and to try to set up lines of communication with what Trotsky termed his “cothinkers” in the Soviet Union. Trilisser, the head of foreign intelligence, was probably alerted to Blyumkin’s visit by an OGPU agent in Trotsky’s entourage. He did not, however, order Blyumkin’s immediate arrest. Instead he arranged an early version of what later became known as a “honey trap.” Trilisser instructed an attractive OGPU agent, Yelizaveta Yulyevna Gorskaya (better known as “Lisa,” or “Vixen”), to “abandon bourgeois prejudices,” seduce Blyumkin, discover the full extent of his collaboration with Trotsky, and ensure his return to the Soviet Union. Once lured back to Moscow, Blyumkin was interrogated, tried in secret and shot. According to the later OGPU defector Aleksandr Mikhailovich Orlov, Blyumkin’s last words before his execution were, “Long live Trotsky!” Soon afterwards “Lisa” Gorskaya married the OGPU resident in Berlin (and later in New York), Vasili Mikhailovich Zarubin. As Stalin became increasingly preoccupied during the early 1930s with the opposition to him within the Communist Party, he began to fear that there were other. undiscovered Blyumkins within INO. But Trotsky himself had not yet been targeted for assassination. The main “enemies of the people” outside the Soviet Union were still considered to be the White Guards. General Kutepov, the head of the ROVS in Paris, was brave, upright, teetotal, politically naive and an easy target for the OGPU. His entourage was skillfully penetrated by Soviet agents, and agents provocateurs brought him optimistic news of a nonexistent anti-Bolshevik underground. “Great movements are spreading across Russia!” Kutepov declared in November 1929. “Never have so many people come from ‘over there’ to see me and ask me to collaborate with their clandestine organizations.” Unlike Savinkov and Reilly, however, Kutepov resisted attempts to lure him back to Russia for meetings with the bogus anti-Communist conspirators. With Stalin’s approval, the OGPU thus decided to kidnap him instead and bring him back for interrogation and execution in Moscow. Overall planning of the Kutepov operation was given to Yakov Isaakovich (“Yasha”) Serebryansky, head of the euphemistically titled “Administration for Special Tasks. Before the Second World War, the administration functioned as a parallel foreign intelligence service, reporting directly to the Centre with special responsibility for sabotage, abduction and assassination operations on foreign soil.^^ Serebryansky later became a severe embarrassment to official historians anxious to distance Soviet foreign intelligence from the blood-letting of the late 1930s and portray it as a victim rather than a perpetrator of the Great Terror. An SVR- sponsored history published in 1993 claimed that Serebryansky was “not a regular member of State Security,” but “only brought in for special jobs. KGB files show that, on the contrary, he was a senior OGPU officer whose Administration for Special Tasks grew into an elite service, more than 200-strong, dedicated to hunting down “enemies of the people” on both sides of the Atlantic. Detailed preparations for the kidnaping of Kutepov were entrusted by Serebryansky to his illegal Paris resident, V. I. Speransky, who had taken part in the deception of Savinkov six years earlier.^ ^ On the morning of Sunday, January 26, 1930 Kutepov was bundled into a taxi in the middle of a street in Paris’s fashionable seventh arrondissement. Standing nearby was a Communist Paris policeman who had been asked to assist by Speransky so that any bystander who saw the kidnaping (one did) would mistake it for a police arrest. Though the Centre commended the kidnaping as “a brilliant operation,” the chloroform used to overpower Kutepov proved too much for the general’s weak heart. He died aboard a Soviet steamer while being taken back to Russia. The Kutepov operation was to set an important precedent. In the early and mid- 1930s the chief Soviet foreign intelligence priority remained intelligence collection. During the later years of the decade, however, all other operations were to be subordinated to “special tasks.” THREE THE GREAT ILLEGALS On January 30, 1930 the Politburo (effectively the ruling body of both the Party and the Soviet Union) met to review INO operations and ordered it to increase intelligence collection in three target areas: Britain, France and Germany (the leading European powers); the Soviet Union’s western neighbors, Poland, Romania, Finland and the Baltic states; and Japan, its main Asian rival. ^ The United States, which established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union only in 1933, was not mentioned. Though the first Soviet illegal had been sent across the Atlantic as early as 1921,^ the USA’s relative isolation from world affairs made American intelligence collection still a secondary priority.^ On Politburo instructions, the main expansion of INO operations was achieved through increasing the number of illegal residencies, each with up to seven (in a few cases as many as nine) illegal officers. By contrast, even in Britain and France legal residencies operating under diplomatic cover in Soviet embassies had three officers at most and sometimes only one. Their main function was to provide channels of communications with the Centre and other technical support for the more highly regarded illegals.^ During the 1920s both legal and illegal residencies had had the right to decide what agents to recruit and how to recruit them. On succeeding Trilisser as head of INO in 1930, however, Artur Artuzov, the hero of the SINDIKAT and TREST operations, complained that the existing agent network contained “undesirable elements.” He decreed that future agent recruitment required the authorization of the Centre. Partly because of problems of communication, his instructions were not always carried out.^ The early and mid- 1930s were to be remembered in the history of Soviet foreign intelligence as the era of the “Great Illegals,” a diverse group of remarkably talented individuals who collectively transformed OGPU agent recruitment and intelligence collection. Post-war illegals had to endure long training periods designed to establish their bogus identities, protect their cover and prepare them for operations in the West. Their pre-war predecessors were successful partly because they had greater freedom from bureaucratic routine and more opportunity to use their own initiative. But they also had to contend with far softer targets than their successors. By the standards of the Cold War, most inter- war Western security systems were primitive. The individual flair of the Great Illegals combined with the relative vulnerability of their targets to give some of their operations a much more unorthodox, at times even eccentric, character than those of the Cold War. Some of the ablest of the Great Illegals were not Russians at all, but cosmopolitan, multilingual Central Europeans who had worked in the Comintern underground before joining the OGPU and shared a visionary faith in the Communist millennium.^ Arnold Deutsch, the chief recruiter of students and young graduates at Cambridge University (discussed in chapter 4), was an Austrian Jew. The most successful of the Fourth Department (Military Intelligence) illegals was the German Richard Sorge, later described by one of his Comintern admirers as a “startlingly good-looking ... romantic, idealistic scholar,” who exuded charm. ^ While Surge’s main successes were achieved posing as a Nazi journalist in Japan, those of the OGPU/NKVD illegals mostly took place in Europe. Though the Great Illegals are nowadays best remembered, particularly in Britain, for their recruitment of young, talented, ideological agents, their first major successes were the less glamorous but scarcely less important acquisition of diplomatic ciphers and documents from agents motivated by money and sex rather than ideology. Codebreaking is often supposed to depend on little more than the cryptanalytic genius of brilliant mathematicians, nowadays assisted by huge networks of computers. In reality, most major twentieth- century codebreaking coups on which information is available have been assisted — sometimes crucially — ^by agent intelligence on code and cipher systems. Tsarist codebreakers had led the world chiefly because of their skill in stealing or purchasing the codes and ciphers of foreign powers. Ten years before the First World War the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir Charles Hardinge, discovered that his head Chancery servant had been offered the then enormous sum of 1,000 pounds to steal the embassy’s main cipher. Though the Okhrana failed on this occasion, it succeeded on many others. Hardinge was disconcerted to be told by a Russian statesman that he “did not mind how much I reported in writing what he had told me in conversation, but he begged me on no account to telegraph as all our [ciphered] telegrams are known!” The Okhrana became the first modem intelligence service to make one of its major priorities the theft of foreign ciphers to assist its codebreakers. In so doing it set an important precedent for its Soviet successors.^ Research on the making of Stalin’s foreign policy has, as yet, barely begun to take account of the large volume of Western diplomatic traffic which the Great Illegals and the codebreakers were instmmental in providing. THE DOCUMENTS OBTAINED from Francesco Constantini in the British embassy in Rome from 1924 onwards included important cipher material.^ KGB records, however, give the main credit for the OGPU’s early successes in obtaining foreign diplomatic ciphers to the most flamboyant of the Great Illegals, Dmitri Aleksandrovich Bystroletov, codenamed HANS or ANDREI, who operated abroad under a series of aliases, including several bogus titles of nobility. His was one of the portraits of the leading heroes of foreign intelligence later chosen to hang on the walls of the secret “memory room” at the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate in Yasenevo (now the headquarters of the SVR). Bystroletov was a strikingly handsome, multilingual extrovert, bom in 1901, the illegitimate son of a Kuban Cossack mother and — Bystroletov later persuaded himself — the celebrated novelist Aleksei Tolstoy. A hagiography of Bystroletov’ s career published by the SVR in 1995 unsurprisingly fails to mention either his fantasy about the identity of his father or the fact that one of his first claims to fame within the OGPU was the seduction of female staff with access to classified documents in foreign embassies and ministries: a technique later employed on a larger scale by Soviet Bloc intelligence agencies in operations such as the “secretaries offensive” in West Germany. A report noted by Mitrokhin quaintly records that Bystroletov “quickly became on close terms with women and shared their beds.” His first major conquest for the OGPU occurred in Prague, where in 1927 he seduced a 29-year-old woman in the French embassy whom the OGPU codenamed LAROCHE. Over the next two years LAROCHE gave Bystroletov copies of both French diplomatic ciphers and classified communications. Bystroletov ’s unconventional flamboyance may help to explain why he never achieved officer rank in Soviet intelligence and remained simply an illegal agent/^ attached in the early 1920s and late 1930s to the illegal Berlin residency of Boris Bazarov (codenamed KIN).^^ Unlike Bystroletov, more conventional OGPU officers missed a number of opportunities to recruit agents with access to diplomatic ciphers. One such opportunity, which later led to a personal rebuke by Stalin to the OGPU personnel responsible, occurred in Paris in August 1928. A stranger, later identified as the Swiss businessman and adventurer Giovanni de Ry (codenamed ROSSI), presented himself at the Soviet embassy and asked to see the military attache, or the first secretary. According to a later account by Bystroletov based on an embassy report, de Ry was a short man whose red nose contrasted colorfully with his yellow briefcase. He allegedly told the OGPU resident, Vladimir Voynovich:^^ This briefcase contains the codes and ciphers of Italy. You, no doubt, have copies of the ciphered telegrams of the local Italian embassy. Take the briefcase and check the authenticity of its contents. Once you have satisfied yourself that they are genuine, photograph them and give me 200,000 French francs. De Ry also offered to provide future Italian diplomatic ciphers for a similar sum. Voynovich took the ciphers into a back room, where they were photographed by his wife. He then returned the originals to de Ry, denounced them as forgeries, ordered him out of the embassy and threatened to call the police. Though the Centre later changed its mind, at the time it commended Voynovich for his astuteness in obtaining Italian ciphers at no cost to theOGPU.19 Exactly a year later, in August 1929, there was another, similar walk-in at the Paris embassy. On this occasion the visitor was a cipher clerk from the Foreign Office Communications Department, Ernest Holloway Oldham, then accompanying a British trade delegation in Paris. Voynovich seems to have tried to repeat the deception practiced on de Ry a year earlier. Oldham, however, was more cautious than de Ry, brought no cipher material with him, tried to prevent his identity being discovered and sought to limit his contact with the OGPU to a single transaction. He identified himself only as “Charlie,” misled Voynovich by claiming to work in the Foreign Office printing department, and announced that he could obtain a copy of the British diplomatic cipher. Oldham asked for 50,000 pounds, Voynovich beat him down to 10,000 pounds and they agreed on a meeting in Berlin early the following year.^^ Before that meeting took place, the work of the Paris embassy and OGPU residency was disrupted by the defection of the Soviet charge d’affaires, Grigori Besedovsky, in October 1929. Accused of counter- revolutionary “plotting,” Besedovsky made a dramatic escape over the embassy wall, pursued by OGPU guards who had orders to return him to Moscow for interrogation and, almost certainly, execution. Besedovsky ’s memoirs, published in 1930, caused outrage in the Centre. They denounced Stalin as “the embodiment of the most senseless type of oriental despotism,” and revealed a number of OGPU secrets: among them the offers of Italian and British ciphers to the Paris residency by unidentified walk-ins.^ ^ These revelations led to Bystroletov’s urgent recall to Moscow. At the Lubyanka, Abram Aronovich Slutsky (later head of foreign intelligence) showed him a copy of Besedovsky’ s memoirs. Opposite the reference to the deception of de Ry, the unidentified walk-in who had provided Italian ciphers in 1928, the instruction “Reopen!” had been penciled in the margin by Stalin himself Slutsky instructed Bystroletov to return to Paris at once, discover the identity of the walk-in swindled two years earlier, renew contact and obtain further ciphers from him. “Where can I find him?” Bystroletov asked. “That’s your business,” Slutsky replied. “You have six months to track him down.”^^ Bystroletov ran de Ry to ground in a Geneva bar. Believing that, after the fraud practiced on him in Paris two years earlier, de Ry might reject an approach from the OGPU, Bystroletov decided to use what later became known as the “false flag” technique and pretended to be working for the Japanese intelligence service. Though de Ry was not deceived for long by the “false flag,” he agreed to sell further Italian ciphers which he claimed to be able to obtain from a corrupt Italian diplomat. Future meetings with de Ry usually took place in Berlin, where the diplomat was allegedly stationed. KGB records, possibly incomplete, show that de Ry was paid at least 200,000 French francs. Bystroletov was also given the task of tracing the unidentified British walk-in (Ernest Oldham) who had offered to sell Foreign Office ciphers to the Paris residency. In April 1930, at the meeting arranged in the previous year, Oldham (codenamed ARNO by the OGPU) handed over only part of a diplomatic cipher, probably as a precaution against being double-crossed, and demanded a 6,000-dollar down-payment before providing the rest. The OGPU tried to locate him after the meeting but discovered that he had given a false address.^^ Probably soon after his first meeting with de Ry, Bystroletov succeeded in tracking down Oldham in a Paris bar, struck up a conversation with him, won his confidence and booked into the hotel where he was staying. There Bystroletov revealed himself to Oldham and his wife Lucy as an impoverished Hungarian aristocrat who had fallen, like Oldham, into the clutches of Soviet intelligence. With his wife’s approval, Oldham agreed to provide Foreign Office ciphers and other classified documents to Bystroletov to pass on to the OGPU. Oldham was given a first payment of 6,000 dollars, a second of 5,000 dollars, then 1,000 dollars a month. Bystroletov portrayed himself throughout as a sympathetic friend, visiting the Oldhams on several occasions at their London home in Pembroke Gardens, Kensington. Oldham’s documents, however, were handed over at meetings in France and Germany. Having originally tried to hold the OGPU at arm’s length, Oldham became increasingly nervous about the risks of working as a Soviet agent. In order to put pressure on him, Bystroletov was accompanied to several of their meetings by the head of the illegal residency in Berlin, Boris Bazarov (codenamed KIN), who posed as a rather menacing Italian Communist named da Vinci. With Bazarov and Bystroletov playing the hard man/soft man routine, Oldham agreed to continue but took increasingly to drink. Bystroletov strengthened his hold over Lucy Oldham (henceforth codenamed MADAM) by putting his relationship with her on what an OGPU report coyly describes as “an intimate footing. Though Bystroletov successfully deceived the Oldhams, he seems to have been unaware that the Oldhams were also deceiving him. At their first meeting, Oldham explained that he was “a lord, who worked out ciphers for the Foreign Office and was a very influential person,” rather than, in reality, a minor functionary. At later meetings Oldham claimed that he traveled abroad on a diplomatic passport illegally provided for him by a Foreign Office friend named Kemp whom he alleged, almost certainly falsely, was in the Secret Intelligence Service. Having helped Bystroletov to acquire a British passport in the name of Robert Grenville, Oldham told him that the passport had been personally issued by the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, who believed it to be for a minor British aristocrat of his acquaintance. Lord Robert Grenville, then resident in Canada. “I didn’t know Lord Robert was here in Britain,” Simon was alleged to have remarked to Oldham. Mrs. Oldham also specialized in tall stories. She told Bystroletov that she was the sister of an army officer named Montgomery who, she claimed, held the (non-existent) post of head of the intelligence service at the Foreign Office a later note on the KGB file, probably dating from the 1940s, identified the mysterious and possibly mythical Montgomery as Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein! Expert though Bystroletov proved as an agent controller, his ignorance of the ways of the Foreign Office and the British establishment made him curiously gullible — though perhaps no more so than the Centre, which was also taken in.^^ De Ry, meanwhile, was providing Bystroletov at meetings in Berlin with a mixture of genuine diplomatic documents (Italian ciphers probably chief among them) and colorful inventions. According to Bystroletov, when asked whether some of his material was genuine, he replied indignantly, “What kind of question is that? Of course they are ... Your Japanese are idiots. Write and tell them to start printing American dollars. Instead of paying me 200,000 genuine francs, give me a million forged dollars and we’ll be quits.” The Centre was taken in by at least some of de Ry’s inventions. Possibly to disguise the fact that he was also trying to sell Italian ciphers to the French and other purchasers, he claimed that Mussolini’s son-in-law. Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo (later Italian foreign minister), had organized “an extensive trade in ciphers” and, when a cipher was missing from the Berlin embassy, had ordered the liquidation of an innocent scapegoat to divert attention from himself. Since the OGPU believed that Western intelligence agencies, like itself, organized secret assassinations, it had surprisingly little difficulty in crediting de Ry’s improbable tale.^^ De Ry appears to have tried to deceive the OGPU on two other occasions by putting it in contact with bogus officials who claimed to have German and British diplomatic ciphers for sale. The Centre attached great importance, however, to an introduction provided by de Ry to his friend the Paris businessman Rodolphe Lemoine, an agent and recruiter of the French foreign intelligence service, the military Deuxieme Bureau. Bom Rudolf Stallmann, the son of a wealthy Berlin jeweler, Lemoine had begun working for the Deuxieme Bureau in 1918 and acquired French citizenship. Intelligence for Lemoine was a passion as well as a second career. According to one of his chiefs in the Deuxieme Bureau, “He was as hooked on espionage as a dmnk is on alcohol.” Lemoine’ s greatest coup was the recmitment in 1931 of a German cipher and SIGINT clerk, Hans-Thilo Schmidt, whose compulsive womanizing had mn him into debt. For the next decade Schmidt (codenamed HE and ASCHE by the French) was the Deuxieme Bureau’s most important foreign agent.^^ Some of the intelligence he provided laid the foundations for the breaking of the German Enigma machine cipher by British cryptanalysts in the Second World War.^^ After Bystroletov had made the initial contact with Lemoine (codenamed REX by the Deuxieme Bureau and JOSEPH by the OGPU), he was instmcted to hand the case over to another, less flamboyant Soviet illegal, Ignace Reiss (alias “Ignace Poretsky,” codenamed RAYMOND) so that he could concentrate on mnning Oldham. At meetings with Lemoine, Reiss posed initially as an American military intelligence officer. Lemoine appeared anxious to set up an exchange of intelligence on Germany and foreign cipher systems, and supplied a curious mixture of good and bad intelligence as evidence of the Deuxieme Bureau’s willingness to cooperate. An Italian cipher which he provided in May 1931 seems to have been genuine. In February 1932, however, Lemoine reported the sensationally inaccurate news that Hitler (who became German chancellor less than a year later) had made two secret visits to Paris and was in the pay of the Deuxieme Bureau. “We French,” he claimed, “are doing everything to hasten his rise to power.” The Centre dismissed the report as disinformation, but ordered meetings with Lemoine to continue and for him to be paid, probably with the intention of laying a trap which would end in his recruitment.^^ In November 1933 Lemoine brought with him to meet Reiss the head of the SIGINT section of the Deuxieme Bureau, Gustave Bertrand, codenamed OREL (“Eagle”) by the Centre. To try to convince Bertrand that he was an American intelligence officer willing to exchange cipher material, Reiss offered him Latin American diplomatic ciphers. Bertrand, predictably, was more interested in European ciphers.^^ Soon after his first meeting with Bertrand, Reiss informed Lemoine that he worked not for American intelligence but for the OGPU. The Centre probably calculated that it had caught Lemoine in a trap, forcing him either to admit to his superiors that he had been both paid and deceived by the OGPU or to conceal that information and risk being blackmailed into working for the Soviet Union. The blackmail failed. Lemoine had probably realized for some time that Reiss, whom he knew as “Walter Scott,” worked for Soviet intelligence. Reiss had several further meetings with Lemoine and Bertrand, at which they exchanged intelligence on Italian, Czechoslovak and Hungarian ciphers. WHILE REISS WAS maintaining contact with Lemoine, Bystroletov was finding Oldham increasingly desperate to extricate himself from the OGPU. By the summer of 1932 Bystroletov feared that Oldham’s worsening alcoholism and carelessness at work would attract the attention of MI5. The Centre concluded that Oldham’s increasingly erratic behavior also risked exposing Bystroletov to a terrible revenge from the supposedly ruthless British intelligence services. On September 17, in recognition of his bravery in the face of nonexistent British assassination squads, it presented him with a rifle carrying the inscription “For unstinting struggle against Counter- Revolution, from your colleagues in the OGPU.”^^ On September 30, 1932, less than a fortnight after Bystroletov received his rifle, Oldham resigned from the Foreign Office, unable to stand the pressures of his double life.^^ To his despair, the OGPU still refused to leave him in peace. Over the next year Bystroletov extracted from him details of all his former colleagues in the Communications Department, hoping to recruit at least one of them as Oldham’s successor. As his drinking got further out of control, Oldham became convinced that his arrest was only a matter of time. His wife told Bystroletov that her husband believed that the permanent under- secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, had personally put him under observation and that British intelligence was also on the trail of Bystroletov.^^ Though there was probably no substance to these fears, the Centre took them seriously. The OGPU trouble-shooter and “flying illegal” Teodor Maly reported to the Centre from London on July 6 that Bystroletov was in great danger: It is possible that ANDREI [Bystroletov] will be liquidated by the enemy. None the less I have not given an order for his immediate departure. For him to depart now would mean the loss of a source of such importance [Oldham] that it would weaken our defense and increase the power of the enemy. The loss of ANDREI is possible today, as is that of other colleagues tomorrow. The nature of their work makes such risks unavoidable.^^ The Centre replied on August 10: Please inform ANDREI that we here are fully aware of the self-denial, discipline, resourcefulness and courage that he has shown in the very difficult and dangerous conditions of recent days while working with ARNO. 41 Bystroletov continued to receive high praise for his skill in outwitting a British version of the Serebryansky Service which existed only in the conspiratorial imagination of the OGPU. On September 29, 1933, almost a year to the day after his resignation from the Foreign Office, Oldham was found unconscious in the gas-filled kitchen of his house in Pembroke Gardens, rushed to the hospital and pronounced dead on arrival. An inquest found that he had taken his life by “coal gas suffocation” while of “unsound mind.”^^ The Centre had no doubt that Oldham had been murdered. Its report on his death concluded: “In order to avoid a scandal the [British] intelligence service had ARNO physically eliminated, making his death appear to be suicide.” It believed, however, that Bystroletov had disguised his identity so successfully that the Foreign Office believed Oldham had been working for French rather than Soviet intelligence.^^ Oldham’s suicide did little if anything to alert the Foreign Office to the chronic problems of its own security and that of British embassies abroad.^^ Still concerned by fears that he was being pursued by a secret British assassination squad, however, Bystroletov failed to grasp how relatively unprotected a target the Foreign Office remained. He concluded that a safer recruiting ground was Geneva, where several of Oldham’s former colleagues were working as cipher clerks with the British delegation to the League of Nations. In December 1933 he made contact there with Raymond Oake (codenamed SHELLEY), one of the most promising potential recruits in the communications department identified by Oldham.^^ Oake had good reason to resent his underprivileged status. Since joining the Foreign Office in 1920 he had remained in the lowly rank of “temporary clerk” without pension rights. Bystroletov handed over the cultivation of Oake to the Dutch artist Henri Christian (“Han”) Pieck, who operated as an OGPU illegal codenamed COOPER.^^ Pieck was almost as flamboyant an extrovert as Bystroletov, with a convivial manner which won him a wide circle of friends and acquaintances among British officials and journalists in Geneva. He invited Oake and other cipher clerks to stay at his house in The Hague where he lavished charm and hospitality on them while assessing them as possible recruits. Oake’s main service to Soviet intelligence was to provide an introduction to Captain John H. King, who joined the Foreign Office communications department as a “temporary clerk” in 193448 subsequently became a far more important agent than Oake himself. Pieck reported that King had been bom in Ireland, considered himself Irish rather than British and, though anti-Soviet, also “hated the English.” Estranged from his wife and with an American mistress to support, he found it difficult to live on his modest Foreign Office salary. Pieck cultivated King with patience and skill. On one occasion he and his wife took King and his lover for an expensive touring holiday in Spain, staying at the best hotels. Mrs. Pieck complained that the whole holiday had been “a real ordeal” and that King and his mistress were “incredibly boring. The Piecks’ hospitality, however, paid off handsomely. Seven months after his first meeting with Pieck, King (henceforth codenamed MAG) began to hand over large amounts of classified material, including Foreign Office telegrams, ciphers and secret daily and weekly summaries of diplomatic correspondence.^^ AN ANAFYSIS BY the Centre concluded that about 30 percent of King’s material was the same as that provided by Francesco Constantini (DUNCAN), the long-serving OGPU agent in the British embassy at Rome.^^ The overlap was, almost certainly, regarded as useful for checking the authenticity of the documents received from both agents. It was a sign of the importance attached to Constantini ’s intelligence that Abram Aronovich Slutsky, who succeeded Artuzov as head of INO in 1934, decided to transfer him from the legal residency in Rome to another of the Great Illegals, Moisei Markovich Akselrod (codenamed OST or OSTO), one of the leading Soviet agent controllers. Bom into a Jewish family in Smolensk in 1898, Akselrod had been a member of the Russian branch of the Zionist socialist organization Poale Zion, until its dissolution in 1922. He then joined the Bolsheviks and in 1925 began a career in INO.^^ Like most of the Great Illegals, Akselrod was a remarkable linguist — fluent in Arabic, English, French, German and Italian — and, according to a fellow illegal, a man of “extraordinary culture” with “a fine indifference to risk.”^^ In 1934 he traveled to Rome on an Austrian passport to establish a new illegal residency and act as Constantini’s controller. He had his first meeting with Constantini in January 1935.^^ Few — if any — Soviet controllers ever met an agent as frequently as Akselrod saw Constantini. At times they had almost daily meetings. On October 27, 1935 the Centre cabled Akselrod: “Between September 24 and October 14 you met [Constantini] 16 times. There must be no more than two or three meetings a week.” It is not difficult to understand Akselrod’s enthusiasm for agent DUNCAN. Constantini supplied him with a remarkable range of documents and cipher material from embassy red boxes, diplomatic bags, filing cabinets and — ^probably — the embassy safe. Far from consisting simply of material on British-Italian relations, the documents included Foreign Office reports and British ambassadors’ despatches on a great variety of major international issues, which were sent for information to the Rome embassy. A Centre report noted on November 15, 1935 that no fewer than 101 of the British documents obtained from Constantini since the beginning of the year had been judged sufficiently important to be “sent to Comrade Stalin”: among them the Foreign Office records of talks between Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, junior Foreign Office minister (who became Foreign Secretary at the end of the year), and Hitler in Berlin; between Eden and Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in Moscow; between Eden and Joseph Beck, the Polish foreign minister, in Warsaw; between Eden and Edvard Benes, the Czechoslovak foreign minister, in Prague; and between Eden and Mussolini in Rome.^^ A striking omission from the Centre’s list of the most important Foreign Office documents supplied to Stalin was Eden’s account of his talks with him during his visit to Moscow in March 1935 — despite the fact that this document was sent to the Rome embassy and was probably among those obtained by Constantini.^^ Since this was Stalin’s first meeting with a minister from a Western government, their talks were of unusual significance. The most likely explanation for the Centre’s failure to send the British record of the meeting to the Kremlin is that Slutsky feared to pass on to Stalin some of Eden’s comments about him. INO would have been unembarrassed to report the fact that Eden was impressed by Stalin’s “remarkable knowledge and understanding of international affairs.” But it doubtless lacked the nerve to repeat Eden’s conclusion that Stalin was “a man of strong oriental traits of character with unshakeable assurance and control whose courtesy in no way hid from us an implacable ruthlessness.” The Centre was probably also nervous about reporting some of the opinions attributed by Eden to Stalin — for example, that he was “perhaps more appreciative of [the] German point of view than Monsieur Litvino[v].”^^ There was no more dangerous activity in Moscow than repeating criticisms of Stalin or attributing heretical opinions to him. The British ambassador in Moscow, Viscount Chilston, optimistically reported that, as a result of Eden’s visit, “the Soviet Government appears to have got rid of the bogey in their minds, that we were encouraging Germany against Soviet plans for Eastern security.”^^ Stalin, however, rarely — if ever — abandoned a conspiracy theory and remained deeply suspicious of British policy. In a communique at the end of his talks in Moscow, Eden had welcomed the Soviet Union’s support for the principle of collective security, following its entry the previous year into the League of Nations (hitherto denounced by Moscow as the “League of Burglars”). But Stalin must have learned from Foreign Office documents that Eden was disinclined to involve the Soviet Union in any collective security arrangements designed to contain Nazi Germany. To Stalin’s deeply suspicious mind, this reluctance was further evidence of a British plot to focus German aggression in the east.^^ Though he was content to entrust most day-to-day diplomacy to the efficient and far more pragmatic Litvinov, it was Stalin who determined the strategic thrust of Soviet foreign policy. The Centre had suspected for some time that its principal source of British diplomatic documents over the last decade, the mercenary agent Francesco Constantin! (DUNCAN), had been selling some material to Italian intelligence as well as to the NKVD. It had dramatic confirmation of these suspicions in February 1936, when a British assessment of the Italo-Ethiopian war — purloined by Constantin! from the British embassy — was published on the front page of the Giornale dltalia.^^ On being challenged by Akselrod, Constantin! was forced to admit that he had supplied some documents to the Italians, but concealed the large scale on which he had done so. Constantin! also admitted in 1936 that he had lost his job in the British embassy, though he apparently omitted that he had been sacked for dishonesty. He tried to reassure Akselrod by telling him that he had a former colleague in the embassy who would continue to supply him with classified documents. The colleague was later identified as Constantin! ’s brother Secondo (codenamed DUDLEY), who had worked as a servant in the embassy Chancery for the previous twenty years. Secondo Constantini, however, took fewer precautions than his brother Francesco. In January he stole a diamond necklace belonging to the ambassador’s wife from a locked red box (normally used for diplomatic documents rather than jewelery) which was kept in the ambassador’s apartment next to the Chancery. The ambassador, Sir Eric Drummond (soon to become Lord Perth), who had previously dismissed the idea that the British diplomatic documents appearing in the Italian press might have been purloined from his embassy, now began to grasp that embassy security might, after all, require serious attention. Since the Foreign Office had no security officer, it was forced to seek the help of Major Valentine Vivian, the head of SIS counter-intelligence. Vivian modestly disclaimed significant expertise in embassy security but, in view of the even greater lack of expertise in the Foreign Office, agreed to carry out an investigation.^^ Once in Rome, he quickly discovered an appalling series of basic lapses. The embassy files, safe and red boxes were all insecure and “it would not be impossible or even difficult for unauthorized persons to spend long periods in the Chancery or Registry rooms.” Vivian quickly identified Secondo Constantini as the man probably responsible for the theft both of the diamond necklace and of at least some of the documents supplied to Italian intelligence: S. Constantini ... has been employed in the Chancery for twenty-one years. He might, therefore, have been directly or indirectly responsible for any, or all, of the thefts of papers or valuables which have taken place, or are thought to have taken place, from this Mission. He was, I understand, not quite free of suspicion of being himself concerned in a dishonest transaction for which his brother [Francesco], then also a Chancery servant, was dismissed a short time ago. Moreover, though the Diplomatic Staff at the time did not connect him with the matter, I am clear in my own mind that the circumstances of the loss of two copies of the “R” Code from a locked press [filing cabinet] in the Chancery in 1925 point towards S. Constantini, or his brother, or both, as the culprits.^^ Though Sir Eric Drummond politely welcomed Vivian’s recommendations for improvements in the security of his embassy, he took little action. In particular, neither he nor most of his staff could credit the charges against Secondo Constantini, whom they regarded as “a sort of friend of the family. Instead of being dismissed, agent DUDLEY and his wife were — amazingly — invited to London in May 1937 as the guests of His Majesty’s Government at the coronation of King George VI, as a reward for his long and supposedly faithful service. When Secondo Constantini returned from his expense- paid junket in London, he was able to resume supplying classified British documents to his brother Francesco, who passed them on for copying by both Akselrod’s illegal residency and Italian intelligence before returning them to embassy files. The Centre regarded the whole improbable story of Constantin! ’s continued access to embassy files after Vivian’s investigation as deeply suspicious. Unable to comprehend the naivety of the British foreign service in matters of embassy security, it suspected instead some deep-laid plot by British and/or Italian intelligence. Regular meetings with Francesco Constantin! were suspended in August 1937.^^ THE CIPHER MATERIAL obtained from the Constantin! brothers. Captain King and other agents in Western embassies and foreign ministries was passed to the most secret section of Soviet intelligence, a joint OGPU/Fourth Department SIGINT unit housed not in the Lubyanka but in the Foreign Affairs building on Kuznetsky Bridge. According to Evdokia Kartseva (later Petrova), who joined the unit in 1933, its personnel were forbidden to reveal even the location of their office to their closest relatives. Like most young women in the unit, Kartseva was terrified of its head, Gleb Ivanovich Boky, who had made his reputation first in conducting the “Red Terror” in Petrograd in 1918, then in terrorizing Turkestan later in the civil war.^^ Though in his mid-fifties, Boky still prided himself on his sexual athleticism and arranged group sex weekends at his dacha. Kartseva lived in fear of being invited to the orgies. During the night shift, when she felt most vulnerable, she wore her “plainest and dullest clothes for fear of attracting [Boky’s] unwelcome attention.”^ ^ Despite the personal depravity of its chief, the combined OGPU/Fourth Department unit was the world’s largest and best-resourced SIGINT agency. In particular, thanks to Bystroletov and others, it received more assistance from espionage than any similar agency in the West. The records seen by Mitrokhin show that Boky’s unit was able to decrypt at least some of the diplomatic traffic of Britain, Austria, Germany and Italy.^^ Other evidence shows that Boky’s unit was also able to decrypt some Japanese, Turkish^^ and — almost certainly — American^^ and French^^ cables. No Western SIGINT agency during the 1930s seems to have collected so much political and diplomatic intelligence. The unavailability of most of the decrypts produced by Boky’s unit makes detailed analysis of their influence on Soviet foreign policy impossible. Soviet SIGINT successes, however, included important Japanese decrypts on the negotiation of the Anti-Comintem Pact between Germany and Japan. The published version of the Pact, concluded in November 1936, merely provided for an exchange of information on Comintern activities and cooperation on preventive measures against them. A secret protocol, however, added that if either of the signatories became the victim of “an unprovoked [Soviet] attack or threat of attack,” both would immediately consult together on the action to take and do “nothing to ease the situation of the USSR.” Moscow, unsurprisingly, read sinister intentions into this tortuous formula, though Japan was, in reality, still anxious not to be drawn into a European war and had no intention of concluding a military alliance. Three days after the signing of the Anti- Comintem Pact, Litvinov publicly announced in a speech to a Congress of Soviets that Moscow knew its secret protocol. His speech also contained a curious veiled allusion to codebreaking: It is not surprising that it is assumed by many that the German-Japanese agreement is written in a special code in which anti-Communism means something entirely different from the dictionary definition of this word, and that people decipher this code in different ways.^^ The success of Boky’s unit in decrypting Italian diplomatic traffic probably provided intelligence on Italy’s decision to join the Anti-Comintem Pact in the following year. THANKS TO ITS penetration agents and codebreakers. as well as to primitive Foreign Office security, Soviet intelligence was able to gather vastly more intelligence on the foreign policy of its main Western target, Great Britain, than the much smaller British intelligence community was able to obtain on Soviet policy. Since 1927 British codebreakers had been unable to decrypt any high-level Soviet communications (though they had some success with the less sophisticated Comintern ciphers). SIS did not even possess a Moscow station. In 1936 the British ambassador. Viscount Chilston, vetoed a proposal to establish one on the grounds that it would be “liable to cause severe embarrassment.” But without an SIS presence he despaired of discovering anything of importance about Soviet policy-making.^^ The Soviet capacity to understand the political and diplomatic intelligence it collected, however, never approached its ability to collect that intelligence in the first place. Its natural tendency to substitute conspiracy theory for pragmatic analysis when assessing the intentions of the encircling imperialist powers was made worse during the 1930s by Stalin’s increasing tendency to act as his own intelligence analyst. Stalin, indeed, actively discouraged intelligence analysis by others, which he condemned as “dangerous guesswork.” “Don’t tell me what you think,” he is reported to have said. “Give me the facts and the source!” As a result, INO had no analytical department. Intelligence reports throughout and even beyond the Stalin era characteristically consisted of compilations of relevant information on particular topics with little argument or analysis Those who compiled them increasingly feared for their life expectancy if they failed to tell Stalin what he expected to hear. Their main priority as they trawled through the Centre’s treasure trove of British diplomatic documents and decrypts was to discover the anti-Soviet conspiracies which Comrade Stalin, “Lenin’s outstanding pupil, the best son of the Bolshevik Party, the worthy successor and great continuer of Lenin’s cause,” knew were there. The main function of Soviet foreign intelligence was thus to reinforce rather than to challenge Stalin’s misunderstanding of the West. A characteristic example of the Centre’s distorted but politically correct presentation of important intelligence was its treatment of the Foreign Office record of the meeting in March 1935 between Sir John Simon, Anthony Eden and Adolf Hitler in Berlin. Copies of the minutes were supplied both by Captain King in the Foreign Office and by Francesco Constantini in the Rome embassy.^^ Nine days before the meeting, in defiance of the post-First World War Treaty of Versailles, Hitler had announced the introduction of conscription. The fact that the meeting — the first between Hitler and a British foreign secretary — went ahead at all was, in itself, cause for suspicion in Moscow. On the British side the talks were mainly exploratory — to discover what the extent of Hitler’s demands for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles really was, and what prospect there was of accommodating them. Moscow, however, saw grounds for deep suspicion. While disclaiming any intention of attacking the Soviet Union, Hitler claimed that there was a distinct danger of Russia starting a war, and declared himself “firmly convinced that one day cooperation and solidarity would be urgently necessary to defend Europe against the ... Bolshevik menace.” Simon and Eden showed not the slightest interest in an anti-Bolshevik agreement, but their fairly conventional exchange of diplomatic pleasantries had sinister overtones in Moscow. According to the Foreign Office record, “The British Ministers were sincerely thankful for the way in which they had been received in Berlin, and would take away very pleasant memories of the kindness and hospitality shown them.”^^ The British record of the talks ran to over 23,000 words. The Russian translation circulated by the Centre to Stalin and others in the Soviet leadership came to fewer than 4,000. Instead of producing a conventional precis the Centre selected a series of statements by Simon, Eden, Hitler and other participants in the talks, and assembled them into what appeared as a continuous conversation. The significance of some individual statements was thus distorted by removing them from their detailed context. Probably at the time, certainly subsequently, one of Simon’s comments was misconstrued as giving Germany carte blanche to take over Austria. Doubtless in line with Stalin’s own conspiracy theories, the Centre interpreted the visit by Simon and Eden to Berlin as the first in a series of meetings at which British statesmen not only sought to appease Hitler but gave him encouragement to attack Russia. In reality, though some British diplomats would have been content to see the two dictators come to blows of their own accord, no British foreign secretary and no British government would have contemplated orchestrating such a conflict. The conspiracy theories which were bom in Stalin’s Moscow in the 1930s, however, have — remarkably — survived the end of the Soviet era. An SVR official history published in 1997 insists that the many volumes of published Foreign Office documents as well as the even more voluminous unpublished files in the Public Record Office cannot be relied upon. The British government, it maintains, is still engaged in a conspiracy to conceal the existence of documents which reveal the terrible tmth about British foreign policy before the Second World War: Some documents from the 1930s having to do with the negotiations of British leaders with the highest leadership of Fascist Germany, including directly with Hitler, have been kept to this day in secret archives of the British Foreign Office. The British do not want the indiscreet peering at the proof of their policy of collusion with Hitler and spurring Germany on to its eastern campaign. FOUR THE MAGNIFICENT FIVE Among the select group of inter-war heroes of foreign intelligence whose portraits hang today on the walls of the SVR’s Memory Room at Yasenevo is the Austrian Jew Arnold Deutsch, probably the most talented of all the Great Illegals. According to an SVR official eulogy, the portrait immediately “attracts the visitor’s attention” to “its intelligent, penetrating eyes, and strong-willed countenance.” Deutsch’ s role as an illegal was not publicly acknowledged by the KGB until 1990.^ Even now, some aspects of his career are considered unsuitable for publication in Moscow. Deutsch’ s academic career was one of the most brilliant in the history of Soviet intelligence. In July 1928, two months after his twenty-fourth birthday and less than five years after entering Vienna University as an undergraduate, he was awarded the degree of PhD with distinction. Though his thesis had been on chemistry, Deutsch had also become deeply immersed in philosophy and psychology. His description of himself in university documents throughout his student years as an observant Jew (mosaischf- was probably intended to conceal his membership of the Communist Party. Deutsch’s religious faith had been replaced by an ardent commitment to the Communist International’s vision of a new world order which would free the human race from exploitation and alienation. The revolutionary myth image of the world’s first worker-peasant state blinded both Deutsch and the ideological agents he later recruited to the increasingly brutal reality of Stalin’s Russia. Immediately after leaving Vienna University, Deutsch began secret work as a courier for OMS, Comintern’s international liaison department, traveling to Romania, Greece, Palestine and Syria. His Austrian wife, Josefme, whom he married in 1929, was also recruited by OMS.^ Deutsch’s vision of a new world order included sexual as well as political liberation. At about the time he began covert work for Comintern, he became publicly involved in the “sex-pol” (sexual politics) movement, founded by the German Communist psychologist and sexologist Wilhelm Reich, which opened clinics to bring birth control and sexual enlightenment to Viennese workers.^ At this stage of his career, Reich was engaged in an ambitious attempt to integrate Freudianism with Marxism and in the early stages of an eccentric research program on human sexual behavior which later earned him an undeserved reputation as “the prophet of the better orgasm.”^ Deutsch enthusiastically embraced Reich’s teaching that political and sexual repression were different sides of the same coin and together paved the way for fascism. He ran the Munster Verlag in Vienna which published Reich’s work and other “sex-pol” literature.^ Though the Viennese police were probably unaware of Deutsch’s secret work for OMS, its anti-pomography section took a keen interest in his involvement with the “sex-pol” movement.^ Remarkably, Deutsch combined, at least for a few years, his role as an open disciple of Reich with secret work as a Soviet agent. In 1932 he was transferred from OMS to the INO, and trained in Moscow as an OGPU illegal with the alias “Stefan Lange” and the codename STEFAN. (Later, he also used the codename OTTO.) His first posting was in France, where he established secret crossing points on the Belgian, Dutch and German borders, and made preparations to install radio equipment on French fishing boats to be used for OGPU communications in times of war.^ Deutsch owed his posthumous promotion to the ranks of KGB immortals to his second posting in England. The rules protecting the identities and legends of illegals in the mid- 1930s were far less rigid and elaborate than they were to become later. Early in 1934 Deutsch traveled to London under his real name, giving his profession as “university lecturer” and using his academic credentials to mix in university circles. After living in temporary accommodation, he moved to a flat in Lawn Road, Hampstead, the heartland of London’s radical intelligentsia. The “Lawn Road Flats,” as they were then known, were the first “deck-access” apartments with external walkways to be built in England (a type of construction later imitated in countless blocks of council flats) and, at the time, were probably Hampstead’s most avant-garde building. Deutsch moved into number 7, next to a flat owned by the celebrated crime novelist Agatha Christie, then writing Murder on the Orient Express. Though it is tempting to imagine Deutsch and Christie discussing the plot of her latest novel, they may never have met. Christie lived elsewhere and probably visited Lawn Road rarely, if at all, in the mid- 1930s. Deutsch, in any case, is likely to have kept a low profile. While the front doors of most flats were visible from the street, Deutsch’ s was concealed by a stairwell which made it possible for him and his visitors to enter and leave unobserved.^ Deutsch strengthened his academic cover by taking a postgraduate course in psychology at London University and possibly by part-time teaching. In 1935 he was joined by his wife, who had been trained in Moscow as a radio operator. ^ ^ KGB files credit Deutsch during his British posting with the recruitment of twenty agents and contact with a total of twenty-nine.^^ By far the most celebrated of these agents were a group of five young Cambridge graduates. who by the Second World War were known in the Centre as “The Five”: Anthony Blunt, Guy Burgess, John Caimcross, Donald Maclean and Kim Philby. After the release of the enormously popular Western The Magnificent Seven in 1960, they were often referred to as the “Magnificent Five.” The key to Deutsch’s success was his new strategy of recruitment, approved by the Centre, based on the cultivation of young radical high-fliers from leading universities before they entered the corridors of power. As Deutsch wrote to the Centre: Given that the Communist movement in these universities is on a mass scale and that there is a constant turnover of students, it follows that individual Communists whom we pluck out of the Party remain will pass unnoticed, both by the Party itself and by the outside world. People forget about them. And if at some time they do remember that they were once Communists, this will be put down to a passing fancy of youth, especially as those concerned are scions of the bourgeoisie. It is up to us to give the individual [recruit] a new [non- Communist] political personality.^^ Since the universities of Oxford and Cambridge provided a disproportionate number of Whitehall’s highest fliers, it was plainly logical to target Oxbridge rather than the red brick universities elsewhere. The fact that the new recruitment was based chiefly on Cambridge rather than Oxford was due largely to chance: the fact that the first potential recruit to come to Deutsch’s attention, Kim Philby, was a graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge. Of the other members of the “Magnificent Five,” all recruited as a direct or indirect consequence of Philby ’s own recruitment, three (Blunt, Burgess and Caimcross) also came from Trinity College and the fourth (Maclean) from the neighboring Trinity Hall.^^ Deutsch’s recruitment strategy was to prove a spectacular success. By the early years of the Second World War all of the Five were to succeed in penetrating either the Foreign Office or the intelligence community. The volume of high-grade intelligence which they supplied was to become so large that Moscow sometimes had difficulty coping with it. AFTER GRADUATING FROM Cambridge in June 1933 with the conviction that “my life must be devoted to Communism,” Philby spent most of the next year in Vienna working for the MOPR (the Russian acronym of the International Workers Relief Organization) and acting as a courier for the underground Austrian Communist Party. While in Vienna he met and married a young Communist divorcee, Litzi Friedman, after a brief but passionate love affair which included his first experience of making love in the snow (“actually quite warm, once you got used to it,” he later recalled). The first to identify Philby’s potential as a Soviet agent — and probably to draw him to the attention of Arnold Deutsch — was Litzi’s friend Edith Suschitsky, who was herself recruited by Deutsch and given the unimaginative codename EDITH. In May 1934 Kim and Litzi Philby returned to London, arriving some weeks after Deutsch. Several months earlier Edith Suschitsky had also taken up residence in London, marrying another recruit of Deutsch’ s, an English doctor named Alex Tudor Hart. The newly married couple were given the joint codename STRELA (“Arrow”). In June 1934 Edith Tudor Hart took Philby to his first meeting with Deutsch on a bench in Regent’s Park, London. According to a later memoir written by Philby for the KGB, Deutsch instructed him, “We need people who could penetrate into the bourgeois institutions. Penetrate them for us!”^^ At this early stage, however, Deutsch did not tell Philby that he was embarking on a career as a Soviet agent. Instead, he gave him the initial impression that he was joining Comintern’s underground war against international fascism. Philby’s immediate task, Deutsch told him, was to break all visible contact with the Communist Party and to try to win the confidence of British pro-German and pro-fascist circles. As was not uncommon at this period, Philby’s first codename, given him immediately after his meeting with Deutsch, had two versions: SOHNCHEN in German or SYNOK in Russian — ^both roughly equivalent to “Sonny” in English.^ ^ Half a century later, Philby still remembered his first meeting with the man he knew as “Otto” as “amazing”: He was a marvelous man. Simply marvelous. I felt that immediately. And [the feeling] never left me ... The first thing you noticed about him were his eyes. He looked at you as if nothing more important in life than you and talking to you existed at that moment ... And he had a marvelous sense of humor.^^ It is difficult to imagine any other controller in the entire history of the KGB as ideally suited as Deutsch to the Cambridge Five. Though four of the Five graduated from Cambridge with first-class honors, Deutsch’ s academic career was even more brilliant than theirs, his understanding of human character more profound and his experience of life much broader. He combined a charismatic personality and deep psychological insight with visionary faith in the future of a human race freed from the exploitation and alienation of the capitalist system. His message of liberation had all the greater appeal to the Cambridge Five because it had a sexual as well as a political dimension. All the Five were rebels against the strict sexual mores as well as the antiquated class system of inter-war Britain. Burgess and Blunt were homosexuals, Maclean a bisexual and Philby a heterosexual athlete. Caimcross, a committed heterosexual, later wrote a history of polygamy which concluded with a quotation from George Bernard Shaw: “Women will always prefer a 10 percent share of a first- rate man to sole ownership of a mediocre man.”^^ Caimcross plainly considered himself first-rate rather than mediocre. Graham Greene was charmed by Caimcross ’s book. “Here at last,” he wrote to Caimcross, “is a book which will appeal strongly to all polygamists.”^^ During almost four years as an illegal controlling British agents, Deutsch served under three illegal residents, each of whom operated under a variety of aliases: Ignati Reif, codenamed MARR; Aleksandr Orlov, codenamed SCHWED (“Swede”); and Teodor Maly, successively codenamed PAUL, THEO and MANN. By 1938 all three were to become victims of the Terror. Reif and Maly were shot for imaginary crimes. Orlov defected just in time to North America, securing his survival by threatening to arrange for the revelation of all he knew about Soviet espionage should he be pursued by an NKVD assassination squad.^^ Somewhat misleadingly, a KGB/S VR- sponsored biography of Orlov published in 1993 claimed that he was “the mastermind” responsible for the recmitment of the Cambridge agents. There are probably two reasons for this exaggeration. The first is hierarchical. Within the Soviet nomenklatura senior bureaucrats commonly claimed, and were accorded, the credit for their subordinates’ successes. The claim that Orlov, the most senior intelligence officer involved in British operations in the 1930s, “recruited” Philby is a characteristic example of this common phenomenon.^^ But there are also more contemporary reasons for the inflation of Orlov’s historical importance. It suits the SVR, which sees itself as the inheritor of the finest traditions of the KGB First Chief Directorate, to seek to demonstrate the foolishness of Western intelligence and security services by claiming that they failed for over thirty years to notice that the leading recruiter of the Cambridge Five and other agents was living under their noses in the United States. For several years before his death in 1973, the KGB tried to persuade Orlov to return to a comfortable flat and generous pension in Russia, where he would doubtless have been portrayed for propaganda purposes as a man who, despite being forced to flee from Stalin’s Terror, had — like Philby — “kept faith with Lenin’s Revolution” and used his superior intelligence training to take in Western intelligence agencies for many years. In reality, Orlov spent only just over a year in London — ten days in July 1934, followed by the period from September 1934 to October 1935.^^ During that period Deutsch, who was subordinate in rank to Orlov, had to seek his approval for his intelligence operations. On occasion Orlov took the initiative in giving instructions to Deutsch. But the files noted by Mitrokhin make clear that the grand strategy which led to the targeting of Philby and other young Cambridge high-fliers was devised not by Orlov but by Deutsch.^ ^ And, as Philby himself acknowledged, no other controller equaled Deutsch’ s tactical skill in implementing that strategy. Philby’ s first major service to Soviet intelligence was to direct Deutsch to two other potential Cambridge recruits, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess. If not already a committed Communist by the time he entered Trinity Hall, Cambridge, in 1931, Donald Maclean became one during his first year. As the handsome, academically gifted son of a former Liberal cabinet minister, Maclean must have seemed to Deutsch an almost ideal candidate to penetrate the corridors of power. On his graduation with first-class honors in modem languages in June 1934, however, Maclean showed no immediate sign of wanting a career in Whitehall. His ambition was either to teach English in the Soviet Union or to stay at Cambridge to work for a PhD. In the course of the summer he changed his mind, telling his mother that he intended to prepare for the Foreign Office entrance examinations in the following year.^^ That change of heart reflected the influence of Deutsch. The first approach to Maclean was made through Philby in August 1934. Deutsch reported that Philby had been instmcted to meet Maclean, discuss his job prospects and contacts and ask him to open contact with the Communist Party and begin work for the NKVD. Maclean agreed. For the time being, however, the Centre refused to sanction meetings between Deutsch and Maclean, and contact with him for the next two months was maintained through Philby. Maclean’s first codename, like Philby’ s, had two versions: WAISE in German, SIROTA in Russian — ^both meaning “Orphan” (an allusion to the death of his father two years earlier). For some months Guy Burgess, then in his second year as a history research student at Trinity College preparing a thesis he was never to complete, had been enthused by the idea of conducting an underground war against fascism on behalf of the Communist International. Ironically, in view of the fact that he was soon to become one of the Magnificent Five, he seems to have been inspired by the example of the Filnfergruppen, the secret “groups of five” being formed by German Communists to organize opposition to Hitler. Maclean was, very probably, among the Communist friends with whom he discussed the (in reality rather unsuccessful) German groups of five.^^ When Maclean admitted, against his instructions, that he had been asked to engage in secret work,^^ Burgess was desperate for an invitation to join him. In December 1934 Maclean arranged a first meeting between Deutsch and Burgess. Deutsch already knew that Burgess was one of the most flamboyant figures in Cambridge: a brilliant, gregarious conversationalist equally at home with the teetotal intellectual discussions of the Apostles, the socially exclusive and heavy-drinking Pitt Club and the irreverent satirical revues of the Footlights. He made no secret either of his Communist sympathies or of his enjoyment of the then illegal pleasures of homosexual “rough trade” with young working-class men. A more doctrinaire and less imaginative controller than Deutsch might well have concluded that the outrageous Burgess would be a liability rather than an asset. But Deutsch may well have sensed that Burgess’s very outrageousness would give him good, if unconventional, cover for his work as a secret agent. No existing stereotype of a Soviet spy remotely resembled Burges s.^^ When invited to join the Comintern’s underground struggle against fascism, Burgess told Deutsch that he was “honored and ready to sacrifice everything for the cause.” His codename MADCHEN^^ (“Little Girl,” by contrast with Philby’s codename “Sonny”) was an obvious reference to his homosexuality. Deutsch initially told both Maclean and Burgess, like Philby, that their first task was to distance themselves from the left and conform to the ideas of the establishment in order to penetrate it successfully.^^ Maclean successfully persuaded his mother. Lady Maclean, that he had “rather gone off’ his undergraduate flirtation with Communism. In August 1935 he passed the Foreign Office exams with flying colors. When asked about his “Communist views” at Cambridge, Maclean decided to “brazen it out”: “Yes,” I said, “I did have such views — and I haven’t entirely shaken them off.” I think they must have liked my honesty because they nodded, looked at each other and smiled. Then the chairman said: “Thank you, that will be all, Mr. Maclean. In October 1935, as a new member of His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service, Maclean became the first of the Magnificent Five to penetrate the corridors of power. Burgess went about burying his Communist past with characteristic flamboyance. Late in 1935 he became personal assistant to the young rightwing gay Conservative MP Captain “Jack” Macnamara. Together they went on fact-finding missions to Nazi Germany which, according to Burgess, consisted largely of homosexual escapades with like-minded members of the Hitler Youth. Burgess built up a remarkable range of contacts among the continental “Homintem.” Chief among them was Edouard Pfeiffer, chef de cabinet to Edouard Daladier, French war minister from January 1936 to May 1940 and prime minister from April 1938 to March 1940. Burgess boasted to friends that, “He and Pfeiffer and two members of the French cabinet ... had spent an evening together at a male brothel in Paris. Singing and dancing, they had danced around a table, lashing a naked boy, who was strapped to it, with leather whips. In February 1935 there was a security alert at the London illegal residency. Reif, operating under the alias “Max Wolisch,” was summoned for an interview at the Home Office and observed a large file in the name of Wolisch on his interviewer’s desk. Orlov reported to the Centre that the British authorities appeared to have been “digging around but could not come up with anything and decided to get rid of him.” Reif obeyed Home Office instructions to arrange for his prompt departure. Orlov feared that MI5 might also be on the trail of Deutsch and announced that as a precaution he was taking personal control of Philby, Maclean and Burgess, by now sometimes referred to as the “Three Musketeers.” Orlov believed that his own cover as an American businessman selling imported refrigerators from an office in Regent Street was still secure. In October, however, there was another security alert when he accidentally encountered a man who, some years earlier, had given him English lessons in Vienna and knew his real identity. Orlov made a hasty exit from London, never to return, leaving Deutsch to resume the running of the Cambridge recruits. Under Deutsch ’s control, Philby, Maclean and Burgess rapidly graduated as fully fledged Soviet agents. They may not have been told explicitly that they were working for the NKVD rather than assisting Comintern in its underground struggle against fascism, but they no longer needed formal notification. As Deutsch wrote later in a report for the Centre, “They all know that they are working for the Soviet Union. This was absolutely understood by them. My relations with them were based upon our Party membership.” In other words, Deutsch treated them not as subordinate agents but as comrades working under his guidance in a common cause and for the same ideals. Later, less flexible controllers than Deutsch were unhappy that Philby, Burgess and Maclean appeared to consider themselves as officers, rather than agents, of Soviet intelligence.^^ It came as a considerable shock to Philby after his defection to Moscow in 1963 to discover that, like other foreign agents, he did not possess, and would never be allowed to acquire, officer rank — hence his various attempts to mislead Western journalists into believing that he was Colonel, or even General, Philby of the KGB.^^ In his memoirs, published in 1968, Philby repeated the lie that he had “been a Soviet intelligence officer for some thirty-odd years. AFTER THE SECURITY scares of 1935, Deutsch and the illegal residency took increased precautions to evade MI5 and Special Branch surveillance. Before preparing for a meeting with an agent, usually in London, Deutsch would be driven out of town, watching carefully to see if the car was being followed. Once satisfied that he was not being tailed, he returned to London by public transport, changing several times en route. During his travels Deutsch concealed film of secret documents inside hairbrushes, travel requisites and household utensils. Reports to the Centre were usually sent in secret ink to an address in Copenhagen for forwarding to Moscow.^^ Though the KGB and SVR released interesting material in the early 1990s on the “Three Musketeers,” they avoided any reference to Norman John (“James”) Klugmann, recruited by Deutsch in 1936.^^ Klugmann and the young Marxist poet John Comford, “James and John,” were the two most prominent Communist Party activists in Cambridge. Though Comford was killed in the Spanish Civil War in 1937, just after his twenty-first birthday, Klugmann went on to become head of the Party’s Propaganda and Education Department, a member of the political committee (in effect its Politburo) and the Party’s official historian. He had become a Communist at Gresham’s School, Holt, where he had been a friend and contemporary of Donald Maclean. Klugmann won an open scholarship in modem languages to Trinity College, Maclean a slightly less prestigious exhibition to the neighboring Trinity Hall. Both graduated with first-class honors. Like Maclean, Anthony Blunt’s conversion to Communism owed something to Klugmann’ s influence. Blunt found him “an extremely good political theorisf’ who “ran the administration of the Party with great skill and energy ... It was primarily he who decided what organizations and societies in Cambridge were worth penetrating [by the Communists].”^^ Klugmann had an unshakable conviction that British capitalism was close to collapse. “We simply knew, all of us, that the revolution was at hand,” he later recalled. “If anyone had suggested it wouldn’t happen in Britain for say thirty years. I’d have laughed myself sick.”^^ Since Klugmann was one of Britain’s most active young Communists, there was little prospect that, like the Five, he could convincingly distance himself from the Party and penetrate the “bourgeois apparatus.” Deutsch saw another role for Klugmann: as a talent- spotter for the NKVD, capable, when necessary, of persuading Communist students to engage in underground work rather than conventional Party militancy. Before Deutsch recruited Klugmann, the NKVD obtained the approval of the British Party leadership. There was never any likelihood that the British general secretary, Harry Pollitt, would object. Like most Western Communist leaders he believed that the interests of the Communist International required unconditional support for the Soviet Union, whatever the twists of policy in the Kremlin. With Pollitt’ s consent, Klugmann was recruited by Deutsch as agent MER.^^ The refusal by the SVR until 1998 to admit Klugmann’ s recruitment was due to the involvement of the British Communist Party. One of the KGB’s most closely guarded secrets was the extent to which, as late as the 1980s, it expected the leaders of “fraternal parties” in the West to assist in the recruitment of agents and the fabrication of “legends” for its illegals. IN THE SPRING of 1936 the Centre appointed another of the Great Illegals, Teodor Maly (codenamed MANN), head of the illegal London residency. Like Deutsch, Maly was later included among the intelligence immortals whose portraits hung on the walls of the First Chief Directorate Memory Room. Hungarian by birth, Maly had entered a Catholic monastic order before the First World War but had volunteered for military service in 1914.^^ He was taken prisoner while serving as second lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian army on the Russian front in 1916, and spent the rest of the war in a series of POW camps. Maly later told one of his agents: I saw all the horrors, young men with frozen limbs dying in the trenches ... I lost my faith in God and when the Revolution broke out I joined the Bolsheviks. I broke with my past completely ... I became a Communist and have always remained one.^^ Maly was originally posted to London in January 1936 to run the Foreign Office with cipher clerk Captain King (previously controlled by Pieck), to whom he introduced himself as an executive of the fictitious Dutch bank which King believed was paying him for classified documents. In April Maly was appointed illegal resident and henceforth shared with Deutsch in the running of the Cambridge agents. Like Deutsch, he impressed them with both his human sympathy and his visionary faith in the Communist millennium. During the early months of 1937 Deutsch and Maly completed the recruitment of the Magnificent Five. At the beginning of the year, Burgess, by then a producer at the BBC, arranged a first meeting between Deutsch and Anthony Blunt, French linguist, art historian and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Though the title of “Fourth Man” later accorded Blunt was a media invention rather than a KGB sobriquet, he was both the fourth of the Five to be recruited and, over forty years later, the fourth to be publicly exposed. Until the war Blunt’s chief role for the NKVD was that of talent- spotter. His first recruit, by agreement with Deutsch, was a wealthy young American Communist undergraduate at Trinity, Michael Straight (codenamed NIGEL). Shortly after his own first meeting with Deutsch, Blunt invited Straight to his elegant rooms in Trinity. Straight was still shattered by the news a fortnight earlier that his close friend, John Comford, had died a hero’s death in the Spanish Civil War. “Our friends,” Blunt told him, had been giving much thought to his future. “They have instructed me to tell you ... what you must do.” “What friends?” Straight asked. “Our friends in the International, the Communist International,” Blunt replied. The “friends” had decided that Straight’s duty was to break all overt connection with the Party, get a job in Wall Street after his graduation later that year and provide Comintern with inside information. Straight protested. Comford had given his life for the International. “Remember that,” Blunt told him. A few days later. Straight agreed. “In the course of a week,” Straight wrote later, “I had moved out of the noisy, crowded world of Cambridge into a world of shadows and echoes.” His only meeting with Deutsch, whom he mistook for a Russian, took place in London just after his graduation. Deutsch asked him for some personal documents. Straight gave him a drawing. Deutsch tore it in two, gave him one halfback and told him the other half would be returned to him by a man who would contact him in New York. The last of the Magnificent Five to be recruited, and later the last to be publicly exposed, was the “Fifth Man,” John Caimcross, a brilliant Scot who in 1934 had entered Trinity at the age of twenty-one with a scholarship in modem languages, having already studied for two years at Glasgow University and gained a licence es lettres at the Sorbonne.^^ His passionate Marxism led the Trinity Magazine to give him the nickname “The Fiery Cross,” while his remarkable facility as a linguist led the same magazine to complain, “Caimcross ... learns a new language every fortnight.” Among his college teachers in French literature was Anthony Blunt, though Caimcross later claimed that they never discussed Communism.^^ In 1936, after graduating with first-class honors, Caimcross passed top of the Foreign Office entrance examinations, one hundred marks ahead of the next candidate (though he did less well at the interview). After Blunt had acted as talent- spotter, the initial approach to Caimcross early in 1937 was entmsted by Deutsch to Burgess^^ — much as Philby had made the first recmitment overture to Maclean in 1934. The actual recmitment of Caimcross shortly afterwards was entmsted to James Klugmann.^^ On April 9 Maly informed the Centre that Caimcross had been formally recmited and given the codename MOLIERE.^^ Had Caimcross known his codename, he might well have objected to its transparency but would undoubtedly have found appropriate the choice of his favorite French writer, on whom he later published two scholarly studies in French. For reasons not recorded in KGB files, the codename MOLIERE was later replaced by that of LISZT. In May Klugmann arranged Caimcross ’s first rendezvous with Deutsch. According to Caimcross ’s admittedly unreliable memoirs, the meeting took place one evening in Regent’s Park: Suddenly there emerged from behind the trees a short, stocky figure aged around forty, whom Klugmann introduced to me as Otto. Thereupon, Klugmann promptly disappeared Deutsch reported to Moscow that Caimcross “was very happy that we had established contact with him and was ready to start working for us at once.”^^ Among the pre- Second World War Foreign Office documents available to both Maclean and Caimcross, and thus to the NKVD, were what Caimcross described as “a wealth of valuable information on the progress of the Civil War in Spain. Only in a few cases, however, is it possible to identify individual documents supplied by Maclean and Caimcross which the Centre forwarded to Stalin, probably in the form of edited extracts. One such document, which seems to have made a particular impression on Stalin, is the record of talks with Hitler in November 1937 by Lord Halifax, Lord President of the Council (who, three months later, was to succeed Eden as Foreign Secretary). Halifax’s visit to Hitler’s mountain lair, the “Eagle’s Nesf’ at Berchtesgaden, got off to a farcical start. As the aristocratic Halifax stepped from his car, he mistook Hitler for a footman and was about to hand him his hat and coat when a German minister hissed in his ear, “Der Fuhrer! Der Fuhrer! The Centre, however, saw the whole meeting as deeply sinister. The extracts from Halifax’s record of his talks with Hitler, tailored to fit Stalin’s profound distrust of British policy, emphasized that Britain viewed Nazi Germany as “the bastion of the West against Bolshevism” and would take a sympathetic view of German expansion to the east7^ Though Halifax’s assessment of Hitler, whom he regarded as “very sincere,” was lamentably naive, his record of his comments on Germany’s role in defending the West against Communism were much more qualified than the Centre’s version of them. He told Hitler: Although there was much in the Nazi system that offended British opinion (treatment of the Church; to a perhaps lesser extent, the treatment of Jews; treatment of Trade Unions), I was not blind to what he had done for Germany and to the achievement from his point of view of keeping Communism out of his country and, as he would feel, of blocking its passage West. Halifax also said nothing to support German aggression in eastern Europe. His aim — unrealistic though it was — ^was to turn Hitler into “a good European” by offering him colonial concessions in order to persuade him to limit his European ambitions to those he could achieve peacefully. Halifax made clear, however, that Britain was prepared to contemplate the peaceful revision of Versailles: I said that there were no doubt ... questions arising out of the Versailles settlement which seemed to us capable of causing trouble if they were unwisely handled, e.g. Danzig, Austria, Czechoslovakia. On all these matters we were not necessarily concerned to stand for the status quo as today, but we were concerned to avoid such trouble of them as would be likely to cause trouble. If reasonable settlements could be reached with the free assent and goodwill of those primarily concerned we certainly had no desire to block them. Such statements were music to Hitler’s ears — not because he was interested in the peaceful revision of Versailles, but because he interpreted Halifax’s rather feeble attempt at conciliation as evidence that Britain lacked the nerve to fight when the time came for him to begin a war of conquest. Stalin, characteristically, saw a much more sinister purpose behind Halifax’s remarks and persuaded himself that Britain had deliberately given the green light to Nazi aggression in the east. The Foreign Office documents supplied by Maclean and Caimcross which recorded British attempts to appease Hitler were used by the Centre to provide the evidence which Stalin demanded of a deep-laid British plot to turn Hitler on the Soviet Union. THOUGH KIM PHILBY ultimately became the most important of the Magnificent Five, his career took off more slowly than those of the other four. He abandoned an attempt to join the civil service after both his referees (his Trinity director of studies and a family friend) warned him that, while they admired his energy and intelligence, they would feel bound to add that his “sense of political injustice might well unfit him for administrative work.” His only minor successes before 1937 were to gain a job on an uninfluential liberal monthly, the Review oj Reviews, and become a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship, contemptuously described by Churchill as the “Heil Hitler Brigade.” As Philby later acknowledged, he would often turn up for meetings with Deutsch “with nothing to offer” and in need of reassurance. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War gave him his first important intelligence mission. He eventually persuaded a London news agency to give him a letter of accreditation as a freelance war correspondent and arrived in Spain in February 1937. “My immediate assignment,” he wrote later in his memoirs, “was to get first-hand information on all aspects of the fascist war effort.” As usual, his memoirs fail to tell the whole truth.^^ A few weeks after Philby ’s departure, the London illegal residency received instructions, undoubtedly approved by Stalin himself, to order Philby to assassinate General Francisco Franco, leader of the nationalist forces. Maly duly passed on the order but made clear to the Centre that he did not believe Philby capable of fulfilling Philby arrived back in London in May without even having set eyes on Franco and, Maly told the Centre, “in a very depressed state.” Philby’ s fortunes improved, however, after he was taken on by The Times as one of its two correspondents in nationalist Spain. At the end of the year he became a minor war hero. Three journalists sitting in a car in which he had been traveling were fatally injured by an artillery shell. Philby himself was slightly wounded. He reported modestly to Times readers, “Your correspondent ... was taken to a first aid station where light head injuries were speedily treated.” “My wounding in Spain,” wrote Philby later, “helped my work — ^both journalism and intelligence — no end.” For the first time he gained access to Franco, who on March 2, 1938 pinned on his breast the Red Cross of Military Merit. Then, as Philby reported, “all sorts of doors opened for me.”^^ The doors, however, opened too late. By the time Philby gained access to Franco, the NKVD assassination plot had been abandoned. Since the spring of 1937 the Centre had been increasingly diverted from the war against Franco by what became known as the civil war within the Civil War. The destruction of Trotskyists became a higher priority than the liquidation of Franco. By the end of 1937 the hunt for “enemies of the people” abroad took precedence over intelligence collection. The remarkable talents of the Magnificent Five had yet to be fully exploited. INO was in turmoil, caught up in the paranoia of the Great Terror, with most of its officers abroad suspected of plotting with the enemy. The age of the Great Illegals was rapidly drawing to a brutal close. FIVE TERROR Though “special tasks” only began to dominate NKVD foreign operations in 1937, the problem of “enemies of the people” abroad had loomed steadily larger in Stalin’s mind since the early 1930s as he became increasingly obsessed with the opposition to him inside the Soviet Union. The most daring denunciation of the growing brutality of Stalin’s Russia was a letter of protest sent to the Central Committee in the autumn of 1932 by a former Party secretary in Moscow, Mikhail Ryutin, and a small band of supporters. The “Ryutin platform,” whose text was made public only in 1989, contained such an uncompromising attack on Stalin and the horrors which had accompanied collectivization and the First Five Year Plan over the previous few years that some Trotskyists who saw the document believed it was an OGPU provocation.^ It denounced Stalin as “the evil genius of the Russian Revolution, motivated by vindictiveness and lust for power, who has brought the Revolution to the edge of the abyss,” and demanded his removal from power: “It is shameful for proletarian revolutionaries to tolerate any longer Stalin’s yoke, his arbitrariness, his scorn for the Party and the laboring masses.”^ At a meeting of the Politburo Stalin called for Ryutin’s execution. Only Sergei Mironovich Kirov dared to contradict him. “We mustn’t do that!” he insisted. “Ryutin is not a hopeless case, he’s merely gone astray.” For the time being Stalin backed down and Ryutin was sentenced to ten years in jail.^ Five years later, during the Great Terror, when Stalin had gained the virtually unchallenged power of life and death over Soviet citizens, Ryutin was shot. During the early 1930s Stalin lost whatever capacity he had once possessed to distinguish personal opponents from “enemies of the people.” By far the most dangerous of these enemies, he believed, were the exiled Leon Trotsky (codenamed STARIK, “Old Man,” by the Centre)^ and his followers. “No normal ‘constitutional’ paths for the removal of the governing [Stalinist] clique now remain,” wrote Trotsky in 1933. “The only way to compel the bureaucracy to hand over power to the proletarian vanguard is by force.” Henceforth Stalin used that assertion to argue that the Soviet state was faced with a threat of forcible overthrow, which must itself be forcibly prevented.^ Opposition to Stalin resurfaced at the 1934 Party Congress, though in so muted a form that it passed unnoticed by the mass of the population. In the elections to the Central Committee, Stalin polled several hundred votes fewer than Kirov, who was assassinated, probably on Stalin’s orders, at the end of the year. What increasingly obsessed Stalin, however, were less the powerless remnants of real opposition to him than the gigantic, mythical conspiracy by imperialist secret services and their Trotskyist hirelings. Though the paranoid strain in what Khrushchev later called Stalin’s “sickly suspicious” personality does much to explain his obsession with conspiracy theory, there was an impeccable Leninist logic at the heart of that obsession. Stalin claimed Lenin’s authority for his insistence that it was impossible for the imperialists not to attempt to overthrow the world’s first and only worker-peasant state: We are living not only in a State, but in a system of States, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist States is in the long run unthinkable. But until that end comes, a series of the most terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois States is unavoidable. It was equally inevitable, Stalin argued, that the enemies without would conspire with traitors within. Only “blind braggarts or concealed enemies of the people,” he declared, would dispute this elementary logic. ^ Those who disagreed thus automatically branded themselves as traitors. Despite Stalin’s increasing obsession during the 1930s with Trotskyist conspiracy, Trotsky never really represented any credible threat to the Stalinist regime. He spent his early years in exile trying vainly to find a European base from which to organize his followers. In 1933 he left Turkey for France, then two years later moved on to Norway, but his political activity in all three countries was severely restricted by the reluctant host governments. In 1937, having finally despaired of finding a European headquarters, Trotsky left for Mexico, where he remained until his assassination three years later. The chief European organizer of the Trotskyist movement for most of the 1930s was not Trotsky himself but his elder son. Lev Sedov, who from 1933 was based in Paris. It was Sedov who, until his death in 1938, organized publication of his father’s Bulletin of the Opposition and maintained contact with Trotsky’s scattered supporters. Sedov’s entourage, like his father’s, was penetrated by the OGPU and NKVD. From 1934 onwards his closest confidant and collaborator in Paris was an NKVD agent, the Russian- born Polish Communist Mark Zborowski, known to Sedov as etienne and successively codenamed by the Center MAKS, MAK, TULIP and KANT. Sedov trusted r “Etienne” so completely that he gave him the key to his letterbox, allowed him to collect his mail and entrusted him with Trotsky’s most confidential files and archives for safekeeping.^ AS THE CHIEF headquarters of both the Trotskyist movement and the White Guards, Paris became for several years the main center of operations for the NKVD Administration for Special Tasks, headed by “Yasha” Serebryansky, which specialized in assassination and abduction. Serebryansky’ s illegal residency in Paris had other targets, too. The most prominent was the mercurial Jacques Doriot, a rabble-rousing orator who during the early 1930s was considered a likely future contender for the leadership of the French Communist Party. ^ In the early months of 1934, he aroused the ire of Moscow by calling on the Party to form an anti-fascist Popular Front with the socialists, still officially condemned in Moscow as “social fascists.” Doriot was summoned to Moscow to recant but refused to go. He was expelled from the Party for indiscipline in June 1934, ironically at the very moment when the Communist International, in a rapid volte-face instantly accepted by the French Communist Party, decided in favor of a Popular Front policy. Doriot responded with a series of increasingly bitter attacks on both Stalin’s “oriental” despotism and the French Communist leadership, whom he derided as “Stalin’s slaves.” The Centre, fearing the effect of Doriot’ s impassioned and now subversive oratory on the French left, ordered Serebryansky to keep him under continuous surveillance. In 1935, after almost the whole non-Communist press had publicized Doriot ’s revelation that the French Communist Party received secret instructions and funds from Moscow, the Centre instructed Serebryansky to draw up plans for his liquidation.^ The order to go ahead with the assassination seems never to have been given, perhaps because of the triumph of the Popular Front in the 1936 elections and Doriot’s foundation soon afterwards of the neofascist Parti Populaire Fran^ais. Doriot’s public vindication of the Communist charge that he was a fascist collaborator provided the Centre with a propaganda victory which his assassination would have spoiled rather than enhanced. Among other assassinations which Serebryansky was ordered to organize was that of the leading Nazi Hermann Goering, who was reported to be planning a visit to Paris. The Administration for Special Tasks ordered its Paris residency to recruit a sniper and find a way of infiltrating him into the airport, probably Le Bourget, at which Goering was expected to land. ^ ^ Goering, however, failed to visit France and the sniper was stood down. The files seen by Mitrokhin give no indication of the Centre’s motive in ordering an assassination which was undoubtedly authorized by Stalin himself. The probability is, however, that the main objective was to damage relations between France and Germany rather than to strike a blow against Nazism. The assassination on French soil in 1934 of the President of the Republic and the King of Yugoslavia by a non-Communist assassin doubtless encouraged the Centre to believe that it could avoid responsibility for the killing of Goering if an opportunity arose. Despite the numerous other duties of Serebryansky’s Paris residency, its main task remained the surveillance and destabilization of French Trotskyists. Until 1937 Lev Sedov, thanks to his misplaced but total confidence in “Etienne” Zborowski, was such an indispensable source on the POLECATS (as the Trotskyists were codenamed by the Centre) that he was not marked down as a target for liquidation.^^ In the autumn of 1936 Zborowski warned the Centre that, because of his financial problems, Trotsky was selling part of his archive (formerly among the papers entrusted by Sedov to Zborowski for safekeeping) to the Paris branch of the International Institute of Social History based in Amsterdam. Serebryansky was ordered to set up a task force to recover it, codenamed the HENRY group. He began by renting the flat immediately above the institute in the rue Michelet in order to keep it under surveillance. On Serebryansky’s instructions, Zborowski, then working as a service engineer at a Paris telephone exchange, was ordered to cause a fault on the Institute’s telephone line in order to give him a chance to reconnoitre the exact location of the Trotsky papers and examine the locks. When the Institute reported the fault on its line, however, one of Zborowski ’s colleagues was sent to mend the fault instead. Zborowski promptly put the Institute’s phone out of action once again and on this occasion was called to make the repair himself. As he left the Institute, having mended the fault and closely inspected the locks to the front and back doors, he was given a five franc tip by the director, Boris Nikolayevsky, a prominent Menshevik emigre classed by the NKVD as an “enemy of the people. Serebryansky fixed the time for the burglary at two o’clock on the morning of November 7, 1936, and ordered it to be completed by 5 a.m. at the latest. Since his agents were unable to find keys to fit the Institute locks, he decided to cut them out with a drill powered by an electric transformer concealed in a box filled with sawdust and cotton wool to deaden the sound. The burglars broke in unobserved and left with Trotsky’s papers. Both Sedov and the Paris police immediately suspected the NKVD because of both the professionalism of the burglary and the fact that money and valuables in the Institute had been left untouched. Sedov assured the r police that his assistant “Etienne” Zborowski was completely above suspicion, and in any case kept the main archive, which had not been stolen, at his home address. Ironically, Sedov suggested that the NKVD might have learned of the transfer of a part of the archive as the result of an indiscretion by the Institute director, Nikolayevsky.^^ The extraordinary importance attached by the Centre to the theft of the papers was demonstrated by the award of the Order of the Red Banner to the HENRY group. The operation, however, was as pointless as it was professional. The papers stolen from the Institute (many of them press cuttings) were of no operational significance whatever and of far less historical importance than the Trotsky archive which remained in Zborowski’s hands and later ended up at Harvard University. But by the mid- 1930s Stalin had lost all sense of proportion in his pursuit of Trotskyism in all its forms, both real and imaginary. Trotsky had become an obsession who dominated many of Stalin’s waking hours and probably interfered with his sleep at night. As Trotsky’s biographer, Isaac Deutscher, concludes: The frenzy with which [Stalin] pursued the feud, making it the paramount preoccupation of international communism as well as of the Soviet Union and subordinating to it all political, tactical, intellectual and other interests, beggars description; there is in the whole of history hardly another case in which such immense resources of power and propaganda were employed against a single individual. The British diplomat R. A. Sykes later wisely described Stalin’s world view as “a curious mixture of shrewdness and nonsense. Stalin’s shrewdness was apparent in the way that he outmaneuvered his rivals after the death of Lenin, gradually acquired absolute power as General Secretary, and later out-negotiated Churchill and Roosevelt during their wartime conferences. Historians have found it difficult to accept that so shrewd a man also believed in so much nonsense. But it is no more possible to understand Stalin without acknowledging his addiction to conspiracy theories about Trotsky (and others) than it is to comprehend Hitler without grasping the passion with which he pursued his even more terrible and absurd conspiracy theories about the Jews. GENRIKH GRIGORYEVICH YAGODA, head of the NKVD from 1934 to 1936, was far less obsessed by Trotsky than Stalin was. Stalin’s chief grudge against him was probably a growing conviction that he had been deliberately negligent in his hunt for Trotskyist traitors. His nemesis arrived in September 1936 in the form of a telegram from Stalin and his protege, Andrei Zhdanov, to the Central Committee declaring that Yagoda had “definitely proved himself incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite- Zinovyevite bloc” and demanding his replacement by Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov. As head of the NKVD for the next two years, Yezhov carried through the largest scale peacetime political persecution and blood-letting in European history, known to posterity as the Great Terror.^ ^ One NKVD document from the Yezhov era, which doubtless reflected — and probably slavishly imitated — Stalin’s own view, asserted that “the scoundrel Yagoda” had deliberately concentrated the attack on the “lower ranks” of “the right-wing Trotskyite underground” in order to divert attention from its true leaders: Zinovyev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Kamenev and Smirnov. Yagoda, it was claimed, had either sacked or sidelined NKVD staff who had tried to indict these former heroes of the Leninist era for their imaginary crimes. All save Tomsky, who committed suicide, were given starring roles in the show trials of 1936 to 1938, gruesome morality plays which proclaimed a grotesque conspiracy theory uniting all opposition at home and abroad by the use of elegantly absurd formulae such as: “Trotskyism is a variety of fascism and Zinovyevism is a variety of Trotskyism.” In the last of the great show trials Yagoda, despite a plea for mercy written “on bended knees,” was himself unmasked as a leading Trotskyist conspirator. The chief author of the gigantic conspiracy theory, which became undisputed orthodoxy within the NKVD and provided the ideological underpinning of the Great Terror, was Stalin himself Stalin personally proofread the transcripts of the show trials before their publication, amending the defendants’ speeches to ensure that they did not deviate from their well-rehearsed confessions to imaginary conspiracies.^^ NKVD records of the period proclaim with characteristic obsequiousness that, “The practical organization of the work exposing the right-wing Trotskyite underground was supervised personally by Comrade Stalin, and in 1936-8 crippling blows were delivered to the rabble. “Crippling blows” against both real and imaginary Trotskyist “rabble” were struck outside as well as inside the Soviet Union. The beginning of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 opened up a major new field of operations for Serebryansky’s Administration for Special Tasks and for INO as a whole. The struggle of the Spanish republican government to defend itself against the nationalist rebellion led by General Francisco Franco fired the imagination of the whole of the European left as a crusade against international fascism: 35,000 foreign volunteers, most of them Communist, set out for Spain to join the International Brigades in defense of the republic. In October 1936 Stalin declared in an open letter to Spanish Communists: “Liberation of Spain from the yoke of the Spanish reactionaries is not the private concern of Spaniards alone, but the common cause of all progressive humanity.” From the outset, however, the NKVD was engaged in Spain in a war on two fronts: against Trotskyists within the republicans and the International Brigades, as well as against Franco and the nationalist forces. The former illegal resident in London, Aleksandr Orlov, sent to Spain as legal resident after the outbreak of the Civil War, confidently assured the Centre in October, “The Trotskyist organization POUM [Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista] can be easily liquidated. WHILE ORLOV COORDINATED the NKVD’s secret two-front war within Spain, Serebryansky conducted operations from abroad. Serebryansky organized training courses in Paris for saboteurs from the International Brigades, run by GIGI, a French Communist mechanic who usually worked without pay, FRANYA, a female Polish student paid 1,500 francs a month, and LEGRAND, on whom no further details are available. The greatest sabotage success reported by Serebryansky was the claim by the ERNST TOLSTY group of illegals, based in the Baltic and Scandinavia, to have sunk seventeen ships carrying arms to Franco. One of the leading saboteurs was a young German Communist, Ernst Wollweber, who twenty years later was to become head of the Stasi in East Germany.^^ An NKVD inquiry after the Civil War concluded, however, that some of the reports of sinkings were fabrications.^^ The main NKVD training grounds for guerrillas and saboteurs were within Spain itself at training camps supervised by Orlov at Valencia, Barcelona, Bilbao and Argen. Orlov later boasted of how his guerrilla platoons succeeded in blowing up power lines and bridges and in attacking enemy convoys far behind the nationalist lines. As an SVR-sponsored biography of Orlov acknowledges, his larger purpose was “to build up a secret police force under NKVD control to effect a Stalinization of Spain.” The chief Soviet military adviser in republican Spain, General Jan Berzin, formerly head of Red Army intelligence, complained that Orlov and the NKVD were treating republican Spain as a colony rather than an ally.^^ In the spring of 1937 Orlov and Serebryansky were ordered to move from the surveillance and destabilization of Trotskyist groups to the liquidation of their leaders. While Serebryansky began preparing the abduction of Sedov,^^ Orlov supplied the republican government with forged documents designed to discredit POUM as “a German-Francoist spy organization.” On June 16 the head of POUM, Andreu Nin, and forty leading members were arrested, its headquarters closed and its militia battalions disbanded. Less than a week later Nin disappeared from prison. An official investigation announced that he had escaped. In reality, he was abducted and murdered by a “mobile squad” of NKVD assassins, supervised by Orlov. Nin was one of many Trotskyists in Spain, both real and imagined, who met such fates. Until Orlov defected to the United States in 1938, fearing that he too had been placed on an NKVD death list, he lived in some luxury while organizing the liquidation of enemies of the people. A young volunteer in the International Brigades summoned to his presence was struck by how strongly he reeked of eau de cologne, and watched enviously as he consumed a large cooked breakfast wheeled in on a trolley by a whitecoated servant. Orlov offered none of it to the famished volunteer, who had not eaten for twenty-four hours. Though unusually forthcoming about Orlov, who, because of his defection, never qualified for the KGB Valhalla, the SVR has been much more reluctant to release material on the Spanish Civil War which might damage the reputation of the traditional heroes of Soviet foreign intelligence: among them Hero of the Soviet Union Stanislav Alekseyevich Vaupshasov, long celebrated for his daring exploits behind enemy lines during the Second World War. With four Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Great Patriotic War and a chestfiil of other medals, Vaupshasov was probably the Soviet Union’s most profusely decorated intelligence hero. As recently as 1990 he was honored by a commemorative postage stamp. Vaupshasov’ s murderous pre-war record, however, is still kept from public view by the SVR. In the mid- 1920s he led a secret OGPU unit in numerous raids on Polish and Lithuanian border villages, dressed in Polish and Lithuanian army uniforms. In 1929 Vaupshasov was sentenced to death for murdering a colleague, but managed to have the sentence commuted to ten years in the gulag. He was quickly released and resumed his career as one of the NKVD’s leading experts in assassination. Among Vaupshasov’ s duties in Spain was the construction and guarding of a secret crematorium which enabled the NKVD to dispose of its victims without leaving any trace of their remains. Many of those selected for liquidation were lured into the building containing the crematorium and killed on the spot.^^ The NKVD agent in charge of the crematorium was Jose Castelo Pacheco (codenamed JOSE, PANSO and TEODOR), a Spanish Communist bom in Salamanca in 1910, who was recmited by Orlov’s deputy resident, Leonid Aleksandrovich Eitingon, in 1936.^^ In 1982, some years after Castelo ’s death, the KGB received a letter from a female relative appealing for a pension and claiming that he had told her before his death, “If you have any problems and there is no other way out, I mean only in extreme circumstances, then contact my Soviet comrades.” Though Castelo ’s file showed that he had promised never to reveal any details of his work as a Soviet agent, there was an obvious risk that his relative had discovered his work in the NKVD crematorium. The Centre therefore concluded that to refuse her request might have “undesirable consequences.” In January 1983 she was summoned to the consular department of the Soviet embassy in Madrid by the resident and told that, though she had no legal right to a pension, it had been decided to make her an ex gratia payment of 5,000 convertible roubles, then the equivalent of 6,680 US dollars. No reference was made to Castelo ’s work for the NKVD.3^ REMARKABLY, MANY OTHERWISE admirable studies of the Stalin era fail to mention the relentless secret pursuit of “enemies of the people” in western Europe. The result, all too frequently, is a sanitized, curiously bloodless interpretation of Soviet foreign policy on the eve of the Second World War which fails to recognize the priority given to assassination. Outside Spain, the main theater of operations for the NKVD’s assassins was France, where their chief targets were Lev Sedov and General Yevgeni Karlovich Miller, Kutepov’s successor as head of the White Guard ROVS. In the summer of 1937 Serebryansky devised similar plans to liquidate both. Sedov and Miller were each to be kidnapped in Paris, smuggled on board a boat waiting off the Channel coast, then brought to the Soviet Union for interrogation and retribution. The first stage in the abduction operations was the penetration of their entourages. r Like Sedov’s assistant “Etienne” Zborowski, Miller’s deputy. General Nikolai Skoblin, was an NKVD agent. Probably unknown to Skoblin, Serebryansky also used an illegal, Mireille Lyudvigovna Abbiate (codenamed AVIATORSHA, “aviator’s wife”), to keep Miller under surveillance. Abbiate was the daughter of a French music teacher in St. Petersburg, bom and brought up in Russia. When her family returned to France in 1920, she had stayed in Russia and married the aviator Vasili Ivanovich Yermolov (hence her later codename). In 1931, when she traveled to France to visit her parents, she was recmited by the NKVD. During her visit she recruited her brother, Roland Lyudvigovich Abbiate, who also became an illegal with the codename LETCHIK (“pilot”). AVIATORS HA rented a flat next to General Miller, secretly forced an entry, stole some of his papers and installed a hidden microphone which enabled her to bug his apartment.^^ On September 22, 1937, like Kutepov seven years earlier. Miller disappeared in broad daylight on a Paris street. The Surete later concluded that Miller had been taken to the Soviet embassy, killed and his body placed in a large trunk which was then taken by a Ford truck to be loaded on a Soviet freighter waiting at Le Havre. Several witnesses reported seeing the trunk being loaded on board. Miller, however, was still alive inside the trunk, heavily drugged. Unlike Kutepov in 1930, he survived the voyage to Moscow, where he was interrogated and shot. Skoblin, who fell under immediate suspicion by Miller’s supporters, fled to Spain.^^ Mireille Abbiate, whose role went undetected, was awarded the Order of the Red Star, then reassigned to the operation against Sedov.^^ Planning for the abduction of Sedov was at an advanced stage by the time Miller disappeared. A fishing boat had been hired at Boulogne to take him on the first stage of his journey to the Soviet Union.^^ The operation, however, was aborted — possibly as a result of the furor aroused in France by the NKVD’s suspected involvement in Miller’s abduction. A few months later Sedov met a different end. On February 8, 1938 he entered hospital with acute appendicitis. “Etienne” Zborowski helped to persuade him that, to avoid NKVD surveillance, he must have his appendix removed not at a French hospital but at a small private clinic run by Russian emigres, which was in reality an easier target for Soviet penetration. No sooner had Zborowski ordered the ambulance than, as he later admitted, he alerted the NKVD. But, for alleged security reasons, he refused to reveal the address of the clinic to French Trotskyists. Sedov’s operation was successful and for a few days he seemed to be making a normal recovery. Then he had a sudden relapse which baffled his doctors. Despite repeated blood transfusions, he died in great pain on February 16 at the age of only thirty-two. The contemporary files contain no proof that the NKVD was responsible for his death.^^ It had, however, a sophisticated medical section, the Kamera, which experimented with lethal drugs and was capable of poisoning Sedov. It is certain that the NKVD intended to assassinate Sedov, just as it planned to kill Trotsky and his other leading lieutenants. What remains in doubt is whether Sedov was murdered by the NKVD in February 1938 or whether he died of natural causes before he could be assassinated.^^ Sedov’s death enabled the NKVD to take a leading role in the Trotskyist organization. Zborowski became both publisher of the Bulletin of the Opposition and Trotsky’s most important contact with his European supporters. While unobtrusively encouraging internecine warfare between the rival Trotskyist tendencies, Zborowski impeccably maintained his own cover. On one occasion he wrote to tell Trotsky that the Bulletin was about to publish an article entitled “Trotsky’s Life in Danger,” which would expose the activities of NKVD agents in Mexico. In the summer of 1938 the defector Aleksandr Orlov, then living in the United States, sent Trotsky an anonymous letter warning him that his life was in danger from an NKVD agent in Paris. Orlov did not know the agent’s surname but said that his first name was Mark (the real first name of “Etienne” Zborowski), and gave a detailed description of his appearance and background. Trotsky suspected that this letter and others like it were the work of NKVD agents provocateurs. Zborowski agreed. When told about one of the accusations against him, he is reported as having given “a hearty laugh.”^^ Following the death of Sedov, the NKVD’s next major Trotskyist target in Europe was the German Rudolf Klement, secretary of Trotsky’s Fourth International, whose founding conference was due to be held later in the year.^^ On July 13, 1938 the NKVD abducted Klement from his Paris home. A few weeks later his headless corpse was washed ashore on the banks of the Seine. The founding conference of the Fourth International in September was a tragicomic event, attended by only twenty-one delegates claiming to represent mostly minuscule Trotskyist groups in eleven countries. The Russian section, whose authentic members had probably been entirely exterminated, was represented by Zborowski. The American Trotskyist Sylvia Angeloff, one of the conference translators, was accompanied by her Spanish lover, Ramon Mercader, an NKVD illegal posing as a Belgian journalist who was later to achieve fame as Trotsky’s assassin in Mexico City.^^ BY 1938 SEREBRYANSKY’S Administration for Special Tasks was the largest section of Soviet foreign intelligence, claiming to have 212 illegal officers operating in sixteen countries: the USA, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and China. After Trotskyists, the largest number of “enemies of the people” pursued abroad by the NKVD during the Great Terror came from the ranks of its own foreign intelligence service.^^ When receiving reports from Moscow of show trials and the unmasking of their colleagues as agents of imperialist powers, intelligence officers stationed abroad had to pay careful attention not merely to what they said but also to their facial expressions and body language. Those who failed to respond with sufficiently visible or heartfelt outrage to the non-existent conspiracies being unveiled in Moscow were likely to have adverse reports sent to the Centre — frequently with fatal consequences. After the trial of Lenin’s former lieutenants Zinovyev, Kamenev and other “degenerates” in August 1936, the Centre received an outraged communication from the Paris legal residency regarding the unsatisfactory level of indignation displayed by the military intelligence officer Abram Mironovich Albam (codenamed BELOV): BELOV does not appear to feel a deep hatred or a sharply critical attitude towards these political bandits. During discussions of the trial of the Trotskyite-Zinovyevite bandits, he retreats into silence. BELOV was hoping that the sixteen convicted men would be shown mercy, and, when he read about their execution in the newspaper today, he actually sighed.^^ Albam ’s subversive sigh helped to convict not merely himself but also a number of his colleagues of imaginary crimes. His file lists thirteen of his acquaintances who were subsequently arrested; at least some, probably most, were shot. Albam’ s wife, Frida Lvovna, tried to save herself by disowning her arrested husband. “The most horrible realization for an honest Party member,” she wrote indignantly to the NKVD, “is the fact that he was an enemy of the people surrounded by other enemies of the people. Both at home and abroad the Great Terror favored the survival of the most morally unfit. Those who were quickest to denounce their colleagues for imaginary crimes stood the greatest chance of being among the minority of survivors. The fact that Yakov Surits, ambassador in Berlin at the beginning of the Great Terror, was one of the few senior diplomats to survive may well have owed something to his expertise in denunciation. Surits sought to head off denunciation by the head of the legal residency in his embassy, B. M. Gordon, by denouncing Gordon first. At the outset of the Terror, Surits drew to the attention of the Centre that a Soviet diplomat with whom Gordon was on friendly terms was a former Socialist Revolutionary who frequently visited relatives in Prague “where other SR emigres reside. After the show trial of the “Trotskyite-Zinovyevite Terrorist Center” in January 1937, Surits reported disturbing evidence of Gordon’s Trotskyite sympathies: On February 2 a Party meeting was held in the Berlin embassy. Gordon, B. M., the resident and Communist Party organizer, delivered a report on the trial of the Trotskyite Center. Gordon did not say a word about the fact that his rabble of bandits had a specific program of action; he did not say why this scum hid its program from the working class and from all working people; why it led a double life; why it went deeply underground. He did not dwell on the reasons why after all the enemies managed to cause damage for so many years. He did not deal with the question why, despite wrecking, sabotage, terrorism and espionage, our industry and transport constantly made progress and continue to make progress. He did not touch on the international significance of the trial. Surits, however, was unaware that he was himself being simultaneously denounced for similar failings by one of his secretaries, who wrote virtuously to the Centre: To this day the office of Comrade Surits is adorned with a portrait of Bukharin with the following inscription: “To my dear Surits, my old friend and comrade, with love — ^N. Bukharin.” I deliberately do not take it down, not because I greatly enjoy looking at it, but because I want to avoid the cross looks which Comrade Surits gave me when I removed the portrait of Yenukidze. I am waiting for him to remove it himself, since if Bukharin was indeed once his close friend, he must now be his enemy, as he has become the enemy of our Party and of the whole working class. The portrait should immediately have been thrown into the fire. That, really, is all that I considered it my Party duty to report to you. After the adoption of the Stalin Constitution [of 1936] which has granted us great rights and put us under great obligations, calling us to exercise discipline, honest work and vigilance, I could not remain silent about these facts. In 1937-8, following the recall and liquidation of all or most of their officers, many NKVD residencies ceased to function. Though the residencies in London, Berlin, Vienna and Tokyo did not close, they were reduced to one or, at the most, two officers each.^^ Most of the Great Illegals were purged with the rest. Among the first to fall under suspicion was the London head of probably the NKVD’s most successful illegal residency, Teodor Maly, whose religious background and revulsion at the use of terror made him an obvious suspect. He accepted the order to return to Moscow in June 1937 with an idealistic fatalism. ‘T know that as a former priest I haven’t got a chance,” he told Aleksandr Orlov. “But I have decided to go there so that nobody can say: ‘That priest might have been a real spy after all.’ Once in Moscow he was denounced as a German spy, interrogated and shot a few months later. Moisei Akselrod, head of the illegal residency in Italy and controller of DUNCAN, the most productive source of intelligence on Britain during the previous decade, was also recalled to Moscow. After a brief period in limbo, he too was executed as an enemy of the people. Amid the paranoia of the Great Terror, Arnold Deutsch’s Jewish- Austrian origins and unorthodox early career made him automatically suspect in the Centre. After the recall of Maly, Akselrod and other illegals, he must have feared that his own turn would not be long in coming. In an effort to extend his visa he had recently contacted a Jewish relative in Birmingham, Oscar Deutsch, president of a local synagogue and managing director of Odeon Theatres. Arnold sometimes visited his Birmingham relatives for Friday night sabbath dinners, and Oscar promised to provide work to enable him to stay in Britain. These contacts doubtless added to the suspicions of the Centre. Remarkably, however, Deutsch survived. He may well have owed his survival to the defection in July 1937 of a Paris-based NKVD illegal, Ignace Poretsky (alias Reiss, codenamed RAYMOND). Poretsky was tracked down in Switzerland by a French illegal in the “Serebryansky Service,” Roland Abbiate (alias “Rossi,” codenamed LETCHIK), whose sister Mireille, also in the “Serebryansky Service,” was simultaneously preparing the abduction of General Miller in Paris. To lure Poretsky to his death, Abbiate used one of his friends, Gertrude Schildbach, a German Communist refugee who was persuaded to write to Poretsky to say that she urgently needed his advice. Schildbach refused a request to give Poretsky a box of chocolates laced with strychnine (later recovered by the Swiss police), but enticed him into a side-road near Lausanne where Abbiate was waiting with a machine-gun. At the last moment Poretsky realized that he was being led into a trap and tried to grab hold of Schildbach. His bullet-ridden body was later discovered, clutching in one hand a strand of her greying hair.^^ The NKVD damage assessment after Poretsky’ s defection concluded that he had probably betrayed Deutsch, with whom he had been stationed in Paris a few years earlier, to Western intelligence services. Deutsch’ s classification as a victim of Trotskyite and Western conspiracy helped to protect him from charges of being part of that conspiracy. He was recalled to Moscow in November 1937, not, like Maly, to be shot, but because the Centre believed he had been compromised by Poretsky and other traitors. The liquidation of Maly and recall of Deutsch did severe and potentially catastrophic damage to the NKVD’s British operations. All contact was broken with Captain King (MAG), the cipher clerk in the Foreign Office recruited in 1935, since the NKVD damage assessment absurdly concluded that Maly “had betrayed MAG to the enemy. The files noted by Mitrokhin do not record what the damage assessment concluded about the Cambridge recruits, but, since Maly knew all their names, there were undoubtedly fears that they too had been compromised. Those fears must surely have been heightened by the defection in November of Walter Krivitsky, the illegal resident in the Netherlands. Though Krivitsky seems not to have known the names of any of the Cambridge Five, he knew some details about them, including the fact that one of them was a young journalist who had been sent to Spain with a mission to assassinate Franco. After Deutsch’s recall to Moscow, the three members of the Five who remained in England — Burgess, Blunt and Caimcross — were out of direct contact with the Centre for nine months. They were so highly motivated, however, that they continued to work for the NKVD even as the illegal residency which had controlled them was disintegrating. Burgess, who had been allowed by Deutsch and Maly to consider himself an NKVD officer rather than an agent wholly dependent on instructions from his controller, continued recruiting agents on his own initiative. He saw himself as continuing and developing Deutsch’s strategy of recruiting bright students at Oxford as well as Cambridge who could penetrate Whitehall. Burgess intended his chief talent- spotter at Oxford to be Goronwy Rees, a young Welsh Fellow of All Souls and assistant editor of the Spectator. Rees had first met Burgess in 1932 and, though resisting Burgess’s attempt to seduce him, had none the less been deeply impressed by him: “It seemed to me that there was something deeply original, something which was, as it were, his very own in everything he had to say.”^^ It was probably a book review by Rees late in 1937 which persuaded Burgess that he was ready for recruitment. The misery of mass unemployment in south Wales, wrote Rees, was misery of a special and peculiar kind ... and to many people it implies a final condemnation of the society which has produced it ... If you tell men and women, already inclined by temperament and tradition to revolutionary opinions, that their sufferings are caused by an impersonal economic system, you leave them but one choice. Lenin could not do better. One evening, probably at the beginning of 1938, sitting in Rees’s flat with, as usual, a bottle of whiskey between them, Burgess told him that his Spectator review showed that he had “the heart of the matter in him.” Then, according to Rees, he added with unusual solemnity, “I am a Comintern agent and have been ever since I came down from Cambridge. In later years Rees was to try to give the impression that he did not agree to become an agent. His KGB file makes clear that he was recruited — though it confirms that Burgess asked him not to work for the NKVD but “to help the Party. As an NKVD case officer with whom Burgess made contact later in the year reported to the Centre, he regarded Rees (henceforth codenamed FLEET or GROSS) as a key part of his Oxbridge recruitment strategy: The kind of work which he would do with great moral satisfaction and with absolute confidence in its success and effectiveness is the recruitment by us of young people graduating from Oxford and Cambridge Universities and preparing them to enter the civil service. For this kind of work he has such assistants as TONY [Blunt] in Cambridge and GROSS [Rees] in Oxford. MADCHEN [Burgess] always returns to this idea at every meeting ...^^ Though unhappy with Burgess’s undisciplined recruiting methods, the Centre regarded Rees as potentially an important agent. Three of Britain’s leading appeasers — Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary; Sir John Simon, then Home Secretary; and Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times — were nonresident Fellows of All Souls. The Center attached exaggerated importance to the fact that Rees met all three from time to time on high table. It also overestimated the influence of Rees’s friend Sir Ernest Swinton, a retired major-general who had been Chichele Professor of Military History since 1925 and was referred to by the Centre as “General Swinton. WHILE BURGESS WAS pressing ahead enthusiastically with his Oxbridge recruitment strategy, INO was in turmoil. On February 17, 1938 its head, Abram Slutsky, was found dead in his office, allegedly from a heart attack. But at his lying in state in the NKVD officers’ club, his senior staff noticed on his face the tell-tale signs of cyanide poisoning. Yagoda, meanwhile, was confessing at his trial to working for the German, Japanese and Polish intelligence services, to poisoning his predecessor, Menzhinsky, and to attempting to poison his successor, Yezhov.^^ By the end of the year, Slutsky’s two immediate successors as head of INO, Zelman Pasov and Mikhail Shpigelglas, had also been shot as enemies of the people. INO collapsed into such confusion during 1938 that for 127 consecutive days not a single foreign intelligence report was forwarded to Stalin.^^ In December Yezhov was replaced as head of the NKVD by Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria; a few months later he was accused of treasonable conspiracy with Britain, Germany, Japan and Poland. As NKVD officers went home in the evening, each one must have wondered whether the knock at the door in the early hours would signal that his own doom was nigh. Most of the INO officers who were interrogated and brutally tortured during the late 1930s in the name of the vast conspiracy theories of Stalin and his NKVD chiefs did not live to tell the tale. One of the few who did was the first of the Great Illegals, Dmitri Bystroletov. In 1937 Bystroletov had been sent on a mission to Berlin to contact a Soviet agent on the Reichswehr general staff. He later claimed that, before he left, he was embraced by Yezhov. “Be proud that we have given you one of our best sources,” Yezhov told him. “Stalin and your fatherland will not forget you.”^^ Early in 1938, however, Bystroletov was suspended from duty and transferred to the Moscow Chamber of Commerce, where he worked until his arrest in September.^^ During Bystroletov’ s interrogation by Colonel Solovyev, Yezhov entered the room and asked what he was accused of. When told he was charged with spying for four foreign powers, Yezhov replied “Too few!”, turned on his heels and left.^^ When Bystroletov refused to confess to his imaginary crimes, Solovyev and his assistant, Pushkin, beat him with a ball-bearing on the end of an iron rope, breaking two of his ribs and penetrating a lung. His skull was fractured by one of the other instruments of torture, a hammer wrapped in cotton wool and bandages, and his stomach muscles tom by repeated kicks from his interrogators. Convinced that he would die if the beating continued, Bystroletov signed a confession dictated to him by Solovyev. For most INO officers, torture and confession to imaginary crimes were followed by a short walk to an execution chamber and a bullet in the back of the head. Bystroletov, however, survived to write an account of his interrogation. Though sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in 1939, he was rehabilitated during the Second World War. By the time he was released, his wife, Shelmatova, sent to the gulag as the spouse of an enemy of the people, had killed herself by cutting her throat with a kitchen knife. His elderly mother poisoned herself. AFTER THE DISINTEGRATION of the London illegal residency following the liquidation of Maly and the recall of Deutsch, the Centre planned to hand over the running of its main British agents to the legal residency at the Soviet embassy in Kensington. In April 1938 a new resident, Grigori Grafpen (codenamed SAM), arrived to take charge. The massacre of many of the most experienced INO officers had a dramatic effect on the quality of NKVD tradecraft. Deutsch, Orlov and Maly had taken elaborate precautions to avoid surveillance before meeting their agents. But an inexperienced emissary from the Centre who came to inspect Graven’s residency had so little idea about tradecraft that he assumed it was safe to operate in the immediate environs of the embassy. He reported naively to Moscow, “Next to the Embassy there is a park [Kensington Gardens] which is convenient ... for holding meetings with agents, as one can simply give the appearance of having gone out for a walk in this park.”^^ Graven’s first priority was to renew contact with Donald Maclean, then the most productive of the Cambridge Five and able to smuggle large numbers of classified documents out of the Foreign Office. On April 10 a young and apparently inexperienced female NKVD officer, codenamed NORMA, met Maclean in the Empire Cinema in Leicester Square. A few days later Maclean came to NORMA ’s flat with a large bundle of Foreign Office documents which she photographed, before giving the undeveloped film to Grafpen for shipment to Moscow. Either on that occasion or soon afterwards, the young British agent and his Soviet case officer followed the photography session by going to bed together. In defiance of her instructions, NORMA also told Maclean, probably in bed, that his current codename (which he was not supposed to know) was LYRIC. In September 1938 Maclean left for his first foreign posting as third secretary in the Paris embassy, preceded by an effusive testimonial from the Foreign Office personnel department: Maclean, who is the son of the late Sir Donald Maclean ... has done extremely well during his first two years here and is one of the mainstays of the Western Department. He is a very nice individual indeed and has plenty of brains and keenness. He is, too, nice-looking and ought, we think, to be a success in Paris from the social as well as the work point of view.^^ As Maclean was leaving for Paris, the Munich crisis was reaching its humiliating climax with the surrender of the Czech Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. On September 30 the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, returned to a hero’s welcome in London, brandishing the worthless piece of paper bearing Hitler’s signature which, he claimed, meant not only “peace with honor” but “peace for our time.” For the Cambridge Five, incapable of imagining that less than a year later Stalin would sign a pact with Hitler, Munich was further confirmation of the justice of their cause. During the Munich crisis Caimcross had access to Foreign Office files containing what Burgess described as “the very best information imaginable” on British policy, which he passed to the NKVD via Klugmann and Burgess. Caimcross ’s documents on the attempted appeasement of Germany, which reached its nadir with the Munich agreement, were used by the Centre to provide further evidence for the conspiracy theory that the secret aim of British foreign policy, supported by the French, was “to lure Germany into an attack on Russia.” Though the chief advocate of this theory was Stalin, it was also fervently espoused by INO. Throughout the Cold War, the claim that Britain’s aim at Munich had been not merely to appease Hitler but also to drive him into a conflict with the Soviet Union remained unchallenged orthodoxy among KGB historians. As late as the mid- 1990s, Yuri Modin, the post-war controller of the Five, was still insisting that, “This claim was neither propaganda nor disinformation but the unvarnished tmth, proven by the documents obtained for us by Burgess” (chiefly, no doubt, from Caimcross).^^ After Maclean’s posting to Paris during the Munich crisis, Caimcross was intended by the Centre to succeed him as its chief source within the Foreign Office. The London resident. Graven, bungled the transition. Caimcross ’s prickly personality and lack of social graces had not won the same encomiums from his colleagues or the Foreign Office personnel department as Maclean’s more patrician manner. In December 1938 he moved to the Treasury. At almost the same moment as Caimcross ’s departure for the Treasury, though for unconnected reasons, Grafpen was recalled to Moscow. Given the atmosphere of the time, he may actually have been relieved, after being “unmasked” as a Trotskyist on his arrival, to be sentenced to only five years in a labor camp rather than being led to an execution cellar in the Lubyanka basement. En route for Moscow in December 1938, Grafpen accompanied NORMA (renamed ADA since her earlier indiscretion) to Paris where she was due to resume contact with Maclean. ADA reported that Maclean was having an affair with an American student at the Sorbonne, Melinda Marling, whom he was later to marry. She also discovered that Maclean, now drinking heavily, had admitted that while dmnk he had told both his mistress and his brother that he was working for Soviet intelligence.^^ ADA remained in Paris, filming the documents provided by Maclean from embassy files, then passing the film to an illegal codenamed FORD for transmission to the Centre. The news in December 1938 of Maclean’s drunken security lapse was balanced by a spectacular success. In the same month Burgess reported, probably via Paris, that he had succeeded in joining the Secret Intelligence Service. He had been taken on by SIS’s newest branch. Section D, founded earlier in the year to devise dirty tricks ranging from sabotage to psychological warfare (delicately described as ways of “attacking potential enemies by means other than the operations of military force”) for use in a future war.^^ Instead of being elated by the news, however, the Centre appeared almost paralyzed by fear and suspicion. THE EXPOSURE OF two London illegal residents, Reif and Maly, and the legal resident. Graven, as imaginary enemy agents, combined with the defection of Orlov, put the entire future of intelligence operations in Britain in doubt. The illegal residency had been wound up and, with one exception, the staff of the legal residency were recalled to Moscow. The only remaining INO officer in London, Anatoli Veniaminovich Gorsky, was poorly briefed about even the most important British agents. In the summer of 1939, when Philby was due to return to London after the end of the Spanish Civil War, Gorsky told the Centre, “When you give us orders on what to do with SOHNCHEN, we would appreciate some orientation on him, for he is known to us only in the most general terms. An assessment in the Centre concluded that intelligence work in Britain “was based on doubtful sources, on an agent network acquired at the time when it was controlled by enemies of the people and was therefore extremely dangerous.” It concluded with a recommendation to break contact with all British agents — the Five included. Though contact was not yet broken, the Five seem to have been held at arm’s length for most of 1939. Intelligence from them was accepted, often without any visible interest in it, while the Centre continued to debate the possibility that some or all were agents provocateurs. ADA reported that Philby “frequently” complained to Maclean about the NKVD’s lack of contact with, and interest in, him.^^ Fitzi Philby (MARY) and Edith Tudor Hart (EDITH), who were used by Burgess and others as couriers to make contact with the NKVD in Paris in 1938-9, grumbled that their expenses were not being paid. Gorsky reported to the Centre in July 1939: MARY announced that, as a result of a four-month hiatus in communications with her, we owe her and MADCHEN £65. 1 promised to check at home [the Centre] and gave him £30 in advance, since she said they were in material need ... MARY continues to live in [France] and for some reason, she says on our orders, maintains a large flat and so on there. The Centre replied: At one time, when it was necessary, MARY was given orders to keep a flat in Paris. That is no longer necessary. Have her get rid of the flat and live more modestly, since we will not pay. MARY should not be paid £65, since we do not feel that we owe her, for anything. We confirm the payment of £30. Tell her that we will pay no more.^^ To a remarkable degree, however, the ideological commitment of the main British agents survived the turmoil in the Centre. In 1938 Burgess recruited one of his lovers, Eric Kessler, a Swiss journalist turned diplomat on the staff of the Swiss embassy in London. Later codenamed OREND and SHVEYTSARETS (“Swiss”), Kessler proved a valuable source on Swiss- German relations. Probably in 1939, Burgess recruited another foreign lover, the Hungarian Andrew Revoi, later leader of the exiled Free Hungarians in wartime London. Codenamed TAFFY (“Toffee”), he was described in his KGB file as a pederast; the same source also claimed that he had “had homosexual relations with a Foreign Office official.” Ironically, in 1942 Burgess was also to recruit Revoi as an MI5 source. Kim and Litzi Philby, still good comrades according to KGB files though they both now had different partners, made a probably even more important recruitment in 1939: that of the Austrian journalist H. P. Smolka, whom Litzi had known in Vienna. Soon after the Nazi Anschluss, which united Austria with Germany in 1938, Smolka became a naturalized British subject with the name of Peter Smollett. Codenamed ABO by the Centre, Smollett later succeeded in becoming head of the Russian section in the wartime Ministry of Information.^^ The signature of the Nazi-Soviet Non- Aggression Pact in Moscow on August 23, 1939 was an even bigger blow to the morale of the NKVD’s British agents than the turmoil in the Centre. Exchanging toasts with Hitler’s foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Stalin told him, ‘T can guarantee, on my word of honor, that the Soviet Union will not betray its partner.” The ideological agents recruited during the 1930s had been motivated, at least in part, by the desire to fight fascism. Most, after varying degrees of inner turmoil, overcame their sense of shocked surprise at the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Over the previous few years, they had become sufficiently indoctrinated, often self-indoctrinated, in Stalinist double-think to perform the intellectual somersaults required to sustain their commitment to the vision of the Soviet Union as the world’s first worker- peasant state, the hope of progressive mankind. A minority of the ideological agents in the West, however, were so sickened by the Nazi-Soviet Pact that they ended their connection with the NKVD. The most important of those who broke contact in Britain was FLEET, Goronwy Rees. During a visit to Moscow in 1993, Rees’s daughter Jenny was informed, accurately, during a briefing by an SVR representative that Rees had refused to cooperate after the Pact: “We hear no more of him after that.” At the end of the briefing, Jenny Rees asked perceptively: “You know something else, do you, about Rees that you are not going to tell me?”^^ The SVR did indeed. The most important of the secrets that the SVR was unwilling to reveal was that Burgess, by now an SIS officer, panicked when Rees decided to break away, sent an urgent message to the Centre warning that Rees might betray both himself and Blunt, and asked for Rees to be assassinated. The Centre refused. Rees’s KGB file, however, records that he did not betray Burgess and Blunt because of his “old friendship” with Burgess. In an attempt to make betrayal less likely, Burgess told Rees that he too had been disillusioned by the Nazi-Soviet Pact and had ended illegal work for the Communist Party.^^ Maclean was also deeply worried by Rees’s “defection.” Years later, as he was beginning to crack under the strain of his double life as British diplomat and Soviet agent, he spat at Rees: “You used to be one of us, but you ratted! The doubts about Moscow felt by some of the NKVD’s British agents after the Nazi-Soviet Pact were more than matched by the Centre’s doubts about its agents. The Center launched an investigation into the possibility that Philby was either a German or a British agent. Since Philby had provided the original leads which led to the recruitment of Burgess and Maclean, and ultimately to all the Cambridge recruits, doubts about him reflected on the whole British agent network. The lowest point in the history of NKVD operations in Britain came at the beginning of 1940 when Gorsky, the last member of the London legal residency, was withdrawn to Moscow, leaving not a single NKVD officer active in Britain. A file in the KGB archives records, “The residency was disbanded on the instruction of Beria [head of the NKVD].”^^ Beria’ s reasons are not recorded, at least in the files examined by Mitrokhin, but chief among them was undoubtedly the recurrent fear that the British agent network was deeply suspect. In February 1940 the Centre issued orders for all contact with Philby to be broken of£99 Contact with Burgess was terminated at about the same time.^^^ DURING THE LATER 1930s the hunt for “enemies of the people” replaced intelligence collection as the main priority of NKVD foreign operations. The NKVD’s most active foreign intelligence agency was Serebryansky’s Administration for Special Tasks, whose persecution of INO officers steadily diminished the flow of foreign intelligence and degraded its analysis at the Center. Even the executioners abroad, however, were not immune from the Terror at home. Serebryansky himself became one of the victims of his own witch-hunt. Though he held the Order of Lenin for his many victories over enemies of the people, he was recalled to Moscow in November 1938 and exposed as “a spy of the British and French intelligence services.” An inquiry later concluded that his network contained “a large number of traitors and plain gangster elements.” Though the allegations of espionage for Britain and France were absurd, the charge that Serebryansky had inflated both the size of his illegal network and the scale of its accomplishments in reports to the Centre was probably well founded. Serebryansky’ s successor was Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, who a few months earlier had assassinated the emigre Ukrainian nationalist leader Yevkhen Konovalets with an ingeniously booby-trapped box of chocolates. In March 1939 Sudoplatov became deputy head of foreign intelligence, thus bringing “special tasks” and INO into closer association than ever before. He was personally instructed by Stalin that his chief task was to send a task force to Mexico to assassinate Leon Trotsky. The killing of Trotsky, codenamed operation UTKA (“Duck”), had become the chief objective of Stalin’s foreign policy. Even after the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, discovering the intentions of Adolf Hitler remained a lower priority than arranging the liquidation of the great heretic. Sudoplatov’s task force was composed of Spanish and Mexican NKVD agents recruited during the Civil War, supervised by his deputy, Leonid Eitingon, whose long experience of “special actions” included the liquidation of “enemies of the people” in Spain. The task force consisted of three groups. The first was an illegal network headed by the Spanish Communist Caridad Mercader del Rio (codenamed MOTHER), who was both recruited and seduced by Eitingon, one of the NKVD’s most celebrated womanizers. The most important agent in Caridad Mercader’ s group was her son Ramon (codenamed RAYMOND), who traveled on a doctored Canadian passport in the name of Frank Jacson (an eccentric NKVD spelling of Jackson). Like Eitingon, Ramon Mercader employed seduction as an operational technique, using his affair with the American Trotskyist Sylvia Ageloff to penetrate Trotsky’s villa near Mexico City. His opportunity came when Ageloff began work as one of Trotsky’s secretaries early in 1940. Each day Mercader drove her to Trotsky’s villa in the morning and returned to collect her after work. Gradually he became a well-known figure with the guards and some of Trotsky’s entourage, who, in March 1940, allowed him into the villa for the first time. Mercader’ s role at this stage was still that of penetration agent rather than assassin, with the task of reporting on the villa’s defenses, occupants and guards. The attack on the villa was to be led by a second group of agents drawn from veterans of the Spanish Civil War, headed by the celebrated Mexican Communist painter David Alfaro Siqueiros (codenamed KONE),^^^ who was animated by an exuberant ideological mix of art, revolution, Stalinism and exhibitionism. Both Mercader and Siqueiros were later to become well known for their involvement in operation UTKA. KGB files, however, also reveal the involvement of a shadowy third group of assassins headed by one of the most remarkable of all Soviet illegals, Iosif Romualdovich Grigulevich (then codenamed MAKS and FELIPE), who had taken a leading role in liquidating Trotskyists during the Spanish Civil War, as well as training saboteurs and arsonists to operate behind Franco’s lines. It is a measure of Grigulevich’ s skill in assuming false identities that, though bom a Lithuanian Jew,^^^ he was to succeed, a decade later, in passing himself off as a Costa Rican diplomat.^ Early in 1940 he recmited Siqueiros’s former pupil, the painter Antonio Pujol (codenamed JOSE), whom he later described as lacking in initiative but “very loyal, exceptionally reliable and quite bold,” to act as Siqueiros’s second-in-command in the assault on Trotsky’s villa.^^^ Grigulevich’s other recmits included his future wife and assistant, the Mexican Communist Laura Araujo Aguilar (codenamed LUISA). A key part of the assault plan was the infiltration in April 1940 of a young American agent, Robert Sheldon Harte (codenamed AMUR), posing as a New York Trotskyist, as a volunteer guard in Trotsky’s villa. Harte’s role was to open the main gate when the assault group staged its surprise attack in the middle of the night. Though enthusiastic, he was also naive. Grigulevich decided not to brief him on what would happen after he opened the villa gate. KGB records identify Grigulevich as the real leader of the assault on Trotsky’s villa.^^^ Grigulevich’s role in the attack was two-fold: to ensure that Siqueiros’s assault group gained entrance to the villa compound, and to try to inject some element of discipline into the attack. Left to his own devices, Siqueiros would have led the assault with all guns blazing but probably have made few attempts to cover his tracks. On the evening of May 23, 1940 Siqueiros and a group of about twenty followers put on a mixture of army and police uniforms and armed themselves with pistols and revolvers. As they did so, according to one of their number, they “laughed and joked as if it were a feast day.”^^^ Then, with Pujol carrying the only machine-gun, Grigulevich and the assault group set off to assassinate Trotsky.^ On arriving at the villa in the early hours of May 24, Grigulevich spoke to the American volunteer guard, Harte, who opened the gate.^^^ The assault group raked the bedrooms with gun fire to such effect that the Mexican police later counted seventy-three bullet holes in Trotsky’s bedroom wall. Remarkably, however, Trotsky and his wife survived by throwing themselves beneath their bed. Though an incendiary bomb was thrown into the bedroom of their small grandson, he too escaped by hiding under his bed.^^^ Harte was shocked by the attack — ^particularly, perhaps, by the attempt to kill Trotsky’s grandchild. He angrily told the assault group that, had he known how they would behave, he would never have let them in. To prevent Harte revealing what had happened, he was taken away and shot.^^^ A few months later, Siqueiros was tracked down and arrested. Grigulevich, however, managed to smuggle himself, Pujol and Laura Araujo Aguilar out of the country without his identity being discovered by the Mexican police. From 1942 to 1944 he ran an illegal residency in Argentina which, according to KGB files, planted more than 150 mines in cargoes and ships bound for Germany. The failure of the attack on Trotsky’s villa, followed by the dispersal of Siqueiros’s gunmen, led to the promotion of Ramon Mercader from penetration agent to assassin. Mercader succeeded partly because he was patient. Five days after the raid he met Trotsky for the first time. Amiable as ever, he gave Trotsky’s grandson a toy glider and taught him how to fly it. Over the next three months he paid ten visits to the villa, sometimes bringing small presents with him and always taking care not to overstay his welcome. Finally, on August 20, he brought an article he had written and asked for Trotsky’s advice. As Trotsky sat reading it at his study desk, Mercader took an icepick from his pocket and brought it down with all the force he could muster on the back of Trotsky’s skull. Mercader had expected Trotsky to die instantly and silently, thus allowing him to make his escape to a car nearby where his mother and her lover, Eitingon, were waiting. But Trotsky, though mortally wounded, let out “a terrible piercing cry.” (‘T shall hear that cry all my life,” said Mercader afterwards.) Mercader was arrested and later sentenced to twenty years in jail.^^^ Eitingon persuaded his mother to flee with him to Russia, promising to marry her if she did so. In Moscow Senora Mercader was welcomed by Beria, received by Stalin in the Kremlin and decorated with the Order of Lenin. But within a few years, abandoned by Eitingon and denied permission to leave Russia, she was consumed with guilt at having turned her son into an assassin and then leaving him to languish in a Mexican jail. Ramon Mercader kept the Stalinist faith throughout his twenty years in prison. History, he claimed, would see him as a soldier who had served the cause of the working- class revolution by ridding it of a traitor. KGB files reveal (contrary to most published accounts) that when Mercader was finally released and traveled to Moscow in 1960, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, along with a general’s pension and a three-room apartment, and was personally congratulated by Khrushchev. Twenty years after the assassination of Trotsky, the liquidation of enemies of the people abroad still remained, on a reduced scale, a significant part of KGB foreign operations. SIX WAR During the later months of 1940, with Trotsky dead and the worst of the blood-letting inside INO at an end, the Centre sought to rebuild its foreign intelligence network. Until the Great Terror, all new recruits to INO had been trained individually at secret apartments in Moscow and kept strictly apart from other trainees. By 1938, however, so many INO officers had been unmasked as (imaginary) enemies of the people that the Centre decided group training was required to increase the flow of new recruits. NKVD order no. 00648 of October 3 set up the Soviet Union’s first foreign intelligence training school, hidden from public view in the middle of a wood at Balashikha, fifteen miles east of the Moscow ringroad. Given the official title Shkola Osobogo Naznacheniya (Special Purpose School), but better known by the acronym SHON, it drew its recruits either from Party and Komsomol members with higher education or from new university graduates in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and elsewhere.^ Since most of the new recruits had experienced only the cramped, squalid living conditions of crowded city apartment blocks, collective farms and army barracks, an attempt was made to introduce them to gracious living so that they would feel at ease in Western “high society.” Their rooms were furnished with what an official history solemnly describes as “rugs, comfortable and beautiful furniture, and tastefully chosen pictures on the walls, with excellent bed linens and expensive bedspreads.”^ With no experience of personal privacy, the trainees would have been disoriented by being accommodated separately even if space had allowed, and so were housed two to a room. The curriculum included four hours’ teaching a day on foreign languages, two hours on intelligence tradecraft, and lectures on the CPSU, history, diplomacy, philosophy, religion and painting — an eclectic mix designed both to reinforce their ideological orthodoxy and to acquaint them with Western bourgeois culture.^ There were also regular musical evenings. Instructors with experience living in the West gave the trainees crash courses in bourgeois manners, diplomatic etiquette, fashionable dressing and “good taste. During its first three years, SHON taught annual intakes totalling about 120 trainees — all but four of them male.^ The most successful of SHON’s first intake of students was Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, whose early career had been spent in an agricultural publishing house. In February 1938 he had been recruited by the NKVD’s internal training school to fill one of the many vacancies caused by the liquidation of “enemies of the people” within its ranks. In October he was transferred to SHON, where, according to an official hagiography, his “high intellect and outstanding organizational ability” made an immediate impression. After only a few months, with his training still incomplete, he was drafted into foreign intelligence. In May 1939 he was appointed head of INO. At age thirty-one, Fitin was both the youngest and most inexperienced foreign intelligence chief in Soviet history. At the time of his sudden promotion his prospects must have seemed poor. During the chaotic previous fifteen months three of his predecessors had been liquidated and a fourth transferred.^ Fitin, however, proved remarkably tenacious. He remained head of INO for seven years, the longest period anyone had held that office since the 1920s, before losing favor and returning to provincial obscurity.^ Towards the end of 1940, four INO officers were despatched to London on Fitin’ s orders to reopen the legal residency. The new resident was Anatoli Veniaminovich Gorsky (codenamed VADIM), the last intelligence officer to be withdrawn from London before the residency had closed that February.^ Gorsky was a grimly efficient, humorless, orthodox Stalinist, a far cry from the Great Illegals of the mid- 1930s. Blunt found him “flat-footed” and unsympathetic.^ Another of his wartime agents described him as “a short, fattish man in his mid-thirties, with blond hair pushed straight back and glasses that failed to mask a pair of shrewd, cold eyes.”^^ Like Fitin, Gorsky owed his rapid promotion to the recent liquidation of most of his colleagues. Gorsky returned to London, however, far better briefed than during his previous tour of duty, when he had been forced to ask the Centre for background material on Kim Philby.^^ On Christmas Eve 1940 he reported that he had renewed contact with SOHNCHEN. The Centre appeared jubilant at Gorsky’s report. In the summer of 1940 Burgess had succeeded in recruiting Philby to Section D of SIS, which soon afterwards was merged into a new organization, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), instructed by Churchill to “set Europe ablaze” through subversive warfare behind enemy lines. Following the six-week defeat of France and the Low Countries, the Prime Minister’s orders proved wildly optimistic. The Centre, however, warmly welcomed Gorsky’s report that Philby “was working as a political instructor at the training center of the British Intelligence Service preparing sabotage agents to be sent to Europe.” There was, however, one major surprise in Philby ’s early reports. “According to SOHNCHEN’ s date,” Gorsky informed the Centre, “[SOE] has not sent its agents to the USSR yet and is not even training them yet. The USSR is tenth on the list of countries to which agents are to be sent.” Wrongly convinced that the Soviet Union remained a priority target, a skeptical desk officer in the Centre underlined this passage and placed two large red question marks in the margin. Early in 1941, the London residency renewed contact with the other members of the Five. Maclean continued to provide large numbers of Foreign Office documents. Unlike Philby, Burgess had failed to secure a transfer from Section D of SIS to SOE and had returned to the BBC. Blunt, however, had succeeded in entering the Security Service, MI5, in the summer of 1940. As well as providing large amounts of material from MI5 files. Blunt also ran as a sub-agent one of his former Cambridge pupils, Leo Long (codenamed ELLI), who worked in military intelligence.^^ Among the early intelligence provided by Blunt from MI5 files was evidence that during the two years before the outbreak of the Second World War the NKVD had abandoned one of its best- placed British agents. In the summer of 1937, at the height of the paranoia generated by the Great Terror, the Centre had jumped to the absurd conclusion that Captain King, the Foreign Office cipher clerk recruited three years earlier, had been betrayed to British intelligence by Teodor Maly, the illegal resident in London. Blunt revealed that King had gone undetected until his identification by a Soviet defector at the outbreak of 14 war.^^ Caimcross too had succeeded in occupying what the Centre considered a prime position in Whitehall. In September 1940 he left the Treasury to become private secretary to one of Churchill’s ministers, Lord Hankey, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Though not a member of the War Cabinet (initially composed of only five senior ministers), Hankey received all cabinet papers, chaired many secret committees and was responsible for overseeing the work of the intelligence services. By the end of the year Caimcross was providing so many classified documents — among them War Cabinet minutes, SIS reports. Foreign Office telegrams and General Staff assessments — that Gorsky complained there was far too much to transmit in cipher. During 1941 London was easily the NKVD’s most productive legal residency. According to the Centre’s secret statistics, the residency forwarded to Moscow 7,867 classified political and diplomatic documents, 715 on military matters, 127 on economic affairs and 51 on British intelligence.^^ In addition it provided many other reports based on verbal information from the Five and other agents. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, until the Soviet Union entered the war, most of this treasure trove of high-grade intelligence was simply wasted. Stalin’s understanding of British policy was so distorted by conspiracy theory that no amount of good intelligence was likely to enlighten him. Despite the fact that Britain and Germany were at war, he continued to believe — as he had done since the mid- 193 Os — that the British were plotting to embroil him with Hitler. His belief in a non-existent British conspiracy helped to blind him to the existence of a real German plot to invade the Soviet Union. THE LEGAL RESIDENCY in the Berlin embassy resumed work in 1940 at about the same time as that in London. The NKVD had lost touch with its most important German agent, Arvid Hamack (codenamed CORSICAN), an official in the Economics Ministry, in June 1938. Early on the morning of September 17,1940 contact was resumed by the newly arrived deputy Berlin resident, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov (alias “Erdberg,” codenamed SASHA and DLINNY). The fact that Korotkov simply knocked on Hamack’ s door and arranged their next meeting in the Soviet embassy is evidence both of the decline in tradecraft caused by the liquidation of most experienced INO officers and of the fact that the Gestapo was at this stage of the war far less omnipresent than was widely supposed. A fellow member of the German Communist underground. Reinhold Schonbmnn, later recalled: Hamack ... had little sense of humor, and we, his colleagues, did not feel at ease in his presence. There was something of the puritan in the man, something narrow and doctrinaire. But he was extremely devoted. Like Burgess and Philby, Hamack was so highly motivated that he had carried on recruiting intelligence sources even during the two and a quarter years that he was out of contact with the Centre. Korotkov reported that Hamack was in touch with a loose network of about sixty people, although he could not “personally vouch for every person”: CORSICAN’S description of the way that they camouflage their operations is that, while not all of the members of the circle know one another, something of a chain exists. CORSICAN himself tries to remain in the background although he is at the heart of the organization.^^ The most important of the sources cultivated by Hamack was a lieutenant in the Luftwaffe intelligence service, Harro Schulze-Boysen, codenamed STARSHINA (“Senior”), whose dynamic personality provided a striking contrast with that of the dour Hamack. Leopold Trepper, who knew them both, found Schulze-Boysen “as passionate and hot-headed as Arvid Hamack was calm and reflective.” His tall, athletic frame, fair hair, blue eyes and Aryan features were far removed from the Gestapo stereotype of the Communist subversive. On March 15, 1941 the Centre ordered Korotkov to make direct contact with Schulze-Boysen and persuade him to form his own network of informants independent of Hamack. Schulze- Boysen needed little persuasion. Even a more experienced intelligence officer than Korotkov would have found Hamack, Schulze-Boysen and their groups of agents difficult to mn. Both networks put themselves at increased risk by combining covert opposition to the Nazi regime with espionage for the Soviet Union. Schulze-Boysen and his glamorous wife, Libertas, held evening discussion groups for members of, and potential recmits to, an anti-Hitler underground. Libertas ’s many lovers added to the danger of discovery. As young resisters pasted anti-Nazi posters on Berlin walls, Schulze-Boysen stood guard over them dressed in his Luftwaffe uniform, with his pistol at the ready and the safety catch off.^^ The most important intelligence provided by the Hamack and Schulze-Boysen networks in the first half of 1941 concerned Hitler’s preparations for operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of Russia. On June 16 Korotkov cabled the Centre that intelligence from the two networks indicated that “[a] 11 of the military training by Germany in preparation for its attack on the Soviet Union is complete, and the strike may be expected at any time.”^^ Similar intelligence arrived from NKVD sources as far afield as China and Japan. Later KGB historians counted “over a hundred” intelligence warnings of preparations for the German attack forwarded to Stalin by Fitin between January 1 and June 21 ?^ Others came from military intelligence. All were wasted. Stalin was as resistant to good intelligence from Germany as he was to good intelligence from Britain. The Great Terror had institutionalized the paranoid strain in Soviet intelligence assessment. Many NKVD officers shared, if usually to a less grotesque degree, Stalin’s addiction to conspiracy theory. None the less, the main blame for the catastrophic failure to foresee the surprise attack on June 22 belongs to Stalin himself, who continued to act as his own chief intelligence analyst. Stalin did not merely ignore a series of wholly accurate warnings. He denounced many of those who provided them. His response to an NKVD report from Schulze- Boysen on June 16 was the obscene minute: “You can send your ‘source’ from the German air force to his whore of a mother! This is not a ‘source’ but a disinformer. J. Stalin. Stalin also heaped abuse on the great GRU illegal Richard Sorge, who sent similar warnings from Tokyo, where he had penetrated the German embassy and seduced the ambassador’s wife. Sorge ’s warnings of operation BARBAROSSA were dismissed by Stalin as disinformation from a lying “shit who has set himself up with some small factories and brothels in Japan.”^^ Stalin was much less suspicious of Adolf Hitler than of Winston Churchill, the evil genius who had preached an anti-Bolshevik crusade in the civil war twenty years earlier and had been plotting against the Soviet Union ever since. Behind many of the reports of impending German attack Stalin claimed to detect a disinformation campaign by Churchill designed to continue the long- standing British plot to embroil him with Hitler. Churchill’s personal warnings to Stalin of preparations for BARBAROSSA only heightened his suspicions. From the intelligence reports sent by the London residency, Stalin almost certainly knew that until June 1941 the Joint Intelligence Committee ( JIC), the body responsible for the main British intelligence assessments, did not believe that Hitler was preparing an invasion. It reported to Churchill as late as May 23 that “the advantages ... to Germany of concluding an agreement with the USSR are overwhelming.”^^ The JIC assessments were probably regarded by Stalin as further proof that Churchill’s warnings were intended to deceive him. Stalin’s deep suspicions of Churchill and of British policy in general were cleverly exploited by the Germans. As part of the deception operation which preceded BARBAROSSA, the Abwehr, German military intelligence, spread reports that rumors of an impending German attack were part of a British disinformation campaign. By early June, reports of German troop movements toward the Soviet frontier were too numerous to be explained, even by Stalin, simply as British disinformation. At a private lunch in the German embassy in Moscow, the ambassador, Count von der Schulenberg, revealed that Hitler had definitely decided on invasion. “You will ask me why I am doing this,” he said to the astonished Soviet ambassador to Germany, Vladimir Georgyevich Dekanozov. “I was raised in the spirit of Bismarck, who was always an opponent of war with Russia.” Stalin’s response was to tell the Politburo, “Disinformation has now reached ambassadorial level On June 9, or soon afterwards, however, Stalin received a report that the German embassy had been sent orders by telegram to prepare for evacuation within a week and had begun burning documents in the basement.^^ Though Stalin remained preoccupied by a non-existent British conspiracy, he increasingly began to suspect a German plot as well — though not one which aimed at surprise attack. As it became ever more difficult to conceal German troop movements, the Abwehr spread rumors that Hitler was preparing to issue an ultimatum, backed by some display of military might, demanding new concessions from the Soviet Union. It was this illusory threat of an ultimatum, rather than the real threat of German invasion, which increasingly worried Stalin during the few weeks and days before BARBAROSSA. He was not alone. A succession of foreign statesmen and journalists were also taken in by the planted rumors of a German ultimatum.^^ Beria sought to protect his position as head of the NKVD by expressing mounting indignation at those inside and outside the NKVD who dared to send reports of preparations for a German invasion. On June 21, 1941 he ordered four NKVD officers who persisted in sending such reports to be “ground into labor camp dust.” He wrote to Stalin on the same day with his characteristic mix of brutality and sycophancy: I again insist on recalling and punishing our ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov, who keeps bombarding me with “reports” on Hitler’s alleged preparations to attack the USSR. He has reported that this attack will start tomorrow ... But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, have firmly embedded in our memory your wise conclusion: Hitler is not going to attack us in 1941.^^ Also in jeopardy for providing intelligence on the forthcoming German invasion was the senior INO officer Vasili Mikhailovich Zarubin, later chief resident in the United States. Early in 1941 Zarubin was sent to China to meet Walter Stennes, German adviser to the Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. Stennes had once been deputy head of Hitler’s stormtroopers, the Sturmabteilung, but developed a grudge against him after being sacked in 1931. In 1939 Stennes was approached by the NKVD Chungking residency and agreed to supply intelligence on Hitler. In February 1941 Zarubin reported to the Centre that a visitor from Berlin had secretly assured Stennes that “an attack against the USSR by the Germans ... was being planned for the end of May this year” (the original date set by Hitler but later postponed). Zarubin cabled on June 20: “The FRIEND [Stennes] repeats and confirms categorically — ^based on absolutely reliable information — that Hitler has completed preparations for war against the USSR.”^^ Fitin outraged Beria by taking these and similar warnings seriously. An SVR official history concludes, probably correctly, “Only the outbreak of war saved P. M. Fitin from the firing squad.”^^ The devastating surprise achieved by the German invasion in the early hours of June 22 was made possible both by the nature of the Soviet intelligence system at the time and by the personal failings of the dictator who presided over it. In Whitehall the patient, if uninspired, examination of intelligence reports through the committee system eventually turned the belief that Germany saw the “overwhelming” advantages of a negotiated settlement with Russia into recognition that Hitler had decided to attack. In Moscow the whole system of intelligence assessment was dominated by the fearful sycophancy encapsulated in the formula “sniff out, suck up, survive,” and by a culture of conspiracy theory. Stalin had institutionalized both a paranoid strain and a servile political correctness which continued to distort in greater or lesser degree all intelligence assessment even after the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War in 1941. From 1942 to 1944 the Cambridge Five, probably the ablest group of Soviet wartime agents, were to be seriously suspected by the Centre of being double agents controlled by British intelligence simply because their voluminous and highly classified intelligence sometimes failed to conform to Stalin’s conspiracy theories. The responsibility, however, did not rest with Stalin alone. Some degree of distortion in intelligence assessment remained inherent in the autocratic nature of the Soviet system throughout the Cold War. The Centre always shrank from telling the Kremlin what it did not want to hear. The last head of KGB foreign intelligence, Leonid Shebarshin, confessed in 1992 that until Gorbachev introduced a measure of glasnost, the KGB “had to present its reports in a falsely positive light” which pandered to the predilections of the political leadership.^^ IN THE EARLY months of the Great Patriotic War, while the German forces advancing into Russia were sweeping all before them, Stalin faced the even more terrifying prospect of a two-front war. Ribbentrop instructed the German embassy in Japan, “Do everything to rouse the Japanese to begin war against Russia ... Our goal remains to shake hands with the Japanese on the Trans-Siberian Railway before the beginning of winter.” Opinion in Tokyo was initially divided between those who favored the “northern solution” (war with the Soviet Union) and the supporters of the “southern solution” (war with Britain and the United States). Sorge, deeply distrusted by Stalin, sought to provide reassurance from Tokyo that the advocates of the “southern solution” were gaining the upper hand. But on October 18 Sorge was arrested and his spy ring rapidly rounded up. SIGINT was more influential than Sorge in persuading Stalin that there would be no Japanese attack. Late in 1938 the combined NKVD/Fourth Department SIGINT unit had been broken up. The NKVD section moved into the former Hotel Select on Dzerzhinsky Street, where it concentrated on diplomatic traffic; most, but not all, military communications were the responsibility of the cryptanalysts of the GRU (successor to the Fourth Department). In February 1941 the NKVD cryptanalysts had been integrated into a new and enlarged Fifth (Cipher) Directorate, with, at its heart, a research section responsible for the attack on foreign codes and ciphers. The chief Japanese specialist in the section, Sergei Tolstoy, went on to become the most decorated Soviet cryptanalyst of the war, winning two Orders of Lenin. In the autumn of 1941, a group led by him replicated the success of American codebreakers a year earlier in breaking the main Japanese diplomatic cipher, codenamed by the Americans and since known to Western historians as PURPLE. The teetotal American codebreakers had celebrated their success by sending out for a case of Coca- Cola. Tolstoy is unlikely to have had time to celebrate at all. The Japanese diplomatic decrypts which he provided, however, were of enormous importance. Japan, they made clear, would not attack the Soviet Union.^^ The reassurance about Japanese intentions provided by SIGINT enabled Stalin to shift to the west half the divisional strength of the Far Eastern Command. During October and November 1941, between eight and ten rifle divisions, together with about a thousand tanks and a thousand aircraft, were flung into the fight against Germany. These forces, together with other Red Army divisions which had been held in reserve, may well have saved the Soviet Union from defeat. As Professor Richard Overy concludes in his study of the eastern front, “It was not the tough winter conditions that halted the German army [in December 1941] but the remarkable revival of Soviet military manpower after the terrible maulings of the summer and autumn.”^^ As well as providing reassurance that Japan did not propose to attack the Soviet Union, SIGINT also gave indications of its move towards war with Britain and the United States, though the diplomatic decrypts contained no mention of plans for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A decrypted telegram from Tokyo to its Berlin embassy (probably copied to the Moscow embassy) on November 27, 1941, ten days before Pearl Harbor, instructed the ambassador: See Hitler and Ribbentrop, and explain to them in secret our relations with the United States ... Explain to Hitler that the main Japanese efforts will be concentrated in the south and that we propose to refrain from deliberate operations in the north [against the Soviet Union]. Soviet cryptanalysts, however, were unable to match the success of the British wartime SIGINT agency at Bletchley Park in breaking the main high-grade ciphers used by the German armed forces. They failed to do so partly for technological reasons. Soviet intelligence was unable to construct the powerful electronic “bombs,” first constructed at Bletchley Park in 1940 to break the daily settings of the German Enigma machine cipher. It was even further from being able to replicate COLOSSUS, the world’s first electronic computer used by Bletchley from 1943 to decrypt the Geheimschreiber messages (radio signals based on teleprinter impulses enciphered and deciphered automatically) which for the last two years of the war yielded more operational intelligence than the Enigma traffic. But there was a human as well as a technological explanation for the inferiority of Soviet to British SIGINT. The Soviet system would never have tolerated the remarkable infusion of unconventional youthful talent on which much of Bletchley’s success was built. Alan Turing — the brilliant eccentric who buried his life savings (converted into silver ingots) in the Bletchley Woods, forgot where he had hidden them, but went on to be chiefly responsible for the invention of COLOSSUS — was one of many British cryptanalysts who would surely have been incapable of conforming to the political correctness demanded by the Stalinist system.^^ Some British ULTRA — the SIGINT derived from decrypting high-grade enemy traffic — ^was, however, passed officially to Moscow in a disguised form, and in an undisguised form by several Soviet agents. JUST AS THE KGB later sought to take refuge from the horrors of its Stalinist past by constructing a Leninist golden age of revolutionary purity, so it also sought to reinvent its record during the Great Patriotic War of 1941- 5 as one of selfless heroism — ^best exemplified by its role in special operations and partisan warfare behind enemy lines. According to Pavel Anatoly evich Sudoplatov, head of the wartime NKVD Directorate for Special Tasks and Guerrilla Warfare, “This chapter in NKVD history is the only one that was not officially rewritten, since its accomplishments stood on their own merit and did not contain Stalinist crimes that had to be covered up.”^^ In reality, the NKVD’s wartime record, like the rest of its history, was extensively doctored. Among the best-publicized examples of the NKVD’s bravery behind enemy lines were the heroic deeds of its detachment in the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa during the 907-day occupation by German and Romanian forces. The detachment based itself in the catacombs there, a maze of underground tunnels used to excavate sandstone for the construction of the elegant nineteenth- century buildings which still line many of Odessa’s streets and boulevards. With over a thousand kilometers of unmapped tunnels as well as numerous entrances and exits, the catacombs made an almost ideal base for partisan warfare. In 1969, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of VE Day, a section of the catacombs on the outskirts of Odessa was opened as the Museum of Partisan Glory, which throughout the remainder of the Soviet era received over a million visitors a year.^^ After the Second World War, however, the sometimes heroic story of the struggle to liberate Odessa from enemy occupation was hijacked by the KGB to refurbish its dubious wartime record. Pride of place in the Museum of Partisan Glory is given to the exploits of the NKVD detachment headed by Captain Vladimir Aleksandrovich Molodtsov, who was posthumously made a Hero of the Soviet Union and suffered the indignity of having his whole life transformed into that of a Stalinist plaster saint. The origins of Molodtsov’s heroism were officially traced back to selfless devotion in overfulfilling his norms as a miner during the first Five Year Plan. “What a wonderful thing it is,” he was said to have declared in 1930, “not to notice or watch the time during the working day, not to wait for the end of the shift but to seek to prolong it, to run behind the [coal] trolley, to be bathed in sweat and at the end of the shift to emerge victorious in fulfilling the plan!”^^ The Museum of Partisan Glory contains a “reconstruction” of the NKVD detachment’s underground headquarters, complete with dormitories, ammunition depot, workshops, fuel store, kitchen and meeting room with — inevitably — a portrait of Lenin (but not of Stalin) on the wall.^^ Nearby is a vertical shaft 17 meters long linking the headquarters to the surface, through which it received messages and food from its agents in Odessa. During the Soviet era numerous films, books, magazine and newspaper articles, many promoted by the KGB, celebrated the heroic feats of the NKVD detachment in holding at bay thousands of German and Romanian troops in Odessa before giving their lives in defense of the fatherland. Mitrokhin owed his discovery of the true story of the catacombs to a colleague in the FCD Illegals Directorate S, who borrowed the multi- volume Odessa file and, when he returned it, told Mitrokhin he might find it interesting. The file began by recording the despatch of Molodtsov’s detachment of six NKVD officers to Odessa shortly before it fell to the Germans in October 1941, with orders to establish an underground residency which would organize reconnaissance, sabotage and special operations behind the German lines. In Odessa they were joined by thirteen members of the local NKVD Special Department, commanded by Lieutenant V. A. Kuznetsov. According to the official version of events, the two groups held a Party/Komsomol meeting on the evening of October 15 immediately before going down into the catacombs to set up their base. What actually took place, according to the KGB file, was a raucous dinner party and heavy drinking which ended in a fight between the Moscow and Odessa NKVD detachments. The next day the two groups entered the catacombs still at daggers drawn, with Molodtsov and Kuznetsov each claiming overall command. Over the next nine months Muscovites and Odes sans combined operations against the Germans and Romanians with internecine warfare among themselves. Molodtsov’ s end may well have been genuinely heroic. According to the official Soviet version, he was captured by the enemy in July 1942 but refused to beg for his life, courageously telling his captors, “We are in our own country and will not ask the enemy for mercy.”^^ The rest of the history of the Odessa catacombs, however, was an NKVD horror story. After Molodtsov’ s execution, Kuznetsov disarmed his detachment and put them under guard inside the catacombs. All but one, N. F. Abramov, were executed on Kuznetsov’s orders on charges of plotting against him. As conditions in the catacombs deteriorated, the Odessans then proceeded to fall out among themselves. The dwindling food supply became moldy; and, with their kerosene almost exhausted, the detachment was forced to live in semidarkness. On August 28 Kuznetsov shot one of his men, Molochny, for the theft of a piece of bread. On September 27 two others, Polschikov and Kovalchuk, were executed for stealing food and “lack of sexual discipline.” Fearing that he might be shot next, Abramov killed Kuznetsov a month later. In his notebook, later discovered in the catacombs and preserved in the KGB Odessa file, Abramov wrote: The former head of the Third Special Department of the Odessa district of the NKVD, State Security Lieutenant V. A. Kuznetsov, was shot by me with two bullets in the temple in the underground “Mirror Factory” [the base in the catacombs] on October 21, 1942. By this time, following several other deaths at the hands of the enemy, only three NKVD officers remained alive in the catacombs: Abramov, Glushchenko and Litvinov. Abramov and Glushchenko together killed Litvinov, then began to eye each other suspiciously in the semi-darkness. Glushchenko wrote in his diary that Abramov wanted to surrender: “We are beaten. There is no victory to wait for. He told me not to be frightened of committing treason or being shot as he has friends in German intelligence.” On February 18, 1943, apparently suffering from hallucinations, Glushchenko wrote, “[Abramov] was bending over, attending to his papers. I took my pistol from my belt and shot him in the back of the head.” Over the next few months Glushchenko spent much of his time outside the catacombs in his wife’s Odessa flat, finally abandoning the underground base on November 10, 1943. After the liberation of Odessa by the Red Army in April 1945 Glushchenko returned with members of the Ukrainian NKVD to collect equipment and compromising papers from the catacombs, but was fatally wounded when a grenade he picked up exploded in his hands. For almost twenty years, the Centre believed that no survivor of the Odessa catacombs remained to cast doubt on the heroic myth it had constructed. In 1963, however, the KGB was disconcerted to discover that Abramov had not been killed by Glushchenko after all, but had escaped and was living in France. His father, who may also have known the true story of the Odessa catacombs, was reported to have emigrated to the United States. Abramov’s supposed widow, Nina Abramova, who had been working in the KGB First Chief Directorate, was quietly transferred to another job. The myth of the NKVD heroes of the Odessa catacombs was left undisturbed.^^ According to statistics in KGB files, the NKVD ran a total of 2,222 “operational combat groups” behind enemy lines during the Great Patriotic War.^^ Mitrokhin found no realistic appraisal, however, of the effectiveness of partisan warfare. Contrary to the claims of post-war Soviet hagiographers, the combat groups seem only rarely to have tied down German forces larger than themselves. Because about half of all partisans were NKVD personnel or Party officials, they were frequently regarded with acute suspicion by the peasant population on whom they depended for local support. The virtual collapse of partisan warfare in the western Ukraine, for example, was due largely to the hostility of the inhabitants to the Party and the NKVD. Though partisan warfare became more effective after Stalingrad, there were important areas — notably Crimea and the steppes — where it never became a significant factor in the fighting on the eastern front. OUTSIDE EUROPE, THE NKVD’s most successful attacks on German targets were mounted by an illegal residency in Argentina,^^ headed by Iosif Romualdovich Grigulevich (codenamed ARTUR), a veteran both of sabotage operations in the Spanish Civil War and of the first attempt to assassinate Trotsky in Mexico City.^^ In September 1941 an official Argentinian inquiry reached the hysterical conclusion, endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies but rejected by the government, that the German ambassador was the head of over half a million Nazi stormtroopers operating under cover in Latin America. During the months after Pearl Harbor, Argentina and Chile were the only Latin American states not to break off diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan. The rumors of Nazi plots among Argentina’s quarter of a million German speakers, pro-German sympathies in its officer corps, and the presence of an Argentinian military purchasing mission in Berlin until 1944, helped to persuade the Centre that Argentina was a major Nazi base. Though this belief was greatly exaggerated, it was shared by OSS, the US wartime foreign intelligence agency, which reported that Dr. Ramon Castillo, president of Argentina from 1941 to 1943, was in the pay of Hitler.^^ Such reports, passed on to the Centre by its agents in OSS and the State Department,^^ doubtless reinforced Moscow’s suspicions of Nazi plots in Argentina. After the outbreak of war the German merchant navy was unable to run the gauntlet of the Royal Navy and enter Argentinian ports. Grigulevich’s residency, however, reported in 1941 that copper, saltpetre, cotton and other strategic raw materials were being exported from Argentina in neutral vessels to Spain, whence they were being secretly transported overland through France to Germany. To disrupt this export trade, Grigulevich recruited a sabotage team of eight Communist dockyard workers and seamen, headed by a Polish immigrant, Feliks Klementyevich Verzhbitsky (codenamed BESSER), who in December 1941 obtained a job as a blacksmith in the port of Buenos Aires. The first major exploit of Verzhbitsky’s group was to bum down the German bookshop in Buenos Aires, which Grigulevich regarded as the main center of Nazi propaganda. Thereafter it concentrated on planting delayed-action incendiary devices on ships and in warehouses containing goods bound for Germany. Grigulevich also ran smaller sabotage and intelligence networks in Chile and Uruguay. The approximately seventy agents in his far-flung illegal residency were to remain the basis of Soviet intelligence operations in Argentina, Uruguay and — to a lesser extent — Chile during the early years of the Cold War as well as the Second World War.^^ Between the beginning of 1942 and the summer of 1944, according to statistics in KGB files, over 150 successful incendiary attacks were mounted by Grigulevich’ s agents against German cargoes, and an unspecified number of Spanish, Portuguese and Swedish vessels sunk. One, probably exaggerated, assessment by the Centre claims that the attacks succeeded early in 1944 in halting German exports from Buenos Aires. A more serious problem for Germany than Soviet sabotage, however, was the change of government in Argentina. A military coup in the summer of 1943, followed by the uncovering of a Nazi espionage network, led Argentina to sever diplomatic relations with Germany in January 1944,60 For most of the war communications between Grigulevich’ s residency and the Centre were slow and spasmodic, depending on occasional couriers between Buenos Aires and the New York residency. In the summer of 1944, shortly after the NKGB had established a legal residency in Uruguay, Grigulevich was summoned to Montevideo to give a detailed report on his intelligence operations, finances and agent networks since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The Centre had become alarmed at the scale of his incendiary attacks on neutral shipping and feared that his cover might be blown. In September it ordered him to suspend sabotage operations and limit himself to intelligence collection in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Once instructed to stop work by Grigulevich, Verzhbitsky began making grenades for the underground Argentinian Communist Party but was seriously injured in October by an explosion in his workshop which cost him his left arm and the sight in one eye. Grigulevich reported that he behaved with great bravery during police investigation, sticking to a prepared cover story that a personal enemy had planted explosives on him, hidden in a packet of dried milk. In 1945 Verzhbitsky was smuggled out of prison and exfiltrated by the Argentinian Communist Party across the border into Uruguay, where he lived on a Party pension. Remarkable though they were, the sabotage operations run from Buenos Aires had no perceptible influence on the course of the Great Patriotic War. Once the alarmism of the summer of 1944 had died down, however, they greatly enhanced Grigulevich’ s reputation in the Centre as saboteur and assassin. His successes in wartime Argentina help to explain his later selection for the most important assassination mission of the Cold War.^^ By contrast, Grigulevich’s chief saboteur, Verzhbitsky, was regarded as an embarrassment because of his disablement. His request to emigrate to the Soviet Union in 1946 was brusquely turned down. In 1955, however, when Verzhbitsky, by then completely blind, applied again, his application was accepted — possibly for fear that he might otherwise reveal his wartime role.^^ On arrival in the Soviet Union, Verzhbitsky was awarded an invalidity pension of 100 roubles a month, but his application for membership of the Soviet Communist Party was turned down.^^ DESPITE INDIVIDUAL ACTS of heroism, the NKVD and NKGB (as its security and intelligence components were renamed in 1943) deserve to be remembered less for their bravery during the Second World War than for their brutality. After the forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union of eastern Poland in September 1939, followed by the Baltic states and Moldavia in the summer of 1940, the NKVD quickly moved in to liquidate “class enemies” and cow the populations into submission. On June 25, 1941, three days after the beginning of Hitler’s invasion, the NKVD was ordered to secure the rear of the Red Army by arresting deserters and enemy agents, protecting communications and liquidating isolated pockets of German troops. In August 1941 Soviet parachutists disguised as Germans landed among the villages of the Volga German Autonomous Region and asked to be hidden until the arrival of the Wehrmacht. When they were given shelter, the whole village was exterminated by the NKVD. All other Volga Germans, however loyal, were deported by the NKVD to Siberia and northern Kazakhstan, with enormous loss of life. When the Red Army took the offensive in 1943, the NKVD followed in its wake to mop up resistance and subversion. Beria reported proudly to Stalin at the end of the year: In 1943, the troops of the NKVD, who are responsible for security in the rear of the Active Red Army, in the process of cleaning up the territory liberated from the enemy, arrested 931,549 people for investigation. Of these, 582,515 were servicemen and 394,034 were civilians. Of those arrested, 80,296 were “unmasked,” in many cases wrongly, as spies, traitors, deserters, bandits and “criminal elements.” Stalin used the NKVD to punish and deport entire nations within the Soviet Union whom he accused of treachery: among them Chechens, Ingushi, Balkars, Karachai, Crimean Tartars, Kalmyks and Meskhetian Turks. In response to Stalin’s instructions to reward “those who have carried out the deportation order in an exemplary manner,” Beria replied: In accordance with your instructions, I submit a draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on decorations and medals for the most outstanding participants in the operation involving the deportation of the Chechens and Ingushes. 19,000 members of the NKVD, NKGB and Smersh took part, plus up to 100,000 officers of the NKVD forces ... As on this occasion, many of the NKVD and NKGB personnel decorated during the war received their medals not for valor against the enemy but for crimes against humanity. THE WARTIME RECORD of Soviet intelligence on the eastern front was patchy. Up to the end of 1942 the main espionage system providing intelligence from Nazi Germany and occupied Europe was a loosely coordinated GRU illegal network linked to the NKVD Hamack and Schulze-Boysen groups, codenamed the Rote Kappelle (“Red Orchestra”) by the Abwehr. The “musicians” were the radio operators who sent coded messages to Moscow; the “conductor” was the Polish Jew Leopold Trepper, alias Jean Gilbert, known within the network as le grand chef. The Rote Kappelle had 117 agents: 48 in Germany, 35 in France, 17 in Belgium and 17 in Switzerland.^^ The network was gradually wound up during the later months of 1942 as German radio direction- finding tracked down the “musicians.” Trepper himself was captured as he sat in a dentist’s chair in occupied Paris on December 5. According to the Abwehr officer who arrested him, “For a second he was disturbed; then he said in perfect German, ‘You did a fine job.’ ” Only Rado’s GRU illegal residency in Switzerland, known as the Rote Drei after its three main radio transmitters, which was out of reach of German intelligence, continued work for another year until it was shut down by the Swiss.^^ Though both Trepper and Rado were sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in Moscow after the war, it was later alleged by Soviet historians that intelligence from the Rote Kappelle had been of enormous assistance to the Red Army. In reality, intelligence did not begin to have a significant influence on Soviet military operations until after Trepper was arrested and most of his network wound up. Military intelligence failed to detect the sudden German turn south which captured Kiev in September 1941, and was taken aback by the intensity of the October assault on Moscow. The loss of Kharkov in May 1942 was due partly to the fact that the Stavka (a wartime combination of GHQ and high command) was expecting another attack on the capital. The Wehrmachfs move south in the summer again took the Stavka by surprise. Throughout the German advance to Stalingrad and the Caucasus, Soviet forces were constantly confused about where the next blow would fall. When the Red Army encircled Axis forces at Stalingrad in November 1942, it believed it had trapped 85,000 to 90,000 troops; in reality it had surrounded three times as many.^^ The NKVD’s main role at Stalingrad was less in providing good intelligence than in enforcing a ferocious discipline within the Red Army. About 13,500 Soviet soldiers were executed for “defeatism” and other breaches of military discipline in the course of the battle, usually by a squad from the NKVD Special Detachment. Before execution, most were ordered to strip so that their uniform and boots could be reused. The NKVD postal censorship seized on any unorthodox or politically incorrect comment in soldiers’ letters to their families as evidence of treachery. A lieutenant who wrote “German aircraft are very good ... Our anti-aircraft people shoot down only very few of them” was, inevitably, condemned as a traitor. In the 62nd Army alone, in the first half of October 1942, the NKVD claimed that “military secrets were divulged in 12,747 letters. The great victory at Stalingrad, sealed by the surrender of the German Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, twenty- two generals and 91,000 troops early in 1943, was achieved in spite of, rather than because of, the contribution of the NKVD. Stalingrad was followed by a major improvement in the quality of Soviet military intelligence on the eastern front, made possible in part by massive supplies of radio equipment from the Americans and the BritishJ^ At the end of 1942 the Stavka established special-purpose radio battalions, each equipped with eighteen to twenty radio- intercept receivers and four direction- finding sets. The result, according to a Soviet historian given access to the battalions’ records, was “a qualitative jump in the development of radio-electronic combat in the Soviet army.” Though Soviet cryptanalysts lacked the state-of- the-art technology which enabled Bletchley Park to decrypt high-grade Enigma and Geheimschreiber messages, they made major advances during 1943 — reluctantly assisted by German cipher personnel captured at Stalingrad — in direction-finding, traffic analysis and the breaking of lower- grade hand ciphers. In 1942-3 they also had the benefit of Luftwaffe Enigma decrypts supplied by an agent inside Bletchley Park. All these improvements were evident during the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 when the Red Army defeated the last great German offensive on the eastern front. Intelligence reports captured by the Wehrmacht from the Red Army during the battle revealed that Soviet SIGINT had located the positions and headquarters of the 6th, 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions, II and XIII Panzer Corps, and Second Army HQ. Aerial reconnaissance before and during Kursk was also on a larger scale and more successful than ever before. Victory at Kursk opened the way to an almost continuous advance by the Red Army on the eastern front which was to end with Marshal Zhukov accepting the surrender of Berlin in May 1945. With a four-to-one superiority in men over the Wehrmacht, large amounts of military equipment from its Western allies and growing dominance in the air, the Red Army, though suffering enormous losses, proved unstoppable. In the course of its advance, the Red Army sometimes captured lists of the daily settings for periods of up to a month of the Wehrmacht’ s Enigma machines, as well as some of the machines and their operators. During the final stages of the war these captures sometimes enabled Soviet cryptanalysts to decrypt spasmodically a still unknown number of Enigma messages. Despite the improvements after Stalingrad, however, the quality of Soviet intelligence on the eastern front — in particular the SIGINT — never compared with the intelligence on Germany available to their Western allies. The ULTRA intelligence provided to British and American commanders was, quite simply, the best in the history of warfare. The Soviet Union’s most striking intelligence successes during the Great Patriotic War, by contrast, were achieved not against its enemies but against its allies in the wartime Grand Alliance: Britain and the United States. SEVEN THE GRAND ALLIANCE For most of the inter- war years the United States had ranked some way behind Britain as a target for INO operations. Even in the mid- 1930s the main Soviet espionage networks in the United States were run by the Fourth Department (Military Intelligence, later renamed the GRU) rather than by the NKVD. Fourth Department agents included a series of young, idealistic high-flyers within the federal government, among them: Alger Hiss and Julian Wadleigh, both of whom entered the State Department in 1936; Harry Dexter White of the Treasury Department; and George Silverman, a government statistician who probably recruited White. ^ Fike the Cambridge Five, the Washington moles saw themselves as secret warriors in the struggle against fascism. Wadleigh wrote later: When the Communist International represented the only world force effectively resisting Nazi Germany, I had offered my services to the Soviet underground in Washington as one small contribution to help stem the fascist tide.^ The main NKVD operations in the United States during the mid- 1930s were run by an illegal residency established in 1934 under the former Berlin resident, Boris Bazarov (codenamed NORD), with Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov (YUNG), a Soviet Tartar, as his deputy.^ Bazarov was remembered with affection by Hede Massing, an Austrian agent in his residency, as the warmest personality she had encountered in the NKVD. On the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1935 he sent her fifty long-stemmed red roses with a note which read: Our lives are unnatural, but we must endure it for [the sake of] humanity. Though we cannot always express it, our little group is bound by love and consideration for one another. I think of you with great warmth. Though Akhmerov, by contrast, struck Massing as a “Muscovite automaton,” he was less robotic than he appeared.^ Unknown to Massing, Akhmerov was engaged in a passionate love affair with his assistant, Helen Lowry, the cousin of the American Communist Party leader, Earl Browder, and — ^unusually — gained permission from the Centre to marry her.^ Bazarov’s and Akhmerov’s recruits included three agents in the State Department: ERIKH, KIY and “19.”^ Probably the most important, as well as the only one of the three who can be clearly identified, was agent “19,” Laurence Duggan, who later became chief of the Latin American Division.^ To Hede Massing, Duggan seemed “an extremely tense, high-strung, intellectual young man.” His recruitment took some time, not least because Alger Hiss was simultaneously attempting to recruit him for the Fourth Department. In April 1936 Bazarov complained to the Centre that the “persistent Hiss” showed no sign of abandoning the attempt.^ A year later, in the midst of the Moscow show trials, Duggan told Akhmerov that he was afraid that, if he “collaborated” with Soviet intelligence, he might be exposed by a Trotskyite traitor. By the beginning of 1938, however, Duggan was supplying Akhmerov with State Department documents which were photographed in the illegal residency and then returned. In March Duggan reported that his close friend Sumner Welles, under-secretary at the State Department from 1938 to 1945, had told him he was becoming too attracted to Marxism and had given him a friendly warning about his left-wing acquaintances.^ Duggan’s future in the State Department, however, seemed as bright as that of Donald Maclean in the Foreign Office. The Centre also saw a bright future for Michael Straight (codenamed NOMAD and NIGEL), the wealthy young American recruited shortly before his graduation from Cambridge University in 1937.^^ Its optimism sprang far more from Straight’s family connections than from any evidence of his enthusiasm for a career as a secret agent. Straight’s job hunt after his return to the United States began at the top — over tea at the White House with Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt. With some assistance from Mrs. Roosevelt, he obtained a temporary, unpaid assignment in the State Department early in 1938. Soon afterwards, he received a phone call from Akhmerov, who passed on “greetings from your friends at Cambridge University” and invited him to dinner at a local restaurant. Akhmerov introduced himself as “Michael Green,” then ordered a large meal. Straight watched as he ate: He was dark and stocky, with broad lips and a ready smile. His English was good; his manner was affable and easy. He seemed to be enjoying his life in America. Ahkmerov seemed to accept that it would be some time before Straight had access to important documents, but was evidently prepared to wait. Before paying the bill, he delivered a brief lecture on international relations. Straight was “too stunned to think clearly.” Though Straight claims that he was “unwilling to become a Soviet agent in the Department of State,” he plainly did not say so to Akhmerov. The two men “parted as friends” and Straight agreed to continue their meetings. With the approach of war in Europe, the Centre’s interest in the United States steadily increased. In 1938 the NKVD used the defection of the main Fourth Department courier, Whittaker Chambers, as a pretext for taking over most of the military intelligence agent network, with the notable exception of Alger Hiss.^^ In the United States, as elsewhere, however, the expansion of NKVD operations was disrupted by the hunt for imaginary “enemies of the people.” Ivan Andreyevich Morozov (codenamed YUZ and KIR), who was stationed in the New York legal residency in 1938-9, sought to prove his zeal to the Centre by denouncing the Resident, Pyotr Davidovich Gutzeit (codenamed NIKOLAI), and most of his colleagues as secret Trotskyists.^^ In 1938 both Gutzeit and Bazarov, the legal and illegal residents, were recalled and shot.^^ Morozov’s denunciation of the next legal resident, Gayk Badalovich Ovakimyan (codenamed GENNADI), was less successful and may have prompted Morozov’s own recall in 1939.^^ Bazarov was succeeded as illegal resident by his former deputy, Iskhak Akhmerov, who henceforth controlled most political intelligence operations in the United States. Mitrokhin noted the codenames of eight rather diverse individuals in whom the Centre seemed to place particularly high hopes on the eve of the Second World War:^^ Laurence Duggan (agent “19,” later FRANK) in the State Department; Michael Straight (NIGEL), also in the State Department; Martha Dodd Stem (LIZA), daughter of the former US ambassador to Germany, William E. Dodd, and wife of the millionaire Alfred Kaufman Stem (also a Soviet agent); Martha’s brother, William E. Doss, Jr. (PRESIDENT), who had mn unsuccessfully for Congress as a Democrat and still had political ambitions; Harry Dexter White in the Treasury Department (KASSIR, later JURIST); an agent codenamed MORIS (probably John Abt) in the Justice Department”; Boris Morros (FROST), the Hollywood producer of Laurel and Hardy’s Flying Deuces and other box-office hits;^^ Mary Wolf Price (codenamed KID and DIR), an undeclared Communist who was secretary to the well-known columnist Walter Lippmann; and Henry Buchman (KHOSYAIN, “Employer”), owner of a women’s fashion salon in Baltimore.^^ In August 1939, however, political intelligence operations in the United States, as in Britain, were partially dismpted by the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Laurence Duggan broke off contact with Akhmerov in protest.^^ Others who had serious doubts included Michael Straight. At a meeting in October in a restaurant below Washington’s Union Station, Akhmerov tried to reassure him. “Great days are approaching!” he declared. With the beginning of the Second World War, revolution would spread like wildfire across Germany and France.^^ Straight was unimpressed and failed to attend the next meeting.^^ Duggan and Straight are unlikely to have been the only agents to break contact, at least temporarily, with the NKVD. Further disruption to NKVD operations in the United States followed Akhmerov’s recall, soon after his last meeting with Straight, to Moscow where he was accused by Beria of treasonable dealings with enemies of the people.^^ Though, for unknown reasons, the charges were dropped, Akhmerov was placed in the NKVD reserve and remained under suspicion for the next two years while his record was thoroughly checked. For the first time, the center of NKVD operations in the United States was moved, after Akhmerov’s recall, to the legal residency headed by Gayk Ovakimyan, later known to the FBI as the “wily Armenian.” Ovakimyan found himself terribly overworked, all the more so since he was also expected to take an active part in the complex preparations for Trotsky’s assassination in Mexico City. He would sometimes return home exhausted after meeting as many as ten agents in a single day.^^ Ovakimyan ’s main successes were in scientific and technological (S&T), rather than political, intelligence. He was unusual among INO officers in holding a science doctorate from the MVTU (Moscow Higher Technical School) and, since 1933, had operated under cover as an engineer at Amtorg (American- Soviet Trading Corporation) in New York. In 1940 he enrolled as a graduate student at a New York chemical institute to assist him in identifying potential agents. Ovakimyan was the first to demonstrate the enormous potential for S&T in the United States. In 1939 alone NKVD operations in the United States obtained 18,000 pages of technical documents, 487 sets of designs and 54 samples of new technology.^^ Ovakimyan was probably also the first to suggest using an INO officer, under cover as an exchange student, to penetrate the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The first such “student,” Semyon Markovich Semyonov (codenamed TVEN), entered MIT in 1938. The scientific contacts which he made over the next two years, before changing his cover in 1940 to that of an Amtorg engineer, helped to lay the basis for the remarkable wartime expansion of S&T collection in the United States. One of his colleagues in the New York residency was struck by Semyonov’s “large eyes which, while he was talking to somebody, [revolved] like parabolic antennae. By April 1941 the total NKVD agent network in the United States numbered 221, of whom forty-nine were listed in NKVD statistics as “engineers” (probably a category which included a rather broad range of scientists). In the same month the Centre for the first time established separate departments in its major residencies to specialize in scientific and technological intelligence operations (later known as Line X), a certain sign of their increasing priority.^ ^ According to an SVR official history, the sheer number of agents with whom Ovakimyan was in contact “blunted his vigilance.” In May 1941 he was caught by the FBI in the act of receiving documents from agent OCTANE, briefly imprisoned, freed on bail and allowed to leave the country in July.^^ But for the remarkably lax security of the Roosevelt administration, the damage to NKVD operations might have been very much worse than the arrest of Ovakimyan. On September 2, 1939, the day after the outbreak of war in Europe, Whittaker Chambers had told much of what he knew about Soviet espionage in the United States to Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State and President Roosevelt’s adviser on internal security. Immediately afterwards, Berle drew up a memorandum for the President which listed Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White and the other leading Soviet agents for whom Chambers had acted as courier. One of those on the list was a leading presidential aide, Lauchlin Currie (mistranscribed by Berle as Lockwood Curry). Roosevelt, however, was not interested. He seems to have dismissed the whole idea of espionage rings within his administration as absurd. Equally remarkable, Berle simply pigeon-holed his own report. He did not even send a copy to the FBI until the Bureau requested it in 1943.^^ IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States in December 1941, Vassili Zarubin (alias Zubilin, codenamed MAKSIM) was appointed legal resident in New York. Already deeply suspicious of British commitment to the defeat of Nazi Germany, Stalin also had doubts about American resolve. He summoned Zarubin before his departure and told him that his main assignment in the United States was to watch out for attempts by Roosevelt and “US ruling circles” to negotiate with Hitler and sign a separate peace. As resident in New York, based in the Soviet consulate, Zarubin was also responsible for subresidencies in Washington, San Francisco, and Latin America.^^ Though fragmentary, the evidence suggests that Stalin continued to take a direct personal interest in overseeing intelligence operations against his allies. A brief official SVR biography portrays Zarubin’s wartime record in New York (and later in Washington) as one of unblemished brilliance. In reality, his abrasive personality and foul-mouthed behavior caused immediate uproar. Zarubin’s preference for the operations officers whom he brought with him (among them his wife, Yelizaveta Yulyevna Zarubina)^^ and his unconcealed contempt for existing residency staff led to open rebellion. Two of the operations officers whom he insulted, Vasili Dmitry evich Mironov and Vasili Georgyevich Dorogov, went to the remarkable lengths of reporting “his crudeness, general lack of manners, use of street language and obscenities, carelessness in his work, and repugnant secretiveness” to the Centre, and asking for his recall along with his almost equally unpopular wife. Feuding within the residency continued throughout the Second World War.^^ Zarubin’s recruitment strategy was simple and straightforward. He demanded that the leaders of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUS A) identify supporters and sympathizers in government establishments suitable for work as agents. When Zarubin arrived in New York, the CPUS A leader Earl Browder (codenamed RULE VO Y — “Helmsman”) was serving a prison sentence for using a false passport during his frequent secret journeys to the Soviet Union. His first contact was therefore with Eugene Dennis (bom Francis X. Waldron, codenamed RYAN), a Moscowtrained Comintern agent who later succeeded Browder as CPUS A general secretary. Dennis reported that a number of Communists (mostly secret Party members) were joining the first professional American foreign intelligence agency, the Office of the Coordinator of Information, reorganized in June 1942 as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Shortly before the foundation of OSS, Browder left prison to resume the Party leadership. He was, Dennis told Moscow, “in a splendid mood.”^^ Among the first Soviet agents to penetrate OSS was Duncan Chaplin Lee (codenamed KOCH), who became personal assistant to its head. General “Wild Bill” Donovan. Donovan had a relaxed attitude to the recruitment of Communists. “I’d put Stalin on the OSS payroll,” he once said, “if I thought it would help us defeat Hitler.” Throughout the Second World War the NKVD knew vastly more about OSS than OSS knew about the NKVD.^o Browder’s recruitment leads also included foreign Communists and fellow travelers who had taken refuge in the United States. Among the most important was the French radical politician Pierre Cot, six times Minister of Air and twice Minister of Commerce in the short-lived governments of the prewar Third Republic. Cot had probably been recruited by the NKVD in the mid- 1930s, but seems to have drifted out of touch during the chaotic period which followed the purge of much of Soviet foreign intelligence and had condemned the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Rebuffed by General Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French after the fall of France in 1940, Cot spent the next few years in the United States. In November Browder reported to Moscow: “Cot wants the leaders of the Soviet Union to know of his willingness to perform whatever mission we might choose, for which purpose he is even prepared to break faith with his own position. Probably a month or so after his arrival in New York, Zarubin approached Cot and, with his habitual brusqueness, pressed Cot to begin active work as a Soviet agent forthwith. Cot’s KGB file records that he was taken aback by the peremptory nature of Zarubin’s summons and insisted that one of the leaders of the French Communist Party exiled in Moscow give his approval.^^ On July 1 Zarubin reported to the Centre “the signing on of Pierre Cot” as agent DAEDALUS.^^ In 1944 Cot was to be sent on a three-month mission to Moscow on behalf of de Gaulle’s provisional government. He concluded the report on his mission: “Liberty declines unceasingly under capitalism and rises unceasingly under socialism.”^^ Though the Centre was plainly impressed by the quality of Communist recruits talent- spotted by Browder, it cautioned Zarubin against over-reliance on them: We permit the use of the Communist [Party members’] illegal intelligence capabilities ... as a supplement to the Residency’s operations, but it would be a mistake to turn these capabilities into the main basis of operations. At almost the same moment in December 1941 when Zarubin arrived in New York as legal resident, Iskhak Akhmerov (successively codenamed YUNG and ALBERT) returned to reestablish the illegal residency. also based in New York, which he had been ordered to abandon two years earlier. Though he had previously used Turkish and Canadian identity documents, on this occasion he carried a doctored US passport which he had acquired in 1938.^^ Unlike Zarubin, Akhmerov avoided all contact with Browder — despite the fact that his wife and assistant, Helen Lowry (codenamed MADLEN and ADA), was Browder’s niece.^^ In March 1942 the Akhmerovs moved from New York to Baltimore, a more convenient location from which to run agents based in Washington. There Akhmerov, whose stepfather had been a furrier, opened a fiir and clothes business in partnership with a local Soviet agent, KHOSYAIN, to give himself a cover occupation.^^ Michael Straight (NIGEL), in whom Akhmerov had placed such high hopes before the Second World War, refused to resume work as a Soviet agent. Straight had one last meeting with Akhmerov in Washington early in 1942, declined any further meeting, shook hands and said goodbye. Most other pre-war agents, however, were successfully reactivated, among them Laurence Duggan (FRANK)^i and Harry Dexter White (JURIST).^^ Wallace, vice-president during Roosevelt’s third term of office (1941 to 1945), said later that if the ailing Roosevelt had died during that period and he had become president, it had been his intention to make Duggan his Secretary of State and White his Secretary of the Treasury.^^ The fact that Roosevelt survived three months into an unprecedented fourth term in the White House, and replaced Wallace with Harry Truman as vice- president in January 1945, deprived Soviet intelligence of what would have been its most spectacular success in penetrating a major Western government. The NKVD succeeded none the less in penetrating all the most sensitive sections of the Roosevelt administration. Akhmerov’s most productive Washington network was a group of Communists and fellow travelers with government jobs run by Nathan Gregory Silvermaster (successively codenamed PAL and ROBERT), a statistician in the Farm Security Administration, later seconded to the Board of Economic Warfare. “Greg” Silvermaster retained the untarnished idealism of the revolutionary dream. A chronic sufferer from bronchial asthma, which often left him gasping for breath, he believed that, “My time is strictly limited, and when I die I want to feel that at least I have had some part in building a decent life for those who come after me.”^^ Akhmerov believed, probably correctly, that, despite the security risks involved in Silvermaster ’s unorthodox tradecraft, he was able to obtain far more intelligence from his increasing number of sources than if each of them was run individually by a Soviet controller. Silvermaster himself disdained the NKVD’s bureaucratic “orthodox methods.” Though most of his sources must have been aware of the ultimate destination of their intelligence, the network was run under what Akhmerov termed “the Communist Party flag.” Informants regarded themselves as helping the CPUS A, which would in turn assist its Soviet comrades. To limit the security risks, Akhmerov placed two cut- outs between himself and the Silvermaster group. The first was a courier, Elizabeth Bentley (codenamed MIRNA, then, more condescendingly, UMNITSA — “Good Girl”), a Vassar graduate who in 1938, at the age of thirty, had been persuaded to break her visible links with the CPUS A in order to work for the NKVD. Every fortnight Bentley collected classified documents microfilmed by Silvermaster and his wife in her knitting bag. She reported not to Akhmerov himself but to another Soviet illegal in his residency, Jacob Golos (ZVUK — “Sound”), whom she knew as “Timmy.” Golos broke NKVD rules by seducing Bentley during a New York snowstorm. According to Bentley’s enthusiastic description of the seduction, she felt herself “float away into an ecstasy that seemed to have no beginning and no end.” Encouraged by Golos ’s unprofessional example, Bentley mixed friendship and espionage in a way which would have horrified the Centre. Each Christmas she used NKVD funds to buy carefully chosen presents, ranging from whiskey to lingerie, for the agents in Silvermaster’ s group. These, she said later, were “the good old days — the days when we worked together as good comrades. Like Zarubin’s, Akhmerov’s illegal residency recruited non- American as well as American agents. Among the most important was the British journalist and wartime intelligence officer Cedric Belfrage (codenamed CHARLIE), who joined British Security Coordination (BSC) in New York shortly after the United States entered the war.^^ Directed by the SIS head of station. Sir William Stephenson, for much of the war, BSC handled intelligence liaison with the Americans on behalf of MI5 and SOE as well as SIS.^^ Belfrage volunteered his services to Soviet intelligence. Like a number of other American agents in the United States, he made his initial approach to Earl Browder, who passed him on to Golos.^^ Given the unprecedented number of wartime secrets exchanged by the British and American intelligence communities, Belfrage had access to an unusually wide range of intelligence. The rolls of microfilm forwarded by Akhmerov’s illegal residency to the Centre via the legal residency in New York increased almost four- fold in the space of a year, from fifty-nine in 1942 to 21 1 in 1943. Zarubin none the less regarded Akhmerov’s refusal to have direct dealings with the CPUS A leadership and his roundabout methods of controlling the Silvermaster group as feeble and long-winded. Akhmerov himself, Zarubin complained, had a “dry and distrustful” manner — ^which may well have been true as far as his relations with Zarubin were concerned. Zarubin had a much higher opinion of Akhmerov’s wife, Helen Lowry, whom he regarded as more quick-witted, more business-like in manner, and — ^because of her American upbringing — better able to make direct contact with US agents. THERE WAS THUS a breathtaking gulf between the intelligence supplied to Stalin on the United States and that available to Roosevelt on the Soviet Union.^^ Whereas the Centre had penetrated every major branch of Roosevelt’s administration, OSS — like SIS — had not a single agent in Moscow. At the Tehran Conference of the Big Three in November 1943 — the first time Stalin and Roosevelt had met — vastly superior intelligence gave Stalin a considerable negotiating advantage. Though there is no precise indication of what intelligence reports and documents were shown to Stalin before the summit, there can be no doubt that he was remarkably well briefed. He was almost certainly informed that Roosevelt had come to Tehran determined to do his utmost to reach agreement with Stalin — even at the cost of offending Churchill. FDR gave proof of his intentions as soon as he arrived. He declined Churchill’s proposal that they should meet privately before the conference began, but accepted Stalin’s pressing invitation that — allegedly on security grounds — he should stay at a building in the Soviet embassy compound rather than at the US legation. It seems not to have occurred to Roosevelt that the building was, inevitably, bugged, and that every word uttered by himself and his delegation would be recorded, transcribed and regularly reported to Stalin. Stalin must also have welcomed the fact that Roosevelt was bringing to Tehran his closest wartime adviser, Harry Hopkins, but leaving behind his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Hopkins had established a remarkable reputation in Moscow for taking the Russians into his confidence. Earlier in the year he had privately warned the Soviet embassy in Washington that the FBI had bugged a secret meeting at which Zarubin (apparently identified by Hopkins only as a member of the embassy) had passed money to Steve Nelson, a leading member of the US Communist underground. Information sent to Moscow by the New York residency on the talks between Roosevelt and Churchill in May 1943 had also probably come from Hopkins. There is plausible but controversial evidence that, in addition to passing confidences to the Soviet ambassador, Hopkins sometimes used Akhmerov as a back channel to Moscow, much as the Kennedys later used the GRU officer Georgi Bolshakov. Hopkins’s confidential information so impressed the Centre that, years later, some KGB officers boasted that he had been a Soviet agent. These boasts were far from the truth. Hopkins was an American patriot with little sympathy for the Soviet system. But he was deeply impressed by the Soviet war effort and convinced that, “Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. “Chip” Bohlen, who acted as American interpreter, later described Hopkins’s influence on the President at the Tehran summit as “paramount. It was at Tehran, Churchill later claimed, that he realized for the first time how small the British nation was: There I sat with the great Russian bear on one side of me, with paws outstretched, and on the other side the great American buffalo, and between the two sat the poor little English donkey ...^^ Despite the closeness of the British-American wartime “special relationship” and Roosevelt’s friendship with Churchill, his priority at Tehran was to reach agreement with Stalin. He told his old friend, Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labor, how Winston got red and scowled, and the more he did so, the more Stalin smiled. Finally, Stalin broke out into a deep, hearty guffaw, and for the first time in three days I saw light. I kept it up until Stalin was laughing with me, and it was then that I called him “Uncle Joe.” He would have thought me fresh the day before, but that day he laughed and came over and shook my hand. From that time on our relations were personal ... We talked like men and brothers.^^ In the course of the Tehran Conference, Hopkins sought out Churchill privately at the British embassy, and told him that Stalin and Roosevelt were adamant that Operation OVERLORD, the British-American cross- Channel invasion of occupied France, must take place the following spring, and that British opposition must cease. Churchill duly gave way. The most important political concession to Stalin was British-American agreement to give the post-war Soviet Union its 1941 frontier, thus allowing Stalin to recover his territorial gains ill-gotten under the Nazi-Soviet Pact: eastern Poland, the Baltic states and Moldova. The Polish govemment-in-exile in London was not consulted. Stalin returned to Moscow in high spirits. The United States and Britain seemed to have recognized, as a Russian diplomat put it privately, Russia’s “right to establish friendly governments in the neighboring countries. Roosevelt’s willingness to go so far to meet Stalin’s wishes at Tehran had derived chiefly from his deep sense of the West’s military debt to the Soviet Union at a time when the Red Army was bearing the overwhelming brunt of the war with Germany. But there is equally no doubt that Stalin’s negotiating success was greatly assisted by his knowledge of the cards in Roosevelt’s handJ^ Despite the considerable success of the legal and illegal American residencies in penetrating the Roosevelt administration, however, they had failed totally in one important respect. Part of Zarubin’s original brief from the Centre had been to recruit agents from among the large German-American community who could be used against Germany. In the end he recruited not a single one. When asked to explain this omission, he told the Centre that most German-Americans were Jews and therefore unsuitable. The Centre, like Zarubin, had become so engrossed in the intelligence offensive against its allies that it appears to have judged leniently his failure against the enemy. WARTIME INTELLIGENCE GATHERING continued to expand in Britain as well as the United States. At the beginning of 1942 a second legal residency began to operate in London under Ivan Andreyevich Chichayev (JOHN) alongside that of Anatoli Gorsky (successively HENRY and VADIM). Unlike Gorsky, who remained in charge of the agent network, Chichayev announced his presence in London to the authorities and was responsible for intelligence liaison with both the British and allied govemments-in-exile.^^ Chichayev also ran an agent network of emigre officials from central and eastern Europe who kept him informed of British negotiations with the Polish govemment-in-exile, the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Bene's, King Peter of Yugoslavia and his prime minister, Ivan Subas7^ The Cambridge Five, meanwhile, continued to generate a phenomenal amount of intelligence. For 1942 alone Maclean’s documents filled more than forty-five volumes in the Centre archives. Philby too was providing large quantities of highly classified files. Since September 1941 he had been working in Section V (Counter-intelligence) of SIS. Though Section V was then located in St. Albans, rather than in SIS Fondon headquarters at Broadway Buildings, it had the advantage of being next door to the registry which housed SIS archives. Philby spent some time cultivating the archivist. Bill Woodfield, with whom he shared a common appreciation of pink gin. As Philby later recalled, “This friendly connection paid off.”^^ Over a period of months, Philby borrowed the operational files of British agents working abroad and handed them to Gorsky in batches to be photographed.^^ Early in April 1942 the Centre completed a lengthy analysis of the SIS records removed by Philby up to the end of the previous year. Though praising SOHNCHEN for “systematically sending a lot of interesting material,” it was puzzled that this material appeared to show that SIS had no agent network in Russia and was conducting only “extremely insignificanf ’ operations against the Soviet Union. Centre analysts had two reasons for disputing these entirely accurate conclusions. First, though at least partly aware that the evidence used to convict some of their liquidated predecessors of working for British intelligence was fraudulent, they remained convinced that SIS had been conducting major operations against the Soviet Union, using “their most highly skilled agents,” throughout the 1930s. The reality — that SIS had not even possessed a Moscow station — was, so far as the Centre was concerned, literally unbelievable. The Centre refused to believe that the Soviet Union was a smaller priority for British intelligence (which was, in truth, almost wholly geared to the war effort) than Britain was for Soviet intelligence: If the HOTEL [SIS] has recruited a hundred agents in Europe over the past few years, mainly from countries occupied by the Germans, there can be no doubt that our country gets no less attention. Such reports merely echoed Stalin’s own acute suspicions of his British allies. The intelligence from the London residency during the first year of the Great Patriotic War which ultimately had the greatest impact on both Stalin and the Centre came from Caimcross. On September 25, 1941 Gorsky telegraphed Moscow: I am informing you very briefly about the contents of a most secret report of the Government Committee on the development of uranium atomic energy to produce explosive material which was submitted on September 24, 1941 to the War Cabinet. The secret committee which produced the report was the Scientific Advisory Committee, chaired by Lord Hankey, whose codename BOSS reflects the fact he was Caimcross’s employer. The report which Caimcross gave Gorsky was the first to alert the Centre to British plans to build the atomic bomb.^^ Vitally important though that report, and others on the atomic bomb despatched from London over the next few months, proved to be, they had a delayed impact in Moscow. When Caimcross’s first report arrived, Stalin and the Stavka were preoccupied by the German advance which in October 1941 forced them to evacuate the capital. It was not until March 1942 that Beria sent Stalin a full assessment of British atomic research. The British high command, he reported, was now satisfied that the theoretical problems of constmcting an atomic bomb had been “fundamentally solved,” and Britain’s best scientists and major companies were collaborating on the project. At Beria’ s suggestion, detailed consultations with Soviet scientists followed over the next few months. In June 1942 President Roosevelt ordered an all-out effort, codenamed the MANHATTAN project, to build an American atomic bomb. Though it was another year before British participation in the project was formally agreed, the NKVD discovered that Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed cooperation on the building of the bomb during talks in Washington on June 20.^^ On October 6, following extensive consultations with Soviet scientists, the Centre submitted the first detailed report on Anglo-American plans to construct an atomic bomb to the Central Committee and the State Defence Committee, both chaired by Stalin. By the end of the year, Stalin had decided to begin work on the construction of a Soviet atomic bomb.^^ In taking that momentous decision in the middle of the battle of Stalingrad, the main turning point in the war on the eastern front, Stalin was not thinking of the needs of the Great Patriotic War, since it was clear that the bomb could not be ready in time to assist in the defeat of Germany. Instead, he was already looking forward to a post-war world in which, since the United States and Britain would have nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union must have them too.^^ For most of the Great Patriotic War Moscow collected more atomic intelligence from Britain than from the United States. In December 1942 the London residency received a detailed report on atomic research in Britain and the United States from a Communist scientist codenamed “K.” Vladimir Barkovsky, head of scientific and technological intelligence (S&T) at the residency. later reported that “K” “works for us with enthusiasm, but ... turns down the slightest hint of financial reward.” With the help of a duplicate key personally manufactured by Barkovsky from a wax impression provided by “K,” he was able to remove numerous classified documents from colleagues’ safes as well as his own. The most valuable, in the Centre’s view, were those on “the construction of uranium piles.” At least two other scientists, codenamed MOOR and KELLY, also provided intelligence on various aspects of TUBE ALLOYS, the British atomic project. The most important of the British atom spies, the Communist physicist Klaus Fuchs, a naturalized refugee from Nazi Germany, was initially a GRU rather than an NKVD/NKGB agent. Fuchs was a committed Stalinist who was later to take part in the construction of the first atomic bomb. Before the war he had been an enthusiastic participant in dramatized readings of the transcripts of the show trials organized by the Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, and impressed his research supervisor, the future Nobel Laureate Sir Neville Mott, with the passion with which he played the part of the prosecutor Vyshinsky, “accusing the defendants with a cold venom that I would never have suspected from so quiet and retiring a young man.” Late in 1941, Fuchs asked the leader of the German Communist Party (KPD) underground in Britain, Jurgen Kuczynski, for help in passing to the Russians what he had learned while working on the TUBE ALLOYS project at Birmingham University. Kuczynski put him in touch with Simon Davidovich Kremer, an officer at the GRU London residency, who irritated Fuchs by his insistence on taking long rides in London taxis, regularly doubling back in order to throw off anyone trying to tail them.^^ In the summer of 1942 Fuchs was moved on to another and more congenial GRU controller, SONYA (referred to in KGB files under the alternative codename FIR),^^ who he almost certainly never realized was the sister of Jurgen Kuczynski. They usually met near Banbury, midway between Birmingham and Oxford, where SONYA lived as Mrs. Brewer, a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany. SONYA remembered the material she collected from Fuchs as “just strings of hieroglyphics and formula written in such tiny writing that they just looked like squiggles:” Klaus and I never spent more than half an hour together when we met. Two minutes would have been enough but, apart from the pleasure of the meeting, it would arouse less suspicion if we took a little walk together rather than parting immediately. Nobody who did not live in such isolation can guess how precious these meetings with another German comrade were.^^ SONYA later became the only woman ever to be made an honorary colonel of the Red Army, in recognition of her remarkable achievements in the GRU^^ But though it has been publicly acknowledged that she ran other agents besides Fuchs during her time in Britain, both the SVR and the GRU have gone to some pains to conceal the existence of the most important of them: Melita Stedman Norwood, nee Semis (codenamed HOLA). Norwood’s file in the Centre shows her to have been, in all probability, both the most important British female agent in KGB history and the longest- serving of all Soviet spies in Britain. HOLA was bom in 1912 to a Latvian father and British mother, joined the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), married another Party member employed as a mathematics teacher in a secondary school, and from the age of twenty onwards worked as a secretary in the research department of the British Non-Ferrous Metals Association. Talent-spotted in 1935 by one of the CPGB’s founders, Andrew Rothstein, she was recommended to the NKVD by the Party leadership and recmited two years later. Like the Magnificent Five, Norwood was a committed ideological agent inspired by a myth-image of the Soviet Union which bore little relationship to the bmtal reality of Stalinist mle. Her forty-year career as a Soviet agent, however, nearly ended almost as soon as it began. She was involved with a spy ring operating inside the Woolwich Arsenal, whose three leading members were arrested in January 1938, tried and imprisoned three months later. MI5 failed, however, to detect clues to her identity contained in a notebook taken from the ringleader, Percy Glading (codenamed GOT), and after a few months “on ice” she was reactivated in May 1938. It is a sign of the Centre’s high opinion of Norwood that contact with her was maintained at a time when it was broken with many other agents, including some of the Five, because of the recall or liquidation of most foreign intelligence officers. Contact with Norwood was suspended, however, after the temporary closure of the London residency early in 1940. When reactivated in 1941, she was for unexplained reasons handed over to SONYA of the GRU rather than to an NKVD controller. Her job at the Non-Ferrous Metals Association gave her access to extensive S&T documents which she passed on to SONYA and subsequent controllers. By the final months of the war Norwood was providing intelligence on the TUBE ALLOYS project. According to Mitrokhin’s notes on her file, she was assessed throughout her career as a “committed, reliable and disciplined agent, striving to be of the utmost assistance. By the beginning of 1943, aware of American plans to build the first atomic bomb, the Centre was even more anxious to collect atomic intelligence in the United States than in Britain. One certain indication of the importance attached by the Centre to monitoring the MANHATTAN project was the dispatch of its head of scientific and technological intelligence, Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov (ANTON), to New York where he became deputy resident for S&T in January 1943.^^ Igor Vasiliy evich Kurchatov, the newly appointed scientific head of the Soviet atomic project, wrote to Beria on March 7: My examination of the [intelligence] material has shown that their receipt is of enormous and invaluable significance to our nation and our science. On the one hand, the material has demonstrated the seriousness and intensity of the scientific research being conducted on uranium in Britain, and on the other hand, it has made it possible to obtain important guidelines for our own scientific research, by-passing many extremely difficult phases in the development of this problem, learning new scientific and technical routes for its development, establishing three new areas for Soviet physics, and learning about the possibilities for using not only uranium- 235 but also uranium-238.^^ While Beria was reading the report, a new top-secret laboratory was starting work at Los Alamos in New Mexico to build the first atomic bomb. Los Alamos contained probably the most remarkable collection of youthful talent ever assembled in a single laboratory. A majority of the scientists who worked on the bomb were still in their twenties; the oldest, Robert Oppenheimer, the head of the laboratory, was thirtynine. Los Alamos eventually included twelve Nobel Laureates. In April 1943, a month after the opening of Los Alamos, the New York residency reported an important source on the MANHATTAN project. An unknown woman had turned up at the Soviet consulate-general and delivered a letter containing classified information on the atomic weapons program. A month later the same woman, who again declined to give her name, brought another letter with details of research on the plutonium route to the atomic bomb. Investigations by the New York residency revealed that the woman was an Italian nurse, whose first name was Lucia, the daughter of an anti- fascist Italian union leader, “D.” At a meeting arranged by the residency through the leaders of the Friends of the USSR Society, Lucia said that she was acting only as an intermediary. The letters came from her brother-in-law, an American scientist working on plutonium research for the Du Pont company in Newport while completing a degree course in New York, who had asked his wife Regina to pass his correspondence to the Soviet consulate via her sister Lucia. The scientist — apparently the first of the American atom spies — was recruited under the codename MAR; Regina became MONA and Lucia OLIVIA.^^ In June the New York residency forwarded intelligence on uranium isotope separation through gaseous diffusion from an unidentified agent codenamed KVANT (“Quantum”) working for the MANHATTAN project. KVANT demanded payment and was given 300 dollars. On July 3, after examining the latest atomic intelligence from the United States, Kurchatov wrote to the NKVD (probably to Beria in person): I have examined the attached list of American projects on uranium. Almost every one of them is of great interest to us ... These materials are of enormous interest and great value ... The receipt of further information of this type is extremely desirable. As yet, however, atomic intelligence from the United States was less detailed than that obtained from Britain in 1941-2.^^^ Among those who supplied some of the further intelligence requested by Kurchatov was MAR, who in October 1943 was transferred to the Du Pont plant in Hanford, Washington State, which produced plutonium for the MANHATTAN project. He told his controller that his aim was to defeat the “criminal” attempt of the US military to conceal the construction of an atomic bomb from the USSR.^^^ Other sources of atomic intelligence included a “progressive professor” in the radiation laboratory at Berkeley, California, and — ^probably — a scientist in the MANHATTAN project’s metallurgical laboratory at Chicago University. The mercenary KVANT seems to have faded away, but by early 1944 another agent, a Communist construction engineer codenamed FOGEL (later PERS), was providing intelligence on the plant and equipment being used in the MANHATTAN project. There is, however, no reliable evidence that Soviet intelligence yet had an agent inside Los Alamos. The penetration of the MANHATTAN project was only the most spectacular part of a vast wartime expansion of Soviet scientific and technological espionage. S&T from the United States and Britain made a major contribution to the development of Soviet radar, radio technology, submarines, jet engines, aircraft and synthetic rubber, as well as nuclear weapons. Atomic intelligence was codenamed ENORMOZ (“Enormous”), jet propulsion VOZDUKH (“Air”), radar RADUGA (“Rainbow”). A. S. Yakovlev, the aircraft designer and Deputy Commissar of the Aviation Industry, paid handsome, though private, tribute to the contribution of S&T to the Soviet aircraft which bore his name.^^^ Political and military intelligence from inside all the main branches of the Roosevelt administration also continued to expand, thanks chiefly to the increasing activity of Akhmerov’s Washington networks. The rolls of film of classified documents sent by his illegal residency to Moscow via New York increased from 21 1 in 1943 to 600 in 1944.111 THE QUALITY OF political intelligence from Britain probably exceeded even that from the United States, partly as a result of the greater coordination of British government and intelligence assessment through the War Cabinet and the Joint Intelligence Committee (of which there were no real equivalents in the United States, despite the existence of bodies with similar names). The wartime files of the London residency contain what Mitrokhin’s summary describes as “many secrets of the British War Cabinet,” correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt, telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office, the embassies in Moscow, Washington, Stockholm, Ankara and Tehran, and the minister-resident in Cairo, and intelligence reports. From the summer of 1942 to the summer of 1943, the intelligence reports included ULTRA decrypts direct from Bletchley Park, the main wartime home of the British SIGINT agency, where John Caimcross spent a year as a Soviet agent. His controller, Anatoli Gorsky, whom, like the rest of the Five, he knew as “Henry,” gave him the money to buy a second-hand car to bring ULTRA to London on his days off.^^^ Because of the unprecedented wartime collaboration of the Anglo-American intelligence communities, the London residency was also able to provide American as well as British intelligence. The problem for the professionally suspicious minds in the Centre was that it all seemed too good to be true. Taking their cue from the master conspiracy theorist in the Kremlin, they eventually concluded that what appeared to be the best intelligence ever obtained from Britain by any intelligence service was at root a British plot. The Five, later acknowledged as the ablest group of agents in KGB history, were discredited in the eyes of the Centre leadership by their failure to provide evidence of a massive, non-existent British conspiracy against the Soviet Union. Of the reality of that conspiracy, Stalin, and therefore his chief intelligence advisers, had no doubt. In October 1942 Stalin wrote to the Soviet ambassador in Britain, Ivan Maisky: All of us in Moscow have gained the impression that Churchill is aiming at the defeat of the USSR, in order then to come to terms with the Germany of Hitler or Briining at the expense of our country. Always in Stalin’s mind when he brooded on Churchill’s supposed wartime conspiracies against him was the figure of Hitler’s deputy Fiihrer, Rudolf Hess, whom, he told Maisky, Churchill was keeping “in reserve.” In May 1941 Hess had made a bizarre flight to Scotland, in the deluded belief that he could arrange peace between Britain and Germany. Both London and Berlin correctly concluded that Hess was somewhat deranged. Stalin, inevitably, believed instead that Hess’s flight was part of a deeply laid British plot. His suspicions deepened after the German invasion in June. For at least the next two years he suspected that Hess was part of a British conspiracy to abandon its alliance with the Soviet Union and sign a separate peace with Germany.^ At dinner with Churchill in the Kremlin in October 1944 Stalin proposed a toast to “the British intelligence service which had inveigled Hess into coming to England:” “He could not have landed without being given signals. The intelligence service must have been behind it all.”^^^ Stalin’s mood at dinner was jovial, but his conspiracy theory was deadly earnest. If his misunderstanding of Hess’s flight to Britain did not derive from Centre intelligence assessments, it was certainly reinforced by them. As late as the early 1990s the same conspiracy theory was still being publicly propounded by a KGB spokesman who claimed that in 1941 Hess “brought the Fiihrer’s peace proposals with him and a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union.” That myth is still, apparently, believed by some of their SVR successors. On October 25, 1943 the Centre informed the London residency that it was now clear, after long analysis of the voluminous intelligence from the Five, that they were double agents, working on the instructions of SIS and MI5. As far back as their years at Cambridge, Philby, Maclean and Burgess had probably been acting on instructions from British intelligence to infiltrate the student left before making contact with the NKVD. Only thus, the Centre reasoned, was it possible to explain why both SIS and MI5 were currently employing in highly sensitive jobs Cambridge graduates with a Communist background. The lack of any reference to British recruitment of Soviet agents in the intelligence supplied either by SOHNCHEN (Philby) from SIS or by TONY (Blunt) from MI5 was seen as further evidence that both were being used to feed disinformation to the NKGB: During the entire period that S[OHNCHEN] and T[ONY] worked for the British special services, they did not help expose a single valuable ISLANDERS [British] agent either in the USSR or in the Soviet embassy in the ISLAND [Britain]. There was, of course, no such “valuable agent” for Philby or Blunt to expose, but that simple possibility did not occur to the conspiracy theorists in the Centre. Philby ’s accurate report that “at the present time the HOTEL [SIS] is not engaged in active work against the Soviet Union” was also, in the Centre’s view, obvious disinformation. Since the Five were double agents, it followed that those they had recruited to the NKVD were also plants. One example which particularly exercised the Centre was the case of Peter Smollett (ABO), who in 1941 had achieved the remarkable feat of becoming head of the Russian department in the wartime Ministry of Information. By 1943 Smollett was using his position to organize pro-Soviet propaganda on a prodigious scale. A vast meeting at the Albert Hall in February to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army included songs of praise by a massed choir, readings by John Gielgud and Laurence Olivier, and was attended by leading politicians from all parties. The film USSR at War was shown to factory audiences of one and a quarter million. In September 1943 alone, the Ministry of Information organized meetings on the Soviet Union for 34 public venues, 35 factories, 100 voluntary societies, 28 civil defense groups, 9 schools and a prison; the BBC in the same month broadcast thirty programs with a substantial Soviet content. Yet, because Smollett had been recruited by Philby, he was, in the eyes of the Centre, necessarily a plant. His apparently spectacular success in organizing pro- Soviet propaganda on an unprecedented scale was thus perversely interpreted as a cunning plot by British intelligence to hoodwink the NKVD.121 Even the hardened conspiracy theorists of the Centre, however, had some difficulty in explaining why the Five were providing, along with disinformation, such large amounts of accurate high-grade intelligence. In its missive to the London residency of October 25, the Centre suggested a number of possible answers to this baffling problem. The sheer quantity of Foreign Office documents supplied by Maclean might indicate, it believed, that. unlike the other four, he was not consciously deceiving the NKVD, but was merely being manipulated by the others to the best of their ability. The Centre also argued that the Five were instructed to pass on important intelligence about Germany which did not harm British interests in order to make their disinformation about British policy more credible. The most valuable “documentary material about the work of the Germans” in 1943 was the German decrypts supplied by Caimcross from Bletchley Park. A brief official biography of Fitin published by the SVR singles out for special mention the ULTRA intelligence obtained from Britain on German preparations for the battle of Kursk when the Red Army halted Hitler’s last major offensive on the eastern front. The Luftwaffe decrypts provided by Caimcross were of cmcial importance in enabling the Red Air Force to launch massive pre-emptive strikes against German airfields which destroyed over 500 enemy aircraft. The Centre’s addiction to conspiracy theory ran so deep, however, that it was capable of regarding the agent who supplied intelligence of critical importance before Kursk as part of an elaborate network of deception. It therefore ordered the London residency to create a new independent agent network uncontaminated by the Five. But, though the Five were “undoubtedly double agents,” the residency was ordered to maintain contact with them. The Centre gave three reasons for this apparently contradictory decision. First, if British intelligence realized that their grand deception involving the Five had been discovered, they might well intensify their search for the new network intended to replace them. Secondly, the Centre acknowledged that, despite the Five’s “unquestionable attempts to disinform us,” they were none the less providing “valuable material about the Germans and other matters.” Finally, “Not all the questions about this group of agents have been completely cleared up.” The Centre was, in other words, seriously confused about what exactly the Five were up to.^^^ To try to discover the exact nature of the British intelligence conspiracy, the Centre sent, for the first time ever, a special eight-man surveillance team to the London residency to trail the Five and other supposedly bogus Soviet agents in the hope of discovering their contacts with their non-existent British controllers. The same team also investigated visitors to the Soviet embassy, some of whom were suspected of being MI5 agents provocateurs. The new surveillance system was hilariously unsuccessful. None of the eight-man team spoke English; all wore conspicuously Russian clothes, were visibly ill at ease in English surroundings and must frequently have disconcerted those they followed. The absurdity of trailing the Five highlights the central weakness in the Soviet intelligence system. The Centre’s ability to collect intelligence from the West always comfortably exceeded its capacity to interpret what it collected. Moscow’s view of its British allies was invariably clouded by variable amounts of conspiracy theory. The Soviet leadership was to find it easier to replicate the first atomic bomb than to understand policy- making in London. EIGHT VICTORY Given the closeness of the British-American “special relationship,” the Centre inevitably suspected that some of the President’s advisers sympathized with Churchill’s supposed anti-Soviet plots. ^ Suspicions of Roosevelt himself, however, were never as intense as those of Churchill. Nor did the Centre form conspiracy theories about its American agents as preposterous as those about the Cambridge Five. Perhaps because the NKVD had penetrated the OSS from the moment of its foundation, it was less inclined to believe that United States intelligence was running a system of deception which compared with the supposed use of the Five by the British. The CPUS A’ s assistance in the operation to assassinate Trotsky, combined with the enthusiasm with which it “exposed and weeded out spies and traitors,”^ appeared to make its underground section a reliable recruiting ground. Vasili Zarubin’s regular contacts with the CPUS A leader, Earl Browder, plainly convinced him of the reliability of those covert Party members who agreed to provide secret intelligence. By the spring of 1943, however, the Centre was worried about the security of its large and expanding American agent network. Zarubin became increasingly incautious both in his meetings with Party leaders and in arranging for the payment to them of secret subsidies from Moscow. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin records censoriously, “Without the approval of the Central Committee, Zarubin crudely violated the rules of clandestinity.” On one occasion Browder asked Zarubin to deliver Soviet money personally to the Communist underground organization in Chicago; the implication in the KGB file is that he agreed. On another occasion, in April 1943, Zarubin traveled to California for a secret meeting with Steve Nelson, who ran a secret control commission to seek out informants and spies in the Californian branch of the Communist Party, but failed to find Nelson’s home. Only on a second visit did he succeed in delivering the money. On this occasion, however, the meeting was bugged by the FBI which had placed listening devices in Nelson’s home.^ The Soviet ambassador in Washington was told confidentially by none other than Roosevelt’s adviser, Harry Hopkins, that a member of his embassy had been detected passing money to a Communist in California.^ Though Zarubin became somewhat more discreet after this “friendly warning,” his cover had been blown. Worse was yet to come. Four months later Zarubin was secretly denounced to the FBI by Vasili Mironov, a senior officer in the New York residency who had earlier appealed unsuccessfully to the Centre for Zarubin’s recall.^ In an extraordinary anonymous letter to Hoover on August 7, 1943, Mironov identified Zarubin and ten other leading members of residencies operating under diplomatic cover in the United States, himself included, as Soviet intelligence officers. He also revealed that Browder was closely involved with Soviet espionage and identified the Hollywood producer Boris Morros (FROST) as a Soviet agent. Mironov’s motives derived partly from personal loathing for Zarubin himself He told Hoover, speaking of himself in the third person, that Zarubin and Mironov “both hate each other.” Mironov also appears to have been tortured by a sense of guilt for his part in the NKVD’s massacre of the Polish officer corps in 1940. Zarubin, he told Hoover, “interrogated and shot Poles in Kozelsk, Mironov in Starobelsk.” (In reality, though Zarubin did interrogate some of the Polish officers, he does not appear to have been directly involved in their execution.) But there are also clear signs in Mironov’s letter, if not of mental illness, at least of the paranoid mindset generated by the Terror. He accused Zarubin of being a Japanese agent and his wife of working for Germany, and concluded bizarrely: “If you prove to Mironov that Z is working for the Germans and Japanese, he will immediately shoot him without a trial, as he too holds a very high post in the NKVD.”^ By the time Mironov’s extraordinary denunciation reached the FBI, Zarubin had moved from New York to Washington — a move probably prompted by the steady growth in intelligence of all kinds from within the Roosevelt administration. As the senior NKVD officer in the United States, Zarubin retained overall control in Washington of the New York and San Francisco residencies; responsibility for liaison with the head of the CPUS A, Browder, and with the head of the illegal residency, Akhmerov; and direct control of some of his favorite agents, among them the French politician Pierre Cot and the British intelligence officer Cedric Belfrage, whom he took over from Golos.^ With his cover blown, however, Zarubin found life in Washington difficult. One of his most humiliating moments came at a dinner for members of the Soviet embassy given early in 1944 by the governor of Louisiana, Sam Houston Jones. ^ After dinner, as guests wandered round the governor’s house in small groups, a lady who appeared to know that Zarubin was a senior NKGB officer, turned to him and said, “Have a seat. General!” Zarubin, whose fuse and sense of humor were both somewhat short, took the seat but replied stiffly, “I am not a general!” Another guest, who identified himself as an officer in military intelligence, complimented the lady on her inside knowledge. He then caused Zarubin further embarrassment by asking for his views on the massacre of 16,000 Polish officers, some of whose bodies had been exhumed in the Katyn woods. Zarubin replied that German allegations that the officers had been shot by the NKVD (as indeed they had) were a provocation intended to sow dissension within the Grand Alliance which would deceive only the naive. ^ Zarubin subsequently sought to persuade the Centre that his humiliating loss of cover was due not to his own indiscretion but to the fact that the Americans had somehow discovered that he had interrogated imprisoned Polish officers in Kozelsk. The Centre was unimpressed. In a letter to the Central Committee, the NKGB Personnel Directorate reported that his period as resident in the United States had been marked by a series of blunders. Mironov not long before had informed on Zarubin to Hoover, now appears to have written to Stalin, accusing Zarubin of being in contact with the FBI. ^ ^ In the summer of 1944, both Zarubin and Mironov were recalled to Moscow. Anatoli Gorsky, who until a few months earlier had been resident in London, succeeded Zarubin in Washington. Once back in Moscow, Zarubin quickly succeeded in reestablishing his position at the expense of Mironov and was appointed deputy chief of foreign intelligence. By the time he retired three years later, allegedly on grounds of ill health, he had succeeded in taking much of the credit for the remarkable wartime intelligence obtained from the United States, and was awarded two Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, one Order of the Red Star, and numerous medals. Mironov, by contrast, was sentenced soon after his return to Moscow to five years in a labor camp, probably for making false accusations against Zarubin. In 1945 he tried to smuggle out of prison to the US embassy in Moscow information about the NKVD massacre of Polish officers similar to that which, unknown to the Centre, he had sent to the FBI two years earlier. On this occasion Mironov was caught in the act, given a second trial and shot.^^ Even after the recall of Zarubin and Mironov, feuding and denunciations continued within the American residencies. As with Mironov’s bizarre accusations, some of the feuds had an almost surreal quality about them. In August 1944 the newly appointed resident in San Francisco, Grigori Pavlovich Kasparov, telegraphed to the Centre a bitter denunciation of the resident in Mexico City, Lev Tarasov, who, he claimed, had bungled attempts to liberate Trotsky’s assassin, Ramon Mercader, and had adopted a “grand lifestyle.” As well as renting a house with grounds and employing two servants in addition to the staff allocated to him, Tarasov was alleged to be spending too much time breeding parrots, poultry and other birds. The fate of Tarasov’s denounced parrots is not recorded. There was dissension too in New York, where the inexperienced 28-year-old Stepan Apresyan (MAY) had been appointed resident early in 1944, despite the fact that he had never previously been outside the Soviet Union. His appointment was bitterly resented by his much more experienced deputy, Roland Abbiate (alias “Vladimir Pravdin,” codenamed SERGEI), whose previous assignments had included the liquidation of the defector Ignace Poretsky. Operating under cover as the Tass bureau chief in New York, Abbiate had a grasp of American conditions which greatly exceeded Apresyan’s, but his career continued to be held back by the fact that, although he had been bom in St. Petersburg in 1902, his parents were French and had returned to France in 1920. Abbiate had returned with them, living in France until his recmitment by the OGPU as an illegal in 1932.^^ As a stop-gap measure to compensate for Apresyan’s now visible incompetence, the Centre gave Abbiate virtually equal status with Apresyan in the autumn of 1944 in mnning the residency. Abbiate responded by telegraphing to Moscow a scathing attack on Apresyan, whom he condemned as “incapable of dealing with the tasks which are set him” or of gaining the respect of his staff: MAY [Apresyan] is utterly without the knack of dealing with people, frequently showing himself excessively abmpt and inclined to nag, and too rarely finding time to chat with them. Sometimes our operational workers ... cannot get an answer to an urgent question from him for several days at a time ... A worker who has no experience of work abroad cannot cope on his own with the work of directing the TYRE OFFICE [New York residency]. The real responsibility, Abbiate clearly implied, rested with the Centre for appointing such an obviously unsuitable and unqualified resident. The civil war between the resident and his deputy continued for just over a year before ending in victory for Abbiate. In March 1945 Apresyan was transferred to San Francisco, leaving Abbiate as resident in New York.^^ WHIFF THE WASHINGTON and New York residencies were both in some turmoil in the summer of 1944, sanity was returning to Fondon. The Magnificent Five were officially absolved of all suspicion of being double agents controlled by the British. On June 29 the Centre informed the Fondon residency, then headed by Konstantin Mikhailovich Kukin (codenamed IGOR),^^ that recent important SIS documents provided by Philby had been largely corroborated by material from “other sources” (some probably in the American OSS, with whom SIS exchanged many highly classified reports) “This is a serious confirmation of S[OHNCHEN]’s honesty in his work with us, which obliges us to review our attitude toward him and the entire group.” It was now clear, the Centre acknowledged, that intelligence from the Five was “of great value,” and contact with them must be maintained at all costs: On our behalf express much gratitude to S[OHNCHEN] for his work ... If you find it convenient and possible, offer S[OHNCHEN] in the most tactful way a bonus of 100 pounds or give him a gift of equal value. After six years in which his phenomenal work as a penetration agent had been frequently undervalued, ignored or suspected by the Centre, Philby was almost pathetically grateful for the long overdue recognition of his achievements. “During this decade of work,” he told Moscow, “I have never been so deeply touched as now with your gift and no less deeply excited by your communication [of thanks]. High among the intelligence which restored the Centre’s faith in Philby were his reports, beginning early in 1944, on the founding by SIS of a new Section IX “to study past records of Soviet and Communist activity.” Urged on by his new controller, Boris Krotenschield (alias Krotov, codenamed KRECHIN), Philby succeeded at the end of the year in becoming head of an expanded Section IX, with a remit for “the collection and interpretation of information concerning Soviet and Communist espionage and subversion in all parts of the world outside British territory.” As one of his SIS colleagues, Robert Cecil, wrote later, “Philby at one stroke had ... ensured that the whole post-war effort to counter Communist espionage would become known in the Kremlin. The history of espionage records few, if any, comparable masterstrokes.”^^ At about the same time that Philby was given his present, Caimcross was belatedly rewarded for his contribution to the epic Soviet victory at Kursk. Krotenschield informed him that he had been awarded one of the highest Soviet decorations, the Order of the Red Banner. He opened a velvet-lined box, took out the decoration and placed it in Caimcross ’s hands. Krotenschield reported to the Centre that Caimcross was visibly elated by the award, though he was told to hand it back for safekeeping in Moscow.^^ The award came too late, however, to achieve its full effect. In the summer of 1943, exhausted by the strain of his regular car journeys to London to deliver ULTRA decrypts to Gorsky, and probably discouraged by Gorsky’s lack of appreciation, Caimcross had left Bletchley Park. Though he succeeded in obtaining a job in SIS, first in Section V (Counterintelligence), then in Section I (Political Intelligence), his importance in the Centre’s eyes now ranked clearly below that of Philby.^^ Unlike Philby, Caimcross did not get on well with his SIS colleagues. The head of Section I, David Footman, found him “an odd person, with a chip on his shoulder. Encouraged by the Centre’s new appreciation of their talents, the other members of the Five — Maclean, Burgess and Blunt — ^became even more productive than before. In the spring of 1944 Maclean was posted to the Washington embassy, where he was soon promoted to first secretary. His zeal was quickly apparent. According to one of his colleagues, “No task was too hard for him; no hours were too long. He gained the reputation of one who would always take over a tangled skein from a colleague who was sick, or going on leave, or simply less zealous.” The most sensitive, and in the NKGB’s view probably the most important, area of policy in which Maclean succeeded in becoming involved by early 1945 was Anglo-American collaboration in the building of the atomic bomb.^^ Burgess increased his usefulness to the NKGB by gaining a job in the Foreign Office press department soon after Maclean was posted to Washington. Claiming no doubt that he required access to a wide range of material to be adequately informed for press briefings, Burgess regularly filled a large holdall with Foreign Office documents, some of them highly classified, and took them to be photographed by the NKGB. The holdall, however, was almost his undoing. At a meeting with Krotenschield, Burgess was approached by a police patrol, who suspected that the bag contained stolen goods. Once reassured that the two men had no housebreaking equipment and that the holdall contained only papers, the patrol apologized and proceeded on its way. Though Burgess may subsequently have used a bag which less resembled that of a housebreaker, his productivity was unaffected. According to one of the files examined by Mitrokhin, of the Foreign Office documents provided by Burgess in the first six months of 1945, 389 were classified “top secret.”^^ Blunf s productivity was prodigious too. In addition to providing intelligence from MI5, he continued to run Leo Long in military intelligence, and in the crucial months before D-Day gained access to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), not far from MI5 headquarters.^^ Part of Blunt’s contribution to NKGB operations in London was to keep the residency informed of the nature and extent of MI5 surveillance. Intelligence which he provided in 1945 revealed that MI5 had discovered that his Cambridge contemporary, James Klugmann, was a Communist spy. In 1942 Klugmann had joined the Yugoslav section of SOE Cairo, where his intellect, charm and fluent Serbo-Croat gave him an influence entirely disproportionate to his relatively junior rank (which eventually rose to major). As well as briefing Allied officers about to be dropped into Yugoslavia, he also briefed the NKGB on British policy and secret operations. In both sets of briefings he sought to advance the interests of Tito’s Communist partisans over those of Mihailovich’s royalist Chetniks. For four months in 1945 he served in Yugoslavia with the British military mission to Tito’s forces. Blunt was able to warn Krotenschield that MI5 listening devices in the British Communist Party headquarters in King Street, London, had recorded a conversation in which Klugmann boasted of secretly passing classified information to the Yugoslav Communists. WITH THE EXCEPTION of the Five, potentially the most important Soviet spy in Britain was the nuclear physicist Klaus Fuchs, recruited by the GRU late in 1941.30 Fuchs left for the United States late in 1943 as part of the British team chosen to take part in the MANHATTAN project, he was — though he did not realize it — transferred from GRU to NKGB control and given the codename REST (later changed to CHARLES).^ ^ Earlier in 1943, the Centre had instructed its residencies in Britain and the United States that “[t]he brain centers [scientific research establishments] must come within our jurisdiction.” Not for the first time, the GRU was forced to give way to the demands of its more powerful “neighbor.”^^ In 1944 Melita Norwood, the long-serving Soviet agent in the British Non-Ferrous Metals Association, ceased contact with SONYA of the GRU and was given an NKGB controller. In March 1945, after her employer won a contract from the TUBE ALLOYS project, Norwood gained access to documents of atomic intelligence which the Centre described as “of great interest and a valuable contribution to the development of work in this field.” She was instructed to say nothing about her espionage work to her husband, and in particular to give no hint of her involvement in atomic intelligence.^^ Atomic intelligence from London and the American residencies was complementary as well as overlapping. According to Vladimir Barkovsky, head of S&T at the London residency, “In the USA we obtained information on how the bomb was made and in Britain of what it was made, so that together [intelligence from the two countries] covered the whole problem.”^^ On February 5, 1944 Fuchs had his first meeting in New York’s East Side with his NKGB controller, Harry Gold (codenamed successively GOOSE and ARNO), an industrial chemist bom in Switzerland of Russian parents. Fuchs was told to identify himself by carrying a tennis ball in his hand and to look for a man wearing one pair of gloves and carrying another. Gold, who introduced himself as “Raymond,” reported to Leonid Kvasnikov, head of S&T at the New York residency (later known as Line X), that Fuchs had “greeted him pleasantly but was rather cautious at first. Fuchs later claimed, after his arrest in 1949, that during their meetings “the attitude of ‘Raymond’ was at all times that of an inferior.” Gold admitted, after his own arrest by the FBI, that he was overawed by the extraordinary intelligence which Fuchs provided and had found the idea of an atomic bomb “so frightening that the only thing I could do was shove it away as far back in my mind as I could and simply not think on the matter at all.”^^ On July 25, 1944 the New York residency telegraphed the Centre: “Almost half a year of contact established with REST [Fuchs] has demonstrated the value of his work for us.” It asked permission to pay him a “reward” of 500 dollars. The Centre agreed, but, before the money could be handed over, Fuchs had disappeared.^^ It was over three months before Gold discovered that Fuchs had been posted to Fos Alamos, and he did not renew contact with him until Fuchs returned to the east coast on leave in February 1945.^^ During 1944 Kvasnikov’s responsibilities were extended: he was given the new post of S&T resident for the whole of the United States — a certain indication of the increasing priority of atomic espionage.^^ Fate in 1944 Kvasnikov was able to inform the Centre that, in addition to Fuchs, there were now two more prospective spies at Fos Alamos. The first, David Greenglass, was recruited through a group of S&T agents run by Julius Rosenberg (codenamed successively ANTENNA and FIBERAF), a 26-year-old New York Communist with a degree in electrical engineering. Fike Fuchs, the members of the Rosenberg ring, who included his wife Ethel, had been rewarded with cash bonuses in the summer. The ring was producing so many classified documents to be photographed in Kvasnikov’s apartment that the New York residency was running dangerously short of film. The residency reported that Rosenberg was receiving so much intelligence from his agents that he was finding it difficult to cope: “We are afraid of putting LIBERAL out of action with overwork. In November 1944 Kvasnikov informed the Centre that Ethel Rosenberg’s sister, Ruth Greenglass (codenamed WASP), had agreed to approach her husband, who worked as a machinist at Los Alamos. “I was young, stupid and immature,” said David Greenglass (codenamed BUMBLEBEE and CALIBRE) later, “but I was a good Communist.” Stalin and the Soviet leadership, he believed, were “really geniuses, every one of them:” “More power to the Soviet Union and abundant life for their peoples!” “My darling,” Greenglass wrote to his wife, “I most certainly will be glad to be part of the community project [espionage] that Julius and his friends [the Russians] have in mind.”^^ The New York residency also reported in November 1944 that the precociously brilliant nineteen-year-old Harvard physicist Theodore Alvin (“Ted”) Hall, then working at Los Alamos, had indicated his willingness to collaborate. As well as being inspired by the myth-image of the Soviet worker-peasant state, which was an article of faith for most ideological Soviet agents. Hall convinced himself that an American nuclear monopoly would threaten the peace of the post-war world. Passing the secrets of the MANHATTAN project to Moscow was thus a way “to help the world,” as well as the Soviet Union. As the youngest of the atom spies, Hall was given the appropriate, if transparent, codename MLAD (“Young”). Though only one year older, the fellow Harvard student who first brought Hall into contact with the NKGB, Saville Savoy Sax, was codenamed STAR (“Old”).^^ Hall himself went on to become probably the youngest major spy of the twentieth century. THE PENETRATION OF Los Alamos was part of a more general surge in Soviet intelligence collection in the United States during the last two years of the war, as the NKGB’s agents, buoyed up by the remorseless advance of the Red Army towards Berlin and the opening of a second front, looked forward to a glorious victory over fascism. The number of rolls of microfilm sent by Akhmerov’s illegal residency to Moscow via New York grew from 211 in 1943 to 600 in 1944 and 1,896 in 1945 The Centre, however, found it difficult to believe that espionage in the United States could really be as straightforward as it seemed. During 1944-5 the NKGB grew increasingly concerned about the security of its American operations and sought to bring them under more direct control.^^ Among its chief anxieties was Elizabeth Bentley’s habit of socializing with the agents for whom she acted as courier. When Bentley’s controller and lover, Jacob Golos, died from a sudden heart attack on Thanksgiving Day 1943, Akhmerov decided to dispense with a cut-out and act as her new controller. Bentley’s first impressions were of a smartly dressed “j aunty-looking man in his mid- thirties” with an expansive manner. (Akhmerov was actually fortytwo). She soon realized, however, that “despite the superficial appearance of a boulevardier, he was a tough character. For the next six months, though Bentley continued to act as courier for the Silvermaster group in Washington, she felt herself under increasing pressure. In March 1944 Earl Browder passed on to her another group of Washington bureaucrats who had been sending him intelligence which he had previously passed on to Golos. Bentley regarded Victor Perlo (RAIDER), a government statistician who provided intelligence on aircraft production, as the leader of the group — ^probably because he acted as spokesman during her first meeting with them.^^ Akhmerov, however, believed that the real organizer was Charles Kramer (LOT), a government economist, and was furious that the Perlo/Kramer network had been handed over by Browder not to him but to Bentley. For over a year, he told the Centre, Zarubin and he had wanted to make direct contact with the group, but Browder had failed to arrange it. “If we work with this group,” Akhmerov added, “it will be necessary to remove [Bentley]. Bentley appealed to Browder for support as she struggled to remain the courier for the Washington networks. “Night after night, after battling with [Akhmerov],” wrote Bentley later, “I would crawl home to bed, sometimes too weary to undress.” Eventually, Bentley agreed to arrange a meeting between Akhmerov and Silvermaster (PAL). Soon afterwards, according to Bentley, Akhmerov told her, “almost drooling with arrogance:” “Earl [Browder] has agreed to turn Greg [Silvermaster] over to me ... Go and ask him.” “Don’t be naive,” Browder told Bentley the next day. “You know that when the cards are down, I have to take my orders from them.”^^ Akhmerov reported to the Centre that Bentley had taken her removal from the Silvermaster group “very much to heart ... evidently supposing that we do not trust her. She is offended at RULE VO Y [Browder] for having consented to our liaison with PAL.”^^ Bentley was also removed from contact with the Perlo/Kramer group. Gorsky tried to placate her by inviting her to dinner at a waterfront restaurant in Washington. He made a bad start. “I hope the food is good,” he said. “Americans are such stupid people that even when it comes to a simple matter like cooking a meal, they do it very badly.” “Ah, yes,” he added, seeing Bentley’s expression change. “I had forgotten for the moment that you, too, are an American.” Gorsky went on to tell her that she had been awarded the Order of the Red Star (“one of the highest — reserved for all our best fighters”) and showed her a facsimile: “We all think you’ve done splendidly and have a great future before you.” GOOD GIRL was not to be placated.^^ A year later she secretly began telling her story to the FBI. The Centre was also worried by increased FBI surveillance of the New York Soviet consulate, which housed the legal residency, and by a warning from Duncan Lee (KOCH) in September 1944 that the OSS Security Division was compiling a list of Communists and Communist sympathizers in OSS.^^ The Centre’s nervousness was shared by some of its best agents. Bentley found Lee himself “on the verge of cracking up ... so hypercautious that he had taken to crawling around the floor of his apartment on hands and knees examining the telephone wires to see if they had been tampered with.”^^ Another highly placed Soviet agent, the senior Treasury official Harry Dexter White (JURIST), told his controller that, though he was unconcerned for his own personal security and his wife had prepared herself “for any self- sacrifice,” he would have to be very cautious because of the damage to the “new course” (the Soviet cause) which would occur if he were exposed as a spy. He therefore proposed that in the future they have relatively infrequent meetings, each lasting about half an hour, while driving around in his car.^^ There was a further alarm in November which, according to Bentley, followed an urgent warning from an agent in the White House, Roosevelt’s administrative assistant Lauchlin Currie. Currie reported that “the Americans were on the verge of breaking the Soviet code.”^^ The alarm appears to have subsided when it was discovered that Currie had wrongly concluded that a fire- damaged NKGB codebook obtained by OSS from the Finns would enable Soviet communications (which went through a further, theoretically impenetrable, encipherment by “one-time pad”) to be decrypted.^ ^ (Given the phenomenal success of Anglo-American codebreakers in breaking the highest grade German and Japanese ciphers, Currie’s mistake is understandable.) At Roosevelt’s insistence, Donovan returned the NKGB codebook to the Soviet embassy. A doubtless bemused Fitin sent Donovan his “sincere thanks. DESPITE ALL THE Centre’s anxiety that Soviet espionage was about to be exposed, and despite all the confusion in the residencies, the NKGB’s eager American and British agents continued to provide intelligence remarkable for both its quantity and quality. The NKGB proudly calculated after the war that the grand total of its wartime agents and informers (“confidential contacts”) around the world had been 1,240, who had provided 41,718 items of intelligence. Approximately 3,000 foreign intelligence reports and documents had been judged important enough to be sent to the State Defense Committee and the Central Committee. Eighty-seven foreign intelligence officers were decorated for their wartime work.^^ Moscow made far better use of S&T than of its political intelligence, which was always likely to be ignored or regarded with suspicion when it disagreed with Stalin’s conspiracy theories — or with those of the Centre, which were closely modeled on his. S&T from the West, by contrast, was welcomed with open and unsuspicious arms by Soviet scientists and technologists. A. F. Ioffe, the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Leningrad Physics and Technological Institute, wrote of wartime S&T: The information always turns out to be accurate and for the most part very complete ... I have not encountered a single false finding. Verification of all the formulae and experiments invariably confirms the data contained in the materials. The most valuable S&T concerned the atomic program. Kurchatov reported to Beria on September 29, 1944 that intelligence revealed the creation for the MANHATTAN project of “a concentration of scientific and engineering- technical power on a scale never before seen in the history of world science, which has already achieved the most priceless results. According to NKGB calculations, up to November 1944 it had acquired 1,167 documents on nuclear research, of which 88 from the United States and 79 from Britain were judged of particular importance. The most important, however, were yet to come. On February 28, 1945 the NKGB submitted to Beria its first comprehensive report on atomic intelligence for two years — also the first to be based on reports from inside Los Alamos. Five months before the successful test of the first atomic bomb at Alamogordo in southern New Mexico, the Centre was informed of all the main elements in its construction. The information which Fuchs had passed to Gold on the east coast in mid-February arrived too late to be included in the Centre’s assessment. The report passed to Beria was, almost certainly, based chiefly on intelligence from the nineteen-year-old Theodore Hall and technical sergeant David Greenglass. There can be little doubt that Hall’s intelligence, delivered to the New York residency by his friend, Saville Sax, was the more important. It was probably Hall who first revealed the implosion method of detonating the bomb, though a more detailed report on implosion by Fuchs reached Kurchatov on April 6.^^ In the spring of 1945 Sax was replaced as courier between Hall and the New York residency by Leontina (“Lona”) Cohen, codenamed LESLIE. “Lona” had been recruited in 1941 by her husband Morris (codenamed LUIS), who had become a Soviet agent during the Spanish Civil War while serving in the International Brigades. The couple, later to figure among the heroes of Soviet intelligence, were collectively codenamed the DACHNIKI (“Vacationers”), but their careers as agents were interrupted by Morris’s conscription in 1942. “Lona” was reactivated early in 1945 to act as a courier to both Los Alamos and the Anglo-Canadian atomic research center at Chalk River, near Ottawa, which was also penetrated by Soviet agents. While she made contact with Hall, Gold acted as courier for Fuchs and Greenglass. Each of the three Soviet agents was completely ignorant of the espionage conducted by the other two.^^ It is probable that both Fuchs and Hall independently furnished the plans of the first atomic bomb, each of which the Centre was able to crosscheck against the other. Fuchs and Hall also independently reported that the test of the first atomic bomb had been fixed for July 10, 1945,^^ though in the end weather conditions caused it to be postponed for six days. A month later the Pacific War was at an end. Following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, Japan surrendered. Lona Cohen spent the final dramatic weeks of the Pacific War in New Mexico, waiting for Hall to deliver the results of the Alamogordo test. After missing rendezvous in Albuquerque on three consecutive Sundays, Hall finally handed a set of highly classified papers to his courier, probably soon after the Japanese surrender.^ ^ On catching the train back to New York, Lona Cohen was horrified to see military police on board searching passengers’ luggage. With remarkable presence of mind she thrust Hall’s documents inside a newspaper and gave it to a policeman to hold while she opened her purse and suitcase for inspection. The policeman handed the newspaper back, inspected her purse and suitcase, and Mrs. Cohen returned safely to New York.^^ Thanks chiefly to Hall and Fuchs, the first Soviet atomic bomb, successfully tested just over four years later, was to be an exact copy of the Alamogordo bomb. At the time, however, the Centre found it difficult to believe that the theft of two copies of perhaps the most important secret plans in American history could possibly escape detection. The sheer scale of its success made the NKGB fear that the penetration of the MANHATTAN project would soon be uncovered by the Americans. The NKGB officer in charge of intelligence collected from Los Alamos in 1945 was Anatoli Antonovich Yatskov (alias “Yakovlev,” codenamed ALEKSEI), an engineer recruited by the NKVD in 1939 who succeeded Kvasnikov as S&T resident in the United States. He is nowadays remembered as one of the heroes of Russian foreign intelligence.^^ At the time, however, the Centre was bitterly critical of him. In July 1945 it concluded that his carelessness had probably compromised MLAD, and denounced his “completely unsatisfactory work with the agents on ENORMOZ [the MANHATTAN project].”^^ At the very moment of Soviet intelligence’s greatest ever triumph in the United States, the acquisition of the plans of the first atomic bomb, the Centre wrongly feared that the whole ENORMOZ operation was in jeopardy. The GRU, as well as the NKGB, had some striking successes in the wartime United States. Though Soviet military intelligence had been forced to surrender both Fuchs and the majority of its more important pre-war American agents to the more powerful NKGB, it had succeeded in retaining at least one of whom the Centre was envious in 1945. Gorsky reported to the Centre a conversation between Akhmerov and ALES (Alger Hiss), who had been working for the GRU for the past ten years. Though Hiss was a senior diplomat, Akhmerov said that the GRU had generally appeared little interested in State Department documents, and had asked Hiss and a small group of agents, “for the most part consisting of his relations,” to concentrate on military intelligence.^^ Late in 1944, however. Hiss’s role as a Soviet agent took on a new significance when he became actively engaged in preparations for the final meeting of the wartime Big Three at Yalta in the Crimea in February 1945. Yalta was to prove an even bigger success for Soviet intelligence than Tehran. This time both the British and the American delegations, housed respectively in the ornate Vorontsov and Livadia Palaces, were successfully bugged. The mostly female personnel used to record and transcribe their private conversations were selected and transported to the Crimea in great secrecy. Not till they arrived at Yalta did they discover the jobs that had been assigned to them.^^ The NKGB sought, with some success, to distract both delegations from its surveillance of them by lavish and attentive hospitality, personally supervised by a massive NKGB general, Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov. When Churchill’s daughter, Sarah, casually mentioned that lemon went well with caviar, a lemon tree appeared, as if by magic, in the Vorontsov orangery. At the next Allied conference, in Potsdam, General Kruglov was rewarded with a KBE, thus becoming the only Soviet intelligence officer to receive an honorary knighthood. Stalin was even better informed about his allies at Yalta than he had been at Tehran. All of the Cambridge Five, no longer suspected of being double agents, provided a regular flow of classified intelligence or Foreign Office documents in the runup to the conference, though it is not possible to identify which of these documents were communicated to Stalin personally. Alger Hiss actually succeeded in becoming a member of the American delegation. The problem which occupied most of the time at Yalta was the future of Poland. Having already conceded Soviet dominance of Poland at Tehran, Roosevelt and Churchill made a belated attempt to secure the restoration of Polish parliamentary democracy and a guarantee of free elections. Both were outnegotiated by Stalin, assisted once again by a detailed knowledge of the cards in their hands. He knew, for example, what importance his allies attached to allowing some “democratic” politicians into the puppet Polish provisional government already established by the Russians. On this point, after initial resistance, Stalin graciously conceded, knowing that the “democrats” could subsequently be excluded. After first playing for time, Stalin gave way on other secondary issues, having first underlined their importance, in order to preserve his allies’ consent to the reality of a Soviet-dominated Poland. Watching Stalin in action at Yalta, the permanent under- secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan, thought him in a different league as a negotiator to Churchill and Roosevelt: “He is a great man, and shows up very impressively against the background of the other two aging statesmen.” Roosevelt, in rapidly failing health and with only two months to live, struck Cadogan, by contrast, as “very woolly and wobbly. Roosevelt and Churchill left Yalta with no sense that they had been deceived about Stalin’s true intentions. Even Churchill, hitherto more skeptical than Roosevelt, wrote confidently, “Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don’t think I’m wrong about Stalin.”^^ Some sense of how Moscow felt that good intelligence had contributed to Stalin’s success at Yalta is conveyed by Moscow’s congratulations to Hiss. Gorsky reported to the Centre in March 1945, after a meeting between Akhmerov and Hiss: Recently ALES [Hiss] and his whole group were awarded Soviet decorations. After the Yalta conference, when he had gone on to Moscow, a Soviet personage in a very responsible position (ALES gave to understand that it was Comrade Vyshinsky [Deputy Foreign Minister]) allegedly got in touch with ALES and at the behest of the military NEIGHBOURS [GRU] passed on to him their gratitude and so on.^^ The NKGB’s regret at failing to wrest Hiss from the NEIGHBOURS must surely have intensified in April when he was appointed acting Secretary-General of the United Nations “organizing conference” at San Francisco. BEHIND THE VICTORIOUS Red Army as it swept into central Europe during the final months of the war came detachments of Smersh (short for Smert Shpionam, “Death to Spies!”), a military counter-intelligence agency detached from the NKVD in 1943 and placed directly under the control of Stalin as Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Defense Commissar.^^ Smersh’s main mission was to hunt for traitors and Soviet citizens who had collaborated with the enemy. On Stalin’s instructions, it cast its net remarkably wide, screening well over five million people. The million or more Soviet POWs who had survived the horrors of German prison camps were treated as presumed deserters and transported to the gulag, where many died. In their anxiety to honor obligations to their ally, both the British and American governments collaborated in a sometimes barbarous repatriation. So far as Britain was concerned, the most controversial part of the forced repatriation was the hand-over of Cossacks and “dissident” Yugoslavs from south Austria to the Red Army and Tito’s forces respectively in May and June 1945. Most had collaborated with the enemy, though sometimes only to a nominal degree. On June 1 battle- hardened soldiers of the 8th Argylls, some of them in tears, were ordered to break up a Cossack religious service and drive several thousands of unarmed men, women and children into cattle trucks with rifle butts and pick handles. There were similar horrors on succeeding days. Some of the Cossacks killed themselves and their families to save them from torture, execution or the gulag. Most of the 45,000 repatriated Cossacks were Soviet citizens, whom Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed at Yalta to return to the Soviet Union. But a minority, variously estimated at between 3,000 and 10,000 were so- called “old emigres” who had left Russia after the civil war, had never been citizens of the Soviet Union, and were not covered by the Yalta agreement. They too were repatriated against their will.^^ Among the “old emigres” were a group of White generals — chief among them Pyotr Krasnov, Andrei Shkuro and Sultan Kelech Ghirey^^ — whom the NKGB and its predecessors had been pursuing for a quarter of a century. A Smersh detachment was sent to Austria with orders to track them down. Its initial inquiries to the British about their whereabouts met with no response other than the claim that no information was available. After heavy drinking at a dinner for Anglo-Russian troops, however, a British soldier blurted out that, until recently, the generals had been at a camp in the village of Gleisdorf.^^ A group of Smersh officers drove immediately to Gleisdorf where they discovered that, though the generals had left, Shkuro ’s mistress Yelena (surname unknown) was still there. Yelena was lured out of the camp on the pretense that she had a visitor. As she approached the Smersh car, she suddenly saw the Russian officers inside and froze with fear. She was quickly bundled into the car and revealed, under no doubt brutal interrogation, that the White generals had appealed for the Supreme Allied Commander, Field Marshal Alexander, for protection. Yelena also disclosed that the generals had with them fourteen kilograms of gold.^^ What happened next is of such importance that Mitrokhin’s note on it deserves to be quoted as fully as possible: The Chekists [Smersh officers] raised the matter of the generals again at a meeting with ... [a British] lieutenant-colonel. They mentioned where the generals were. The Chekists proposed that they should approach the question of the generals’ fate in a business-like way. “What do you mean by that?” asked the Englishman. They explained to him. If the British would hand them over quietly at the same time as the Cossacks were repatriated, they could keep the generals’ gold. “If the old men remain with you, you and your colleagues will get no benefit at all. If you accept our alternative, you will get the gold.” The lieutenant-colonel thought a while and then agreed. He talked with two of his colleagues about the details of the operation. On the pretext that they were being taken to Alexander’s headquarters for talks, the generals were put into cars without any of their belongings and driven to Odenburg [Judenburg] where they were handed over to the Chekists. From the hands of Smersh they were transferred to Moscow, to the Calvary of the Lubyanka.^^ No corroboration is available from any other source for the claim in a KGB file that a British army officer (and perhaps two of his colleagues) had been bribed into handing over the White generals. Given the failure on the ground to distinguish the minority of non- Soviet Cossacks from the rest, they might well have been surrendered to Smersh in any case. The generals would probably have survived, however, if their petitions had reached Field Marshal Alexander, who might well have granted them. But the petitions mysteriously disappeared en route. The speed and injustice of the “repatriation” derived chiefly from the desire of military commanders on the spot to be rid of an unwelcome problem as soon as possible, combined with the belief that individual screening to determine which Cossacks were not of Soviet nationality would be a complex, long drawn out, and in some cases impossible task. On May 21 Brigadier Toby Low of 5 Corps, which was in charge of the “repatriation,” issued an order defining who were to be regarded as Soviet citizens. The one White Russian group which could be collectively identified as non- Soviet, the Schutzkorps, commanded by Colonel Anatol Rogozhin, was, he instructed, not to be repatriated. But those to be “treated as Soviet Nationals” included the “Ataman Group” (of which General Krasnov was a leading member) and the “Units of Lt.-Gen. Shkuro.” Low added that “[ijndividual cases [appeals] will NOT be considered unless particularly pressed,” and that “[i]n all cases of doubt, the individual will be treated as a Soviet National. When all allowance is made for the difficulties of combining loyalty to allies with respect for the human rights of the Cossacks, the brutality with which the repatriation was conducted remains perhaps the most ignominious episode in twentieth-century British military history. “I reproach myself for just one thing,” the 76- year-old White general Krasnov later told the NKGB. “Why did I trust the British?” On May 27, just before 3 A.M., a time of day much favored by Soviet Security, General Shkuro was awakened by an unidentified British officer, who told him he was under arrest and took him to be held under close guard well away from the Cossack camp. Another, or perhaps the same, British officer later delivered an “urgent,” though bogus, invitation to General Krasnov to a conference with Field Marshal Alexander, his former comrade-in-arms during the Russian civil war. Smersh photographers were waiting to record the historic moment when the NKGB’s oldest enemies were turned over to it.^^ For the British army it was a shameful moment. For Stalin, Smersh and the NKGB, it was a famous victory. NINE FROM WAR TO COLD WAR At the end of the Second World War, the Centre faced what it feared was impending disaster in intelligence operations against its wartime allies. The first major alarm occurred in Ottawa, where relations among NKGB and GRU personnel working under “legal” cover in the Soviet embassy were as fraught as in New York. The situation was worst in the GRU residency.^ On the evening of September 5, 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a GRU cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, secretly stuffed more than a hundred classified documents under his shirt and attempted to defect. He tried hard to hold his stomach in as he walked out of the embassy. “Otherwise,” his wife said later, “he would have looked pregnant.” Defection turned out to be more difficult than Gouzenko had imagined. When he sought help at the offices of the Ministry of Justice and the Ottawa Journal, he was told to come back the next day. But on September 6 both the Ministry of Justice and the Ottawa Journal, which failed to realize it was being offered the spy story of the decade, showed no more interest than on the previous evening. By the night of September 6 the Soviet embassy realized that both Gouzenko and classified documents were missing. While Gouzenko hid with his wife and child in a neighbor’s flat, NKGB men broke down his door and searched his apartment. It was almost midnight before the local police came to his rescue and the Gouzenko family at last found sanctuary.^ As well as identifying a major GRU spy ring, Gouzenko also provided fragmentary intelligence on NKGB operations. Some months later Lavrenti Beria, the Soviet security supremo, circulated to residencies a stinging indictment of the incompetence of the GRU and, he implied, the NKGB in Ottawa: The most elementary principles of security were ignored, complacency and self-satisfaction went unchecked. All this was the result of a decline in political vigilance and sense of responsibility for work entrusted by the Party and the government. G[ouzenko]’s defection has caused great damage to our country and has, in particular, very greatly complicated our work in the American countries.^ The fear of being accused of further breaches of security made the Ottawa residency unwilling to take any initiative in recruiting new agents. According to a later damage assessment, Gouzenko’s defection “paralyzed intelligence work [in Canada] for several years and continued to have a most negative effect on the work of the residency right up to 1960.” In the summer of 1949 the acting resident in Ottawa, Vladimir Trofimovich Burdin (also known as Borodin), newly arrived from Moscow, wrote to the Centre to complain about his colleagues’ inertia: The residency not merely lost all its previous contacts in Canadian circles but did not even try to acquire new ones ... The Soviet colony closed in on itself and shut itself off from the outside world, becoming wholly preoccupied with its own internal affairs. The Centre agreed. The residency, it concluded, had “got stuck in a rut.”^ For the rest of Gouzenko’s life the KGB tried intermittently and unsuccessfully to track him down. In 1975, after a Progressive Conservative MP, Thomas Cossit, requested a review of Gouzenko’s pension, the Ottawa residency deduced that Gouzenko lived in his constituency. The residency also reported that Cossit and Gouzenko had been seen together at an ice hockey match during a visit to Canada by the Soviet national team. A KGB officer stationed in Ottawa, Mikhail Nikolayevich Khvatov, sought to cultivate Cossit in the hope of discovering Gouzenko’s whereabouts. He had no success and the residency subsequently reported that parliamentary questions by Cossit were “clearly anti- Soviet in tone.” Some years later the KGB began to search for compromising material on Cossit’s private life and prepare active measures to discredit him. He died in 1982 before the campaign against him had begun. ^ Gouzenko’s defection in September 1945 also caused alarm at NKGB residencies in Britain and the United States. As head of SIS Section IX (Soviet Counter- intelligence) Philby was kept well informed of the debriefing of Gouzenko and reported “an intensification of counter-measures” against Soviet espionage in London. The Centre responded with instructions for tight security procedures to ensure that “the valuable agent network is protected from compromise.” Boris Krotenschield (aka “Krotov”), the controller of the residency’s most important agents, was told to hand over all but Philby to other case officers and to reduce the frequency of meetings to once a month: “Warn all our comrades to make a thorough check when going out to a meeting and, if surveillance is observed, not to attempt under any circumstances to evade the surveillance and meet the agent ...” If necessary, contact with British agents was to be temporarily broken off.^ Even greater alarm was caused by the attempted defection of an NKGB officer in Turkey, Konstantin Dmitry evich Volkov. On August 27, 1945 Volkov wrote to the British vice-consul in Istanbul, C. H. Page, requesting an urgent appointment. When Page failed to reply, Volkov turned up in person on September 4 and asked for political asylum for himself and his wife. In return for asylum and the sum of 50,000 pounds (about a million pounds at today’s values), he offered important files and information obtained while working on the British desk in the Centre. Among the most highly rated Soviet agents, he revealed, were two in the Foreign Office (doubtless Burgess and Maclean) and seven “inside the British intelligence system,” including one “fulfilling the function of head of a section of British counter-espionage in London” (almost certainly Philby).^ On September 19 Philby was startled to receive a report of Volkov’s meeting with Page by diplomatic bag from the Istanbul consulate.^ He quickly warned Krotenschield. ^ On September 21 the Turkish consulate in Moscow issued visas for two NKGB hatchet men posing as diplomatic couriers. The next day Philby succeeded in gaining authorization from the chief of SIS, Sir Stewart Menzies, to fly to Turkey to deal personally with the Volkov case. Due to various travel delays he did not arrive in Istanbul until September 26. Two days earlier Volkov and his wife, both on stretchers and heavily sedated, had been carried on board a Soviet aircraft bound for Moscow. During the flight back to London Philby drafted a cynical report to Menzies on the possible reasons for Volkov’s detection by the NKGB. As he wrote later. Doubtless both his office and his living quarters were bugged. Both he and his wife were reported to be nervous. Perhaps his manner had given him away; perhaps he had got drunk and talked too much; perhaps even he had changed his mind and confessed to his colleagues. Of course, I admitted, this was all speculation; the truth might never be known. Another theory — that the Russians had been tipped off about Volkov’s approach to the British — had no solid evidence to support it. It was not worth including in my report. ^ ^ Under interrogation in Moscow before his execution, Volkov admitted that he had asked the British for political asylum and 50,000 pounds, and confessed that he had planned to reveal the names of no fewer than 314 Soviet agents. Philby had had the narrowest of escapes. With slightly less luck in Ottawa a few weeks earlier, Gouzenko would not have been able to defect. With slightly more luck in Istanbul, Volkov would have succeeded in unmasking Philby and disrupting the MGB’s British operations. The Gouzenko and Volkov alarms occurred at a remarkably busy period for the London residency, headed until 1947 by Konstantin Kukin (codenamed IGOR). From September 11 to October 2, 1945 the Council of Foreign Ministers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China) held its first meeting in London to discuss peace treaties with defeated enemy states and other post-war problems. The residency’s penetration of the Foreign Office gave it an unusually important role. Throughout the meeting, according to KGB files, the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, placed greater reliance on residency staff than on his own diplomats, forcing them to extend each working day into the early hours of the following morning. The Security Council meeting, however, was a failure, publicly exposing for the first time the deep East- West divisions which by 1947 were to engender the Cold War. At this and subsequent meetings of the Security Council, Stalin’s foreign minister, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, depended heavily on the intelligence supplied by the MGB’s Western agents. Indeed, he tended to take it for granted. “Why,” he roared on one occasion, “are there no documents?” At the London conference which opened in November 1947, he appears to have received some Foreign Office documents even before they reached the British delegation. The MGB’s most important sources during the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers from 1945 to 1949 were British. Thanks to the kidnapping of Volkov, four of the wartime Magnificent Five were able to carry on work as full-time Soviet agents after the war. The exception was Anthony Blunt, who was under such visible strain that the Centre did not object to his decision to leave MI5. Shortly before he returned to the art world in November 1945 as Surveyor of the King’s Pictures, Blunt made one extraordinary outburst which at the time was not taken seriously. “Well,” he told his MI5 colleague Colonel “Tar” Robertson, “it’s given me great pleasure to pass on the names of every MI5 officer to the Russians!” The Centre may well have hoped that Leo Long (codenamed ELLI), whom Blunt had run as a sub- agent in military intelligence during the war, would succeed him in the Security Service. Blunt recommended Long for a senior post in MI5 but the selection board passed him over, allegedly by a narrow margin, in favor of another candidate. Long moved instead to the British Control Commission in Germany, where he eventually became Deputy Director of Intelligence. There he resisted attempts to put him in regular contact with a case officer — a recalcitrance which the Centre attributed in part to the fact that Blunt had ceased to be his controller. Among the occasional services which Blunt continued to perform for the Centre were two or three visits to Germany to seek intelligence from Long.^^ Unlike Blunt, three of the Magnificent Five — Philby, Burgess and Maclean — were all at their peak as Soviet agents, and Caimcross still close to his, when the Cold War began. Philby remained head of SIS Section IX until 1947, when he was appointed head of station in Turkey, a position which enabled him to betray agents who crossed the Russian border as well as their families and contacts inside the Soviet Union. Maclean established a reputation as a high-flying young diplomat in the Washington embassy, where he remained until 1947. In 1946 Burgess, who had joined the Foreign Office in 1944, became personal assistant to Hector McNeil, Minister of State to Ernest Bevin in the post-war Labor government. After the war John Caimcross returned to the Treasury, where the London residency renewed contact with him in 1948.^^ Caimcross ’s main job at the Treasury over the next few years was to authorize expenditure on defense research. According to his Treasury colleague G. A. Robinson: [Caimcross] thus knew not just about atomic weapons developments but also plans for guided missiles, microbiological, chemical, underwater and all other types of weapons. He also needed to know, inter alia, about projected spending on aeronautical and radar research and anti-submarine detection, research by the Post Office and other bodies into signals intelligence, eavesdropping techniques, etc. He ... could legitimately ask for any further details thought necessary to give Treasury approval to the spending of money. Caimcross ’s controller, Yuri Modin, was, unsurprisingly, “overjoyed by the quality of [his] information.”^^ The new security procedures introduced in the wake of the Gouzenko and Volkov alarms made controlling the London residency’s agents far more laborious and timeconsuming than during or before the war. On average, before every meeting with an agent, each case officer spent five hours moving on foot or by public transport (especially the London Underground) between locations he had studied previously in order to engage in repeated checks that he was not under surveillance. Once at the meeting place, both the case officer and the agent were required to establish visual contact and to satisfy themselves that the other was not being watched before they approached each other. If either had any doubts, they would fall back on one of three previously agreed alternative rendezvous. The system pioneered in London was later introduced into other residencies.^^ The London residency also pioneered the use of radio intercept units to identify and monitor surveillance of its operations by the police and MI5. In addition to the main interception unit in the residency, mobile units were established in embassy cars to check the areas in which meetings took place with agents.^ ^ However, the Centre’s experiment with the eight-man surveillance team sent to London during the Second World War to carry out checks on agents and visitors to the Soviet embassy, as well as to discover the surveillance methods used by British intelligence, was discontinued. A report in KGB archives records that, handicapped by its lack of fluency in English, the team had “no major successes. The experiment was probably a total failure. The London residency’s attempts to enforce the strictest standards of secrecy and security had only a limited effect on Guy Burgess. On one occasion, while coming out of a pub where he had established visual contact with his case officer, he dropped his briefcase and scattered secret Foreign Office papers over the floor. There were frequent complaints that he turned up for meetings the worse for drink and with his clothing in disarray. When George Carey-Foster, head of the embryonic security branch in the Foreign Office, first encountered Burgess in 1947, he was struck by his “disheveled and unshaven appearance. He also smelt so strongly of drink that I enquired who he was and what his job was.” Yet Burgess could still display fragments of the charm and brilliance of his Cambridge years. Late in 1947, probably to get rid of him. Hector McNeil recommended Burgess to the parliamentary under- secretary at the Foreign Office, Christopher Mayhew, who was then organizing the Information Research Department (IRD) to counter Soviet “psychological warfare.” Mayhew made what he later described as “an extraordinary mistake:” “I interviewed Burgess. He certainly showed a dazzling insight into Communist methods of subversion and I readily took him on.” Burgess went the rounds of British embassies selling IRD’s wares while simultaneously compromising the new department by reporting all its plans to Yuri Ivanovich Modin, who became his case officer in 1947 and acquired a reputation as one of the ablest agent controllers in Soviet intelligence. The chorus of protests at Burgess’s undiplomatic behavior led to his removal from the IRD and transfer to the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department in the autumn of 1948.^^ Though it disturbed the Centre, Burgess’s frequently outrageous conduct paradoxically strengthened his cover. Even to most of those whom he outraged he seemed as unlike a Soviet spy as it was possible to imagine. Modin was also concerned about Nikolai Borisovich Rodin (alias “Korovin”), who succeeded Kukin as London resident in 1947. Rodin considered himself above the tight security regulations on which he insisted for the other members of the residency. According to Modin, who loathed him personally, Rodin was “known to go to clandestine meetings in one of the embassy cars, and sometimes was foolhardy enough to place direct calls to agents in their offices.” But, in the rigidly hierarchical world of Soviet intelligence, Modin felt that “there was nothing I could do about it. It was hardly my place to denounce my superior in the service.” As head of Faculty Number One (Political Intelligence) in the FCD Andropov Institute in the early 1980s, Modin was less inhibited. He dismissed Rodin as an arrogant, pretentious nonentity.^^ THOUGH THE MGB’S most important British agents were still undetected at the end of the 1940s, many of their American counterparts had been compromised. The Centre had complained as early as March 1945 that the membership of the Silvermaster spy ring was an open secret among “many” Washington Communists and that Harry Dexter White’s Soviet “connection” had also become known. It denounced “not only the falling off in the [New York] Residency’s work of controlling and educating probationers [agents], but also the lack of understanding by our operational workers of the most elementary rules in our work.”^^ The defections later in 1945 of Igor Gouzenko and Elizabeth Bentley confirmed the Centre’s worst fears. In September J. Edgar Hoover reported to the White House and the State Department that Gouzenko had provided information on the activities of a number of Soviet spies in the United States, one of whom was “an assistant to the Secretary of State” (almost certainly Alger Hiss). On November 7 Bentley, who had first contacted the FBI six weeks earlier, began revealing what she knew of Soviet espionage to its New York field office. Next day Hoover sent President Truman’s military aide a first list of fourteen of those identified by Bentley as supplying information to “the Soviet espionage system:” among them Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White, OSS executive assistant Duncan C. Lee and Roosevelt’s former aide Lauchlin Currie.^^ Bentley’s defection, in turn, revived FBI interest in Whittaker Chambers’ earlier evidence of pre-war Soviet espionage by Hiss, White and others. On November 20 Gorsky, the Washington resident whom Bentley knew as “Al,” met her for the last time in front of Bickford’s cafeteria on 23rd Street and Sixth Avenue in New York. Unaware that they were under surveillance by the FBI, Gorsky arranged their next meeting for January 20. According to Bentley, he told her that she might soon be needed “back in undercover work.” By the time the date for their next rendezvous had arrived, however, Gorsky was back in Moscow.^^ His hasty departure was probably due to the discovery of Bentley’s defection.^^ A few months later the resident in New York, Roland Abbiate (alias “Pravdin”), whose wife was known to Bentley, was also withdrawn.^ ^ A damage assessment in the Centre concluded that Bentley did not know the real name, address or telephone number of her previous controller, Iskhak Akhmerov, the illegal resident in the United States. As a precaution, however, he and his wife were recalled to Moscow.^^ The almost simultaneous recall of Gorsky, Abbiate and Akhmerov left the MGB without experienced leadership in the United States. There were few senior officers at the Centre with first-hand knowledge of North America capable of succeeding them. In any case, as Yuri Modin later acknowledged, “We were leery of sending people out of the Soviet Union for fear of defections. Most of our officers worked in Moscow, with the result that the few men posted in foreign countries had a workload so crushing that many of them cracked under the pressure. Akhmerov was not replaced as illegal resident until 1948. ^^ Gorsky’s two successors as chief legal resident in the United States both became bywords for incompetence in the Centre. Grigori Grigory evich Dolbin, who arrived to replace Gorsky in 1946, had to be replaced in 1948 after showing signs of insanity (due, it was rumored in Moscow, to the onset of hereditary syphilis). His successor, Georgi Aleksandrovich Sokolov, was reprimanded by the Centre before being recalled in 1949 . ^^ The most effective damage limitation measure taken by the MGB after Bentley’s defection was to break off contact with most of the wartime American agents whose identities were known to her. As a result, Bentley’s many leads resulted in not a single prosecution. The FBI began its investigations too late to catch any of the spies named by Bentley in the act of passing on classified information, and it was unable to use evidence from wiretaps in court. The Centre, however, failed to grasp the extent of the legal obstacles which confronted the FBI and continued to fear for several years that it would succeed in mounting a major spy trial. The Centre’s fears were strengthened by a major American codebreaking success, later codenamed VENONA. For its high-grade diplomatic and intelligence communications the Soviet Union had used since 1927 a virtually unbreakable cipher system known in the West as the “one-time pad.”^^ During and immediately after the Second World War, however, some of the one-time pads were reissued, thus becoming vulnerable — though it took several years for American and British codebreakers to exploit the difficult opportunity offered to them by Soviet cryptographic carelessness. Late in 1946 Meredith Gardner, a brilliant cryptanalyst in the US Army Security [SIGINT] Agency, began decrypting some of the wartime messages exchanged between the Centre and its American residencies. By the summer of 1947 he had accumulated evidence from the decrypts of massive Soviet espionage in the wartime United States. In 1948 ASA called in the FBI. From October special agent Robert Lamphere began full-time work on VENONA, seeking to identify the agents (some still active) whose codenames appeared in the VENONA decrypts. Remarkably, however, the Central Intelligence Agency was not informed of VENONA until late in 1952.^^ Even more remarkably. President Truman appears not to have been told of the decrypts, perhaps for fear that he might mention them to the Director of Central Intelligence, head of the CIA, at one of his weekly meetings with him. VENONA showed in graphic detail how OSS, the CIA’s wartime predecessor, had been heavily penetrated by Soviet agents. Both Hoover and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, seem to have suspected — wrongly — that the same was true of the Agency.^^ The Centre learned the VENONA secret in 1947 — five years earlier than the CIA — from an agent in ASA, William Weisband (codenamed ZHORA).^^ The son of Russian immigrants to the United States, Weisband was employed as a Russian linguist and roamed around ASA on the pretext of looking for projects where his linguistic skills could be of assistance. Meredith Gardner recalls Weisband looking over his shoulder at a critical moment in the project late in 1946, just as he was producing one of the first important decrypts — an NKGB telegram of December 2, 1944 which revealed Soviet penetration of Los Alamos.^^ For the Centre, VENONA represented a series of unpredictable timebombs which threatened to explode over the next few years. It had no means of knowing precisely what NKGB telegrams would be decrypted in whole or part, or which Soviet agents would be compromised by them. Moscow’s anxieties were heightened by the public controversy which broke out in the United States in the summer of 1948 over Soviet espionage. In July 1948 Elizabeth Bentley gave evidence in public for the first time to the House Committee on Un- American Activities and achieved instant media celebrity as the “Red Spy Queen.” In evidence to the committee in early August, Whittaker Chambers identified Hiss, White and others as members of a secret pre-war Communist underground. The Centre wrongly feared that the committee hearings would be the prelude to a series of show trials which would expose its wartime espionage network. DURING THE LATE 1940s Soviet foreign intelligence operations were further confused by a major reorganization in Moscow, prompted by the American National Security Act of July 1947 which established a Central Intelligence Agency “for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of national security.” Though that coordination was never fiilly achieved, Molotov argued that the unified foreign intelligence apparatus envisaged by the National Security Act would give the United States a clear advantage over the fragmented Soviet system. The solution, he argued, was to combine the foreign intelligence directorates of both the MGB and the GRU under a single roof. Molotov’s proposal had the further advantage, from Stalin’s viewpoint, of weakening the power of Beria, whose protege, Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov, headed the MGB.^^ In October 1947 the foreign intelligence directorates of the MGB and GRU were combined to form a new unified foreign intelligence agency, the Committee of Information (Komitet Informatsii or Under the new, highly centralized system, even the operational plans for arranging meetings with, and investigating the reliability of, important agents required the prior approval of the KI.^^ The appointment of Molotov as first chairman of the Committee of Information gave the Foreign Ministry greater influence on foreign intelligence operations than ever before. The first deputy chairman, responsible to Molotov for day-to-day operations, was the relatively pliant Pyotr Vasilyevich Fedotov, who had become the MGB foreign intelligence chief in the previous year.^^ Like most of the Centre management, Fedotov had almost no experience of the West. Roland Abbiate, the former resident in New York and probably the senior intelligence officer best acquainted with the West, was sacked on the formation of the KI. His file records that he was given no explanation for his dismissal and that “it was a terrible blow for him.” Though the reason for the sacking is not recorded, it may well have been related to his foreign Jewish ancestry, which is duly noted in his file. Abbiate was briefly reinstated after Stalin’s death, then sacked again and later committed suicide. Molotov sought to strengthen Foreign Ministry control of KI operations by appointing Soviet ambassadors in major capitals as “chief legal residents” with authority over both civilian (ex-MGB) and military (ex-GRU) residents. In the jaundiced view of the later KGB defector Ilya Dzhirkvelov: This resulted in incredible confusion. The residents, the professional intelligence officers, resorted to incredible subterfuges to avoid informing their ambassadors about their work, since the diplomats had only amateurish knowledge of intelligence work and its methods ...^^ Some diplomats, however, became directly involved in intelligence operations. After the troubles in the Washington residency which led to the recall of two successive residents in 1948-9, the Soviet ambassador, Aleksandr Semyonovich Panyushkin, took personal charge for a year. He acquired such a taste for intelligence that he later became head of the KGB First (foreign intelligence) Chief Directorate.^^ In 1949 Molotov, now out of favor with Stalin, was succeeded as both Foreign Minister and chairman of the KI by his former deputy, Andrei Vyshinsky, who had made his reputation as the brutal prosecutor in the prewar show trials. Vyshinsky retained a sycophantic devotion to Beria which showed itself even on the telephone. According to one of his successors, Andrei Gromyko, “As soon as he heard Beria’ s voice Vyshinsky leapt respectfully out of his chair. The conversation itself also presented an unusual picture: Vyshinsky cringed like a servant before his master. Unlike Molotov, Vyshinsky had little interest in KI affairs, handing over the chairmanship after a few months to Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin. Fedotov was succeeded as first deputy chairman in charge of day-to-day operations by the more brutal and decisive Sergei Romanovich Savchenko, like Vyshinsky a protege of Beria. Savchenko seems to have answered to Beria rather than the Foreign Ministry. By the time Vyshinsky succeeded Molotov, much of the Committee of Information had unraveled. In the summer of 1948, after a prolonged dispute with Molotov, Marshal Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, Minister for the Armed Forces, began withdrawing military intelligence personnel from KI control and returning them to the GRU. Probably with the support of Beria, Abakumov then embarked on a long drawn out struggle to recover control of the remnants of the KI. At the end of 1948 all residency officers in the EM (Russian emigre) and SK (Soviet colonies abroad) Lines returned to the MGB. The KI was finally wound up and the rest of its foreign intelligence responsibilities returned to the MGB late in 1951.^^ THE MAIN LEGACY of the KI period to the subsequent development of Soviet intelligence was a renewed emphasis on illegals who, it was believed, would eventually establish a more secure and better-concealed foundation for foreign intelligence operations than the legal residencies, particularly in the United States. The Fourth (Illegals) Directorate of the KI, formed by combining the illegals sections of the MGB and the GRU, had a total staff of eighty-seven, headed by Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov, who had made his reputation during pre-war missions to assassinate “enemies of the people” on foreign soil. In 1949, by which time military personnel in the directorate had returned to the GRU, forty-nine illegals were in training. Korotkov set up departments specializing in the selection of illegals, their training and the fabrication of documentation to support their legends. By 1952 the documentation department had forged or doctored 364 foreign identity documents, including seventy-eight passports. Illegal support (Line N) officers were sent by the Centre to all major legal residencies.^^ The first priority of the Fourth Directorate was the creation of a new illegal residency in New York to rebuild its American intelligence operations. The man selected as illegal resident, the first since Akhmerov’s departure from the United States at the beginning of 1946, was Vilyam (“Willie”) Genrikhovich Fisher, codenamed MARK, probably the only English-bom Soviet intelligence officer. Fisher’s parents were Russian revolutionaries of the Tsarist era who had emigrated in 1901 to Newcastleon-Tyne, where Vilyam had been bom in 1903.^^ In 1921 the family returned to Moscow, where Fisher became a Comintern translator. During military service in 1925-6, he was trained as a radio operator and, after a brief period in the Fourth Department (Military Intelligence), was recmited by INO (OGPU foreign intelligence) in 1927. He served as a radio operator in residencies in Norway, Turkey, Britain and France until 1936, when he was appointed head of a training school for radio operators in illegal residencies.^^ Fisher was fortunate not to be shot during the Great Terror. His file records that, as well as being automatically suspect because of his English background, he had been “referred to in positive terms” by a series of “enemies of the people,” and his wife’s brother was accused of being a Trotskyite. Though dismissed by the NKVD at the end of 1938, he survived to be reemployed during the Great Patriotic War in a unit training radio operators for guerrilla and intelligence operations behind German lines. Fisher’s training as an illegal began in 1946 under the personal supervision of Korotkov, the head of the MGB Illegals Department. His legend was unusually complicated. Fisher assumed one identity during his journey to the United States in 1948 and another shortly after his arrival. The first identity was that of Andrei Yurgesovich Kayotis, a Lithuanian bom in 1895 who had emigrated to the United States and become an American citizen. In November 1947 Kayotis crossed the Atlantic to visit relatives in Europe. While he was in Denmark, the Soviet embassy issued a travel document enabling him to visit Russia and retained his passport for use by Fisher. In October 1948 Fisher traveled to Warsaw on a Soviet passport, then traveled on Kayotis ’s passport via Czechoslovakia and Switzerland to Paris, where he purchased a transatlantic ticket on the SS Scythia. On November 6 he set sail from Le Havre to Quebec, traveled on to Montreal and — still using Kayotis ’s passport — crossed into the United States on November 17.^^ On November 26 Fisher had a secret meeting in New York with the celebrated Soviet illegal I. R. Grigulevich (codenamed MAKS), who had taken part in the first attempt to assassinate Trotsky in Mexico City and had led a Latin American sabotage group during the war attacking ships and cargoes bound for Germany. Grigulevich gave Fisher 1,000 dollars and three documents in the name of Emil Robert Goldfus: a genuine birth certificate, a draft card forged by the Centre and a tax certificate (also forged). Fisher handed back Kayotis ’s documents and became Goldfus. The real Goldfus, bom in New York on August 2, 1902, had died at the age of only fourteen months. Fisher’s file records that his birth certificate had been obtained by the NKVD in Spain at the end of the Spanish Civil War, at a time when it was collecting identity documents from members of the International Brigades for use in illegal operations, but gives no other details of its provenance. According to the legend constructed by the Centre, Goldfus was the son of a German house painter in New York, had spent his childhood at 120 East 87th Street, left school in 1916 and worked in Detroit until 1926. After further periods in Grand Rapids, Detroit and Chicago, the legendary Goldfus had returned to New York in 1947. The legend, however, was far from perfect. The Centre instructed Fisher not to seek employment for fear that his employer would make inquiries which would blow his cover. Instead, he was told to open an artist’s studio and claim to be self-employed.^^ As Fisher mingled with other New York artists, his technique gradually improved and he became a competent, if rather conventional, painter. He surprised friends in the artistic community with his admiration for the late nineteenth-century Russian painter Fevitan, of whom they had never heard, but made no mention of Stalinist “socialist realism,” with which he was probably also in sympathy. Fisher made no secret of his dislike for abstract painting. “You know,” he told another artist, “I think most contemporary art is headed down a blind alley. In 1949, as the basis of his illegal residency, Fisher was given control of a group of agents headed by Morris Cohen (codenamed FUIS and VOFUNTEER), which included his wife Lona (LESLE).^^ Following Elizabeth Bentley’s defection, the Centre had temporarily broken contact with the Cohens early in 1946, but renewed contact with them in Paris a year later and reactivated them in the United States in 1948.^^ The most important agent in the VOLUNTEER network was the physicist Ted Hall (MEAD), for whom Lona Cohen had acted as courier in 1945 when he was passing atomic intelligence from Los Alamos. Early in 1948, Hall, then working for his PhD at Chicago University, had joined the Communist Party together with his wife Joan, apparently with the intention of abandoning work as a Soviet agent and working for the campaign of the Progressive candidate, the naively pro- Soviet Henry Wallace, in the presidential election. Morris Cohen, however, persuaded Hall to return to espionage. On August 2, 1948 the Washington residency telegraphed the Centre: LUIS has met MEAD. He has persuaded him to break contact with the Progressive organization and concentrate on science. Important information obtained on MLAD’s two new contacts. They have declared their wish to transmit data on ENORMOZ [the nuclear program], subject to two conditions: MEAD must be their only contact and their names must not be known to officers of ARTEMIS [Soviet intelligence].^^ The VOLUNTEER network expanded to include, in addition to MEAD, three other agents: ADEN, SERB and SILVER. Two of these were undoubtedly the two nuclear physicists contacted by Hall. Though their identities remain unknown, the Centre clearly regarded their intelligence as of the first importance. According to an SVR history, “the Volunteer group ... were able to guarantee the transmittal to the Centre of supersecret information concerning the development of the American atomic bomb.”^^ In recognition of the VOLUNTEER group’s success, Fisher was awarded the Order of Red Banner in August 1949 69 ^ however, his illegal residency was disrupted by the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, for whom Lona Cohen had acted as courier. Both the Cohens were quickly withdrawn to Mexico, where they were sheltered for several months by the Soviet agents OREL (“Eagle”) and FISH — ^both members of the Spanish Communist Party in exile^^ — ^before moving on to Moscow. The Cohens were to resurface a few years later, under the names Peter and Helen Kroger, as members of a new illegal residency in Britain. Hall’s career as a Soviet spy was also interrupted. In March 1951 he was questioned by an FBI team which was convinced that he was guilty of espionage but lacked the evidence for a prosecution. Under his later alias “Rudolf Abel,” Fisher was to become one of the best-known of all Soviet illegals, whose career was publicized by the KGB as a prime example of the success and sophistication of its operations in the West during the Cold War. In reality, Fisher never came close to rivaling the achievements of his wartime predecessor, Iskhak Akhmerov. During eight years as illegal resident, he appears never to have identified, let alone recruited, a single promising potential agent to replace the VOLUNTEER network. Unlike Akhmerov, however, he did not have the active and enthusiastic assistance of a well-organized American Communist Party (CPUS A) to act as talent-spotters and assistants. Part of the reason for Fisher’s lack of success was the post-war decline and persecution of the CPUSA.^^ THE MOST IMPORTANT American agent recruited during the early Cold War, Aleksandr (“Sasha”) Grigoryevich Kopatzky, was a walk-in. Kopatzky had been bom in the city of Surozh in Bryansk Oblast in 1923,^^ and had served as a lieutenant in Soviet intelligence from August 1941 until he was wounded and captured by the Germans in December 1943. While in a German hospital he agreed to work for German intelligence. During the last two months of the war he served as an intelligence officer in General Andrei Vlasov’s anti-Soviet Russian Army of Liberation which fought the Red Army in alliance with the Wehrmacht. At the end of the war, Kopatzky was briefly imprisoned by the American authorities in the former concentration camp at Dachau.^^ Despite his service in the NKVD, Kopatzky’ s anti- Soviet credentials seemed so well established that he was invited to join the American-supervised German intelligence service established in 1946 at Pullach, near Munich, by General Reinhard Gehlen, the former Wehrmacht intelligence chief on the eastern front In 1948 Kopatzky further distanced himself from his Soviet past by marrying the daughter of a former SS officer, Eleonore Stimer, who had been briefly imprisoned for her activities in the Hitler Youth. Eleonore later recalled that her husband “drank a lot of vodka. He kissed ladies’ hands ... He was very punctual, shined his shoes, did his gymnastics in the morning, had a neat haircut, short hair all his life. And he was a very good shot. Sasha liked to hunt and talked of hunting tigers in Siberia with his father.” Many years later, after Sasha’s death, it suddenly occurred to Eleonore, while watching a televised adaptation of a John Le Carre novel, that her husband might have married her to improve his cover. That realization, she says, “came like a mountain of bricks on me.”^^ By their wedding day Kopatzky was probably already planning to renew contact with Soviet intelligence. The SVR still regards the Kopatzky case as extremely sensitive. It insisted as recently as 1997 that no file exists which suggests that Kopatzky, under any of his aliases, ever engaged in “collaboration ... with Soviet intelligence.”^^ Mitrokhin, however, was able to take detailed notes from the bulky file which the SVR claims does not exist. The file reveals that in 1949 Kopatzky visited the Soviet military mission in Baden-Baden, and was secretly transported to East Berlin where he agreed to become a Soviet agent.^^ Soon afterwards, he infiltrated the anti-Soviet emigre organization Union of the Struggle for Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (SBONR), based in Munich, which had close links with the CIA. In 1951, doubtless to his Soviet controllers’ delight, he was recruited by the CIA station in West Berlin as “principal agent. Successively codenamed ERWIN, HERBERT and RICHARD by the Centre, Kopatzky received a monthly salary of 500 marks in addition to his income from the CIA. Among his earliest successes was, on November 5, 1951, to get one of his fellow CIA agents, the Estonian Vladimir Kivi (wrongly described in Kopatzky’ s file as an “American intelligence chief’), drunk, transport him to East Berlin and hand him over to Soviet intelligence.^^ Though Kopatzky was not a CIA staff officer and never worked at Agency headquarters, he did enormous damage to Agency operations in Germany for more than a decade. According to his file, no fewer than twenty-three KGB legal operational officers and one illegal “met and worked with him” — a certain indication of how highly the Centre rated him.^^ THROUGHOUT THE COLD WAR, Soviet intelligence regarded the United States as its “main adversary.” In second place at the beginning of the Cold War was the United States ’s closest ally, the United Kingdom. In third position came France. Before the Second World War, France had been a major base for NKVD foreign operations. Her crushing defeat in June 1940, however, followed by the German occupation of northern France, the establishment of the collaborationist Vichy regime in the south (later also occupied by the Germans) and Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 drastically reduced the scope for Soviet penetration. The NKGB did, however, establish a strong presence within Communist sections of the French Resistance. There were two main groups of Soviet agents in wartime France: one in Paris of about fifty Communists and fellow travelers headed by LEMOINE (transliterated into the Cyrillic alphabet as LEMON YE), and another of over twenty- five headed by HENRI, based on Toulouse, with, from 1941, a subgroup in Paris. According to KGB records, the LEMOINE group, most of whom believed they were working for the Communist Party rather than the NKGB, “was disbanded because of treachery.” Though six members of the HENRI group (KLOD, LUCIEN, MORIS, ROBERT and ZHANETTA) were caught and shot by the Germans, the core of the group survived. At the end of the war Soviet intelligence had much greater freedom of action in France than in either the United States or Britain. The Parti Communiste Frangais (PCF) publicly congratulated itself on its undeniably heroic role in the wartime Resistance, proudly termed itself le parti des fusilles (“the party of the shot”), and greatly inflated the numbers of its fallen heroes. From August 1944, when General de Gaulle invited the PCF to join the Provisional Government, there were Communist ministers for the first time in French history. According to an opinion poll in May 1945, 57 percent of the population thought that the defeat of Germany was due principally to the Soviet Union (20 percent gave the most credit to the United States, 12 percent to Britain). In the elections of October 1945 the PCF, with 26 percent of the vote, emerged as the largest party in France. By the end of the year it had almost 800,000 members. Though support for the PCF had almost peaked, there were many who hoped — or feared, particularly after de Gaulle’s resignation early in 1946 — that France was on the road to becoming a Communist-controlled “people’s democracy.” One socialist minister privately complained, “How many senior civil servants, even at the very top, are backing Communism to win!”^^ The Centre’s first instructions to the newly re- established Paris residency after the Liberation, dated November 18, 1944, instructed it to profit from the “current favorable situation” to renew contact with the pre-war agent network and recruit new agents in the foreign and interior ministries, intelligence agencies and political parties and organizations. Inspired by the success of scientific and technological intelligence-gathering in Britain and the United States, the Centre sent further instructions on February 20, 1945, ordering the residency to extend its recruitment to the Pasteur and Curie Institutes and other leading research bodies. The appointment of the ardent Communist and Nobel Laureate Frederic Joliot-Curie as the French govemmenf s Director of Scientific Research doubtless delighted the Centre. Joliot-Curie assured Moscow that “French scientists ... will always be at your disposal without asking for any information in return. During 1945 the Paris residency sent 1,123 reports to Moscow, based on intelligence from seventy sources. Its operational problems derived not from any lack of agents but from a shortage of controllers. Up to February 1945 the residency had only three operational officers. In May MARCEL of the wartime HENRI group was instructed to set up a new group to assist in the penetration of the post-war foreign and domestic intelligence agencies, the foreign ministry and the political parties, and in re-establishing control over agents in the provinces.^ ^ By November the number of operational officers in the Paris residency had increased to seven, supported by six technical staff, but there was to be no further increase for several years. In addition to recruiting new agents, the residency was ordered to check individually every agent recruited before the war. Unsurprisingly, its 1945 reports were criticized for lack of depth and insufficient attention to the most valuable agents.^^ The next available statistics on the intelligence supplied by the Paris residency cover the period from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947, when it supplied 2,627 reports and documents, well over double the total for 1945. It also had some major recruiting successes. In 1944 WEST, recruited by HENRI from the Resistance in the previous year, joined the newly founded foreign intelligence agency the DGER (from January 1946 the Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre Espionnage (SDECE)), working first on the British, then the Italian, desk. His file records that he provided “valuable information on the French, Italian and British intelligence services.” Though WEST (later renamed RANGE) was dismissed in 1945 and moved to a career in publishing, he retained contact with some of his former colleagues. RATYEN, the first of his recruits to be identified in the files noted by Mitrokhin, was dismissed from SDECE in 1946. In 1947 WEST recruited two, more important SDECE officers, codenamed CHOU AN (or TORMA) and NOR (or NORMAN) .93 Soviet penetration was assisted by the chronic infighting within SDECE. In May 1946 Andre Dewavrin (alias “Passy”), de Gaulle’s wartime intelligence chief and the first head of SDECE, was arrested on a charge of embezzlement of which he was later found innocent. For the next few years Dewavrin’ s successor, Henri Ribiere, and his deputy, Pierre Fourcaud, were engaged in such bitter feuding that Fourcaud was forced to deny accusations that he had sabotaged the brakes of Ribiere ’s car and caused a near fatal accident. On one occasion, during the fractious daily meeting of SDECE division heads, Ribiere drove his deputy out of the room with his walking stick. As one SDECE officer complained, “[DJivision heads, finding themselves with conflicting orders from their director and his deputy, did not know what to do.”^^ In the year up to June 30, 1947, the Paris residency forwarded to the Centre 1,147 documents on the French intelligence services, 92 on French intelligence operations against the Soviet Union and 50 on other intelligence agencies. The files noted by Mitrokhin record that both CHOUAN and NOR worked on political intelligence (SDECE Section d’ etudes politiques). CHOUAN was employed for a time in the American department of SDECE, but by 1949 was working on Soviet Bloc affairs. NOR specialized in intelligence on Italy.^^ WEST was paid 30,000 francs a month by the Paris residency, and in 1957 was given 360,000 francs to buy a flat.^^ Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, the Paris resident from 1946 to 1948, was fond of boasting of his success in penetrating SDECE. In a lecture at the Centre in 1952 he sneeringly described French intelligence as “that prostitute I put in my pocket. Penetration of the Foreign Ministry at the Quai d’Orsay proved more difficult. During a visit to Moscow in June 1946, the Communist trade union leader Benoit Frachon reported pessimistically: The officials of the Foreign Ministry represent a very closed caste ... well known for their reactionary views. Our situation at the ministry is very precarious. We have only one Party member. This is the private secretary of [Georges] Bidault [the Foreign Minister], who knows that she is Communist — so we do not have total confidence in her. Among the diplomats in foreign postings, only the embassy secretary in Prague is Communist. The Communist embassy secretary was almost certainly r Etienne Manac’h, who went on to become French ambassador in Beijing (1969-75).^^^ Manac’h, codenamed TAKSIM, had first made contact with Soviet intelligence while stationed in Turkey in 1942. His KGB file describes him as a confidential contact rather than an agent, who provided information from time to time “on an ideological-political basis” until 1971. His information was clearly valued by the Centre. During his twenty-nine years’ contact with the KGB he had six case officers, the last of whom — M. S. Tsimbal — ^was head of the FCD Fifth Department, whose responsibilities included operations in France. The KGB’s most important Cold War agents in the Foreign Ministry were cipher personnel rather than diplomats. Ultimately the most valuable and longest- serving agent recruited by the Paris embassy at the end of the war was probably a 23 -year-old cipher officer in the Quai d’Orsay codenamed JOUR (transliterated into the Cyrillic alphabet as ZHUR). The large amount of Foreign Ministry documents and cipher materials provided by JOUR were despatched from Paris to Moscow in what his file describes as “a special container,” and enabled much of the cipher traffic between the Quai d’Orsay and French embassies abroad to be decrypted. In 1957 he was secretly awarded the Order of the Red Star. JOUR was still active a quarter of a century later, and in 1982 was awarded the Order of the Friendship of Peoples for his “long and fruitful co-operation. The dismissal of Communist ministers from the French government in May 1947 made further Soviet penetration of the official bureaucracy more difficult. The Centre complained in April 1948 that: the residency had no agents close to the leadership of the Gaullist Rass emblement du Peuple Frangais, the Christian Democrat MRP and other “reactionary” political parties; it had failed to penetrate the Soviet section of SDECE; intelligence on the British and American embassies was poor; and inadequate progress had been made in penetrating the Commissariat on Atomic Energy and other major targets for scientific and technological intelligence. A plan was drawn up to remedy these failings and to promote active measures “to compromise people hostile to the USSR and the French Communist Party.” Once again, Moscow was not fully satisfied with the results achieved. In the five-month period from September 1 to February 1, 1949, the Paris residency submitted 923 reports, of which 20 percent were judged sufficiently important to pass on to the Central Committee. The Centre noted, however, that “the requirement set by the leadership with regard to political intelligence had still not been adequately met.” During the eleven months from February 1 to December 31 the residency supplied 1,567 reports. Though 21 percent were passed to the Central Committee, the reports were criticized for failing to “reveal the innermost aspects of events” and for “not making it possible to identify the plans of ruling circles in their struggle with democratic [pro-Soviet] forces. The decline in the number of reports to the Centre during 1949 — about forty a month fewer than during the latter months of 1948 — ^was due chiefly to what the files describe as a “deterioration in the operational situation” at the beginning of the year, caused by heightened surveillance by the internal security service, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), and the Surete. On March 12, 1949 the Centre warned the Paris residency of the danger of continuing to meet agents on the street or in cafes and restaurants and advised it to make much greater use of dead letter-boxes, messages in invisible ink and radio communication. The residency was also instructed to train its agents to recognize and evade surveillance, and to instruct them on how to behave if questioned or arrested. A month later the residency reported to the Centre that, though it was impracticable to abandon completely street meetings with agents, security had been much improved. Case officers were now forbidden to go directly from the embassy or any other Soviet premises to meet an agent. Before each meeting the officer was picked up by a residency driver at a pre-arranged location and driven to the area of the rendezvous, after elaborate security checks designed to detect surveillance. Following the meeting the case officer would pass on any materials supplied by the agent to another residency officer in a “brush contacf’ as they walked past each other. Both times and places of meetings with agents were regularly changed, and more rendezvous were arranged in churches, theaters, exhibitions and locations outside Paris. As a further security precaution, the frequency of meetings with agents was also reduced. The six most valuable were seen twice a month, ten other agents were met once a month and another seven once every two months. Less important agents were either put on ice or contacted by pre-arranged signals only as the need arose. After a year operating the new security procedures, the Paris residency reported that operating conditions had improved. On April 22, 1950 it informed the Centre that it was in contact with almost fifty agents — twice as many as a year before. For most of the next decade the residency was to provide better intelligence than its counterparts in Britain and the United States. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONFUSION of Soviet foreign intelligence in the late 1940s was reflected in the running of its three most productive British agents. Remarkably, even Kim Philby had no regular controller during his term as head of station in Turkey from 1947 to 1949. Except during visits to London, he communicated with Soviet intelligence via Guy Burgess. Burgess’s behavior, however, was becoming increasingly erratic. To his controller, Yuri Modin, it seemed “that his nerve was going, and that he could no longer take the strain of his double life.”^^^ A trip by Burgess to Gibraltar and Tangier in the autumn of 1949 turned into what Goronwy Rees called a “wild odyssey of indiscretions”: among them failing to pay his hotel bills, publicly identifying British intelligence officers and dmnkenly singing in local bars, “Little boys are cheap today, cheaper than yesterday.” Burgess was surprised not to be sacked on his return to London. Once back in the Foreign Office, however, he resumed his career as a dedicated Soviet agent, supplying large quantities of classified papers. On December 7, 1949, for example, he handed Modin 168 documents, totaling 660 pages. KGB files also credit Burgess with using Anglo-American policy differences over the People’s Republic of China, established in October 1949, to cause friction in the “Special Relationship.”^ Donald Maclean was under even greater strain than Burgess. His posting to Cairo in October 1948 as counselor and head of chancery at the age of only thirty- five seemed to set him on a path which would lead him to the top of the diplomatic service, or a position close to it. But Maclean became deeply depressed at his insensitive handling by the Cairo residency. The documents he supplied were accepted without comment and no indication was given by the Centre of what was expected of him. In December 1949 Maclean attached to a bundle of classified diplomatic documents a note asking to be allowed to give up his work for Soviet intelligence. The Cairo residency gave so little thought to running Maclean that it forwarded his note unread to Moscow. Incredibly, the Centre also ignored it. Not till Maclean sent another appeal in April 1950, asking to be released from the intolerable strain of his double life, did he attract the Centre’s attention. It then read for the first time the letter he had sent four months earlier.^ While the Centre was deliberating, Maclean went berserk. One evening in May, while in a drunken rage, he and his drinking companion Philip Toynbee broke into the flat of two female members of the US embassy, ransacked their bedroom, ripped apart their underclothes, then moved on to destroy the bathroom. There, Toynbee later recalled, “Donald raises a large mirror above his head and crashes it into the bath, when to my amazement and delight, alas, the bath breaks in two while the mirror remains intact.” A few days later Maclean was sent back to London where the Foreign Office gave him the summer off and paid for treatment by a psychiatrist who diagnosed overwork, marital problems and repressed homosexuality. In the autumn, apparently back in control of himself, at least in office hours, he was made head of the American desk in the Foreign Office. The impact of Burgess’s and Maclean’s intelligence in Moscow was heightened by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Maclean’s deputy on the American desk, Robert Cecil, later concluded that the Kremlin must have found the documents provided by Maclean “of inestimable value in advising the Chinese and the North Koreans on strategy and negotiating positions.”^ In addition to supplying classified documents, Maclean and Burgess also put their own anti-American gloss on them and thus strengthened Soviet fears that the United States might escalate the Korean conflict into world war. For perhaps the first time in his diplomatic career, Maclean showed open sympathy in a Foreign Office minute with the crude Stalinist analysis of the inherently aggressive designs of American finance capital. There was, he said, “some point” to the argument that the American economy was now so geared to the military machine that all-out war might seem preferable to a recession produced by demobilization. ^ The Centre’s most prized British agent, however, remained Kim Philby, who, it was hoped, would one day rise to become Chief of the Secret Service. In the autumn of 1949 he was appointed SIS station commander in Washington. Philby was exultant. His new posting, he later wrote, brought him “right back into the middle of intelligence policy-making” and gave him “a close-up view of the American intelligence organizations.”^ Before his departure for the United States, Philby was “indoctrinated” into the VENONA secret. Though aware of the possibility that one of the decrypts might identify him as a Soviet agent, he was doubtless reassured to discover that VENONA provided comparatively little information on NKGB activities in Britain. The bulk of the Soviet intelligence decrypts concerned operations in the United States. In late September 1949, immediately after the successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Philby discovered during his VENONA briefing that the atom spy CHARLES in Los Alamos had been identified as Klaus Fuchs. The Centre promptly warned those of its American agents who had been in contact with Fuchs that they might have to escape through Mexico. It did not, however, succeed in warning Fuchs, who in April 1950 was sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment. On his arrival in Washington in October 1949, Philby quickly succeeded in gaining regular access to VENONA decrypts. That access became particularly important after the arrest and imprisonment in the following year of William Weisband, the American agent who had first revealed the VENONA secret to the Centre. Philby’ s liaison duties with the CIA allowed him to warn the Centre of American as well as British operations against the Soviet Bloc, even enabling him to provide the geographical coordinates of parachute drops by British and American agents. When writing his memoirs later, Philby was sometimes unable to resist gloating over the fate of the hundreds of agents he betrayed. Referring to those who parachuted into the arms of the MGB, he wrote with macabre irony, ‘T do not know what happened to the parties concerned. But I can make an informed guess. Philby’ s success in Washington was achieved despite, rather than because of, the assistance given him by the KI/MGB in Washington. The chaotic state of the Washington residency, which led to the recall of two successive residents in 1948-9/^^ made Philby refuse to have any contact with any legal Soviet intelligence officers in the United States. For almost a year Philby’s sole contact with the Centre was via messages sent to Burgess in London. In the summer of 1950 Philby received an unexpected letter from Burgess. “I have a shock for you,” Burgess began. “I have just been posted to Washington.” Philby later claimed in his memoirs that he had agreed to put Burgess up in his large neoclassical house at 4100 Nebraska Avenue during his tour of duty at the Washington embassy to try to keep him out of the spectacular “scrapes” for which he was now notorious. The “scrapes,” however, continued. In January 1951 Burgess burst in on a dinner party given by the Philby s and drew an insulting (and allegedly obscene) caricature of Libby Harvey, wife of a CIA officer. The Harveys stormed out, Aileen Philby retired to the kitchen and Kim sat with his head in his hands, repeatedly asking Burgess, “How could you? How could you?”^^^ Despite Burgess’s scrapes in the United States, he fulfilled an important role as courier between Philby and his newly appointed case officer, a Russian illegal codenamed HARRY (GARRI in Cyrillic transliteration), who had arrived in New York a few months before Burgess began his posting at the Washington embassy. HARRY had been bom Valeri Mikhaylovich Makayev in 1918. In May 1947 he had been sent to Warsaw to establish his legend as a US citizen who had lived for some years in Poland. As evidence of his bogus identity the Centre gave him an out-of-date US passport issued in 1930 to Ivan (“John”) Mikhailovich Kovalik, bom in Chicago to Ukrainian parents in 1917.^^^ The real Kovalik, whose identity Makayev assumed, had been taken to Poland as a child by his parents in 1930, later settling in the Soviet Union; he died in 1957 in Chelyabinskaya Oblast. After two years in Warsaw, Makayev was able to obtain a new US passport in the name of Kovalik with the help of a female clerk at the American embassy. The MGB discovered that in November 1948, without informing the embassy, the clerk had married a Polish citizen with whom she planned to return to the United States after her tour of duty. Anxious to keep her marriage secret, she was pressured by the MGB into swearing under oath that she was personally acquainted with Kovalik and his parents and could vouch for his good character. According to Makayev ’s file, his application for a new US passport was “processed in an expeditious manner and with significant deviations from the mles.” The cormpt embassy clerk received a reward of 750 dollars. On March 5, 1950 Makayev left Gdynia for the United States on board the ship Batory. ™ The Centre concluded that his cover, like Fisher’s, could best be preserved within New York’s cosmopolitan artistic community. Soon after his arrival, he began an affair with a Polish- bom ballerina, codenamed ALICE, who owned a ballet studio in Manhattan. Makayev’s gifts as a musician probably exceeded Fisher’s as a painter. After a brief period working as a furrier, he succeeded in obtaining a job teaching musical composition at New York University. The Centre had high hopes of Makayev. He was given 25,000 dollars to establish a new illegal American residency to mn parallel with Fisher’s. Two other Soviet illegals were selected to work under him: Reino Hayhanen (codenamed VIK), who had assumed a bogus Finnish identity, and Vitali Ivanovich Ly ampin (DIM or DIMA), who had an Austrian legend. Two dedicated communications channels were prepared for the new residency: a postal route between agents MAY in New York and GERY in London, and a courier route using ASKO, a Finnish seaman on a ship which traveled between Finland and New York. Makayev impressed the Centre by getting to know the family of the Republican senator for Vermont, Ralph E. Flanders. His main mission, however, was to act as controller of Moscow’s most important British agent, Kim Philby.^^^ Burgess’s first journey as a courier between Philby in Washington and Makayev in New York took place in November 1950.^^^ The main pretext for his journeys to New York was to visit his friend Alan Maclean (younger brother of Donald), private secretary to the British representative at the United Nations, Gladwyn Jebb.^^^ Once the liaison established by Burgess was working smoothly, Philby agreed to meet Makayev himself Burgess, however, continued to act as the usual method of communication between Philby and his case officer. His visits to Alan Maclean became so frequent that Jebb formed the mistaken impression that the two men “shared a flat.” Conversations with Alan doubtless also helped Burgess keep track of Donald Maclean’s unstable mental state. Some of the most important intelligence which Philby supplied to Makayev directly concerned Maclean. The VENONA decrypts to which he had access contained a number of references to an agent codenamed HOMER operating in Washington at the end of the war, but initially only vague clues to his identity. Philby quickly realized that HOMER was Maclean, but was informed by the Centre that “Maclean should stay in his post as long as possible” and that plans would be made to rescue him “before the net closed in.”^^^ The net did not begin to close until the winter of 1950-1. By the end of 1950 the list of suspects had narrowed to thirty-five. By the beginning of April 1951 it had shrunk to nine.^^^ A few days later a telegram decrypted by Meredith Gardner finally identified HOMER as Maclean. It revealed that in June 1944 HOMER’ s wife was expecting a baby and living with her mother in New York^^^ — information which fitted Melinda Maclean but not the wife of any other suspect. There still remained a breathing space of at least a few weeks in which to arrange Maclean’s escape. The search for the evidence necessary to convict him of espionage, complicated by the decision not to use VENONA in any prosecution, made necessary a period of surveillance by MI5 before any arrest. The plan to warn Maclean that he had been identified as a Soviet agent was worked out not by the Centre but by Philby and Burgess. In April 1951 Burgess was ordered home in disgrace after a series of escapades had aroused the collective wrath of the Virginia State Police, the State Department and the British ambassador. On the eve of Burgess’s departure from New York aboard the Queen Mary, he and Philby dined together in a Chinese restaurant where the piped music inhibited eavesdropping and agreed that Burgess would convey a warning to both Maclean and the London residency as soon as he reached Britain. Philby was even more concerned with his own survival than with Maclean’s. If Maclean cracked under interrogation, as seemed possible in view of his overwrought condition, Philby and the rest of the Five would also be at risk. Mitrokhin’s notes on the KGB file record: “STANLEY [Philby] demanded HOMER’ s immediate exfiltration to the USSR, so that he himself would not be compromised.”^^^ He also extracted an assurance from Burgess that he would not accompany Maclean to Moscow, for that too would compromise him. Immediately after his return to England on May 7, Burgess called on Blunt and asked him to deliver a message to Modin, whom Blunt knew as “Peter.” According to Modin, Blunt’s anxious appearance, even before he spoke, indicated that something was desperately wrong. “Peter,” he said, “there’s serious trouble. Guy Burgess has just arrived back in London. HOMER’ s about to be arrested ... Donald’s now in such a state that I’m convinced he’ll break down the moment they question him.” Two days later the Centre agreed to Maclean’ s exfiltration. Meanwhile Burgess had seen Maclean and was worried that, despite (or because of) his nervous exhaustion, he might refuse to defect. He reported to Modin and the London resident, Nikolai Rodin, that Maclean could not bring himself to leave his wife Melinda, who was expecting their third child in a few weeks’ time. When Rodin reported Maclean’s hesitations to Moscow, the Centre telegraphed, “HOMER must agree to defect.” Melinda Maclean, who had been aware that her husband was a Soviet spy ever since he had asked her to marry him, agreed that, for his own safety, he should leave for Moscow without delay. It was clear, however, that Maclean would need an escort. On May 17 the Centre instructed the London residency that Burgess was to accompany him to Moscow. Burgess initially refused to go, recalling his promise to Philby not to defect, and seemed to Modin “close to hysteria.” Rodin, however, seems to have persuaded Burgess to go by giving the impression that he would not need to accompany Maclean all the way, and would in any case be free to return to London. In reality, the Centre believed that Burgess had become a liability and was determined to get him to Moscow — by deception, if necessary — and keep him there. “As long as he agreed to go with Maclean,” wrote Modin later, “the rest mattered precious little. Cynically enough, the Centre had ... concluded that we had not one but two bumt-out agents on our hands. Though the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, had secretly authorized the interrogation of Maclean, no date had been decided for it to begin. The London residency, however, mistakenly believed that Maclean was to be arrested on Monday, May 28, and made plans for his exfiltration with Burgess during the previous weekend. It reported to the Centre that surveillance of Maclean by MI5 and Special Branch ceased at 8 p.m. each day and at weekends. (It may not have realized that there was no surveillance at all of Maclean at his home at Tatsfield on the Kent-Surrey border.) The residency also discovered that the pleasure boat Falaise made weekend round-trip cruises from Southampton, calling in at French ports, which did not require passports. Burgess was instructed to buy tickets for himself and Maclean under assumed names for the cruise leaving at midnight on Friday, May 25. That evening Burgess arrived at Tatsfield in a hired car, had dinner with the Macleans, then drove off with Donald to Southampton where they were just in time to board the Falaise before it set sail. The next morning they left the boat at St. Malo, made their way to Rennes and caught the train to Paris. From Paris they took another train to Switzerland, where they were issued false passports by the Soviet embassy in Berne. In Zurich they bought air tickets to Stockholm via Prague, but left the plane at Prague, where they were met by Soviet intelligence officers. By the time Melinda Maclean had reported that her husband had not returned home after the weekend, Burgess and Maclean were behind the Iron Curtain. Once in the Soviet Union, Burgess was told that he would not be allowed back to Britain but would receive an annual pension of 2,000 roubles. Modin later complained that his talents were wasted by the Centre: “He read a lot, walked and occasionally picked up another man for sex ... He might have been very useful to [the KGB]; but instead he did nothing because nothing was asked of him, and it was not in his nature to solicit work.”^^^ Maclean was rather better treated than Burgess. He settled in Kuibyshev, took Soviet citizenship under the name Mark Petrovich Fraser, was awarded an annual pension twice that of Burgess and taught for the next two years at the Kuibyshev Pedagogical Institute. In September 1953, in an operation codenamed SIRA, his wife and three children were exfiltrated from Britain to join him in Kuibyshev. THE CENTRE CONGRATULATED itself that the successful exfiltration of Burgess and Maclean had “raised the authority of the Soviet intelligence service in the eyes of Soviet agents.”^^^ That, however, was not Philby’s view. At a meeting on May 24, Makayev had found him “alarmed and concerned for his own security” and insistent that he would be put “in jeopardy” if Burgess as well as Maclean fled to Moscow. The first that Philby learned of Burgess’s defection with Maclean was during a briefing about five days later by the MI5 liaison officer in Washington. “My consternation [at the news],” wrote Philby later, “was no pretense.” Later that day he drove into the Virginia countryside and buried the photographic equipment with which he had copied documents for Soviet intelligence in a forest — an action he had mentally rehearsed many times since arriving in Washington two years earlier. Just when Philby most needed his controller’s assistance, however, Makayev let him down. The New York legal residency left a message and 2,000 dollars in a dead letter-box for HARRY to deliver to Philby. Makayev failed to find them and Philby never received them.^^^ An inquiry by the Centre into Makayev ’s conduct in New York, prompted by his failure to help Philby, was highly critical. It found him guilty of “lack of discipline,” “violations of the Centre’s orders” and “crude manners” — a defect blamed on his neglected childhood. Plans for Makayev to found a new illegal residency in the United States were canceled and he was transferred to Fisher’s residency so that he could receive expert supervision. His performance, however, failed to improve. While returning to New York from leave in Moscow, he lost a hollow imitation Swiss coin which contained secret operational instructions on microfilm. After a further inquiry at the Centre, Makayev was recalled and his career as an illegal terminated. Attempts to recover 9,000 dollars allotted to him in New York (2,000 dollars in bank accounts and 7,000 dollars in stocks) were unsuccessful and the whole sum had to be written off.^^^ The Centre calculated that since their recruitment in 1934-5, Philby, Burgess and Maclean had supplied more than 20,000 pages of “valuable” classified documents and agent reports. As Philby had feared, however, the defection of Burgess and Maclean did severe, though not quite terminal, damage to the careers in Soviet intelligence of the other members of the Magnificent Five. Immediately after the defection, Blunt went through Burgess’s flat, searching for and destroying incriminating documents. He failed, however, to notice a series of unsigned notes describing confidential discussions in Whitehall in 1939. In the course of a lengthy MI5 investigation. Sir John Colville, one of those mentioned in the notes, was able to identify the author as Caimcross. MI5 began surveillance of Caimcross and followed him to a hurriedly arranged meeting with his controller, Modin. Just in time, Modin noticed the surveillance and returned home without meeting Caimcross. At a subsequent interrogation by MI5, Caimcross admitted passing information to the Russians but denied being a spy. Shortly afterwards he received “a large sum of money” at a farewell meeting with Modin, resigned from the Treasury and went to live abroad. Immediately after the defection of Burgess and Maclean, the Centre instmcted Modin to press Blunt to follow them to Moscow. Unwilling to exchange the prestigious, congenial surroundings of the Courtauld Institute for the bleak socialist realism of Stalin’s Russia, Blunt refused. ‘T know perfectly well how your people live,” Blunt told his controller, “and I can assure you it would be very hard, almost unbearable, for me to do likewise.” Modin, by his own account, was left speechless. Blunt was rightly confident that MI5 would have no hard evidence against him. Soviet intelligence had few further dealings with him.^^^ As Philby had feared, the defection of his friend and former lodger, Burgess, placed him under immediate suspicion. The Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith, promptly informed SIS that he was no longer acceptable as its liaison officer in Washington. On his return to London, Philby was officially retired from SIS. In December 1951 he was summoned to a “judicial inquiry” at MI5 headquarters — in effect an informal trial, of which he later gave a misleading account in his memoirs. According to one of those present, “There was not a single officer who sat through the proceedings who came away not totally convinced of Philby’ s guilt.” Contrary to the impression Philby sought to create in Moscow after his defection twelve years later, many of his own former colleagues in SIS shared the opinion of MI5. But the “judicial inquiry” concluded that it would probably never be possible to find the evidence for a successful prosecution. Within SIS Philby retained the support of a loyal group of friends to whom he cleverly presented himself as the innocent victim of a McCarthyite witch-hunt. Soviet intelligence had no further contact with him until 1954.^^^ Philby seems never to have realized that Burgess’s sudden defection was the result not of his own loss of nerve but of a cynical deception by the Centre, and never forgave Burgess for putting him in jeopardy. By the time Philby himself finally defected to Moscow in 1963, Burgess was on his death bed. He asked his old friend to visit him at the KGB hospital in Pekhotnaya Street. Philby refused to go.^^^ His sense of grievance was increased by his own reception in Moscow. Philby had long believed that he was an officer in the Soviet foreign intelligence service and was shocked to discover that, as a foreign agent, he would never be awarded officer rank. Worse still, he was not fully trusted by the leadership either of the KGB or its First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate. Not until the sixtieth anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution, fourteen years after his arrival in Moscow, was the KGB’s most celebrated Western agent at last allowed to enter its headquarters. TEN THE MAIN ADVERSARY Part 1: North American Illegals in the 1950s One of the most remarkable public appearances ever made by a Soviet illegal took place on November 6, 1951, when “Teodoro B. Castro” attended the opening in Paris of the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly as an adviser to the Costa Rican delegation. Castro was, in reality, Iosif Romualdovich Grigulevich (variously codenamed MAKS, ARTUR and DAKS),^ a Lithuanian Jew whose main previous expertise had been in sabotage and assassination. He had trained saboteurs during the Spanish Civil War, taken a leading role in the operations to kill Trotsky in Mexico and had run a wartime illegal residency in Argentina which specialized in the sabotage of ships and cargoes bound for Germany.^ While in Argentina, Grigulevich had begun to develop an elaborate Latin American legend for use after the war.^ Late in 1949, Grigulevich and his wife, Laura Araujo Aguilar (a Mexican illegal agent codenamed LUIZA), set up an illegal residency in Rome. Posing as Teodoro Castro, the illegitimate son of a dead (and childless) Costa Rican notable, Grigulevich established a small import- export business to provide cover for his intelligence work. In the autumn of 1950 he made the acquaintance of a visiting delegation from Costa Rica which included the leading Costa Rican politician of his generation, Jose Figueres Ferrer, head of the founding junta of the Second Republic which had restored constitutional government and later President of the Republic in 1953-8 and 1970-4. Grigulevich ’s success in winning Figueres ’s confidence must have exceeded his wildest expectations. Hoodwinked by Grigulevich’ s fraudulent account of his illegitimate birth, Figueres told him they were distant relatives. Thereafter, according to Grigulevich’ s file, he became the friend and confidant of the future president, using the Centre’s money to invest with him in an Italian firm importing Costa Rican coffee.^ In October 1951, under his cover name Teodoro Castro, Grigulevich was appointed Costa Rica’s charge d’affaires in Rome. A month later he was chosen as an adviser to the Costa Rican delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly at its meeting in Paris. During the assembly he was introduced to the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden — ^but not, apparently, to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Vyshinsky.^ Vyshinsky’s usual oratorical style at international gatherings was tedious and longwinded. On this occasion, however, he arrived with a caged dove, intended to represent the innocent victims of imperialist aggression, then proceeded to speak with the brutal sarcasm for which he had been infamous as prosecutor during the show trials of the Great Terror. Referring to a speech by President Truman on arms limitation, Vyshinsky declared in the course of a lengthy diatribe, ‘T could hardly sleep all night last night having read that speech. I could not sleep because I kept laughing.”^ Among the other targets for Vyshinsky’s sarcasm was the Costa Rican delegation. One of the motions debated by the General Assembly was the call by the Greek delegation for the return to Greece of the children evacuated to the Soviet Bloc during the Greek civil war. At Acheson’s request, the Costa Rican delegation agreed to support the motion. Doubtless to his extreme embarrassment, Grigulevich was chosen to draft a speech in favor of it to be delivered by Jorge Martinez Moreno. He did his best to limit the offense to the Soviet delegation by somewhat vacuous rhetoric which emphasized “the anxiety and the interest with which [the Costa Rican] delegation had always considered any threat liable to endanger the peace of the world,” and congratulated the UN Special Committee on the Balkans “for its work of observation and conciliation, thanks to which ... although the Balkans remained a danger, at least world peace had been safeguarded.” The Soviet delegation was unimpressed. Probably unaware of Castro’s real identity, Vyshinsky condemned the speech as the ramblings of a diplomatic clown. ^ Vyshinsky’s denunciation, however, did nothing to damage Grigulevich’s diplomatic career. On May 14, 1952 he presented his letters of credence as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Rome to the Italian president, Luigi Einaudi. According to his file, Grigulevich was on good terms with the American ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, and his successor, Claire Boothe Luce, and successfully cultivated the Costa Rican nuncio to the Vatican, Prince Giulio Pacelli, a nephew of Pope Pius XII. Grigulevich had a total of fifteen audiences with the Pope. He also made friends with one of Italy’s leading post-war politicians, the Christian Democrat Alcide de Gasperi (Prime Minister, 1945-53), who gave him a camera inscribed “In token of our friendship.”^ Grigulevich’s astonishing transformation from Soviet saboteur and assassin into a popular and successful Latin American diplomat, combined with the initial success of “Willie” Fisher’s illegal residency in providing “supersecref ’ nuclear intelligence from the United States,^ seemed to vindicate the Centre’s early Cold War strategy of attempting to recreate the age of the Great Illegals. The role of the post-war illegals was considered to be potentially even more important than that of their illustrious predecessors. If the Cold War turned into hot war, as the Centre thought quite possible, Soviet embassies and the legal residencies they contained would have to be withdrawn from NATO countries, leaving the illegals to run wartime intelligence operations. DESPITE THE EARLY Cold War success of Grigulevich and Fisher, the mood in the Centre at the beginning of the 1950s was anything but triumphalist. As a result of the identification of Soviet spies in the VENONA decrypts, following the earlier revelations by Bentley, Chambers and Gouzenko, the Centre had to set about rebuilding almost its entire American agent network while operating under far closer FBI surveillance than ever before. It could no longer count on significant help from the Communist Party of the United States (CPUS A), which during the Second World War had assisted Soviet penetration of the Roosevelt administration, the intelligence community and the MANHATTAN project. In 1949 Gene Dennis, the CPUS A general secretary, and ten other party leaders were tried on charges of advocating the forcible overthrow of the federal government. Dennis and nine of the defendants were sentenced to five years in jail, the eleventh was jailed for three years, and all the defense attorneys were found in contempt of court. After the Supreme Court upheld the sentences in 1951, more than a hundred other leading Communists were convicted on similar charges. For most of the decade the Party was forced into a largely underground existence. The Centre was also greatly exercised by the unprecedented publicity given to Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. On January 24, 1950 Klaus Fuchs began confessing his wartime espionage at Los Alamos to his British interrogators. The next day, in New York, Alger Hiss was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for perjury in denying espionage charges before a Grand Jury. On February 2 Fuchs was formally charged in London, and the menace of Soviet atomic espionage burst on to the front pages of the American press. A week later the previously little-known Wisconsin senator, Joseph R. McCarthy, falsely claimed to have the names of 205 State Department Communists who were “shaping” American foreign policy. Despite his outrageous inventions and exaggerations, McCarthy rapidly won a mass following. He did so because he succeeded in striking a popular chord. To many Americans the idea of an “enemy within,” given plausibility by the convictions of Hiss and Fuchs (followed a year later by those of the Rosenbergs), helped to explain why the United States, despite its immense power, seemed unable to prevent the onward march of world Communism and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear superpower. As late as January 1954 opinion polls found 50 percent of Americans with a favorable opinion of McCarthy and only 29 percent opposed to him. President Truman’s claim in 1951 that “the greatest asset that the Kremlin has is Senator McCarthy” was, in the long run, to be proved right. McCarthy ultimately did more for the Soviet cause than any agent of influence the KGB ever had. His preposterous self-serving crusade against the “Red Menace” made liberal opinion around the world skeptical of the reality of Moscow’s secret intelligence offensive against the Main Adversary. Even Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executed one after the other in the same electric chair at New York’s Sing Sing Prison in 1953, were widely believed to have been framed. It took some years, however, for the Centre to grasp the enormous propaganda advantages of McCarthyism. At the time the Centre was chiefly concerned by the increased difficulties created by “spy mania” in the United States for its attempts to recruit and run new American agents. McCarthyism reinforced the Centre’s belief in the importance of expanding its illegal presence on the territory of the Main Adversary. While legal residencies based in official Soviet missions were inevitably subject to increasingly sophisticated FBI surveillance, illegal residencies could operate freely so long as they remained unidentified. Since his arrival in the United States in 1947 “Willie” Fisher (MARK) had attracted no suspicion whatsoever — despite the fact that his agent, Theodore Hall, was interrogated by the FBI in 1951 after his identity was disclosed by the VENONA decrypts. The Centre also took seriously the possibility that illegal residencies might have to take over all intelligence operations if war or other crises led to the expulsion of Soviet missions and legal residencies. The preparations for a major expansion of the illegal residencies were enormously detailed. In 1954 the Illegals Directorate drew up plans for a network of 130 “documentation agents” whose sole responsibility was to obtain birth certificates, passports and other documents to support the illegals’ legends. Operations officers specializing in illegal documentation were posted in twenty-two Western and Third World residencies, as well as in China and all Soviet Bloc KGB liaison missions. There were, however, more serious obstacles than the Centre was willing to acknowledge than the expansion of its illegal networks. The age of the Great Illegals — brilliant cosmopolitans such as Deutsch and Maly, able to inspire others with their own visionary faith in the future of the Soviet system — had gone, never to return. Turning Soviet citizens brought up in the authoritarian, intellectually blinkered command economy of Stalin’s Russia into people who could pass as Westerners and cope successfully with life in the United States was to prove a daunting, as well as time-consuming, business. Recruiting high-flying ideologically committed American agents was also vastly more difficult during the Cold War than during the 1930s or the Second World War. The Soviet Union had lost much of its appeal even to young radical intellectuals alienated by the materialism and injustices of American society. It was deeply ironic that when McCarthy’s self-serving campaign against the Red Menace was at its height, Soviet penetration of the American government was at its lowest ebb for almost thirty years. The Centre was further hampered by its own cumbersome bureaucracy, complicated during the final years of the Stalinist era by the rise and fall of the Committee of Information (KI) as the overseer of Soviet foreign intelligence.^^ In the course of the Cold War, the organization of the Illegals Directorate changed eight times, and the role assigned to it was modified on fourteen different occasions. Aleksandr Korotkov, the head of the directorate during the first decade of the Cold War, had no experience of life in the West and little understanding of the problems faced by illegals in the United States. Few of his grandiose plans for illegal operations against the Main Adversary were ever realized. Throughout the 1950s, the Centre struggled to establish even one more illegal residency in the United States to add to that of Fisher. The first attempt to found a second residency collapsed in ignominious failure, the recall in 1951 of Makayev (HARRY), the intended resident, and the disappearance of 9,000 dollars of KI funds. The next attempt was more cautious. Using a strategy which it was later to repeat, the Centre decided to send a potential illegal resident to Canada, wait until he was well established, and only then move him on to the more difficult terrain of the Main Adversary. The first Soviet illegal to use Canada as a staging post for the United States was the 30-year-old Yevgeni Vladimirovich Brik (codenamed HART), who landed in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in November 1951 with instructions to take up residence in Montreal. Brik had the great advantage of a bilingual education. From 1932 to 1937 he had been a pupil at the Anglo- American School in Moscow, subsequently spending several years in New York, where his father worked for Amtorg, the Soviet trade mission in the United States, before returning to serve in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. In 1948 Brik was instructed to cultivate Western pupils at his old school in order to test his suitability for intelligence work in North America. Having succeeded in that exercise to the Centre’s satisfaction, he began a two-year training course in 1949, covering ciphers, secret writing, use of short-wave radio, selection and use of dead letter-boxes, anti- surveillance precautions and methods of intelligence collection. Brik was also taught the trade of a watchmaker in order to enable him to start a small business in Canada. For his journey to Canada, Brik adopted the identity of a Canadian “live double,” Ivan Vasilyevich Gladysh (codenamed FRED), recruited in July 1951 specifically to provide cover for him. On instructions from the Centre, Gladysh crossed the Atlantic to Britain, then traveled through France and West Germany to Vienna, where he met Brik. In Vienna Gladysh briefed Brik on the details of his life in Canada and his journey to Europe, then gave him his Canadian passport. Brik pasted his own photograph in the passport in place of Gladysh’ s and set off across the Atlantic.^ ^ After landing at Halifax, Brik took a train to Montreal and went to the station lavatories. On one of the cubicle doors he saw the chalk mark he had been told to expect. He went inside, removed the top of the cistern and found taped to the underside the birth certificate and other documents belonging to another “live double,” David Semyonovich Soboloff.^^ Soboloff (codenamed SOKOL) had been bom in Toronto in 1919 but at the age of sixteen had emigrated with his family to the Soviet Union. In 1951 he was working as a teacher at the Magnitogorsk Mining and Metallurgical Institute. For the remainder of his time in Canada Brik became David Soboloff. In July he obtained a passport in his name.^^ Brik succeeded in persuading the Centre that there was no realistic possibility of establishing himself as a watchmaker in Montreal, and that he should open a oneman photographic studio instead. While in Montreal, he was instructed to begin making plans for emigration to the United States.^^ Brik, however, proved an even more disastrous choice than Makayev as the potential head of an illegal American residency. Without telling the Centre, in October 1953 he began a passionate affair with the wife of a Canadian soldier living in Kingston, Ontario. In order not to break contact with her, Brik persuaded the Centre that it would be premature for him to move to the United States. Before long he admitted to his lover that he was a Russian spy living under a false identity and tried to persuade her to leave her husband. She refused but begged him to go to the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and make a voluntary confession.^^ In November 1953 Brik gave in to his lover’s pleas and telephoned the RCMP headquarters in Ottawa. Terry Guernsey, the head of the diminutive B (Counter- intelligence) Branch of the RCMP Security Service, decided to run Brik (codenamed GIDEON by B Branch) as a double agent in order to uncover as much as possible about Soviet intelligence operations in Canada. GIDEON proved unusually difficult to run, particularly when his lover broke off their affair, and his drinking ran periodically out of control. On one occasion, after consuming more than a bottle of Old Tom gin, he rang the Montreal Gazette and, to the horror of the RCMP officer monitoring his telephone calls, said in a drunken slur, ‘T’m a Russian spy. Do you want a story?” Like the Ottawa Journal which had turned away Gouzenko in September 1945, the Gazette failed to realize it was being offered the spy story exclusive of the decade and dismissed the caller as a drunk.^^ Until the summer of 1955 it did not occur to the KGB that the illegal HART (Brik) might now be a double agent. Once it was satisfied that he had successfully established his bogus identity and cover profession in Montreal, the Centre proceeded to the next stage in his development as an illegal resident whose main role would be as an agent controller. Between 1951 and 1953 the Ottawa legal residency, spurred on by Moscow’s criticism of its inertia since the defection of Gouzenko, recruited eleven agents (all apparently fairly low-level) with the assistance of the Canadian Communist Party. Five were Communists and most supplied scientific and technological intelligence.^^ By transferring some of the agents to an illegal controller, the Centre hoped to overcome the problems created by the RCMP security service’s surveillance of the Ottawa embassy. By the time the KGB realized that Brik was under RCMP control, it had put him in touch with five agents. Three were male: LISTER, a Toronto Communist of Ukrainian origin bom in 1919; LIND, an Irish-Canadian Communist employee of the A. V. Roe aircraft company, also resident in Toronto; and POMOSHCHNIK, the Communist owner of a radio and television sales and service business in Ottawa.^^ The intelligence supplied by LIND included plans for the CF-105 Avro Arrow, then among the most advanced jet fighter aircraft in the world. Brik also knew the identities of EMMA and MARA, two female agents used as “live letterboxes” (LLBs) for communications with the Centre. EMMA, who had been recruited while studying at the Sorbonne in 1951, took the Canadian External Affairs Ministry entrance examination, but was unsuccessful. In 1954 she opened an arts and crafts shop in Quebec. MARA was a French fashion designer, bom in 1939, the co-owner of a furniture shop in Paris who was used as an LLB for KGB communications from Canada.^ ^ The Centre later concluded that Brik had betrayed all five of the agents with whom he had been put in contact. He was unaware, however, of the identity of Hugh Hambleton, ultimately the most important of the agents recmited by the Ottawa legal residency in the early 1950s. Hambleton had been bom in Ottawa in 1922 and had spent some of his childhood in France, where his father was a Canadian press correspondent. During the Second World War he served as an intelligence officer with the Free French in Algiers and, after the Liberation, in Paris, before becoming French liaison officer with the US army’s 103rd Division in Europe. In 1945 he transferred to the Canadian army and spent a year based in Strasbourg analyzing intelligence on occupied Germany, and interrogating prisoners-of-war. Unsurprisingly, the post-war years seemed dull by comparison. “To be important, to have people pay attention to you,” he once said, “that is what counts in life.”^^ The KGB gave him the recognition which he craved. Hambleton’s KGB file reveals for the first time that he emerged from the war as a committed Communist and was talent- spotted by the Centre’s “Canadian friends.” Harry Baker, one of the Canadian Communist leaders, picked him out at Party meetings and later vouched for his ideological reliability. Another Party member, codenamed SVYASHCHENIK (“Priest”), carried out background checks on him. In 1952 Hambleton was recruited as a Soviet agent by the Ottawa resident, Vladimir Trofimovich Burdin, and given the codename RIMEN (later changed to RADOV). Two years later Hambleton moved to Paris where he began postgraduate research in economics at the Sorbonne. In 1956 he gained a job in the economics directorate of NATO, whose headquarters were then on the outskirts of Paris. Over the next five years Hambleton handed over what his KGB file describes as “a huge quantity of documents,” most of which were assessed by the Centre as “valuable or extremely valuable in content.”^^ Though Brik was unaware of his existence, Hambleton was eventually betrayed twenty years later by another Soviet illegal. Early in 1955, probably as part of its preparations to transfer Brik to the United States, the Centre made plans to move another illegal resident, codenamed ZHANGO, to Canada. ZHANGO was a 49-year-old Russian, Mikhail Ivanovich Filonenko, who had been given the genuine birth certificate, and had assumed the identity, of Joseph Ivanovich Kulda. Bom on July 7, 1914 in Alliance, Ohio, Kulda had emigrated to Czechoslovakia with his parents in 1922. Filonenko ’s wife, Anna Fyodorovna (codenamed successively MARTA and YELENA), took the identity of Mariya Navotnaya, a Czech bom on October 10, 1920 in Manchuria. Anna was Czech on her father’s side; before marrying Filonenko she had spent two years in Czechoslovakia perfecting her grasp of the language and improving her legend. Posing as Czechoslovak refugees, the Filonenkos were initially unsuccessful in their applications for Canadian visas, but with the help of the UN Refugees Commission (later the UNHCR) gained entry to Brazil in 1954.^^ In 1955 the Centre made plans to move Filonenko on to join Brik in Canada, where he was to have the new codename HECTOR. Brik duly informed the RCMP of HECTOR’S planned arrival.^^ The KGB was saved in the nick of time from a major intelligence disaster, which, it believed, would have included the arrest and show trial of Filonenko, by a walk-in to the Ottawa residency. On July 21, 1955 a heavily indebted 39-year-old RCMP corporal, James Morrison, who for some years had taken part in surveillance of the Ottawa embassy, got in touch with Burdin’s successor as resident, Nikolai Pavlovich Ostrovsky (codenamed GOLUBEV), and reported that Brik had been “turned” eighteen months earlier. He was acting, he claimed, out of sympathy for the USSR and a desire to prevent a repetition of the Gouzenko affair which had done so much damage to Soviet-Canadian relations ten years earlier. Morrison’s request for 5,000 dollars, however, provides a better indication of his motives. Unknown to Ostrovsky, he had already been caught embezzling RCMP funds with which he hoped to pay off the debts caused by his taste for high living. Remarkably, instead of being sacked, Morrison was allowed to refund the money he had stolen. Ironically, he was to use money from the KGB to repay the RCMP.^^ The Centre initially suspected that the intelligence from Morrison (later code-named FRIEND) was an elaborate “provocation” by the RCMP, but decided to interrogate Brik in Moscow. Fortunately for the KGB, it had already been decided in June that Brik would travel to the Soviet Union for a holiday and reunite with his wife later in the summer. Though understandably nervous at the thought of returning to Moscow, he appears to have been confident of his ability to continue to outwit the KGB.^^ Before leaving Canada, Brik was briefed by Charles Sweeny of the RCMP and Leslie Mitchell, the SIS liaison officer in Washington, and asked to find out what he could about the fate of Burgess and Maclean, as well as to identify as many KGB officers as possible during his visit. They told him that if he needed assistance in Moscow it would be provided by the British SIS, since Canada had no foreign intelligence service. He was given details of one rendezvous point with an SIS officer, the location of two dead letter-boxes and signal sites to indicate when a DLB had been filled. If it became necessary to arrange an escape, SIS would leave in a DLB a short-wave radio, money, a pistol with silencer, false Soviet passports for himself and his wife, the internal travel documents needed to go to the town of Pechenga near the Soviet-Norwegian border and a map showing where to cross the frontier.^ ^ The Centre took great care not to arouse Brik’s suspicions before his departure. His first stop, arranged in June, was in Brazil, where he was due to meet Filonenko (HECTOR) on August 7. Filonenko was warned not to attend the meeting, but the prearranged rendezvous was kept under KGB observation. When Brik arrived on August 7, the KGB watchers reported that he had two companions, thus providing strong circumstantial evidence that he was now a double agent. Apparently undeterred by Filonenko ’s failure to meet him, Brik continued to Moscow via Paris and Helsinki. The residents in both capitals were ordered to give him a friendly welcome and discuss with him the travel arrangements for his return to Canada. A KGB strong-arm man was, however, sent to Finland in case Brik had any last-minute doubts about going to Moscow. If necessary, a Soviet agent in the Finnish police agreed to arrange for his expulsion to the Soviet Union.^^ On August 19, 1955 Brik arrived at Moscow airport and was immediately arrested. He at first denied that he was a double agent, but his file records that he subsequently broke under “pressure” and “told all.”^^ His confession confirmed everything reported to the Ottawa residency by James Morrison (FRIEND), who was then paid the 5,000 dollars he had asked for. Morrison volunteered for further payment what the Centre considered “valuable” information about the organization, personnel and operations of the RCMP and, in particular, its security service.^^ On September 4, 1956, at a closed session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, Brik was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The fact that he escaped the death penalty was presumably due to his cooperation in what his file describes as “an operational game.” Brik was not allowed to meet any member of the SIS station in the Moscow embassy, probably for fear that he would blurt out what had happened to him, but instructed to arrange a rendezvous which he did not keep. By keeping the rendezvous site under surveillance, the KGB was able to identify Daphne (later Baroness) Park, the member of the British embassy who turned up there, as an SIS officer. During the “operational game” Brik was allowed to live at home with his family in order to try to give SIS the impression that he was still at liberty. The KGB discovered, probably by bugging his apartment, that he tried unsuccessfully to persuade his wife to flee abroad.^^ Morrison continued for three years to work as a Soviet agent. Including the 5,000 dollars he received for betraying Brik, he was paid a total of 14,000 dollars by the KGB. The Centre, however, became increasingly dissatisfied with the quality of the information he supplied. In September 1955 Morrison was posted to Winnipeg as part of a unit investigating drug smuggling from the United States, and lost much of his previous access to RCMP intelligence. His last meeting with a Soviet controller took place on December 7, 1957. Morrison asked for help in paying off a debt of 4,800 dollars. The deputy resident in Ottawa, Rem Sergeevich Krasilnikov (ARTUR), however, paid him only 150 dollars and told him that he would need to arrange a transfer to Ottawa and get better access to RCMP intelligence if he wished to earn more money. Morrison failed to turn up to his next pre-arranged meeting with Krasilnikov and broke off further contact with the KGB. In 1958 the Ottawa residency discovered from press reports that Morrison had been dismissed from the RCMP and given a two-year suspended sentence for fraud.^^ Though Morrison’s warning in 1955 had helped to contain the damage done to KGB operations by Brik’s twenty-one months as a double agent, that damage was none the less considerable. The Centre was forced to abandon its plan for a second illegal residency in the United States based on Brik and Filonenko. In addition to betraying five KGB agents, Brik had also identified to the RCMP a number of KGB officers in the Ottawa legal residency, all of whom were withdrawn from Canada.^^ ANOTHER PLAN BY the Centre to establish a further illegal residency in the United States also collapsed in the mid-1950s. The intended illegal resident was Vladimir Vasilyevich Grinchenko (codenamed RON and KLOD), who had taken the identity of Jan Bechko, the son of a Slovak father and a Ukrainian mother. Since 1948 Grinchenko and his wife, Simona Isaakovna Krimker (codenamed MIRA), had been based in Buenos Aires, where in 1951 they had gained Argentinian citizenship. In 1954 the Centre planned to transfer them to the United States. At the last moment, however, it was discovered that the FBI had obtained Grinchenko ’s fingerprints while he was working as an agent on a Soviet ship visiting North America. Grinchenko was hurriedly redeployed to France, where, a few months later, his career as an illegal was ended by what his file describes as “a gross breach of security.” In August 1955 his Argentinian passport, French residence permit, student card and expense account were all stolen from his hotel room in Paris. So was the photograph of, and a letter in Russian from. another KGB illegal codenamed BORIS. Both Grinchenko and BORIS were hurriedly recalled to Moscow.^^ Though the Centre did not yet realize it, its one established American residency was by now also in trouble. Unlike Makayev (HARRY), Brik (HART) and Grinchenko (KLOD), “Willie” Fisher (MARK), the illegal resident in New York, was a paragon of both self- discipline and ideological dedication.^^ His chief assistant, Reino Hayhanen, however, was to prove even less reliable than Brik. Hayhanen had taken the identity of a “live double,” Eugene Nikolai Maki, who had been bom in the United States in 1919 to a Finnish- American father and a New York mother, and at the age of eight had emigrated with his parents to the Finnish- speaking Soviet Republic of Karelia. In 1938 Maki had been arrested on suspicion of espionage but had been released, given the codename DAVID and employed by the Interior Ministry to inform on the families of other Karelian victims of the Terror. In 1949 Maki surrendered his birth certificate to Hayhanen, who spent most of the next three years in Finland taking over Maki’s identity with the help of a Finnish Communist, Olavi Ahman, who had been recmited as a Soviet agent in 1939.^^ On October 20, 1952 Hayhanen, now codenamed VIK, arrived in New York on board the Queen Mary, and spent most of the next two years establishing his new identity, collecting his salary from dead letter-boxes in the Bronx and Manhattan and periodically drawing attention to himself by heavy drinking and violent quarrels with his Finnish wife Hannah.^ ^ The Centre, doubtless unaware of Hayhanen’s disorderly behavior, sent him congratulations on his “safe arrival” in a microfilm message hidden inside a hollowed-out nickel. Like Makayev a year or so earlier, Hayhanen mislaid the nickel, which in the summer of 1953 was used, possibly by Hayhanen himself, to buy a newspaper from a Brooklyn newsboy. The newsboy accidentally dropped the nickel in a stairway and was amazed to see it break in two and a minute microfilm drop out. He handed both the coin and the microfilm to the New York police, who passed them on to the FBI. Though it was some years before the number groups in the microfilm message could be decrypted, the fact that they had been typed on a Cyrillic typewriter helped to alert the Bureau to the presence in New York of a Soviet illegal. It is highly unlikely that VIK informed the Centre that the coin and microfilm were missing. In the summer of 1954 Hayhanen at last began work as Fisher’s assistant. One of his first tasks was to deliver a report from a Soviet agent in the United Nations secretariat in New York, a French economist codenamed ORIZO, to a dead letter-box for collection by the New York legal residency. ORIZO ’s report probably concerned two American nuclear physicists whom he had been instructed to cultivate. The report, however, never arrived. Doubtless alarmed at this breach of security, ORIZO asked to stop working for the KGB, but was ultimately persuaded to carry on.^^ Though disturbed by the weakness of Hayhanen’s tradecraft, Fisher failed to grasp that he was an alcoholic fraudster who posed a serious threat to the future of his residency. During a visit to Bear Mountain Park in the spring of 1955, Fisher and Hayhanen buried 5,000 dollars which Hayhanen was later supposed to deliver to the wife of Morton Sobell, a convicted Soviet spy and member of the Rosenberg spy ring, who had been sentenced to thirty years in jail. Hayhanen later reported, ‘T located Helen Sobell and gave her the money and told her to spend it carefully.” In fact, he kept the 5,000 dollars for himself. Early in 1956 the police were called to the home of the “Makis” home at Peekskill in Hudson Valley, where they found both Hayhanen and his wife drunk; Hayhanen had a deep knife wound in his leg, which he claimed was the result of an accident. Later that year he was found guilty of drunken driving and had his license suspended. In January 1957 Hayhanen was due to return to Moscow on leave. Initially, he could not bring himself to go, fabricating a series of stories to justify his delay. He first told Fisher that he was being tailed by three men, then claimed that the FBI had taken him off the Queen Mary, on which he had booked a passage. The unsuspecting Fisher told Hayhanen to leave the country as soon as possible to escape FBI surveillance and gave him 200 dollars for his travel expenses. On April 24 Hayhanen set sail aboard La Liberte for France. Arriving in Paris on May Day, he made contact with the KGB residency and was given another 200 dollars to complete his journey to Moscow. Four days later, instead of returning to Russia, he entered the American embassy in Paris, announced that he was a KGB officer and began to tell his story. Though the KGB did not discover the defection until August, it warned Fisher, probably in late May or early June, that Hayhanen had failed to arrive in Moscow, and instructed him as a precaution to leave the United States, using a new set of identity documents. Fisher disobeyed his orders and stayed. He was arrested early on the morning of June 21 while staying in a New York hotel on East 28th Street and flown to the Alien Detention Facility in McAllen, Texas, for questioning.^^ After a few days spent stonewalling his questioners Fisher finally admitted that he was a Russian who had been living under false identities in the United States, and gave as his real name that of a deceased friend and KGB colleague, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel. The Centre, Fisher knew, would realize what had happened as soon as it saw the name Abel on the front pages of the American newspapers.^^ FISHER’S ARREST MARKED a major strategic defeat for KGB operations against the Main Adversary. The Centre’s early Cold War strategy in the United States had been based on the creation of an illegal network which would run major agents such as Hall and Philby, and eventually penetrate the administration to approximately the level achieved during the Great Patriotic War. Fisher’s failure, however, appears to have left the KGB without a single illegal residency in the United States. Instead of adopting a more realistic strategy with far more limited aims, the Centre persisted with its plan to revive the era of the Great Illegals and blamed its initial failure on a series of operational errors. The Centre’s investigations of the cases of Makayev (HARRY), Brik (HART) and Hayhanen (VIK) all revealed flaws in the selection of the first generation of Cold War illegals. Hayhanen’ s file in the KGB archives contains many warning signs which should have been evident well before he was despatched to the United States in 1952. In both the Soviet Union and Finland he had a record for getting into debt and borrowing money, as well as for unusually complicated sexual liaisons. Though already married in the Soviet Union, Hayhanen entered into a bigamous marriage in Finland — ^without informing the Centre beforehand — with Hannah Kurikka, with whom he later lived in the United States. The report on Hayhanen prepared for the leadership of the KI in 1949, however, glossed over his character weaknesses and insisted that his operational failings would be rectified during training. Mitrokhin noted after reading Hayhanen’s file in the KGB archives: It was obvious that the KGB wanted to keep VIK in intelligence work no matter what, regardless of signs that he was in trouble, because they did not want to expose any of their operations, because the training of a replacement would be difficult and time- consuming, and because they regretted wasting so much time and money on VIK.^^ Hayhanen’s Russian wife was informed of his defection, divorced him and went back to her maiden name, Moiseyeva. In 1957 the chairman of the KGB received a letter from a woman named M. M. Gridina asking for news of Hayhanen, who, she said, was the father of her 12-year-old son. The KGB was less frank with Gridina than with Moiseyeva. She was told that the KGB had never employed Hayhanen and did not know his whereabouts, but had heard rumors that he had committed a serious crime against the Soviet state and was wanted by the police. Gridina replied that she would tell her son that his father had been killed fighting the Germans during the Great Patriotic War.^^ In fact, Hayhanen died in the United States in 1961. At the time it was alleged that he had been killed in a car accident on the Pennsylvania turnpike; in reality he seems to have died from cirrhosis of the liver.^^ On November 15, 1957 the 55-year-old “Rudolf Abel” was sentenced to thirty years in jail. His American lawyer, James Donovan, was struck by “Abel’s” “uncanny calm” as he listened to what was, in effect, a life sentence: “This cool professional’s self-control was just too much for me. ”64 “Abel’s” wife, Ilya, who had last seen her husband when he returned on leave to Moscow in the summer of 1955, made less attempt to disguise her feelings. She wrote bitterly to the Centre that it was not simply a question of waiting for twenty-five or thirty years but “I do not know if my husband will ever return.” For the past seven years she had worked as a harpist in a circus orchestra; however, when she criticized the KGB after her husband was jailed, she was made redundant on the pretext that the orchestra no longer needed a harpist. The Centre rejected Ilya “Abel’s” pleas for help in finding another job, but granted her a pension of 51 roubles a month. At Atlanta Penitentiary, in Georgia, where “Rudolf Abel” had been sent to serve his sentence, he became friends with two other convicted Soviet spies. He played chess with Morton Sobell, whose wife had failed to receive the 5,000 dollars embezzled by Hayhanen.^^ “Abel” also received a number of small favors from Kurt Ponger, an Austrian-bom American in the penitentiary’s dental section who had been sentenced in 1953 to a term of five to fifteen years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit espionage while serving in the US army in Austria. Ponger’s file in the KGB archives reveals that he had been a Soviet agent since 1936, but that after his arrest the Centre had wrongly concluded that he was a double agent whose arrest had been deliberately staged by the Americans in order to discredit the Soviet Union in Austrian public opinion. “Abel” had no doubt that Ponger was a genuine Soviet agent and later tried to persuade the KGB to give Ponger financial assistance after he was freed in September 1962.^^ “Abel” served only just over four years of his sentence. On February 10, 1962 he was exchanged on the Glienicker Bridge, which linked West Berlin with Potsdam, for the shot-down American U-2 pilot Gary Powers. The exchange was treated by the KGB as a major operation, codenamed LYUTENTSIA, coordinated by Vladimir Trofimovich Burdin, the former resident in Ottawa. An undercover KGB group was stationed in West Berlin to watch for signs of American military activity in the area of the bridge. On the bridge itself, hidden in the offices of the East German Customs Service, was a KGB armed operational group. Close at hand, but also out of view from the Western side of the bridge, was another armed group which had accompanied Powers from Potsdam for the exchange. At the Soviet checkpoint, a specially trained officer from the 105th Regiment was put in command of a detail of submachine gunners. The East Germans provided a reserve unit of twenty men armed with submachine guns and grenades. The Centre congratulated itself on the fact that its absurdly large, concealed military presence had gone almost unobserved. “Abel’s” lawyer was more impressed by the fact that the American guard who accompanied his client on to the bridge was “one of the largest men I have ever seen. He must have been six feet seven inches tall and weighed perhaps three hundred pounds.”^ ^ After the exchange of “Abel” for Powers, the Glienicker Bridge became famous during the Cold War as the “Bridge of Spies.” The KGB file on operation LYUTENTSIA records that its total nonmilitary cost (food, train tickets, hotel bills, various items for “Abel” and his wife and daughter, and a celebration dinner) came to 5,388 marks 90 pfennigs. Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader, did not share the Centre’s satisfaction at the success of the operation. He complained to the Soviet ambassador, Pervukhin, on February 15 that his government had not been adequately informed and that the failure to include East German police among Powers’s escort showed lack of respect for the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. Ulbricht followed his verbal protest with a diplomatic note citing other Soviet slights.^^ In the United States, “Abel’s” paintings and prints became collectors’ items. The Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, asked the Soviet embassy to find out whether “Abel” would be willing to give the US government a portrait of his brother, President Kennedy, which he had painted in Atlanta Penitentiary, and allow it to be hung in the White House. The Centre suspected a plot. The proposal to display “Abel’s” portrait in the White House was, it believed, a provocation, though it was not certain what exactly it was intended to provoke. Robert Kennedy’s request was turned down.^^ “Abel” received an unpublicized hero’s welcome on his return to Moscow, being received in turn by Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny, chairman of the KGB, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Sakharovsky, head of the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, and General Pyotr Ivashutin, head of the GRU.^^ At Semichastny’ s prompting, “Abel” wrote to Khrushchev to thank him personally for the supposed part he had taken in securing his release: “... I am especially touched by the fact that, amidst the great variety of your Party and governmental concerns, you found the time to think about me as well.” Though it suited the Centre, for the sake of its own reputation in the Party hierarchy, to portray “Abel’s” mission to the United States as an operational triumph by a dedicated Chekist, brought to a premature conclusion only by an act of treachery for which he bore no responsibility, it was well aware that in reality he had achieved nothing of real significance. He had been arrested in 1957 only because he had disobeyed instructions to leave the country after Hayhanen had failed to return to MoscowJ^ The Centre took advantage of the fact that “Abel” was portrayed in the American media as a master spy of heroic stature. That impression was strengthened by the sympathetic portrayal of him in Strangers on a Bridge, an account by his lawyer of his trial, imprisonment and exchange for Powers published in 1964. Donovan made clear that he “admired Rudolf as an individual,” and quoted Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961, as telling him, “I wish we had three or four just like him in Moscow right now ...” He ended his book by printing a letter “Abel” had sent him from Moscow, enclosing two rare, sixteenth-century, vellum-bound Latin editions of Commentaries on the Justinian Code. “Please accept them,” “Abel” wrote, “as a mark of my gratitude for all that you have done for me.”^^ All this was music to the Centre’s ears.^^ The myth of the master spy Rudolf Abel replaced the pedestrian reality of Fisher’s illegal residency. The inconvenient lack of heroic exploits to celebrate was glossed over by the assurance that, though there were many of them, they remained too secret to celebrate in public. The real “Willie” Fisher, however, became increasingly disillusioned. After his return to Moscow, he was given a chair in a comer of the FCD Illegals Directorate but was denied even a desk of his own. When a friend asked him what he did, he replied disconsolately, “I’m a museum exhibit.’ ELEVEN THE MAIN ADVERSARY Part 2: Walk-ins and Legal Residencies in the Early Cold War The KGB’s chief successes against the Main Adversary during the presidencies of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953- 61) and John F. Kennedy (1961-3) derived not from its grand strategy for new illegal residencies, which collapsed for several years after FISHER’ s arrest, but from a series of walk-ins. The most important was probably a CIA “principal agent” in West Berlin and Germany, Alexsandr (“Sasha”) Grigoryevich Kopatzky, alias “Koischwitz” (successively codenamed ERWIN, HERBERT and RICHARD), who had offered himself for recruitment by Soviet intelligence in 1949.^ Trained by the KGB in secret writing and microphotography, he was paid a total of 40,000 West German and 2,117 East German marks during the 1950s, as well as being rewarded for his success with several gold watches.^ Kopatzky was employed at one of the focal points of American intelligence operations. The CIA’s West Berlin station was situated only a few miles from the greatest concentration of Soviet forces anywhere in the world. One of Kopatzky ’s chief tasks was to find East German women willing to have sex with Soviet soldiers and act as CIA agents. By taking an active part in the station’s attempt to recruit Soviet personnel and encourage defections, he was able to find numerous opportunities to sabotage its operations. Among the wealth of intelligence which Kopatzky provided were the identities of more than a hundred American intelligence officers and agents in East Germany; some were arrested while others were turned into double agents. He also assisted a number of KGB operations to “dangle” bogus agents intended to deceive the CIA station. In 1952 he helped to organize the bogus defection of Soviet agent VIKTOR, who was later employed by the Voice of America radio station and supplied what Kopatzky’ s file terms “valuable information.”^ After Kopatzky was briefly imprisoned for drunken driving in 1954, his name was changed by the CIA to “Igor Orlov,” so that his criminal record would not appear on his application for US citizenship.^ In 1957, with his cover as a CIA (but not Soviet) agent largely blown in Berlin, Orlov was taken to Washington with his family and given further operational training by the Agency. He then returned to Europe to take part in various CIA operations in Germany and Austria.^ In I960 the CIA at last began to suspect that “Orlov” was working for the KGB. A later damage assessment at the Centre concluded that the extraordinary number of KGB officers who had been in direct contact with him — over twenty during the last decade — might have helped to place him under suspicion.^ In order to prevent Orlov defecting before the case against him had been established, the CIA promised him a new job with the Agency in Washington, sacked him on his arrival in January 1961 and began an intensive investigation.^ Orlov made contact with his new Soviet controller, I. P. Sevastyanov, an operations officer at the Washington residency, got a job as a truck driver and heard nothing for several years from either the CIA or the FBI. In 1964 he bought a picture-framing gallery in Alexandria, Virginia, paid for in part, no doubt, by his earnings from the KGB.^ By the time he opened his gallery, Orlov may well have felt confident that the case against him could never be proved. His confidence evaporated in the spring of 1965 when the FBI arrived on his doorstep, spent several days searching his home, questioned his wife Eleonore and summoned him to take a polygraph test. Orlov seems to have panicked. Under surveillance and unable to make covert contact with the KGB, he went into the Soviet embassy on 1 6th Street through a rear door, vainly hoping to enter unobserved.^ The Washington residency arranged with him an exfiltration plan which was agreed to by Moscow. Encouraged by “Abel’s” star rating as a master spy and his American lawyer’s affectionate memoir of him, the Centre intended to turn the exfiltration into a publicity stunt. It planned a press conference in Moscow at which Orlov would be presented as a Soviet illegal who had performed heroic deeds behind the German lines on the eastern front during the Second World War and later penetrated the CIA. Orlov would then publish his life story, which would be used as an “active measure” to glamorize the KGB and denigrate its Main Adversary. The plan, however, had to be called off. Orlov’s wife flatly refused to go to Moscow with their two young sons, so he decided to tough it out in Washington. Though the FBI kept the “Orlov” file open, they were never able to prove a case against him. Their investigation, like that of the CIA, however, was based on one false assumption. After his defection in December 1961, KGB Major Anatoli Golitsyn had provided some clues which helped to confirm suspicions about Orlov. Golitsyn correctly said that a Soviet spy whose real surname began with a K had been active in Berlin and West Germany, but wrongly said that his codename, rather than his real name, was SASHA. The CIA and FBI both wrongly concluded that Aleksandr (“Sasha”) Kopatzky, alias “Igor Orlov,” was agent SASHA. Orlov’s KGB file shows that he was at various stages of his career successively ERWIN, HERBERT and RICHARD, but never SASHA, and that he remained a Soviet agent until a few years before his death in 1982. After a press article in 1978 claimed that Orlov was a Soviet spy, the KGB broke off contact with RICHARD. In 1992, ten years after Orlov’s death, the Gallery Orlov, run by his widow, was still described by a Washington guide as “a hangout for espionage writers. West Berlin and West Germany, where Kopatzky (aka Orlov) had first offered his services to the KGB in 1949, were the KGB’s most successful recruiting grounds for disgruntled US military personnel. The most important was probably Robert Lee Johnson, codenamed GEORGE, a disaffected army sergeant and part-time pimp in West Berlin. In 1953 Johnson and his prostitute fiancee, Hedy, crossed into East Berlin and asked for political asylum. The KGB, however, persuaded Johnson to stay in the West, earn a second salary by spying for the Soviet Union and pay off his old scores against the US army. Despite his involvement in prostitution, alcohol abuse and gambling (not to mention espionage), Johnson succeeded in gaining employment as a guard from 1957 to 1959 at missile sites in California and Texas, where he purloined documents, photographs and, on one occasion, a sample of rocket fuel for the KGB.^^ Johnson’s most productive period as a Soviet agent began in 1961 when he was stationed as a guard in the US Armed Forces Courier Centre at Orly Airport, near Paris, one of the main nerve centers in the classified military communications system. Over the next two years he handed over 1,600 pages of top secret documents to his controller. Among them were ciphers and daily key-tables for the Adonis, KW-9 and HW-18 cipher machines; the operational plans of the US armed forces command in Europe; documents on the production of American nuclear weapons; lists and locations of targets in the Soviet Bloc; US intelligence reports on Soviet scientific research, aviation and missile development; and SIGINT evidence on the state of readiness of the East German Air Force. Collectively the documents provided an extraordinary and highly classified insight both into American forces in Europe and into what they knew about the forces of the Warsaw Pact.^^ Johnson was finally arrested in 1964 after a tip-off from the KGB defector Yuri Nosenko.^^ IN THE UNITED STATES itself the most remarkable KGB walk-ins during the Eisenhower presidency were two employees of the National Security [SIGINT] Agency, 31 -year-old Bemon F. Mitchell and 29-year-old William H. Martin. On September 6, 1960, in Moscow’s House of Journalists, Mitchell and Martin gave perhaps the most embarrassing press conference in the history of the American intelligence community. The greatest embarrassment was the public revelation that NS A had been decrypting the communications of some of the United States’ allies. Among them, said Martin, were “Italy, Turkey, France, Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic [Egypt and Syria], Indonesia, Uruguay — that’s enough to give a general picture, I guess.” Though the defection of the two NS A employees was a spectacular publicity coup, Mitchell’s KGB file reveals that it fell some way short of the Centre’s expectations.^^ Somewhat surprisingly, Mitchell had been recruited by NS A in 1957 despite admitting to six years of “sexual experimentations” up to the age of nineteen with dogs and chickens. His gifts as a mathematician were presumably thought more important than his farmyard experiences. During Martin’s positive vetting, acquaintances variously described him as irresponsible and an insufferable egotist but — like his friend Mitchell — a gifted mathematician. Politically naive and socially inadequate, Mitchell and Martin were seduced by the Soviet propaganda image of the USSR as a state committed to the cause of peace whose progressive social system could offer them the personal fulfillment they had failed to find in the United States.^ ^ In December 1959, Mitchell flew from Washington to Mexico City, in defiance of NS A regulations, entered the Soviet embassy and asked for political asylum in the USSR, giving ideological reasons as the motive for his action.^^ The KGB residency made strenuous attempts to persuade him to stay on inside NS A as a defector- in- place, but without success. Mitchell agreed to a secret meeting with another KGB officer in Washington but maintained his insistence on emigrating to the Soviet Union with Martin. Once there, however, he promised to reveal all he knew about NS A. On June 25, 1960, at the beginning of three weeks’ summer leave, Mitchell and Martin boarded Eastern Airlines flight 307 at Washington National Airport, bound for New Orleans. There, after a brief stopover, they took another flight for Mexico City, stayed the night at the Hotel Virreyes, then caught a Cubana Airlines plane to Havana.^^ In July they were exfiltrated from Cuba to the Soviet Union. KGB codebreakers were disappointed in the amount of detailed knowledge of NS A cryptanalysis possessed by Mitchell and Martin. Their most important intelligence, in the Centre’s view, was the reassurance they were able to provide on NSA’s lack of success in breaking current high-grade Soviet ciphers.^^ However, the KGB similarly remained unable to decrypt high-grade US cipher sy stems. Security was so lax at NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters that no attempt was made to track Mitchell and Martin down until eight days after they had been due to return from their three- week vacation. Inside Mitchell’s house NS A security officers found the key to a safe deposit box, which Mitchell had deliberately left for them to find. Inside the box in a nearby bank they found a sealed envelope bearing a request, signed by both Mitchell and Martin, that its contents be made public. The envelope contained a lengthy denunciation of the US government and the evils of capitalism and a bizarre eulogy of life in the Soviet Union, including the claim that its emancipated women were “more desirable as mates. By decision no. 295 of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, dated August 11, 1960, Mitchell and Martin were given political asylum and monthly allowances of 500 roubles each — about the same as their NS A salaries and well above Soviet salary scales. In the autumn Mitchell was given a job in the Institute of Mathematics at Leningrad University; Martin began doctoral research at the same institute. Both defectors quickly put their beliefs about the desirability of Soviet mates to the test. Mitchell married Galina Vladimirovna Yakovleva, a 30-year-old assistant professor in the piano music department of the Leningrad Conservatory. Martin, who changed his name to Sokolovsky, married a Russian woman whom he met on holiday on the Black Sea.^^ Within a few years the Centre found both Mitchell and Martin considerably more trouble than they were worth. Predictably, both defectors rapidly became disillusioned with life in the Soviet Union. Martin, whom the Centre regarded as the more impressionable of the two, was gullible enough to believe a tale concocted by the KGB that they had both been sentenced in absentia to twenty years’ hard labor by a closed session of the US Supreme Court. He was eventually shown a bogus copy of the judgment in order to persuade him to put all thought of returning home out of his mind. Mitchell was more skeptical and by the 1970s appeared determined to leave. As chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov gave personal instructions that under no circumstances was either Mitchell or Martin to be allowed to go, for fear of deterring other potential defectors from the West. In a further attempt to deter Martin he was shown an article by Yuri Semyonov in Izvestia claiming that American agents had been found in possession of poison ampoules, and was led to believe that these were intended for Mitchell and himself. Mitchell correctly suspected that the story had been fabricated by the KGB. Galina Mitchell was also anxious to leave, but the KGB put pressure on her mother to persuade Galina to change her mind. After their applications for visas had been rebuffed by Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as the United States, the Mitchells told the Soviet authorities on March 29, 1980 that they had given up their attempts to emigrate.^^ But there were persistent reports afterwards that Mitchell was still trying to leave. FOR MOST OF the Cold War, the Washington and New York legal residencies had little success in providing the intelligence from inside the federal government which had been so plentiful during the Second World War. Their limitations were clearly exposed during the two years before the most dangerous moment of the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The vacuum left by the lack of KGB high-grade political intelligence from the United States was partly filled by dangerous nonsense from elsewhere, some of which reflected the paranoid strain in Soviet analysis. On June 29, 1960 the KGB chairman, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin, personally delivered to Khrushchev an alarmist assessment of American policy, based on a misinformed report from an unidentified NATO liaison officer with the CIA: In the CIA it is known that the leadership of the Pentagon is convinced of the need to initiate a war with the Soviet Union “as soon as possible” ... Right now the USA has the capability to wipe out Soviet missile bases and other military targets with its bomber forces. But over the next little while the defense forces of the Soviet Union will grow ... and the opportunity will disappear ... As a result of these assumptions, the chiefs at the Pentagon are hoping to launch a preventive war against the Soviet Union. Khrushchev took the warning seriously. Less than a fortnight later he issued a public warning to the Pentagon “not to forget that, as shown at the latest tests, we have rockets which can land in a pre-set square target 13,000 kilometers away.”^^ Moscow followed the presidential elections of 1960 with close attention. Khrushchev regarded the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, as a McCarthyite friend of the Pentagon hawks, and was anxious that Kennedy should win. The Washington resident, Aleksandr Semyonovich Feklisov (alias “Fomin”), was ordered to “propose diplomatic or propaganda initiatives, or any other measures, to facilitate Kennedy’s victory.” The residency tried to make contact with Robert Kennedy but was politely rebuffed. Khrushchev’s view of Kennedy changed after the CIA’s abortive and absurdly inept attempt to topple Fidel Castro by landing an American-backed “Cuban brigade” at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. In the immediate aftermath of the Cuban debacle, Kennedy despairingly asked his special counsel, Theodore Sorensen, “How could I have been so stupid?”^^ The young president, Khrushchev concluded, was unable to control the “dark forces” of American capitalism’s military-industrial complex. At a summit meeting with Kennedy at Vienna in June, Khrushchev belligerently demanded an end to the three-power status of Berlin and a German peace treaty by the end of the year. The two superpowers seemed set on a collision course. Kennedy said afterwards to the journalist James Reston: I think [Khrushchev] did it because of the Bay of Pigs. I think he thought anyone who was so young and inexperienced as to get in that mess could be taken, and anyone who got into it and didn’t see it through had no guts. So he just beat the hell out of 35 me.^-^ On July 29, 1961 Shelepin sent Khrushchev the outline of a new and aggressive global grand strategy against the Main Adversary designed to “create circumstances in different areas of the world which would assist in diverting the attention and forces of the United States and its allies, and would tie them down during the settlement of the question of a German peace treaty and West Berlin’s proposal.” The first part of the plan was to use national liberation movements around the world to secure an advantage in the East- West struggle and to “activate by the means available to the KGB armed uprisings against pro- Western reactionary governments.” At the top of the list for demolition Shelepin placed “reactionary” regimes in the Main Adversary’s own backyard in Central America, beginning in Nicaragua where he proposed coordinating a “revolutionary front” in collaboration with the Cubans and the Sandinistas. Shelepin also proposed destabilizing NATO bases in western Europe and a disinformation campaign designed to demoralize the West by persuading it of the growing superiority of Soviet forces. On August 1, with only minor amendments, Shelepin’s masterplan was approved as a Central Committee directive.^^ Elements of it, especially the use of national liberation movements in the struggle with the Main Adversary, continued to reappear in Soviet strategy for the next quarter of a century. During the Kennedy administration, however, the role of the KGB in Washington was less important than that of the GRU. In May 1961 GRU Colonel Georgi Bolshakov, operating under cover as head of the Washington bureau of the Tass news agency, began fortnightly meetings with the Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy. Bolshakov succeeded in persuading Robert Kennedy that, between them, they could short-circuit the ponderous protocol of official diplomacy, “speak straightly and frankly without resorting to the politickers’ stock-in-trade propaganda stunts” and set up a direct channel of communication between President Kennedy and First Secretary Khrushchev. Forgetting that he was dealing with an experienced intelligence professional who had been instructed to cultivate him, the President’s brother became convinced that “an authentic friendship grew” between him and Bolshakov: Any time that he had some message to give to the President (or Khrushchev had) or when the President had some message to give to Khrushchev, we went through Georgi Bolshakov ... I met with him about all kinds of things. Despite Bolshakov’s success, GRU intelligence assessment of American policy was abysmal. In March 1962 it produced two dangerously misinformed reports which served to reinforce the KGB’s earlier warning that the Pentagon was planning a nuclear first strike. The GRU claimed that in the previous June the United States had made the decision to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union in September 1961, but had been deterred at the last moment by Soviet nuclear tests which showed that the USSR’s nuclear arsenal was more powerful than the Pentagon had realized. The woefully inaccurate Soviet intelligence reports of Washington’s plans for thermonuclear warfare coincided with a series of real but farcically inept American attempts to topple or assassinate Moscow’s Cuban ally, Fidel Castro — actions ideally calculated to exacerbate the paranoid strain in Soviet foreign policy. In March 1962 Castro urged the KGB to set up an operations base in Havana to export revolution across Latin America. Then, in May, Khrushchev decided to construct nuclear missile bases in Cuba — the most dangerous gamble of the Cold War. He was partly motivated by his desire to impress Washington with Soviet nuclear might and so deter it from further (non- existent) plans for a first strike. At the same time he intended to make a dramatic gesture of support for the Cuban revolution. The Soviet gamble was taken in the belief that Washington would not detect the presence of the Cuban missile sites until it was too late to do anything about them. That belief was mistaken for two reasons. First, high-altitude U-2 spy planes were able to photograph the construction of the missile bases. Secondly, American intelligence analysts were able to make sense of the confusing U-2 photographs because they possessed plans of missile site construction and other important intelligence secretly supplied by Colonel Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, a spy in the GRU run jointly by the British SIS and the CIA. All the main American intelligence reports on the Cuban bases during the missile crisis were later stamped IRONBARK, a codeword indicating that they had made use of Penkovsky’ s documents. As the construction of nuclear missile bases in Cuba began, Bolshakov continued to provide reassurance, probably as part of a deliberate deception strategy, that Khrushchev would never countenance such an aggressive policy. When U-2 spy planes revealed the existence of the bases in mid-October, while they were still in the course of construction, thus beginning the Cuban missile crisis, Robert Kennedy turned on Bolshakov. ‘T bet you know for certain that you have your missiles in Cuba,” he remonstrated. Bolshakov denied it. According to Sorensen, “President Kennedy had come to rely on the Bolshakov channel for direct private information from Khrushchev, and he felt personally deceived. He was personally deceived. At the moment in the Cold War when the Kremlin most urgently needed good intelligence from Washington, the KGB residency was unable to provide it. During the Second World War Soviet agents had penetrated every major branch of the Roosevelt administration. The Centre had been better informed on some important aspects of American policy (notably the MANHATTAN project) than Roosevelt’s vice-presidents or most members of his cabinets. During the Cuban missile crisis, by contrast, the Washington residency’s sources were limited to agents and contacts in the press corps and foreign embassies (especially those of Argentina and Nicaragua). Some of the intelligence which Feklisov, the resident, sent to Moscow was simply gossip. He had no source capable of penetrating the secret deliberations of EXCOMM, Kennedy’s closest advisers who assembled in the cabinet room on October 16 and met in daily session for the next thirteen days until the crisis was resolved. Aleksandr Sakharovsky, the head of the FCD, wrote dismissively on several of Feklisov’ s telegrams at the height of the missile crisis, “This report does not contain any secret information.”^^ The relative lack of influence of the KGB on Khrushchev’s policy during the crisis also reflected the limitations of its chairman. In December 1961 the influential Aleksandr Shelepin had been succeeded as chairman by his less able protege, Vladimir Semichastny, who knew so little about intelligence and was so unattracted by the post offered to him that he accepted it only under pressure from Khrushchev. Khrushchev made clear that his main reason for appointing Semichastny was to ensure the political loyalty of the KGB rather than to benefit from his advice on foreign policy. There is no sign in any of the files noted by Mitrokhin that Semichastny ever followed Shelepin ’s example of submitting to Khrushchev ambitious grand strategies for combating the Main Adversary. During the missile crisis Semichastny had not a single meeting with Khrushchev and was never invited to attend meetings of the Presidium (an enlarged Politburo which for the previous decade had been the main policy-making body). Nor did Khrushchev ever ask for, or receive from, the KGB any assessment of the likely American response to the placing of nuclear missile bases in Cuba.^^ As foreign intelligence chief, Sakharovsky seems to have had little insight into American policy-making. Though apparently a competent bureaucrat in the Soviet mold, his first-hand experience of the outside world was limited to Romania and other parts of eastern Europe. His melancholy expression was probably, as one of his subordinates has written, “due to the enormous pressures of the job.”^^ Among the pressures was the need to conform to the highest standards of political correctness. The FCD rarely submitted assessments save at the specific request of the Foreign Ministry, the International Department of the Central Committee or the Presidium. Most of what it termed its “analyses” were, in reality, little more than digests of information on particular topics which generally avoided arriving at conclusions for fear that these might conflict with the opinions of higher authority. The supreme authority during the missile crisis was Khrushchev himself rather than the Presidium. To a remarkable degree he both determined Soviet policy and, like Stalin before him, acted as his own chief intelligence analyst.^^ Intelligence did, however, have some influence on Khrushchev’s policy during the final stages of the crisis. On October 25 he indicated to the Presidium that, in order to resolve the crisis, it might ultimately be necessary to dismantle the missile bases in return for a US guarantee not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev, however, was not yet ready to make such a proposal. He changed his mind during the night of October 25-6 after a GRU report that US Strategic Air Command had been placed on nuclear alert. Hitherto he had hoped to save face by obtaining the removal of US missile bases in Turkey in return for stopping the construction of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. On the morning of October 26, however, wrongly fearing that an American invasion of Cuba might be imminent, he dictated a rambling and emotional plea for peace to Kennedy which asked for a US guarantee of Cuban territorial integrity but made no mention of the Turkish missile bases. Within twenty-four hours, Khrushchev had changed his mind. On October 27, having concluded that an American invasion was not imminent after all, he sent another letter insisting that the Turkish bases must be part of the deal.^^ Shortly after Khrushchev had sent his second letter, Soviet air defense in Cuba, apparently as a result of a failure in the chain of command, shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Cuba, killing the pilot. Khrushchev panicked. Reports that Kennedy was to make a speech on national television at noon on October 28 wrongly persuaded him that the President might be about to announce an invasion of Cuba. Khrushchev gave in and accepted Kennedy’s terms: a unilateral withdrawal of “all Soviet offensive arms” from Cuba. To make sure his message reached Kennedy in time, he ordered it to be broadcast over Radio Moscow.^^ THE HUMILIATION OF the Soviet climbdown at the end of the missile crisis, which led two years later to Khrushchev’s overthrow in a Kremlin palace coup, was strengthened in the Centre by the discovery of a series of penetrations by, and defections to, the CIA. In December 1961 a KGB officer. Major Anatoli Mikhailovich Golitsyn, walked into the American embassy in Helsinki and was exfiltrated to the United States. In September 1962 the KGB arrested GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who for the past eighteen months had been providing high-grade intelligence to the British and Americans. The damage report on Golitsyn produced the usual stereotyped denunciation of his motives. Since it was impossible to criticize either the KGB or the Soviet system, it followed that the basic cause of all defections was the moral failings of the defectors themselves — in particular, “the virus of careerism” unscrupulously exploited by Western intelligence services: The treason of Golitsyn, an ambitious and vain man, provides a typical example of a person representing the tribe of careerists. In the mid-1950s he reacted painfully to a demotion in his position: he could not tolerate having his mistakes and blunders pointed out and commented on. Emphasizing his exceptional qualities, he said that only bad luck had prevented him from becoming a highly successful senior officer during the Stalin period. [Late in 1961] Golitsyn made persistent attempts to learn the contents of the evaluation written on him for Moscow, which was negative. The [Helsinki] Residency believes that he succeeded in learning its essence and, knowing from the experience of others that he could expect a serious talk in the personnel department and a demotion in rank, he defected to the United States. Like all defectors, Golitsyn was given an insulting codename — in his case, GOR-BATY (“Hunchback”).^ ^ Measures taken to discredit him included the arrest of a Soviet smuggler (codenamed MUSTAFA), who was persuaded to implicate Golitsyn in contraband operations across the Finnish border. An article in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya on September 27, 1962 condemned Golitsyn’s (fictitious) involvement with smugglers. Despite the Centre’s attempt to belittle Golitsyn, the damage assessment after his defection concluded that he had been able to betray a wide range of intelligence to the CIA on the operations of most of the “Lines” (departments) at the Helsinki and other residencies, as well as KGB methods of recruiting and running agents. Between January 4 and February 16, 1962 the Centre sent instructions to fifty-four residents on the action required to limit the damage to current operations. For the time being, all meetings with important agents were to be suspended and contact limited to “impersonal means” such as dead letter-boxes.^^ As well as providing important intelligence on KGB methods and leads to a number of Soviet agents, however, Golitsyn also confused the CIA with a series of increasingly extravagant conspiracy theories. He persuaded the head of the CIA counter-intelligence staff, James Angleton, that the KGB was engaged in a gigantic global deception, and that even the Sino- Soviet split was a charade to deceive the West. Golitsyn was later to maintain that the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia was also a KGB description.^^ It did not occur to the Centre that Golitsyn’s defection, by infecting a small but troublesome minority of CIA officers with his own paranoid tendencies, would ultimately do the Agency more harm than good. In November 1963 Aleksandr Nikolayevich Cherepanov of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (internal security and counter-intelligence), sent the American embassy in Moscow a packet of highly classified papers dealing with the surveillance and entrapment of diplomats and other foreigners in Russia, together with a note offering his services to the CIA. In the ambassador’s absence, the deputy head of mission feared that the documents were part of a KGB provocation. Though the head of the CIA station was allowed to photograph the documents, the originals, despite his protests, were returned to the Russians. Cherepanov fled from Moscow but was arrested by KGB border guards on the frontier with Turkestan on December 17, 1963. He admitted during interrogation that the operational secrets he had revealed to the Americans included the use of “spy dust” (metka), special chemicals applied to suspects’ shoes to facilitate tracking. Cherepanov was sentenced to death at a secret trial in April 1964. The Centre’s damage assessment of the case concluded: It is not possible to determine why the Americans betrayed Cherepanov. Either they suspected that his action was a KGB provocation or they wanted to burden the KGB with a lengthy search for the person who had sent the package to the embassy. Though the CIA was not responsible for Cherepanov’s betrayal, it was shortly to make another, even more serious error. In February 1964 Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a KGB officer serving on the Soviet disarmament delegation in Geneva, who had begun working for the Agency in June 1962, defected to the United States. Nosenko ’s CIA debriefers, however, wrongly concluded that he was a KGB plant. Unaware of the CIA’s horrendous misjudgement, the Centre regarded Nosenko ’s defection as a serious setback. Its damage assessment began with the usual character assassination, claiming that Nosenko (henceforth codenamed IDOL), had been infected — like Golitsyn — with the “virus of careerism:” Nosenko, who lusted for power, did not hide his ambitions and obtained a high position. The leadership of Department 1 at Headquarters will not forget Nosenko’s hysterical reaction when he was informed of their plans to promote him from deputy chief to chief of section [otdeleniye]. “The chief of the directorate has promised that I will replace the head of the department [otdeiy he shouted shamelessly. The characteristics of careerism were evident in many curious facets of his life. When he became the deputy chief of another department, Nosenko was ashamed of his rank [KGB captain], which was below that normally associated with his position. He would return unsigned any documents with “Captain” on them, and would only sign documents on which his perceptive subordinates had not indicated his rank.^^ Throughout the Cold War, the KGB had much greater success in collecting scientific and technological intelligence (S&T) on the Main Adversary than penetrating the federal government. In 1963 the S&T department of the FCD was given enhanced status as Directorate T.^^ Most of its tasking came from the Military — Industrial Commission (VPK), which was responsible for overseeing weapons production, and was obsessed with American armaments and advanced technology — almost to the exclusion of the rest of the world. In the early 1960s over 90 percent of VPK requirements concerned the Main Adversary. Among the American S&T obtained by the KGB during these years was intelligence on aircraft and rocket technology, turbojet engines (from a source in General Electric), the Phantom jet fighter, nuclear research, computers, transistors, radio electronics, chemical engineering and metallurgy. S&T agents in the United States identified in Mitrokin’s notes (though with few details of their accomplishments) include: STARIK and BOR (or BORG), who worked as research scientists for the US air force; URBAN, identified by Mitrokhin as a department head at Kellogg (probably the M. W. Kellogg Technology Company in Houston), who had served as an agent since 1940;^^ BERG, a senior engineer probably employed by Sperry-Rand (UNIVAC);^^ VIE, who worked for the chemical manufacturers Union Carbide; FELKE, an agent in Du Pont de Nemours, the chemical, biomedical and petroleum conglomerate; USACH, of the Brookhaven National Laboratory at Upton, New York, which carried out government research on nuclear energy, high-energy physics and electronics; and NORTON of RCA, which manufactured electronic, telecommunications and defense equipment. During the Cold War, unlike the Second World War, the dwindling band of American Communists and fellow travelers rarely had access to the S&T sought by the KGB. Most S&T agents recruited in the United States seem to have spied for money. Two such mercenary spies were caught by the FBI during the mid-1960s: John Butenko, who worked for an ITT subsidiary which did classified work for Strategic Air Command, and Colonel William Whalen, who provided intelligence on missiles and atomic weapons. In 1963 the New York residency supplied 114 classified S&T documents, totaling 7,967 pages, and 30,131 unclassified documents, totaling 181,454 pages, as well as 71 “samples” of state-of-the-art technology and other items. Washington sent the Centre 37 classified documents (3,944 pages) and 1,408 unclassified documents (34,506 pages). Some of the best American S&T, however, came from residencies outside the United States. Possibly the most important was in the field of computer technology, where the Soviet Union had fallen far behind the West. The experimental Soviet BESM-1, produced in 1953, was judged by a Western expert to be “a respectable computer” for its time, with a capability superior to that of the UNIVAC-1 introduced in 1951. The BESM-2, however, which went into production in 1959, was only a third as fast as the IBM-7094, introduced in 1955, and one-sixteenth as fast as the IBM-7090 of 1959. Because of the embargo on the export of advanced technology to the Soviet Union maintained by COCOM (the embargo coordinating committee of NATO members and Japan), the computers legally imported from the West were barely more powerful than their Soviet counterparts.^^ During the 1960s the attempt to catch up with Western computer technology was based largely on espionage. The KGB’s main source of computer S&T was, almost certainly, IBM, which manufactured over half the computers in use around the world in the mid-1960s. Within IBM, the most important KGB agent identified in Mitrokhin’s notes was ALVAR, a naturalized French citizen bom in Tsarist Russia, whose motives — ^unlike most Americans in the S&T network — may well have been ideological. Probably the KGB’s longest-serving Line X agent, ALVAR had been recmited by the NKVD in 1935. By the 1950s he held a senior post at IBM’s European headquarters in Paris, and in 1958 was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for his work as a Soviet agent. ALVAR carried on working for the KGB until his retirement in the late 1970s, when he was awarded a Soviet pension of 300 dollars a month in addition to his company pension — a certain sign of the Centre’s appreciation of him. In the early 1960s the Paris residency supplied intelligence on American transistor manufacture which, according to KGB files, both improved the quality of Soviet transistors and brought forward the start of mass production by one and a half years. It also provided S&T on computer networking systems which were later imitated by the Soviet defense ministry. The most likely source of the intelligence on both transistor production and computer networks was ALVAR. From 1964, however, the Paris residency also had an agent, codenamed KLOD, in Texas Instruments.^^ Among other agents who provided technology and S&T from IBM was a Nordic national, codenamed KHONG. From 1960 to 1966 KHONG worked for a European affiliate of IBM, and purchased embargoed materials and samples worth 124,000 dollars, which he passed on to the KGB. In both 1961 and 1962 he was questioned by the local US embassy on the reasons for his purchases, but appears to have satisfied the embassy on both occasions. KHONG’ s motives, unlike ALVAR’ s, seem to have been mainly financial. He was initially paid 10 percent commission, subsequently raised to 15 percent, on his purchases from IBM. KHONG later worked for the United Nations in a number of countries. The fact that he had a total of twelve controllers during his career as a Soviet agent is evidence that the Centre considered him an important source. By the time contact with him ceased in 1982, a year after his retirement, the KGB had held about 150 meetings with him.^^ The Soviet Union often found it more difficult to use than to collect the remarkable S&T which it collected from American businesses, most of them defense contractors. In 1965 the Politburo criticized the fact that there was a time lag of two to three years before Soviet industry began exploiting S&T.^^ Even the computer technology stolen by the KGB did no more than, at best. stabilize the striking gap between East and West The gap was not to be explained by any lack of expertise among Soviet scientists and mathematicians. As one Canadian expert wrote in 1968, “Westerners who know Soviet computer scientists can testify to their competence and their thorough knowledge of the field. The continued backwardness of the Soviet computer industry, despite the expertise of Soviet scientists and the remarkable S&T obtained by the KGB, reflected the cumbersome inefficiency of the Soviet command economy, in which technological innovation had to run the gauntlet of a complex and unresponsive state bureaucracy. Rather than accept any share of responsibility for the failure to make efficient use of much of the S&T acquired from the West, the VPK chairman, L. V. Smirnov, blamed the KGB for not obtaining enough of it. In a letter to the KGB chairman, Semichastny, in April 1965, Smirnov complained that over 50 percent of the top priority S&T tasks assigned to the KGB between two and four years earlier had still not been fulfilled. Semichastny replied that steps had been taken to improve the KGB’s ability to meet its assignments, but criticized the VPK for underestimating the current difficulty of collecting S&T from American targets. Since some of the same scientific and technological developments were taking place in Britain, France, Japan and West Germany, the VPK should pay greater attention to targets in these countries. 76 In the following year groups of Line X officers operating against American targets were stationed in residencies in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, India, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and a number of other Third World countries Despite Smirnov’s criticisms, the KGB’s performance in S&T collection was, on balance, a success story. As Smirnov himself acknowledged, the FCD fulfilled almost half of the VPK’s demanding tasks against the Main Adversary with a few years at most. Measured against the spectacular successes of twenty years earlier, however, when the Centre had received the plans of the atomic bomb — the world’s greatest scientific secret — from two different agents and important nuclear intelligence from several more, even the successes of the early 1960s were bound to seem somewhat disappointing. The decline was irreversible. Most of the Soviet spies who penetrated every major branch of the Roosevelt administration had been ideological agents, seduced by the myth-image of Stalin’s Russia as the world’s first worker-peasant state, pointing the way to a new Socialist society. During the early Cold War, even among American radicals, the vision faded. Most of the successors to the wartime ideological moles were mercenary walk-ins and corrupt employees of defense contractors willing to sell their companies’ secrets. Though the KGB could not bring itself to accept it, the golden age of the high-flying American ideological agent had gone, never to return. APPENDIX SOME FAVORITE KGB YA VKAS (MEETING PLACES) IN THE 1960’S Baltimore: by the Clayton men’s clothing store on North Avenue. Boston: the music hall; by the State Hilton Hotel. Chicago: the Chicago Institute of Fine Arts buildings; by the movie theater on State Street; by the Lake State movie theater; and by the men’s tie store on Randolph Street. Cleveland: by the Khipp movie theater. Indianapolis: by the notice board on Market Street. Los Angeles: by the newspaper stand “Out of Town Papers” on Las Palmas Avenue; by the entrance to the movie theaters Viltem and Star Theater; by the display windows on Hollywood Boulevard, the furniture store MacMahon Brasses; near the entrance to the Hotel Roosevelt. Newark: by the Newark train station, on the bench by the monument to Sergeant Donan A. Bazilone. New Haven: by the Taft Hotel; by the Sherman movie theater. New York (Bronx): by the David Marcus movie theater; by the restaurant Savarin; by the display windows of the store Wilma’s Party Center; under the awning of the Middletown Inn Restaurant at 3188 Middletown Road. Philadelphia: by the Randolph and Stanton movie theaters; by the Silvanna Hotel. Portland: by the parking lot on the main street; by the Parker movie theater. Rochester: by the Randolph movie theater. Sacramento: by the Tower movie theater, and near the advertisements at the cafe Camilia Lodge. St. Paul: by the display windows of the St. Paul Hotel; by the Strand movie theater. San Francisco: by the Metro movie theater on Union Street; by Fosters Restaurant, Simms Cafe, and Comptons Cafe (in the downtown area); the Canterbury Hotel. Seattle: by the movie theater Orpheum Cinema on Fifth Avenue; by the City Motel on Queen Anne Avenue. Syracuse: by the Cates movie theater. Union City, New Jersey: by the A&P supermarket. Washington area: the telephone booth by the entrance to the Hot Shoppes Restaurant in the center of Hyattsville, a Washington suburb; by the entrance to the grocery store in the Aspen Hill Shopping Center on Georgia Avenue in Maryland, six miles north of Washington. TWELVE THE MAIN ADVERSARY Part 3: Illegals after ‘‘Abel” In 1966 the lack of high-grade political intelligence from the United States led the KGB Collegium, a senior advisory body headed by the Chairman, to call for a major improvement in intelligence operations against the Main Adversary. The chief method by which it proposed to achieve this improvement, however, was one which had already been attempted unsuccessfully during the 1950s: the creation over the next few years of a network of illegal residencies which would take over the main burden of intelligence operations from the legal residencies in New York, Washington and San Francisco.^ Not until six years after the arrest of “Rudolf Abel” in 1957 did the KGB succeed in establishing another illegal residency on the territory of the Main Adversary. Though there were brief missions to or through the United States by a number of illegals, the first to have taken up residence who is recorded in the files noted by Mitrokhin was KONOV, a Muscovite of Greek origin bom in 1912, who took the identity of Gerhard Max Kohler, a Sudeten German bom in Reichenberg (now part of the Czech Republic) in 1917. KONOV was a war veteran and radio specialist who worked as head of a laboratory in Leningrad until his recmitment by the KGB in April 1955. He spent the next four years in East Germany, working as an engineer, establishing his German cover identity and studying both his next destination. West Germany, and his ultimate target, the United States. The KGB, which specialized in arranged marriages for its illegals, found him a German wife and assistant previously employed by the Stasi, codenamed EMMA, who took the identity of Ema Helga Maria Decker, bom on September 2, 1928 near Breslau (now in Poland).^ In October 1959, posing as East German refugees, KONOV and EMMA crossed to the ERG, where KONOV found work as a radio engineer. In 1962 he began corresponding with American radio and electronics companies and obtained several job offers. After visiting the United States as a tourist, he accepted employment in a company which in 1963 enabled EMMA and himself to obtain immigrant visas. KONOV seems to have been the first post-war illegal sent to the United States to concentrate on scientific and technological intelligence (S&T). Specializing in electronic measuring devices, he took part in a number of international exhibitions and — according to his file — made several inventions. KONOV’s S&T was so highly rated by the Centre that it won him two KGB awards. On June 20, 1970, after living for seven years in the United States as Gerhard and Ema Kohler, KONOV and EMMA became American citizens, swearing their oaths of allegiance in Newark Courthouse. 3 By the time KONOV entered the United States in 1963, two other KGB illegals were already established in Canada, both intended by the Centre for subsequent transfer to the Main Adversary. Nikolai Nikolayevich Bitnov (codenamed ALBERT) had arrived in Canada in 1961. The basis of the legend painstakingly constructed for Bitnov was a fabricated version of the life history of Leopold Lambert Delbrouck, who had been bom in Belgium in 1899, emigrated to Russia with his family at the age of eight and died there in 1946. In the fictitious version of Delbrouck’ s career constmcted by the Centre, however, Delbrouck had married a Romanian woman, set up home in Gleiwitz in Germany (now Gliwice in Poland) and then moved to Romania, where he died in 1931. While in Gleiwitz, the couple had supposedly had a son, Jean Leopold Delbrouck, whose identity Bitnov assumed. Bitnov’ s wife, Nina (codenamed GERA), took over the identity of a “dead double,” Yanina Batarovskaya, who had been bom in France in 1928 and died in Lithuania in 1956.4 Early in 1956, now age thirty, Bitnov moved with his wife to Romania to establish his legend with the help of the Romanian intelligence service, the DGSP. In April 1957, using identity documents forged by the Centre, they succeeded in obtaining passports from the Belgian diplomatic mission in Bucharest.^ Six months later, they moved to Geneva so that Bitnov could enroll in a business school and learn how to operate as a businessman in the West. From late 1958 to the summer of 1961 the couple lived in Liege, establishing Belgian identities and obtaining new passports which, unlike those issued in Bucharest, made no reference to their residence in Romania and were thus less likely to arouse suspicion in North America. In July 1960, the Bitnovs emigrated to Canada.^ The Centre probably intended that Bitnov should move on after a few years to the territory of the Main Adversary. Initially, however, he was ordered, like Brik (HART) a decade earlier, to establish himself under business cover in Canada. Despite his course in Geneva, however, Bitnov proved a hopeless businessman. First, he invested 2,000 dollars of KGB funds in a business which bought up land with mineral rights and sold them to mining companies. After two years the company went bankrupt. Then Bitnov spent 2,000 dollars purchasing a directorship in a car dealership which went into liquidation only two months later. Unwilling to pour good money after bad into any more of his investment schemes, the Centre ordered him to look for paid employment. After a period on unemployment benefits, Bitnov found a poorly paid job as a bookkeeper which, he complained, left him little or no time for intelligence work. Having achieved nothing of any significance as an illegal, he was recalled to Moscow in 1969.^ The following year, he was given a pension and sent into early retirement at the age of only forty-five.^ The fact that the Centre persevered with Bitnov for so long was further evidence of the strength of its determination to establish a network of illegal residencies in North America. Bitnov was unaware that in February 1962, only seven months after his own arrival in Canada, another illegal, codenamed DOUGLAS, had landed with his wife and four-year-old son at Montreal airport. DOUGLAS was Dalibar Valoushek, a 3 3 -year-old Czech border guard recruited by the KGB with the assistance of its Czechoslovak counterpart, the StB.^ He took the identity of a Sudeten German, Rudolf Albert Herrmann, who had died in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. According to Valoushek’ s legend, Herrmann had survived the war and made his home in East Germany, then taken refuge in the West to escape the Communist regime. His wife, Inga (codenamed GERDA), a Sudeten German whose family had moved to the GDR, took the identity of Ingalore Noerke, a “dead double” who had been killed during the wartime bombing of Stettin. At the end of 1957 the Valousheks fled to the West, loudly proclaiming their hatred of the East German regime. They spent the next four years strengthening their legends as anti-Communist refugees while Valoushek learned how to run a small business. Once in Canada, Valoushek proved a much better businessman than Bitnov — though not quite as successful as published accounts of his career (which do not give his real identity) have suggested. Soon after his arrival in Canada he bought Harold’s Famous Delicatessen in downtown Toronto, which he and Inga, as “Rudi” and “Inga Herrmann” made a popular rendezvous for staff from the nearby studios of the Canadian Broadcasting Company. After two years Valoushek sold the delicatessen, got a job as a CBC sound engineer and took courses in film-making. His first major assignment was on a film advertising campaign for the Liberal Party. By the mid-1960s he had a reputation as a popular and successful film-maker. At the 1967 Liberal convention, which elected Pierre Trudeau as party leader, Trudeau leaned off the stage and playfully popped grapes into “Rudi Herrmann’s” mouth. Though Valoushek’s business appeared prosperous, however, his KGB file reveals that the Centre had to provide 10,000 dollars to cover trading losses. In 1967 Valoushek became the controller of the KGB’s most important Canadian agent, Hugh Hambleton (RADOV).^^ After losing his job at NATO on security grounds in 1961 (though without any charges being brought against him), Hambleton had spent the next three years taking a PhD at the London School of Economics, returning to Canada in 1967 to become a professor in the economics department at Laval University in Quebec. Once back in Quebec, Hambleton’ s contact with the KGB dwindled. He met an officer from the legal residency three times in Ottawa, on each occasion talking to him in a car parked near the main post office. Hambleton, however, disliked his new controller, who tried unsuccessfully to persuade him to apply for a job in External Affairs. After an interval during which Hambleton failed to turn up for meetings in Ottawa, Valoushek was sent to Quebec to renew contact with him. During a congenial dinner at the Chateau Frontenac overlooking the Saint Lawrence river, the two men established a mutual rapport and Hambleton agreed to resume his career as a Soviet agent. Over the next few years, he traveled to a great variety of destinations, combining research on academic projects with work for the KGB. He remained in touch with Valoushek until 1975, meeting him in Trinidad and Haiti, as well as Canada and the United States. But Hambleton ’s travels were so far flung that it required a considerable number of KGB officers to maintain contact with him.^^ In 1968, a year after becoming Canadian citizens, Valoushek and his family were transferred to the United States to found a new illegal residency in the New York area. His first KGB contact was IVANOVA, a young Russian woman who, having formerly worked as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate inside the Soviet Union, had been allowed (perhaps even encouraged) to marry an American visitor and had moved to the United States. IVANOVA gave Valoushek 15,000 dollars to establish himself and had several further secret meetings with him to pass on instructions from the Centre and letters from his Czech relatives. With the funds provided by IVANOVA, Valoushek made a 12,000 dollar downpayment on a secluded house fifteen miles north of New York, in Hartsdale,^^ joined the New York Press Club and began work as a freelance cameraman and commercial photographer. His first major assignment from the KGB was to penetrate the Hudson Institute, a leading New York think tank. The Centre had been excited by a report from Hambleton giving information on the Institute’s members and believed it to be a major potential source of intelligence on American global strategy and defense policy. IN MAY 1962, three months after Valoushek’ s arrival, BOGUN, another Soviet illegal, had landed in Canada. The Centre intended that, after establishing himself in Canada, BOGUN, like DOUGLAS, should transfer to the territory of the Main Adversary. BOGUN was Gennadi Petrovich Blyablin, a 38-year-old Muscovite who had taken the identity of Peter Carl Fisher, bom in Sofia in 1929 of a German father and Bulgarian mother. Like Valoushek, he perfected his German legend by living in East Germany, then moved to the West in 1959, posing as a refugee. The Centre allowed him three years to settle, legalize his status and find work in West Germany before sending him to Canada. On March 9, 1961 Blyablin married his KGBAPPROVED partner, LENA, in Hanover. In December they obtained their West German passports before setting off for Canada five months later. While Valoushek found cover as a film-maker, Blyablin established himself as a freelance press photographer — a profession which provided numerous opportunities and pretexts for traveling around Canada and further afield. In Febmary 1965, following the Centre’s instmctions, Blyablin and his wife moved to the United States on immigrant visas. His main task over the next three years was photographing and providing intelligence on major military, scientific and industrial targets around the United States. In 1968, however, Blyablin attracted the attention of the FBI during his investigation of major targets in the United States and had to be hurriedly recalled, together with his wife, to Moscow.^ ^ It was later discovered that some of his correspondence with the Centre, routed via agent SKIP, had been intercepted. SKIP was Karo Huseinjyan, an ethnic Armenian bom in Cypms in 1919 was Karo Huseinjyan, an ethnic Armenian bom in Cypms in 1919 who owned a jewelry shop in Beimt and provided a forwarding service for a number of illegals. A Centre investigation disclosed that letters from Blyablin, dated April 7 and July 27, 1968, sent via Huseinjyan, had been steamed open.^^ A year before Blyablin’ s sudden recall, RYBAKOV, another Soviet illegal, had arrived in the United States. RYBAKOV was Anatoli Ivanovich Rudenko, whose early career was strikingly similar to Blyablin’ s. Like Blyablin, Rudenko was a Muscovite bom in 1924 who had assumed a bogus German identity, spent several years in East Germany working on his legend and then moved to the West. Rudenko was given the identity documents of Heinz Walter August Peder, bom in Kalisch on November 6, 1927.^^ While in East Germany he had trained as a piano tuner and repairer. After crossing to West Germany in April 1961, posing as a refugee from Communism, he found a job with the world-famous piano manufacturers Steinway in Hamburg. Though Rudenko was told that his ultimate destination was the United States, in 1964 he was sent to work with a musical instmment company in London, probably in order to accustom him to an English-speaking environment.^^ Rudenko’s period in London almost ended in disaster. Once, while returning from Brussels, where he had received his maintenance allowance from a KGB operations officer, he was stopped at Heathrow and 500 pounds were found on him which he had failed to declare. Rudenko was fortunate to find a sympathetic customs officer. The money, he pleaded, was his life savings, the product of many sacrifices over the years. He was allowed to keep the 500 pounds and no action was taken against him. In 1966 he went to New York on a tourist visa and visited the Manhattan showrooms of Steinway & Sons on West 57th Street, who offered Rudenko a job with a salary of 80 dollars a week. With Steinway ’s assistance, he gained a work permit and traveled to the United States on his German passport in July 1967. In New York Rudenko became piano tuner to a series of celebrities — among them Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of New York, unsuccessful candidate for the Republican nomination in 1964 and future vice-president of the United States.^^ Rockefeller was regarded in Moscow as the “patron” of Henry Kissinger, who in January 1969 became President Nixon’s National Security Adviser (and later Secretary of State).^^ While professor at Harvard during the 1960s, Kissinger had served as Nelson’s paid part-time adviser and speechwriter, receiving a severance pay gift of 50,000 dollars when he joined the Nixon administration. “He has a second-rate mind but a first-rate intuition about people,” Kissinger once said of Rockefeller. “I have a first-rate mind but a third-rate intuition about people. To the Centre it must have seemed that Rudenko had penetrated one of the innermost sanctums of the capitalist system, which the Rockefeller family had seemed to epitomize for three generations. Nelson’s second wife, “Happy,” said of him in the mid-1960s, “He believed he could have it all. He always had.” The six square miles of Nelson’s Westchester estate were one of the world’s most valuable properties and contained some of the most spectacular art treasures in any private collection. Theodore White once offered to exchange his Manhattan townhouse on East 64th Street for a single Tong Dynasty horse from the Westchester collection.^^ Though Rudenko’s occasional visits to Westchester impressed the Centre, however, they achieved nothing of significance. Penetrating the houses of the great and good appears to have become almost an end in itself for Rudenko, even though his access to some of new York’s most distinguished pianos failed to give him any intelligence access. Among the well-known musicians whose pianos he tuned was the world’s most famous pianist, the Russian-bom Vladimir Horowitz, who for the past twenty years had lived on East 94th Street near Central Park. In 1965, after a twelve-year hiatus caused by a mixture of psychiatric problems and colitis attacks, Horowitz had returned to the concert platform at the age of sixty-two, becoming, with Luciano Pavarotti, one of the two most highly paid classical musicians in the world. The recital instrument which he chose for his comeback was the Steinway concert grand numbered CD 186, which had to be tuned to an exact 440-A with a key pressure of 45 grams instead of the usual 48 to Overimpressed by Rudenko’s access to the pianos of new York’s celebrities, the Centre made detailed plans for him to become head of a new illegal residency whose chief targets would be the US mission to the United Nations and a New York think tank, concentrating on relatively junior employees with access to classified information — in particular, single women whose loneliness made them sexually vulnerable and poorly paid employees with large families who were open to financial inducements.^^ Just as the new residency was about to be established in New York, however, the Centre noticed what Rudenko’s file refers to as “irregularities” and “suspicious behavior” and lured him back to Moscow in April 1970 for what he was probably told were final instructions before beginning work. Exactly what the Centre suspected is not known, but, since Rudenko was interrogated under torture, it may well have feared he was working as a double agent for the FBI. What he revealed was much less serious, but bad enough to end his career as an illegal. Soon after arriving in Hamburg in 1961, Rudenko had met BERTA, a 32-year-old ladies’ hairdresser, whom he had suggested recruiting as a Soviet agent. The Centre refused and ordered him to break off all relations with her. During his interrogation in 1970, Rudenko admitted that he had secretly defied his instructions, married BERTA and taken her with him to New York. Worse still, he had taken down radio messages from the Centre and decoded them in her presence. Her parents had discovered that he was a spy, but believed he was working for East Germany. Rudenko also admitted that he was having an affair with a female accountant (codenamed MIRA) in Pennsylvania.^^ As part of the Centre’s damage limitation exercise it instructed Rudenko to write to both BERTA and MIRA letters designed to convince both of them and, if necessary, the FBI that he had left the United States because of the breakdown of his marriage. He told BERTA that he had found it impossible to live with her any longer and urged her not to waste time trying to track him down since she would never find him. In the letter to MIRA, Rudenko was allowed to express his love for her and pain at their separation within what his file quaintly describes as “permissible bounds” and his pain at the separation from her. But, he explained somewhat unconvincingly, his sudden departure from the United States had been the only way to escape from his wife. Both letters were posted by the KGB in Austria, giving no other indication of where Rudenko was living. THE SUCCESSIVE FAILURES of Makayev (HARRY), Brik (HART), Hayhanen (VIK), Grinchenko (KLOD), Bitnov (ALBERT), Blyablin (BOGUN) and Rudenko (RYBAKOV) underscored the Centre’s difficulty in finding illegals capable of fulfilling its expectations in North America. Fisher/“Abel” (MARK) was, in many ways, the exception who proved the rule. He was able to survive, if not actually succeed, as an illegal resident in the United States because of a long experience of the West which went back to his Tyneside childhood, an ideological commitment which probably predated even the Bolshevik Revolution and a thirty-year career as a foreign intelligence officer, most of it under Stalin, from which he had emerged scarred but battle-hardened. Other Cold War illegals in the United States were psychologically less well prepared for the stress of their double lives. All had to come to terms with a society which was strikingly different from the propaganda image of the Main Adversary with which they had been indoctrinated in Moscow. Unlike KGB officers stationed in legal residencies, illegals did not work in a Soviet embassy, where they were constantly subject to the ideological discipline imposed by the official hierarchy. They also had to cope with a much greater degree of personal isolation, which they could diminish only by friendships and sexual liaisons which were liable to undermine their professional discipline. No wonder that some illegals, like Rudenko, had affairs which they tried to conceal from the Centre; that others, like Hayhanen, took to drink and embezzlement; and that others, like Bitnov, found it difficult to survive in an alien market economy. Illegals had also to face unreasonable, and ultimately impossible, expectations from the Centre. Until almost the end of the Cold War, no post-war Soviet leader, KGB chairman or foreign intelligence chief had either any personal experience of living in the West or any realistic understanding of it. Accustomed to strong central direction and a command economy, the Centre found it difficult to fathom how the United States could achieve such high levels of economic production and technological innovation with so little apparent regulation. The gap in its understanding of what made the United States tick tended to be filled by conspiracy theory. The diplomat, and later defector, Arkadi Shevchenko noted of his Soviet colleague: Many are inclined to the fantastic notion that there must be a secret control center somewhere in the United States. They themselves, after all, are used to a system ruled by a small group working in secrecy in one place. Moreover, the Soviets continue to chew on Lenin’s dogma that bourgeois governments are just the “servants” of monopoly capital. “Is not that the secret command center?” they reason.^^ However much the Centre learned about the West, it never truly understood it. Worse still, it thought it did. THE CENTRE’S FAITH in the future of illegal operations in the United States was remarkably unaffected by the many failures and disappointments of the 1950s and 1960s. At the beginning of the 1970s the Centre still had high hopes of KONOV and DOUGLAS. It also had remarkably ambitious projects for the next decade. A plan drawn up in the late 1960s envisaged establishing and putting into operation between 1969 and 1975 ten illegal residencies in the United States, two in Canada, two in Mexico, and one each in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela. For use in wartime and other major crises it was also planned to create five “strategic communications residencies” to maintain contact with the Centre if legal residencies were unable to operate: two in the United States, one in Canada and two in Latin America. This visionary program was to prove hopelessly optimistic. The 1970s produced another crop of serious setbacks in illegal operations in the United States — among them the collapse of the illegal residencies of KONOV and DOUGLAS. When KONOV and EMMA swore their oaths of allegiance as American citizens in 1970, their neighbors apparently regarded them as a model married couple. In reality, the increasing friction between them had begun to affect their operational effectiveness. In 1971 they flew to Haiti to be divorced, but informed only the Centre and their New York lawyer. On their return they still contrived to keep up appearances as a married couple by living together in their New Jersey apartment. EMMA, however, asked the Centre to find her a new partner. In October 1972 KONOV was recalled to Moscow, where he died three years later. EMMA was dismissed from the KGB.^^ Valoushek’s career as the illegal DOUGLAS was to end a few years later in even greater ignominy. His first assignment in the United States, to penetrate the Hudson Institute, was wholly unrealistic. As Valoushek later complained, had he been able to use his real identity and mention his postgraduate degrees from Charles University, Prague, and Heidelberg, he might have made contact with senior members of the Institute. But posing as photographer and cameraman without higher education he had no worthwhile opportunity to do so.^^ In 1970, unreasonably dissatisfied with Valoushek’s progress, the Centre took him off the Hudson Institute assignment.^^ The Vaklousheks’ elder son, Peter Herrmann, bom in 1957, had a brilliant school academic record and was expected to have opportunities to recmit within American universities that his parents did not. In 1972 Valoushek revealed his tme identity to Peter, told the Centre he had done so and said that his son was ready to join the KGB. Moscow accepted the offer and agreed to pay Peter’s university fees. In the summer of 1975, shortly before entering McGill University in Montreal, Peter began training in Moscow and started his career as an illegal with the German codename ERBE (“Inheritor”). In 1976 he moved from McGill to Georgetown University, where he was instructed to report on students whose fathers had government jobs (especially if they had character flaws which could be exploited), as well as on “progressive” students and professors opposed to the imperialist policies of the United States. He was also told to try to find a part- time job in the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, make friends with Chinese students and discover as much as possible about them.^^ By the end of the academic year, Peter Herrmann’s brief career as a teenage illegal was over. Early in May 1977 Valoushek was arrested by the FBI and given the choice of being charged with espionage, together with his wife and son, or of working as a double agent. He later told the espionage writer John Barron that after his arrest he worked as a double agent under FBI control for over two years until the Bureau discontinued the operation. “Rudi [Valoushek] gave us his word and he kept it,” the FBI told Barron. “We must keep our word to him.” On September 23, 1979 an unmarked furniture van removed all the contents of the “Herrmann” household in Andover Road, Hartsdale. The Valoushek family left to start new lives elsewhere under new identities. Valoushek’s KGB file, however, gives a very different account of his relations with the FBI. For well over a year after his arrest, he included deliberate errors and warning signs in his messages to the Centre as an indication that he was working under instructions from the FBI. The KGB failed to notice that anything was wrong until it was warned by an agent early in October 1978 that Valoushek had been turned. Soon afterwards the Centre summoned him to a meeting in Mexico City with the Washington deputy resident, Yuri Konstantinovich Linkov (codenamed BUROV). The FBI told him to keep the rendezvous in order to continue the double agent deception. Valoushek began his meeting with Linkov by admitting that he and his family had been under Bureau control since the spring of the previous year. He suspected that he had been betrayed by LUTZEN, who had defected in West Germany in 1969.^^ He complained that he had done his best to warn the Centre, but that no one had paid attention to his warnings. A subsequent investigation by the counter-intelligence department of the FCD Illegals Directorate uncovered an extraordinary tale of incompetence. A series of warnings and deliberate errors in Valoushek’s communications since May 1977 had been overlooked and messages he had posted to the residencies in Vienna and Mexico City had simply been ignored.^ ^ Immediately after Valoushek’s warning to the KGB in Mexico City in October 1978, the KGB warned Hambleton that contact with his controller would be temporarily broken for security reasons. Instead of being told that Valoushek had defected, however, he was simply given a vague warning that “progressive” people and organizations were under increased surveillance. He was instructed to destroy all compromising materials and to deny everything if he was questioned. In case of emergency, he was advised to escape to East Germany. Hambleton, however, remained confident that he had covered sufficient of his tracks to prevent a case from being brought against him. In June 1979 he sent a confident message to the KGB in secret writing, saying that there was no cause for alarm.^^ At 7:15 a.m. on November 4, 1979 RCMP officers arrived at Hambleton’ s Quebec City apartment with a search warrant. For the next two and a half years there was extensive press speculation and numerous questions about Hambleton in the Canadian parliament, but no Canadian prosecution. On March 3, 1980, the first day of the new Trudeau administration, the FBI made an apparent attempt to force its hand by producing Valoushek (under a pseudonym) for a press conference at Bureau headquarters, where he publicly identified Hambleton as one of his agents. Hambleton shrugged off the charges. Though appearing to revel in detailed descriptions of his secret contacts with Moscow by short- wave radio and other hocus pocus, he insisted that he was not a spy: “A spy is someone who regularly gets secret material, passes it on, takes orders, and gets paid for it. I have never been paid.”^^ According to Hambleton’s KGB file, however, between September 1975 and December 1978 alone he was paid 18,000 dollars. In May 1980 the Canadian Ministry of Justice, apparently convinced that there was still insufficient evidence, announced that Hambleton would not be prosecuted. Thereafter media interest in the case gradually died down. Two years later, however, Hambleton was arrested during a visit to London, tried under the Official Secrets Act and sentenced to ten years in jail.^^ Valoushek’s intended successor as illegal resident in the United States was probably Klementi Alekseyevich Korsakov, codenamed KIM, bom in 1948 in Moscow to a Russian father and a German mother. Korsakov’s mother, who died in 1971, had herself been a KGB illegal, codenamed EVA. Korsakov seems to have been selected as a potential illegal while still a child and, like his mother, was given bogus identity documents by the East Germans. According to his legend, Korsakov was Klemens Oskar Kuitan, an illegitimate child bom in Dalleghof in 1948. Like many other Soviet illegals, he and his mother posed as East German refugees, entering West Berlin in 1953 and moving to the ERG a year later. In 1967, at the age of eighteen, Korsakov obtained a West German passport. After his mother’s death, he spent several years in Vienna, first at an art school, then taking an advertising course, while simultaneously training secretly for illegal intelligence work. In 1978, after two transatlantic trips to familiarize himself with life in the United States, he moved to New York. Once he had begun work as a KGB illegal, however, Korsakov quickly became disillusioned. In January 1980, while undergoing further training in Moscow, he secretly entered the United States embassy, identified himself as an illegal, gave the identities of a number of other KGB officers (among them Artur Viktorovich Pyatin, head of Line N (illegals support) in Washington) and was debriefed by the CIA station. Since Korsakov was nominally a West German citizen, it was decided to transfer him secretly to the embassy of the FRG to arrange for his exfiltration. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record whether the KGB had observed him entering the American embassy, but they were waiting for him when he arrived at Moscow airport to return to the West. After lengthy interrogation, Korsakov was sent to the Kazanskaya psychiatric hospital, where, like a number of prominent Soviet dissidents, he was falsely diagnosed as schizophrenic.^^ THIRTY YEARS AFTER the beginning of the Cold War, the Centre’s grand strategy for a powerful chain of illegal residencies running American agent networks as important as those during the Second World War had little to show for an enormous expenditure of time and effort. At the end of the 1970s, following a string of previous failures, Valoushek’s illegal residency was under the (albeit imperfect) control of the FBI and Korsakov was preparing to defect. Particularly galling for the Centre was the fact that probably the most remarkable penetration of the Main Adversary by an illegal during the Cold War was achieved not by the KGB but by its junior partner, the Czechoslovak StB. In 1965 two StB illegals, Karl and Hana Koecher, arrived in New York, claiming to be refugees from persecution in Czechoslovakia. Fluent in Russian, English and French as well as Czech, Karl Koecher found a job as a consultant with Radio Free Europe while studying first for a master’s degree at Indiana University, then for a doctorate at Columbia. Among his professors at Columbia was Zbigniew Brzezinski, who later became President Carter’s National Security Adviser. All the time, he posed as a virulent anti- communist, even objecting to the purchase of an apartment in his East Side building in New York by the tennis star Ivan Lendl — simply because of Lendl’s Czech origins. In 1969, a year before gaining his PhD, Karl Koecher was appointed lecturer in philosophy at Wagner College, Staten Island. Hana, meanwhile, worked for a diamond business which gave her regular opportunities to travel to Europe and act as courier for the StB. The Koechers may also have been the most sexually active illegals in the history of Soviet Bloc intelligence, graduating from “wifeswapping” parties to group orgies at New York’s Plato’s Retreat and Hell Fire sex clubs which flourished in the sexually permissive pre-AIDS era of the late 1960s and 1970s. With the blessing of the StB, the Koechers later revealed some of their colorful careers to the Washington investigative journalist Ronald Kessler.^^ Karl Koecher’s KGB file, however, reveals that he withheld important details. In 1970 he was summoned back to Prague to take part in an StB active measure designed to unmask alleged CIA operations using Czech emigres. Koecher, however, was too attached to his swinging lifestyle to leave New York, refused to return and for the next four years broke off contact with the StB.^^ In 1971 he succeeded in becoming a naturalized US citizen; his wife was granted citizenship a year later. Karl Koecher seems to have devised a plan to mend his fences with the StB by penetrating the CIA. In 1973 he moved to Washington and obtained a job as translator in the Agency’s Soviet division, with a top secret security clearance. His chutzpah was such that only three weeks later he demanded a better job: My present position is by no means one which would require a PhD. I am interested in intelligence work, and I want to stay with the agency and do a good piece of work. But I also think that it would only be fair to let me do it in a position intellectually far more demanding than the one I have now ... Probably as a result of his complaints, Koecher was later asked to write intelligence assessments based on some of the Russian and Czech material which he translated and transcribed from tape recordings. Sex in Washington struck Koecher as even more exciting than in New York. In the mid-1970s, he later claimed nostalgically, Washington was “the sex capital of the world.” The Koechers joined the “Capitol Couples,” who met for dinner at The Exchange restaurant on Saturday evenings before moving on for group sex in a hotel or private house, as well as becoming members of a private club of Washington swingers at Virginia’s In Place, about ten of whose members worked for the CIA. Hana, blonde, attractive and ten years younger than her husband, later boasted that she had had sex with numerous CIA personnel. Pentagon officials, reporters from major newspapers and a US Senator. The organizer of “Capitol Couples” remembered her as “strikingly beautiful; warm, sweet, ingratiating; incredibly orgasmic.” Karl, however, “was a bit strange ... The women he was with said he was a terrible lover, very insensitive. His wife was everything he wasn’t.”^^ In 1974, having penetrated the CIA, Karl Koecher renewed contact with the StB, which consulted the KGB about whether to reactivate him. Henceforth he became a KGB agent with the codename RING, as well as being an StB illegal. The Koechers’ adventures in Washington sex clubs are unlikely to have provided the StB and KGB with more than compromising information and gossip about Washington officials, most of it of no operational significance. Far more important was the classified Soviet and Czech material translated by Karl Koecher for the CIA which he forwarded to the KGB. Andropov personally praised his intelligence as “important and valuable. In 1975 Koecher left full-time Agency employment, but continued on contract work, based in New York. Among the subjects of his assessments was the decision-making process in the Soviet leadership.^ ^ In 1975 Koecher supplied the KGB’s New York residency with highly rated intelligence on CIA operations against the Soviet Union in the Third World. As well as arranging meetings in New York, his KGB case officers also met him in Austria and France. Among his most important counter-intelligence leads was evidence that the CIA had recruited a Soviet diplomat. Following an apparently lengthy investigation, the KGB identified the diplomat as Aleksandr Dmitryevich Ogorodnik, then working in the American department at the Foreign Ministry. Soon after his arrest in 1977, Ogorodnik agreed to write a full confession but complained that the pen given him by his interrogator was too clumsy for him to use. As soon as he was given his own pen back, he removed a concealed poison capsule, swallowed it before the guard could stop him and died in the interrogation room.^^ In the early 1980s the Koechers were themselves betrayed by a CIA agent in the StB. Arrested in 1984, they returned to Czechoslovakia less than two years later as part of a deal which allowed the imprisoned Russian dissident Anatoli Shcharansky to emigrate to Israel. According to a newspaper report, as they crossed the Glienicker Bridge from West Berlin to East Germany: With his moustache and fur-lined coat, Karl F. Koecher looked like nothing so much as a fox. His wife, Hana, wore a mink coat and high white mink hat. Blonde and sexy, with incredibly large blue eyes, she looked like a movie star. “The KGB thinks highly of me,” Karl Koecher later boasted to Ronald Kessler. There was a curious sequel to the Koechers’ espionage careers in the West. In 1992 Hana succeeded in obtaining a job in the commercial section at the British embassy in Prague. She was sacked two years later after a Czech journalist revealed her background. AT THE BEGINNING of the 1980s, despite all the setbacks of the previous thirty years, the Centre’s plans for the expansion of illegal networks on the territory of the Main Adversary still remained remarkably ambitious — though not to quite the same degree as a decade earlier. Instead of the ten illegal residencies which it had intended to establish within the United States by 1975, the Centre planned to have six by 1982. Between them, the six residencies were supposed to have three to four sources in each of a series of major penetration targets: the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and what were described as “related institutions” — among them the Hudson Institute, the Rand Corporation, Columbia University’s School of International Relations, Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic Studies and the West German affiliates of Stanford University’s Center for Strategy and Research. The Centre also planned the “active recruitment” of students at Columbia, New York and Georgetown Universities.^^ It is clear that the KGB had some success in deploying illegals against the Main Adversary in the 1980s. For example, Mitrokhin’s notes record that in 1983 the illegal couple GORT and LUIZA were operating in the United States, but give no details of their achievements.^^ However, even the KGB’s downgraded plan for six illegal residencies, each with agents at the heart of the Reagan administration, was hopelessly unrealistic. The scale of the Centre’s ambitious projects for illegal operations against the Main Adversary in the later years of the Cold War reflected not the reality of the 1980s but the spell still cast by the triumphs of the Great Illegals half a century before. THIRTEEN THE MAIN ADVERSARY Part 4: Walk-ins and Legal Residencies in the Later Cold War Yuri Andropov became KGB chairman in 1967 with extravagant expectations of the potential contribution of political intelligence to Soviet foreign policy, particularly towards the United States. In a report to KGB Party activists soon after his appointment, he declared that the KGB must be in a position to influence the outcome of international crises in a way that it had failed to do during the Cuban missile crisis five years earlier. He ordered the preparation within three to four months of a First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate report to the Central Committee on the current and future policy of the Main Adversary and its allies. The principal weakness of current operations in the United States, Andropov complained, was the lack of American agents of the caliber of the Britons Kim Philby, George Blake and John Vassall, or the West German Heinz Felfe. Only by recruiting such agents, he insisted, could the FCD gain access to really high-grade intelligence.^ Almost from the moment he became a candidate (non- voting) member of the Politburo in 1967, Andropov established himself as a powerful voice in Soviet foreign policy. In 1968 he emerged as the chief spokesman of those calling for “extreme measures” to crush the Prague Spring.^ During the 1970s he became co-sponsor, with the foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, of the main foreign policy proposals brought before the Politburo (of which both were full, voting members from 1973). Dmitri Ustinov, who became Defense Minister in 1977, sometimes added his signature to the proposals worked out with Gromyko. According to the long- serving Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoli Dobrynin: Andropov had the advantage of familiarity with both foreign policy and military issues from the KGB’s broad sources of information ... Gromyko and Ustinov were authorities in their respective domains but laid no special claim to each other’s fields in the way that Andropov felt comfortable in both.^ Under Andropov, the FCD, which had traditionally been wary of taking the initiative in issuing intelligence assessments, for fear that they might contradict the opinions of higher authority, reformed and expanded its analytical branch.^ On a number of occasions Andropov circulated slanted assessments to the Politburo in an attempt to influence its policy.^ Andropov became one of Brezhnev’s most trusted advisers. In January 1976, for example, he sent the General Secretary a strictly personal eighteen-page letter, which began sycophantically: This document, which I wrote myself, is intended for you alone. If you find something in it of value to the cause, I shall be very glad, and if not, then I ask you to consider it as never having happened.^ Though careful not to criticize Brezhnev even in private discussions with senior KGB officers,^ Andropov was well aware of both his intellectual limitations and declining health, and set out to establish himself as heir- apparent. The General Secretary paid little attention to the details of foreign policy. Dobrynin quickly discovered that what most interested Brezhnev about foreign affairs were the pomp and circumstance of ceremonial occasions: ... the guards of honor, the grand receptions for foreign leaders in the Kremlin, the fulsome publicity, and all the rest. He wanted his photo taken for his albums, which he loved to show. He much preferred a fine ceremony signing final documents rather than working on them. During one meeting with Dobrynin, Brezhnev disappeared upstairs and reemerged in field marshal’s uniform, his chest clanking with medals. “How do I look?” he asked. “Magnificent!” Dobrynin dutifully replied.^ From 1974 onwards a series of mild strokes caused by arteriosclerosis of the brain left Brezhnev a semi-invalid. At the rear of the cavalcade of black Zil limousines which accompanied Brezhnev wherever he went was a resuscitation vehicle. By the mid-1970s one of his closest companions was a KGB nurse, who fed him a steady stream of pills without consulting his doctors.^ THOUGH ANDROPOV STRENGTHENED both his own influence and that of the KGB in the making of Soviet foreign policy, his ambitious plans for dramatically improved political intelligence on the Main Adversary were never realized. Line PR (political intelligence) in the American residencies failed to live up to his high expectations. In 1968, a scandal arose over the New York resident, Nikolai Panteleymonovich Kulebyakin, a former head of the FCD First (North American) Department. After the Centre had received a complaint against him, probably from within his residency, an enquiry revealed that he had entered the KGB with a bogus curriculum vitae. Contrary to the claims in his CV, he had never completed his school education and had evaded military service. Fearing that Kulebyakin might defect if he were confronted with his crimes in Washington, he was told he had been promoted to deputy director of the FCD and summoned home to take up his new office. On arriving in Moscow, however, he was summarily dismissed from the KGB and expelled from the Communist Party. Thanks chiefly to two walk-ins. Line PR in Washington performed rather better than New York during the mid- and late 1960s. In September 1965 Robert Lipka, a twenty-year-old army clerk in NS A, caused great excitement in the Washington residency by presenting himself at the Soviet embassy on Sixteenth Street, a few blocks from the White House, and announcing that he was responsible for shredding highly classified documents. Lipka (code-named DAN) was probably the youngest Soviet agent recruited in the United States with access to high-grade intelligence since the nineteen-year-old Ted Hall had offered his services to the New York residency while working on the MANHATTAN project at Los Alamos in 1944. Lipka’ s file notes that he quickly mastered the intelligence tradecraft taught him by Line PR. Over the next two years he made contact with the residency about fifty times via dead letter-boxes, brush contacts and meetings with a case officer. ^ ^ The youthful head of Line PR, Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, spent “countless hours” in his cramped office in the Washington residency sifting through the mass of material provided by Lipka and choosing the most important documents for cabling to Moscow. Lipka’ s motives were purely mercenary. During the two years after he walked into the Washington embassy, he received a total of about 27,000 dollars, but regularly complained that he was not paid enough and threatened to break contact unless his remuneration was increased. Lipka eventually did break contact in August 1967, when he left NS A at the end of his military service to study at Millersville College in Pennsylvania and probably concluded that his loss of intelligence access made it no longer worth his while maintaining contact with the Washington residency. To discourage the KGB from trying to renew contact, Lipka sent a final message claiming that he had been a double agent controlled by US intelligence. In view of the importance of the classified documents he had provided, however, the KGB had no doubt that he was lying. Attempts by both the residency and illegals to renew contact with Lipka continued intermittently, without success, for at least another eleven years. Only a few months after Lipka ceased working as a Soviet agent, the Washington residency recruited another walk-in with access to SIGINT. The most important Cold War agent recruited in Washington before Aldrich Ames walked in in 1985 was probably Chief Warrant Officer John Anthony Walker, a communications watch officer on the staff of the Commander of Submarine Forces in the Atlantic (COMSUBLANT) in Norfolk, Virginia. Late in 1967 he entered the Soviet embassy and announced, “I’m a naval officer. I’d like to make some money and I’ll give you some genuine stuff in return.” Despite his junior rank. Walker had access to very high-level intelligence — including the key settings of US naval ciphers. The sample batch of his material, which he brought with him to the embassy, was examined with amazement by Kalugin and the Washington resident, Boris Aleksandrovich Solomatin. According to Kalugin, Solomatin’s “eyes widened as he leafed through the Walker papers. ‘I want this!’ he cried.” Walker, they later agreed, was the kind of spy who turns up “once in a lifetime.” Enabling Soviet codebreakers to crack US navy codes, claims Kalugin, gave the Soviet Union “an enormous intelligence advantage” by allowing it to monitor American fleet movements. Walker, described in a fitness report from his commanding officer in 1972 as “intensely loyal” with “a fine sense of personal honor and integrity,” found photographing top secret documents and cipher material with a Minox camera in the COMSUBLANT communications center so easy that he was later to claim, “K Mart has better security than the Navy.” He went on to form a spy-ring by recruiting a naval friend, Jerry Whitworth, and his own son and elder brother. For Kalugin the greatest surprise of both the Lipka and Walker cases was their revelation of “how incredibly lax security still was at some of the United States’ top secret installations.”^^ After the foundation in 1968 of the ultra-secret Sixteenth Department to handle SIGINT material collected by the FCD, Walker was transferred to its control and thus no longer figured on the Washington residency’s agent list.^^ Solomatin, however, was careful to ensure that he retained personal oversight of the running of what became the Walker family spyring throughout the extraordinary eighteen years of its existence. The reflected glory of the Lipka and Walker cases was to win Solomatin the Order of the Red Banner and, later, promotion to deputy head of the FCD. Kalugin’s career also benefited; in 1974 he became the FCD’s youngest general. Most walk-ins were less straightforward than Lipka and Walker. During the 1970s KGB residencies, especially that in Mexico City, had to deal with a growing number of “dangles” — double agents controlled by the US intelligence community who offered their services as Soviet agents. One of the most successful dangles was MAREK, a master sergeant of Czech descent at the Fort Bliss army base in Texas, who visited the Soviet embassy in Mexico in December 1966 and offered information on electronic equipment used by the US army. Recruited in June 1968, he had numerous meetings over the next eight years with a grand total of twenty-six case officers in Mexico, West Germany, Switzerland, Japan and Austria. In May 1976, however, the KGB learned from the former CIA officer Philip Agee (PONT) that MAREK was a US dangle, run in a joint CIA/Defense Intelligence Agency operation of which he had personal knowledge. By the late 1970s a special Pentagon panel was selecting classified documents which were given to American dangles, mostly non-commissioned officers selected by the DIA to strengthen their credibility as Soviet spies. As well as providing a potential channel for disinformation in a conflict or crisis, large amounts of KGB time and energy were wasted in distinguishing dangles from genuine walk-ins. The most successful of the real Soviet recruits, Aldrich Ames, said later that the refusal of the Red Army to release classified documents made it impossible for Soviet dangles to compete with those of the United States: Even if a document were of no real value, no one in the Soviet military was willing to sign off on releasing it, knowing that it was going to be passed to the West. They were afraid that a few months later, they would be called before some Stalin-like tribunal and be shot for treason.^ ^ Throughout the Cold War the main weakness of the Washington residency was its inability to recruit agents able to provide high-level political intelligence from within the federal government. At the end of the 1960s, however, it had one non-agent source to which it attached great importance. A line PR officer, Boris Sedov, operating under cover as a Novosti journalist, had succeeded in making contact with Henry Kissinger while he was still a professor at Harvard University. According to Kalugin, “We never had any illusions about trying to recruit Kissinger: he was simply a source of political intelligence.” When Kissinger became an adviser to Nixon during the 1968 election campaign, he began to use Sedov to pass messages to Moscow that Nixon’s public image as an unreconstructed Cold War warrior was false and that he wanted better relations with the Soviet Union. After Nixon’s election victory, Brezhnev sent personal congratulations to him via Sedov together with a note expressing the hope that together they would establish better US — Soviet relations. While the presidential campaign had been underway, the long-serving Soviet ambassador, Anatoli Dobrynin, had tolerated Sedov’s secret contacts with Kissinger. Once Nixon entered the White House and Kissinger became his National Security Adviser, however, he insisted on taking over the back channel to the Kremlin himself. When Kissinger took over as Secretary of State in 1973, Dobrynin became the only ambassador in Washington who was allowed to enter the State Department unobserved via the underground garage.^^ The Washington residency complained to the Centre that Kissinger had forbidden his officials to meet members of the Soviet embassy outside office hours, thus making it impossible for residency officers to develop contacts of their own within the State Department and “check Kissinger’s true intentions when negotiating with Ambassador Dobrynin.”^^ During his twenty-three years in Washington from 1963 to 1986, Dobrynin’s access to a series of major policy-makers from Dean Rusk under Kennedy to George Shultz under Reagan was never equaled by the Washington residency. Line PR at the New York residency had no success in recruiting “valuable agents” within the US administration either. The United Nations, however, was a much softer target. Of the more than 300 Soviet nationals employed in the UN Secretariat, many were KGB and GRU officers, agents and co-optees. KGB officers operating under diplomatic cover became the trusted personal assistants to successive UN secretaries-general: Viktor Mechislavovich Lesiovsky to U Thant, Lesiovsky and Valeri Viktorovich Krepkogorsky to Kurt Waldheim and Gennadi Mikhaylovich Yevstafeyev to Javier Perez de Cuellar.^^ The KGB made strenuous attempts to cultivate Waldheim in particular, arranging for the publication of flattering articles about him in the Soviet press and selecting a painting of Samarkand by a Soviet artist which was personally presented to him by Lesiovsky and Krepkogorsky when he visited the USSR.^^ According to Arkadi Nikolayevich Shevchenko, the Russian under secretary-general at the UN who defected in 1978, Lesiovsky and Krepkogorsky were given largely routine responsibilities by Waldheim, checking the order of speakers at the General Assembly or representing him at innumerable diplomatic receptions, but were frozen out of sensitive UN business by what they claimed was Waldheim’s “Austrian mafia.” The UN Secretariat in New York none the less became a much more successful recruiting ground than the federal government in Washington. Shevchenko frequently saw Lesiovsky in the delegates’ lounge, “buying drinks for an ambassador, telling amusing stories, procuring hard-to-get theater or opera tickets, name dropping, ingratiating himself. The Secretary-General’s KGB personal assistants spent much of their time cultivating and trying to recruit members of foreign missions and the UN Secretariat from around the world.^^ The Centre, however, frequently expressed disappointment with political intelligence operations by the New York residency outside the United Nations. The residency’s work was seriously disrupted in 1973 when it discovered that the FBI had detailed information on the activities of some of its operations officers, as well as of three “developmental” agents (codenamed GREK, BREST and BRIZ).^^ A report at the end of 1974 concluded that Line PR’s performance had been unsatisfactory for some time past: For a number of years the Residency has not been able to create an agent network capable of fulfilling the complex requirements of our intelligence work, especially against the US We have not succeeded in achieving this goal in 1974, either, although there has been some progress in this line. There have been several recruitments (SUAREZ, DIF, HERMES) and confidential contacts have been acquired. But these results still do not move us any closer to fulfilling our basic task.^^ None of the three new agents was of major significance. SUAREZ was a Colombian journalist recruited by Anatoli Mikhailovich Manakov, a KGB officer operating under cover as Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent in New York. A few years later SUAREZ succeeded in gaining US citizenship.^^ DIF was a US businessman who provided political and economic assessments.^^ HERMES, potentially the most important of the three new recruits, was Ozdemir Ahmet Ozgur, a Cypriot bom in 1929. In 1977, the New York residency was able to arrange through Arkadi Shevchenko for Ozgur to gain a post at the UN Secretariat. When Shevchenko defected in 1978, however, the KGB was forced to break off all contact with HERMES. DIF, the US businessman, was also included in the Washington residency’s list of its Line PR agents in 1974. Line PR had nine other agents: GRIG, MAGYAR, MORTON, NIK, RAMZES, REM, ROMELLA, SHEF and STOIC. GRIG remains unidentified but is reported as operating in Canada.^^ MAGYAR was a leading peace activist. MORTON was a prominent lawyer recruited in 1970 but taken off the agent list in 1975 because of his advancing years. On his retirement he put the Washington residency in touch with his son, who was also a partner in a well-known law firm.^^ NIK was a Colombian who worked on US — Colombian cultural exchange programs. RAMZES was an American professor with contacts in Congress, academe, the press and Latin America.^^ REM was an Italian employee of the UN Secretariat.^^ ROMELLA was a Latin American diplomat in the UN Secretariat, who made contact with the KGB to seek its help in renewing her contract at the UN before it expired in 1975; she supplied both classified documents and recruitment leads. SHEF was a professor at McMaster University, recruited during a visit to Lithuania in 1974.^^ STOIC was a Latin American diplomat in the UN Secretariat. As in New York, none of the Washington Line PR agents had high-level access to any branch of the federal government. Though the New York residency had some successes in electronic eavesdropping, in active measures and in scientific and technological intelligence, its Line PR network mostly consisted of agents at the UN and in emigre communities, only a minority of whom had US citizenship.^^ The largest concentration of agents was within the Soviet colony itself, most of whom inhabited the residential complex in Riverdale. According to KGB statistics, in 1975 the colony numbered 1,366 Soviet employees and dependents. Of the 533 employees, seventy-six were officially classed as agents and sixteen as “trusted contacts. Most, however, were chiefly concerned with informing on their colleagues to Line SK (Soviet Colony) in the residency. The Centre’s assessment in 1974 stressed the limitations of Line PR’s New York agents: Not one of these agents has access to secret American information. The basic thrust of operations with this network therefore consists of using it for the collection of information from UN diplomatic sources, and from several American [non-agent] sources.^^ Lacking any high-level agents in the federal government. Line PR officers in New York and Washington, usually operating under cover as diplomats or journalists, devoted much of their time to collecting insider gossip from well-placed non-agent sources in Congress and the press corps. As head of Line PR in Washington from 1965 to 1970, Kalugin got to know the columnists Walter Lippmann, Joseph Kraft and Drew Pearson; Chalmers Roberts and Murray Marder of the Washington Post; Joseph Harsch of the Christian Science Monitor; Carl Rowan, former director of the US Information Agency; and Henry Brandon of the London Times. Kalugin’s role when he called at their offices or lunched with them in Washington restaurants was not that of agent controller or recruiter. Instead, he “would act like a good reporter,” carefully noting their assessments of the current political situation: “Rarely did I come up with a scoop for the Politburo, but the reporting of our [PR] section enabled Soviet leaders to have a better sense of American political realities ...” During the 1968 presidential election campaign some of Kalugin’s sources provided corroboration for Sedov’s reports, based on conversations with Kissinger, that, if elected, Nixon would prove much less anti-Soviet than Moscow feared. One of Kalugin’s most important contacts was Senator Robert Kennedy who, but for his assassination just after he had won the California presidential primary, might have won the 1968 Democratic nomination. Before his death Kennedy presented Kalugin with a tie-pin showing the PT-109 torpedo boat which his brother had captained during the war. Line PR officers in Washington also had regular meetings with such leading senators as Mike Mansfield, William Fulbright, Mark Hatfield, Charles Percy, Eugene McCarthy, George McGovern and Jacob Javits. The Centre liked to boast to the Politburo that its assessments of American policy were based on access to the Congressional elite.^^ Most of the political reporting of the Washington residency was thus based on non-secret sources — to the considerable annoyance of some of the Soviet diplomats whose far smaller foreign currency allowances gave them less freedom to entertain their contacts in Washington restaurants. Despite his insistence on keeping the back channel to himself, Dobrynin took a more benign view of the residency’s work, and seemed genuinely interested in what it discovered from both its contacts and agents. “In too many Soviet embassies,” Dobrynin complained, “normal personal relations between the ambassador and the KGB resident were the exception rather than the rule.” Ambassador and resident frequently became locked in bitter rivalry as each sought “to show who really was the boss in the embassy” and to demonstrate to Moscow the superiority of his own sources of information.^^ As resident in Washington from 1965 to 1968 Solomatin had got on well with Dobrynin. When he became resident in New York in 1971, however, he quickly began to feud with Yakov Malik, the Soviet representative at the United Nations. Malik strongly objected to Solomatin’ s attempts to develop contacts whom he wished to cultivate himself — among them David Rockefeller, brother of Nelson and chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank.^^ Malik was fascinated by Rockefeller’s 30,000-name card file of his contacts around the world, cross-indexed by country, city and business. On a visit to the chairman’s sprawling seventeenth-floor office at the sixty-story Chase Manhattan building, Malik asked to see a sample from the file. Rockefeller picked out the card for Khrushchev.^^ Malik also vigorously opposed Solomatin’s contacts with the veteran diplomat Averell Harriman, regarded in Moscow as one of the most influential American advocates of better relations with the Soviet Union. In co-operation with Dobrynin, Harriman later returned from retirement to act as unofficial channel of communication between Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter during the transition period after Carter’s 1976 election victory. Solomatin complained to the Centre that Malik’s objections to his attempts to cultivate Rockefeller and Harriman were “characteristic” of his general obstructionism. He failed, however, to tell the Centre that there was not the slightest prospect of recruiting either Rockefeller or Harriman. In an attempt to improve the quality of agent recruitment in the United States, the director of the Institute of Psychology in the Academy of Sciences, Boris Fyodorovich Lomov, a “trusted contact” of the KGB, was sent in 1975 to advise the New York residency on techniques of cultivation.^^ In 1976 the Centre devised an elaborate incentive scheme to reward successful recruiters, with inducements ranging from medals and letters of appreciation to accelerated promotion, new apartments and cash bonuses in hard currency (which would make possible the purchase of Western consumer goods that could be shipped back to Moscow at the end of the officer’s tour of duty).^^ As chairman of the KGB, Andropov seemed unable to grasp the difficulties of penetrating the US administration. During the mid-1970s he initiated a series of hopelessly impracticable recruitment schemes. Following Nixon’s resignation in August 1974 after the Watergate scandal, Andropov instructed the Washington residency to establish contact with five members of the former administration: Pat Buchanan and William Safire, former advisers and speechwriters to Nixon; Richard Allen, Deputy National Security Adviser during the first year of Nixon’s administration; C. Fred Bergsten, an economist on the National Security Council (NSC); and S. Everett Gleason, an NSC veteran who died three months after Nixon’s resignation. All were wildly improbable recruits. In 1975 Andropov personally approved a series of equally improbable operations designed to penetrate the “inner circles” of a series of well-known public figures: among them George Ball, Ramsey Clark, Kenneth Galbraith, Averell Harriman, Teddy Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen. Somewhat humiliatingly for the FCD, the KGB’s most productive agent during the 1976 election campaign was a Democratic activist with access to the Carter camp who had been recruited during a visit to Russia by the Second Chief Directorate.^^ The KGB’s most successful strategy for cultivating American policy-makers was to use the prestigious academic cover of the Moscow Institute of the United States and Canada. The secret 1968 statute of the institute kept at the Centre authorized the KGB to task it to research aspects of the Main Adversary which were of interest to it, to provide KGB officers with cover positions, to invite prominent American policy-makers and academics to Moscow and to undertake intelligence- related missions to the United States. Among the KGB’s cover positions at the institute was that of deputy director, occupied by Colonel Radimir Bogdanov (codenamed VLADIMIROV), sometimes described behind his back as “the scholar in epaulets. The KGB’s most important agent at the institute was its director, Georgi Arbatov, codenamed VASILI, who built up a large circle of high- level contacts in the United States and was regularly required to cultivate them.^^ According to Kissinger: [Arbatov] was especially subtle in playing to the inexhaustible masochism of American intellectuals who took it as an article of faith that every difficulty in US — Soviet relations had to be caused by American stupidity or intransigence. He was endlessly ingenious in demonstrating how American rebuffs were frustrating the peaceful, sensitive leaders in the Kremlin, who were being driven reluctantly by our inflexibility into conflicts that offended their inherently gentle natures. Though Arbatov’s access to US policy-makers raised KGB hopes of a major penetration of the federal government, Mitrokhin found no evidence in the files of any significant recruitment which resulted from it. In the Centre’s view, Arbatov’s most important contact during the 1970s was former Under- Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, codenamed VIZIR (“Vizier”). During a visit to Moscow in the spring of 1973, Vance unsurprisingly agreed with Arbatov on the need to “increase the level of mutual trust” in US — Soviet relations. Arbatov reported that he had told Vance — doubtless to no effect — that the majority of the American press corps in Moscow were propagating “a negative propagandistic” image of the USSR at the behest of the Zionist lobby in the United States. In 1976 Arbatov was sent on another mission to the United States. While there he claimed an addition 200 dollars for “operational expenses” from the New York residency for entertaining Vance and others. From such inconsequential meetings the Centre briefly formed absurdly optimistic hopes of penetrating the new American administration after Jimmy Carter’s victory in the presidential election of November 1976 and his appointment of Vance as Secretary of State. On December 19 Andropov personally approved operations against Vance which were probably intended to make him at least a “trusted contact” of the KGB. The operations were, of course, doomed to failure. Vance’s file records that, once he entered the Carter administration, any possibility of unofficial access to both him and his family dried up.^^ Doubtless to the frustration of the Centre, Ambassador Dobrynin continued to have a private entree to the State Department via its underground garage, just as he had done during Kissinger’s term as Secretary of State, and prided himself on maintaining through Vance the “confidential channel” between White House and Kremlin which the Centre had briefly deluded itself into believing it could take over.^^ The Centre’s early expectations of the Carter administration were so unrealistic that it even devised schemes to cultivate his hardline National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. The FCD drew up a plan to send Arbatov’s deputy, Bogdanov, whom Brzezinski had met previously, to Washington “to strengthen their relationship and to convey to him some advantageous information.” On January 3, 1977 Andropov also approved an operation to collect “compromising information” on Brzezinski as a means of putting pressure on him. Unsurprisingly, as in the case of Vance, the Centre’s early hopes of cultivating Brzezinski quickly evaporated, and the Centre concentrated instead on devising “active measures” to discredit him.^^ KGB Decree No. 0017 of May 26, 1977 declared that there was an urgent need for better intelligence on the Carter administration. The Centre’s evaluations of the work of the Washington and New York residencies in both 1977 and 1978 make clear that this requirement was not met. Line PR’s agent network in the United States was once again declared incapable of meeting the objectives assigned to it. Not a single agent had direct access to major penetration targets. Lacking reliable, high-level sources within the administration, the Centre, as frequently happened, fell back on conspiracy theories. Early in 1977 Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, head of the FCD and a protege of Andropov, submitted to him a report entitled “On CIA Plans to Recruit Agents Among Soviet Citizens,” revealing a non-existent CIA masterplan to sabotage Soviet administration, economic development and scientific research: ... Today American intelligence is planning to recruit agents among Soviet citizens, train them and then advance them into administrative positions within Soviet politics, the economy and science. The CIA has drafted a program to subject agents to individual instruction in espionage techniques and also intensive political and ideological brainwashing ... The CIA intends that individual agents working in isolation to carry out policies of sabotage and distortion of superiors’ instructions will be coordinated from a single center within the US intelligence system. The CIA believes that such deliberate action by agents will create internal political difficulties for the Soviet Union, retard development of its economy and channel its scientific research into dead ends. Andropov considered this improbable top secret conspiracy theory so important that on January 24, 1977 he forwarded it under his signature to the other members of the Politburo and Central Committee. THE CENTRE HARBORED far fewer illusions about the incoming Reagan administration in January 1981 than it had done about Carter four years earlier. Any hope that Reagan’s anti-Soviet speeches during the election had been mere campaign rhetoric quickly faded after his inauguration. In April 1981, after a trip to the United States at the Centre’s request, Arbatov sent a report on the new administration to Andropov and Kryuchkov. At a dinner in the White House he had been able to observe Reagan for one and a half hours from a distance of only fifteen meters. Though Reagan seemed to be acting the role of president, he played the part with genuine emotion. Tears came to his eyes when the flags of the four armed services were brought into the room and when he stood up and placed his hand on his heart as the national anthem was played. Nancy Reagan’s eyes never left her husband. Her adoring expression reminded Arbatov of a teenage girl suddenly placed next to her favorite pop star. Though Reagan’s speech to the assembled journalists was “exceptionally shallow,” the President played to perfection the role of “father of the nation,” a great leader who had kept his humanity, a sense of humor and the common touch. Both the Centre and the Kremlin took a less benign view of Reagan. In a secret speech to a major KGB conference in May 1981 a visibly ailing Brezhnev denounced Reagan’s policies as a serious threat to world peace. He was followed by Andropov, who was to succeed him as general secretary eighteen months later. To the astonishment of most of the audience, the KGB chairman announced that, by decision of the Politburo, the KGB and GRU were for the first time to collaborate in a global intelligence operation, codenamed RYAN — a newly devised acronym for Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie (“Nuclear Missile Attack”). RYAN’s purpose was to collect intelligence on the presumed, but non- existent, plans of the Reagan administration to launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union — a delusion which reflected both the KGB’s continuing failure to penetrate the policy-making of the Main Adversary and its recurrent tendency towards conspiracy theory.^ ^ “Not since the end of the Second World War,” Andropov informed foreign residencies, “has the international situation been as explosive as it is now.”^^ As Brezhnev’s successor in November 1982, Andropov retained full control over the KGB; his most frequent visitors were senior KGB officers.^^ Throughout his term as general secretary, RYAN remained the FCD’s first priority. For several years Moscow succumbed to what its ambassador in Washington, Anatoli Dobrynin, fairly described as a “paranoid interpretation” of Reagan’s policy.^^ Most residencies in Western capitals were less alarmist than Andropov and the KGB leadership. When Oleg Antonovich Gordievsky joined the London residency in June 1982 he found all his colleagues in Line PR skeptical about operation RYAN. None, however, were willing to risk their careers by challenging the Centre’s assessment. RYAN thus created a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment. Residencies were, in effect, ordered to search out alarming information. The Centre was duly alarmed by what they supplied and demanded more.^^ The Washington resident, Stanislav Andreyevich Androsov, a protege of Kryuchkov, was at pains to provide it.^^ The Centre interpreted the announcement of the SDI (“Star Wars”) program in March 1983 as part of the psychological preparation of the American people for nuclear war. On September 28, 1983 the terminally ill Andropov issued from his sickbed a denunciation of American policy couched in apocalyptic language unparalleled since the depths of the Cold War. “Outrageous military psychosis” had taken over the United States. “The Reagan administration, in its imperial ambitions, goes so far that one begins to doubt whether Washington has any brakes at all preventing it from crossing the point at which any sober-minded person must stop.” Alarm within the Centre reached a climax during the NATO exercise “Able Archer 83,” held in November 1983 to practice nuclear release procedures. For a time the KGB leadership was haunted by the fear that the exercise might be intended as cover for a nuclear first strike. Some FCD officers stationed in the West were by now more concerned by the alarmism in the Centre than by the threat of a Western surprise attack. Operation RYAN wound down (though it did not end) during 1984, helped by the death of its two main proponents, Andropov and defense minister Ustinov, and by reassuring signals from London and Washington, both worried by intelligence on Soviet paranoia. The alarmist RYAN reports obediently provided by KGB residencies were merely an extreme example of Line PR’s habitual tendency to tell Moscow what it wanted to hear. One political intelligence officer later admitted: In order to please our superiors, we sent in falsified and biased information, acting on the principle “Blame everything on the Americans, and everything will be OK.” That’s not intelligence, it’s self- deception!^^ During the first Reagan administration, as at other periods, the Centre would have gained a far more accurate insight into American policy by reading the New York Times or Washington Post than by relying on the reports of its own residencies. One of the most striking signs of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” on foreign policy after he became general secretary in 1985 was his early dissatisfaction with the FCD’s political reporting. In December 1985 Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov, KGB chairman since 1982, summoned a meeting of the KGB leadership to discuss a stem memorandum from Gorbachev “on the impermissibility of distortions of the factual state of affairs in messages and informational reports sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU and other mling bodies.” The meeting sycophantically agreed on the need to avoid sycophantic reporting and declared the duty of all Chekists both at home and abroad to fulfill “the Leninist requirement that we need only the whole tmth.”^^ Gorbachev was far more impressed initially by the performance of FCD’s Directorate T. Throughout the Cold War the KGB had greater success in collecting scientific and technological intelligence (S&T) than in its political intelligence operations against the Main Adversary. Infiltrating US defense contractors and research institutes proved far easier than penetrating the heart of the federal government. S&T also rarely suffered from the political correctness which distorted the reporting of Line PR in residencies and political intelligence assessments at the Centre. What remained at least partially taboo, however, was the difficulty experienced by Soviet state-run industry in making full use of the extraordinary S&T which it received. In 1971, for example, the defense and electronics industry ministries began a joint project to duplicate Westinghouse cathode-ray tubes. Two years later, because of production problems at the State Optical Institute, little progress had been made.^^ It was ideologically impossible to learn the lessons of failures such as this, for to do so would have involved a recognition of the inferiority of the Soviet command economy to the market economies of the West. FCD reports thus concentrated on the structural contradictions of Western capitalism while glossing over the far more serious economic problems of the Soviet Bloc.^^ In 1970 the New York and Washington residencies each ran nine Line X agents and five “trusted contacts. In 1973 the new position of head S&T resident for the United States was established in New York, with responsibility for coordinating Line X operations by the three American residencies, as well as attempts to evade the embargo on the export of advanced technology to the Soviet Union. By 1975 Directorate T had seventy-seven agents and forty-two trusted contacts working against American targets inside and outside the United States. Mitrokhin’s notes identify thirty-two of the S&T agents and trusted contacts active in the United States during the 1970s, mostly recruited in the same decade. A further eight whose espionage is not dated in the notes were also probably active in the 1970s.^^ The companies for which they worked included some of the leading American defense contractors: among them IBM, McDonnell Douglas and TRW.^^ The S&T agent network also contained scientists with access to important defenserelated projects at some of the United States’ best- known research institutes: among them MIKE at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and TROP in the Argonne National Laboratory at the University of Chicago. In addition to the civilian S&T agent network, there were also KGB agents in the armed forces who provided intelligence on the latest military technology: among them JOE, an army electronics engineer who provided “valuable information” on military communications systems,^^ and NERPA, who in 1977 was engaged in weapons research at the US army’s Material Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM).^^ Though Mitrokhin’s information on the extent and targets of the S&T network on the territory of the Main Adversary is far more extensive than any previously available account, it is not comprehensive.^^ There is, for example, no mention in Mitrokhin’s notes of the Californian drug dealer Andrew Daulton Lee, who in 1975-6 provided the KGB residency in Mexico City with the operating manual for the Rhyolite surveillance satellite and technical data on other satellite systems. Lee’s source was his friend Christopher Boyce, an employee of Rhyolite’s manufacturer, TRW Corporations in Redondo Beach. Among the TRW secrets passed on to the KGB was detailed information on how American spy satellites monitored Soviet missile tests. In 1977 Lee and Boyce were arrested, tried and sentenced to, respectively, life and forty years’ imprisonment. Both achieved celebrity status as the subjects of the bestselling book and film The Falcon and the Snowman.^^ One of the KGB files noted by Mitrokhin reveals that only a year after the arrest of Lee and Boyce the KGB recruited another, possibly even more important, spy in TRW with the codename ZENIT. While Boyce had been only a clerk (though with access to classified documents), ZENIT was a scientist.^^ Directorate T was proud of its achievements, particularly against the Main Adversary, and anxious to bring them to the attention of the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev was informed in 1972 that S&T had produced a saving during the past year of over a hundred million convertible roubles. Among the successes singled out for Brezhnev’s attention was intelligence on the construction of the American space shuttle and preparations for unmanned flights to Mars. This, he was told, would solve a number of current problems in the development of Soviet space technology. S&T intelligence on the pelletization of seeds, he was further assured (doubtless unrealistically), would increase the Soviet grain harvest by 20 to 30 per cent and shorten growing time.^^ In 1973 Directorate T reported that it had acquired over 26,000 documents and 3,700 “samples.” Though only a minority of this material was classified, it included top secret information on the Saturn rocket, the Apollo space missions, the Poseidon, Honest John, Redeye, Roland, Hydra and Viper missiles, the Boeing 747 jumbo jet and computer technology subsequently plagiarized in the construction of the Minsk-32 computer. The triumphs of S&T collection figured prominently in the Chekist Hall of Fame opened by the FCD at Yasenevo in 1977 to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution. Directorate T’s exhibit claimed that during the previous fiveyear period it had obtained over 140,000 S&T documents and more than 20,000 “samples.” These were alleged to have produced an economic benefit of over one billion roubles for the Soviet economy and to have advanced research work in a number of branches of science and technology by periods of from two to six 97 years. ' Leonid Sergeyevich Zaitsev, the dynamic and ambitious head of Directorate T appointed in 1975, argued that it should be allowed to leave the FCD and become an independent directorate within the KGB. It would, he claimed, need a budget of only 1 percent per annum of the value of the S&T which it supplied to Soviet industry and agriculture.^^ The head of the FCD, Kryuchkov, however, was determined not to allow such a prestigious part of his intelligence empire to escape from his control. Despite failing to win its freedom. Directorate T increasingly operated independently from the rest of the FCD. Its new recruits mostly came from scientific or engineering backgrounds, had their own curriculum in the Andropov Institute (the FCD academy) and trained separately from those in other departments. In foreign residencies Line X officers mixed relatively little with their colleagues in other lines. The Military — Industrial Commission (VPK), which was mainly responsible for overseeing Directorate T, showed greater interest in non-American targets than during the early Cold War.^^^ The United States none the less remained a more important S&T target than the rest of the world combined. In 1980 61.5 percent of the VPK’s information came from American sources (some outside the USA), 10.5 percent from West Germany, 8 percent from France, 7.5 percent from Britain and 3 percent from Japan.^^^ In 1980 the VPK gave instructions for 3,617 “acquisition tasks,” of which 1,085 were completed within a year, benefiting 3,396 Soviet research and development projects. Directorate T was its chief collection agency. Directorate T owed much of its success in meeting so many of the VPK’s requirements to its numerous collaborators in the Soviet scientific community, who numbered approximately 90 agent-recruiters, 900 agents and 350 trusted contacts during the mid- 1 970s. Among these collaborators — ^probably the largest network of talent- spotters in the history of S&T — were some of the Soviet Union’s leading scientists. All Western scientists — ^particularly in the United States — in fields related to Directorate T’s “acquisition tasks” were potential targets for the KGB. The first approach to a targeted scientist usually came from a Soviet colleague in a similar field, who would try to establish cooperation at a personal or institutional level. Directorate T would then seek to recruit the more naive or corrupt of the Western scientists approached in this way as agents or trusted contacts. Among the Directorate’s agent-recruiters was the director of the Physics and Energy Institute of the Latvian Academy of Sciences (codenamed VITOS), who in 1973 recruited MIKE, a senior physicist at MIT.^^^ SATURN, a department head at McDonnell Douglas, was recruited in 1978 with similar assistance from the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences. The KGB also took an active part in the selection of Soviet students for academic exchange programs with the United States and trained many of them as talent-spotters. Students were told to seek places at universities and research institutes within easy reach of the residencies at New York (Brooklyn Polytechnic, MIT, Rensselaer Polytechnic and the universities of Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, New York and Princeton), Washington (American, Catholic, Georgetown, George Washington and Maryland Universities) and San Francisco (the University of California at Berkeley and San Francisco, California Institute of Technology, University of Southern California and Stanford). Directorate T’s success in penetrating American targets was greatly assisted by poor security in some of its target companies and research institutes. Appearing in 1985 before a Senate committee investigating security among defense contractors, Christopher Boyce testified that he and colleagues at TRW “regularly partied and boozed it up during working hours with the ‘black vault’” housing the Rhyolite satellite project. Bacardi rum, he claimed, was kept behind the cipher machines and a cipher- destruction device used as a blender to mix banana daiquiris and Mai-Tais.^^^ Security failures in most other companies probably took less exotic and alcoholic forms. Since most major American companies operated abroad, they were vulnerable to penetration outside as well as inside the United States. In the mid-1970s seventeen major US companies and research institutes were targeted by KGB residencies in western Europe: among them IBM by the London, Paris, Geneva, Vienna and Bonn residencies; Texas Instruments by Paris; Monsanto by London and Brussels; Westinghouse Electric by Brussels; Honeywell by Rome; ITT by Stockholm; and the National Institutes of Health by Copenhagen. European residencies were assisted by a number of walk-ins. In 1974, for example, a Canadian resident of Los Angeles (later given the codename SPRINTER) entered the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, announced that he worked for an electro-optical company which was developing laser anti-missile systems and infra-red sights for firearms, tanks, ships and aircraft, and offered to sell its secrets. Like SPRINTER, most of the KGB’s S&T network in the United States appear to have been mercenary spies. SIGINT added substantially to the S&T provided by agents. The SIGINT stations within the Washington, New York and San Francisco residencies (whose operations are discussed in chapter 21) succeeded in intercepting the telephone and fax communications of the Brookhaven National Laboratory and a series of major companies. Mitrokhin’s notes, however, do not make it possible to assess the proportion of S&T provided by SIGINT rather than HUMINT. Since before the Second World War S&T had been regarded as an essential means of preventing Soviet military technology and weapons systems from falling behind the West’s. According to one report noted by Mitrokhin, over half the projects of the Soviet defense industry in 1979 were based on S&T from the West.^^^ Andropov claimed in 1981 that all the tasks in military S&T set for the KGB had been successfully completed. According to an official US report, based largely on documents supplied during the early 1980s by Vladimir Vetrov (codenamed FAREWELL), a French agent in FCD Directorate T: The Soviets estimate that by using documentation on the US F-18 fighter their aviation and radar industries saved some five years of development time and 35 million roubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equivalent research activity would be $55 million) in project manpower and other developmental costs. The manpower portion of these savings probably represents over a thousand man-years of scientific research effort and one of the most successful individual exploitations ever of Western technology. The documentation of the F-18 fire-control radar served as the technical basis for new lookdown/shootdown engagement radars for the latest generation of Soviet fighters. US methods of component design, fast-Fourier-transform algorithms, terrain mapping functions, and real-time resolution-enhancement techniques were cited as key elements incorporated into the Soviet counterpart. Other successful military projects made possible by S&T were the construction of a Soviet clone of the AWACS airborne radar system and the construction of the Blackjack Bomber modeled on the American Bl-B.^^^ From the late 1970s onwards increasing emphasis was also put on the contribution of S&T to the Soviet economy. Directorate T calculated that the main branches of civilian industry were ten years behind their Western counterparts. In January 1980 Andropov instructed Directorate T to draw up S&T collection plans designed to resolve current problems in Soviet agriculture, metallurgy, power-generation, engineering and advanced technology. Of the 5,456 “samples” (machinery, components, microcircuits, etc.) acquired by Directorate T during 1980, 44 percent went to defense industries, 28 percent to civilian industry via the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and 28 percent to the KGB and other government agencies. In the same, possibly exceptional year, just over half the intelligence obtained by Directorate T came from allied intelligence services, chief among them the East German HVA and the Czechoslovak StB.^^^ Among the HVA’s greatest S&T successes was its penetration of IBM. According to the head of the HVA, Markus Wolf, the East German microelectronics company Robotron “became so heavily dependent on surreptitiously acquiring IBM’s technological advances that it was, in effect, a sort of illegal subsidiary of that company.”^ Though well behind the West, Robotron was rather better than its Soviet equivalents in exploiting IBM computer technology. The KGB’s name-trace system SOUD (“System for Operational and Institutional Data”) used East German computers. S&T collection continued to expand during the 1980s. At a meeting of senior FCD staff early in 1984 Kryuchkov reported that, “In the last two years the quantity of material and samples handed over to civilian branches of industry has increased by half as much again.” This, he claimed, had been used “to real economic effect,” particularly in energy and food production. Kryuchkov characteristically failed to mention that the sclerotic nature of Soviet economic management made it far harder to exploit S&T in the civilian economy than in the imitation of Western armaments. His obsession with operation RYAN also left him dissatisfied with Directorate T’s intelligence on the weapons systems at the heart of Reagan’s non-existent plans for a nuclear first strike. “As previously,” Kryuchkov complained, “we are experiencing an acute shortage of secret information about new types of weapon and their means of delivery.” The FCD “work plan” for 1984 laid down as Directorate T’s main intelligence priorities: military technology measures taken by the Main Adversary to build up first-strike weapons: the quantitative increase in nuclear munitions and means of delivery (MX missile complexes, Trident, Pershing-2, cruise missiles, strategic bombers); replacement of one generation of nuclear missiles by another (Minuteman, Trident-2), the development of qualitatively new types of weapons (space devices for multiple use for military purposes, laser and pencil beam weapons, non-acoustic anti-submarine defense weapons, electronic warfare weapons, etc.). The second priority was “information and specimens of significant interest for civilian branches of the USSR’s economy.”^^^ Like other Soviet leaders, Gorbachev doubtless took it for granted that Soviet military technology required S&T from the West. He was probably more interested, however, in the use of S&T to invigorate the civilian economy. In an address to embassy staff in London on December 15, 1984, three months before he became general secretary, he singled out for praise the achievements of Directorate T and its Line X officers in foreign residencies. It was already clear that Gorbachev regarded the covert acquisition of Western technology and scientific research as an important part of economic perestroika. The dramatic improvement in East — West relations during the later 1980s offered new opportunities for Directorate T, which produced 25-40,000 S&T “information reports” and 12-13,000 “samples” a year. In 1986 it estimated their value at 550 million roubles; in 1988 and 1989 it put the figure at one billion roubles a year.^^^ In the later 1980s about 150 Soviet weapons systems were believed by Western experts to be based on technology system stolen from the West.^^^ AS WELL AS being impressed by the achievements of Directorate T, Gorbachev also seems to have revised his initially critical opinion of the political intelligence provided by the FCD. During the early 1980s Kryuchkov had repeatedly berated his subordinates for their lack of success in recruiting important American agents, and demanded “a radical improvement.” As late as February 1985 he denounced “the low standard” of operations against the Main Adversary and “the lack of appreciable results” by KGB residencies in recruiting US citizens. A walk-in to the Washington embassy two months later came as the answer to Kryuchkov’s prayers. By the time Aldrich Ames offered his services to the KGB in April 1985 he had been working for the CIA for eighteen years. Within two months he had betrayed twenty Western (mostly American) agents: among them Dmitri Polyakov, a GRU general who had worked for the FBI and CIA for over twenty years; Oleg Gordlevsky, a British agent in the KGB who had just been appointed resident in London; Adolf Tolkachev, an electronics expert who had provided high-grade intelligence on the Soviet avionics system; and at least eleven other KGB and GRU officers stationed in various parts of the world. A majority were shot, though Gordlevsky made an epic escape from Russia, with SIS assistance, while under KGB surveillance. Collectively, they had represented probably the most successful Western agent penetration of the Soviet Union since the Bolshevik Revolution. Ames’s main motive for betraying them was probably greed. By the time of his arrest nine years later, the KGB and its successor agency had paid him almost three million dollars (probably more than any other agent in Russian history) and had promised him another two.^^^ As Gorbachev embarked on a new course in policy towards the United States, he was doubtless impressed by the fact that the KGB had, for the first time, recruited a major agent within the CIA. The FCD also appears to have responded to Gorbachev’s demand for less crudely biased reporting on the Main Adversary and its allies. According to Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin, then one of Kryuchkov’s deputies, “the FCD no longer had to present its reports in a falsely positive light,” though many of its officers must surely have found it difficult to throw off the habits of a lifetime. In December 1987 Gorbachev took Kryuchkov with him on his historic visit to Washington to sign with President Reagan the first arms control treaty to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. Never before had a head of the FCD accompanied a Soviet leader on a visit to the West. Gorbachev’s confidence in Kryuchkov — which he would later bitterly regret — doubtless reflected his high opinion of the FCD’s success both in gathering an unprecedented volume of S&T and in penetrating the CIA. During the visit to Washington Kryuchkov had dinner at the Maison Blanche restaurant, unnoticed by other diners, with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates (later DCI). Gates wrote later: Looking back, it is embarrassing to realize that, at this first high-level CIA — KGB meeting, Kryuchkov smugly knew that he had a spy — Aldrich Ames — at the heart of CIA, that he knew quite well what we were telling the President and others about the Soviet Union, and that he was aware of many of our human and technical collection efforts in the USSR.^^^ In October 1988 Kryuchkov achieved his ambition of becoming the first foreign intelligence chief to become chairman of the KGB. His valedictory address on leaving the FCD was a remarkable mixture of the old and new thinking. “Democratization and glasnost are the motive force of perestroika^ he declared, “and we shall not win through without them:” Unless we have an objective view of the world, seeing it unadorned and free of cliches and stereotyped ideas, all claims about the effectiveness of our foreign policy operations will be nothing but empty words. The old suspicions and conspiracy theories about the United States, however, still lurked not far below the surface of Kryuchkov’s address. Without mentioning operation RYAN by name, he sought to justify the principles on which it was based: Many of [the FCD’s] former responsibilities have not been removed from the agenda. The principal one of these is not to overlook the immediate danger of nuclear conflict being unleashed. And he added a warning about what he alleged was the continuing brutality of “provocation operations” by Western intelligence services; he claimed that there had been over 900 such operations during the first half of 1988 alone. Kryuchkov began 1989 with a dramatic demonstration of the new climate of East — West relations, becoming the first chairman in KGB history to receive the United States ambassador in his office. Thereafter he embarked on an unprecedented public relations campaign designed to win over Western as well as Soviet opinion. “The KGB,” he declared, “should have an image not only in our country but worldwide which is consistent with the noble goals I believe we are pursuing in our work.”^^^ After a brief power struggle, Kryuchkov was succeeded as head of the FCD by the 5 3 -year-old Leonid Shebarshin, the first man with experience of working in countries outside the Soviet Bloc to run foreign intelligence since the Second World War.^^^ One of Shebarshin’s main jobs at the beginning of the Gorbachev era had been to prepare intelligence reports for the Party leadership. The fact that he leapfrogged several more senior candidates for his new post is a certain indication that his briefing had impressed Gorbachev. Foreign intelligence officers interviewed by zvestia after Shebarshin’s resignation in September 1991 described him as “the first really competent head of the FCD in decades. According to Shebarshin, his main initial brief from Gorbachev was “to ensure the West did not cheat on arms control.” The tactical victories of the FCD against the Main Adversary which impressed Gorbachev failed to avert strategic defeat. Directorate T’s very success in stealing Western secrets merely underlined the structural problems of the Soviet economy. Despite S&T worth a billion roubles a year and the Soviet Union’s large numbers of scientists and engineers, Soviet technology fell steadily further and further behind the West. Gorbachev’s reforms served only to weaken further the command economy, without establishing a market economy in its stead. There was a bread shortage even after the good harvest of 1990.^^^ No amount of either economic or political intelligence could stave off the disintegration of the failing Soviet system. As the Soviet Union’s economic problems multiplied during 1990 and separatist movements strengthened, the Centre’s traditional suspicions of the Main Adversary revived. Kryuchkov did not place all the blame for Russia’s ills on imperialist plots. “The main sources of our trouble, in the KGB’s view,” he declared, “are to be found inside the country.” But he accused the CIA and other Western intelligence services of promoting “anti- socialist” and separatist forces as part of a “secret war against the Soviet state. According to Shebarshin, Gorbachev failed to heed the FCD’s warnings. “He and his friends lived in a world of self-delusion ... We were hitching our wagon to the Western train.”^^^ With Gorbachev, in the Centre’s view, unwilling to offend the Americans, Kryuchkov began to publicize some of the KGB’s neglected conspiracy theories. In December 1990 he denounced a (non-existent) Western plot, “akin to economic sabotage,” to “deliver impure and sometimes infected grain, as well as products with an above-average level of radioactivity or containing harmful substances.” ™ In February 1991 first Kryuchkov’s deputy, Viktor Fyodorovich Grushko, and then the new prime minister, Valentin Pavlov, denounced an equally imaginary plot by Western banks to undermine the rouble. The fullest public version of the Centre’s theory of a vast American-led conspiracy to subvert the Soviet Union was set out in April 1991 in a speech by the head of KGB assessments, Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov, formerly deputy head of the FCD, responsible for operations in North and South America. The goal of US policy, he declared, was “to eliminate the Soviet Union as a united state.” Gorbachev, he implied, was refusing to listen: The KGB has been informing the leadership of the country about this in time and detail. We would not want a repetition of the tragic situation before the Great Patriotic War against Germany, when Soviet intelligence warned about the imminent attack of Nazi Germany but Stalin rejected this information as wrong and even provocative. You know what this mistake cost us. Further dramatic evidence of the resurgence of the KGB leadership’s traditional conspiracy theories about the Main Adversary came in a speech by Kryuchkov to a closed session of the Supreme Soviet on June 17. Kryuchkov read out a hitherto top secret FCD report to the Politburo of January 1977, “On CIA Plans to Recruit Agents Among Soviet Citizens,” which denounced an imaginary CIA masterplan to sabotage the Soviet administration, economy and scientific research. This plan, Kryuchkov claimed, remained actively in force. The CIA’s most important agent, he solemnly informed Gorbachev, was his own closest adviser, Aleksandr Yakovlev, allegedly recruited while an exchange student at Columbia University over thirty years earlier. As Kryuchkov later complained, Gorbachev did not take such nonsense seriously. Nor, no doubt, did many FCD officers with the first-hand experience of the West which the KGB Chairman lacked. Kryuchkov was now Gorbachev’s most dangerous opponent, convinced that, having tamely accepted the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989, Gorbachev was now presiding over the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In August 1991 he became the chief organizer of the coup which attempted to topple Gorbachev and preserve the Union. FOURTEEN POLITICAL WARFARE Active Measures and the Main Adversary The philosophers,” wrote Marx, “have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”^ In addition to collecting intelligence and producing politically correct assessments of it, the KGB also sought to influence the course of world events by a variety of “active measures” (aktivinyye meropriatia) ranging from media manipulation to “special actions” involving various degrees of violence. Inspired by exaggerated accounts of its heroic defeat of counter- revolutionary conspiracies between the wars and a desire to impress the political leadership, it frequently overestimated its own effectiveness. Throughout the Cold War the United States was the main target for KGB active measures as well as for intelligence collection. Most were at the non-violent end of the active measures spectrum — “influence operations” designed to discredit the Main Adversary. A conference of senior FCD officers in January 1984 reaffirmed a priority which had remained unchanged since the end of the Second World War: “Our chief task is to help to frustrate the aggressive intentions of American imperialism ... We must work unweariedly at exposing the adversary’s weak and vulnerable points.”^ Much of what was euphemistically described as “exposure” was in reality disinformation fabricated by Service A, the active measures branch of the FCD, and spread by Line PR officers in foreign residencies. Line PR officers were supposed to spend about 25 percent of their time on active measures, though in practice some failed to do so. The wide variation in the sophistication of the disinformation generated by Service A reflected the uneven quality of its personnel. About 50 per cent of its officers were specialists in active measures. Some of the remaining 50 per cent were rejects from other departments. Few of the ablest and most ambitious FCD recruits wanted jobs in Service A; it rarely offered the opportunity of overseas postings and was widely regarded as a career dead end.^ There were, of course, exceptions. Yuri Modin, the last controller of the Magnificent Five, became an active measures specialist, was appointed deputy head of Service A and subsequently had a successful Line PR posting spreading disinformation in India before becoming head of political intelligence at the Andropov Institute.^ Many Service A officers, however, had little, if any, experience of living in the West and relied on crude conspiracy theories about the capitalist and Zionist plotters who supposedly operated a secret “command center” in the United States.^ Successive chairmen of the KGB and heads of the FCD, none of whom until the late 1980s had worked in foreign residencies, were influenced by the same theories. IT WOULD HAVE been wholly out of character had the Centre failed to interpret President Kennedy’s assassination by Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas on November 22, 1963 as anything less than conspiracy. The deputy chairman of the KGB reported to the Central Committee in December: A reliable source of the Polish friends [the Polish intelligence service], an American entrepreneur and owner of a number of firms closely connected to the petroleum circles of the South, reported in late November that the real instigators of this criminal deed were three leading oil magnates from the South of the USA — Richardson, Murchison and Hunt, all owners of major petroleum reserves in the southern states who have long been connected to pro-fascist and racist organizations in the South.^ It was not difficult to find circumstantial “evidence” for this simplistic conspiracy theory, particularly as regards the oil magnate and anti-Communist buffoon H. L. Hunt. “The Communists need not invade the United States,” Hunt once preposterously declared. “Pro-Bolshevik sentiment in the US is already greater than when the Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky government and took over Russia.”^ Hunt’s son. Bunker, was one of a group of right-wing mavericks who had paid for a full-page advertisement in the Dallas Morning News on the day of Kennedy’s visit, accusing the President of being a Communist stooge — a charge which prompted Kennedy to say he was “heading into nut country.”^ The Dallas strip-club owner Jack Ruby, who shot and fatally wounded Oswald on November 24, had visited the Hunt offices shortly before Kennedy’s assassination.^ The KGB reported that a journalist from the Baltimore Sun “said in a private conversation in early December that on assignment from a group of Texas financiers and industrialists headed by millionaire Hunt, Jack Ruby, who is now under arrest, proposed a large sum of money to Oswald for the murder of Kennedy.” Oswald had subsequently been shot by Ruby to prevent him revealing the plot.^^ Khrushchev seems to have been convinced by the KGB view that the aim of the right-wing conspirators behind Kennedy’s assassination was to intensify the Cold War and “strengthen the reactionary and aggressive elements of American foreign policy.”^ ^ The choice of Oswald as Kennedy’s assassin, the KGB believed, was intended to divert public attention from the racist oil magnates and make the assassination appear to be a Communist plot.^^ The Centre had strong reasons of its own to wish to deflect responsibility for the assassination from Oswald. It was deeply embarrassed by the fact that in 1959 Oswald had defected to Russia, professing disgust with the American way of life and admiration for the Soviet system. Initially the KGB had suspected that he might have been sent on a secret mission by the CIA, but eventually concluded that he was an unstable nuisance and were glad to see the back of him when he returned to Texas with his Russian wife in 1962. After Oswald’s return the FBI at first similarly suspected that he might be a Soviet agent but then seems to have made the same jaundiced assessment of him as the Centre. KGB suspicions of Oswald revived, however, when he wrote to the CPUS A in August 1963 asking whether it might be better for him to continue the fight against “anti-progressive forces” as a member of the “underground” rather than as an open supporter of “Communist ideals.” Jack Childs (codenamed MARAT), an undeclared member of the CPUS A who acted as one of its main points of contact with the KGB, warned Moscow that Oswald’s letter “was viewed as an FBI provocation.” The fact that, unknown to the KGB, Childs was himself an FBI agent renders his warning unusually ironic. The Warren Commission, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to investigate Kennedy’s assassination, reported in September 1964 that it had found “very persuasive” evidence that Oswald had acted alone and none of a conspiracy. Though the report was flawed, its main conclusions are probably accurate. Service A, which may well have been genuinely persuaded that Kennedy was the victim of a right-wing conspiracy, succeeded in sponsoring its first counterblast even before the Warren Report appeared. The publisher was Carl Aldo Marzani (codenamed NORD), an Italian- born American Communist and Soviet agent, probably recruited before the Second World War, who was extensively used by the KGB for active measures. Early in 1960 the New York residency recommended to the Centre that Marzani be given 6-7,000 dollars to enable his Liberty Book Club to continue publishing pro- Soviet material: NORD is an extremely energetic person and is quite devoted to his task. Despite his financial difficulties, he is struggling to keep SEVER [North, the Liberty Book Club publishing company] afloat. SEVER, together with its commercial bookselling network, the Prometheus Book Club, has been in existence for fourteen years. During this time it has published and distributed more than 200 titles of a progressive nature, by both American and foreign authors. The catalogue of the SEVER publishing firm lists around fifty titles, and the Prometheus Book Club has 7,000 members. Books are also sent to 8,000 addresses on an individual basis. The international department of the Central Committee was plainly impressed. In May 1960 it approved a secret grant of 15,000 dollars, more than twice the sum suggested by the New York residency. Marzani’s productions during 1960 included his own translation of a rapturous endorsement of the Soviet system by an Italian Communist: It is the duty of every Socialist, of every democrat, of every modem man, to deepen his understanding of the USSR ... We are today capable of continuing to transform the world, thanks to the successes of the USSR, thanks to the successes in a series of other countries, thanks to the stmggles which we all wage in our own lands. We can, and we will, extend the civilization that was bom in October 1917.^^ In September 1961 the CPSU Central Committee allocated another 55,000 dollars for the next two years to allow Marzani to expand his publications. He was given a further 10,000 dollars a year to cover advertising costs. When the young KGB officer Oleg Kalugin, stationed in New York in the early 1960s under cover as a Radio Moscow reporter, paid his first visit to one of Marzani’s receptions, he found his apartment “filled with a motley assortment of Communists, liberals, and KGB spooks — all of them watched, undoubtedly, by FBI informers in attendance. Among the books published by Marzani in 1964 was the first volume on the Kennedy assassination to appear in the United States, Oswald: Assassin or Fall-Guy? by the German writer Joachim Joesten. At the beginning of the book Joesten expresses his “heartfelt thanks ... to Carl Marzani, a shrewd and hard-hitting publisher in the finest American tradition, who put his whole heart and soul in this book;” Marzani succeeded in publishing it within five weeks of receiving the manuscript. Joesten supported Moscow’s line in pinning the blame for the assassination on a conspiracy by right-wing racists, chief among them “oil magnate H. L. Hunt:” They all feared that Mr. Kennedy, with his test-ban treaty, his neutralization of Laos, his dislike of Latin- American militarists, and his quiet feelers towards Castro, intended to put an end to the Cold War, cut back the arms budget and bring under control the Warfare State — that “military-industrial complex” which President Eisenhower had excoriated, and warned the nation about, in his farewell address. According to Joesten, Oswald was “an FBI agent provocateur with a CIA background” who had been judged expendable, used as a fall guy and murdered to prevent him giving evidence.^^ Oswald: Assassin or Fall- Guy? thus established two themes which were to recur in Soviet and Russian active measures for the next thirty years: a plot by Hunt and other right-wing fanatics; and the involvement of the CIA. At the time, however, Joesten ’s book was overshadowed by the publication of the Warren report and further undermined by the publicity given to Joesten’ s Communist background.^^ The KGB correctly identified the New York lawyer Mark Lane as the most talented of the first wave of conspiracy theorists researching the JFK assassination. According to one report made on him, probably by the New York residency: Mark Lane is well known as a person with close ties to Democratic Party circles in the US. He holds liberal views on a number of current American political problems and has undertaken to conduct his own private investigation of the circumstances surrounding the murder of J. Kennedy.^^ Joesten praised Lane as “brilliant and courageous” and dedicated his own book to him: “Neither the ‘police state tactics’ of the FBI — to use [Lane’s] own words — nor the conspiracy of silence of the press magnates, could sway him from doggedly pursuing the truth. Together with student assistants and other volunteers, Lane founded the Citizens’ Committee of Inquiry in a small office on lower Fifth Avenue and rented a small theater at which, each evening for several months, he gave what became known as “The Speech,” updating the development of his conspiracy theory. “This alternative method of dissent was required,” writes Lane, “because not a single network radio or television program permitted the broadcast of a word of divergence from the official view.”^^ Though it dared not take the risk of contacting Lane directly, the New York residency sent him 1,500 dollars to help finance his research through the intermediary of a close friend whom Lane’s KGB file identifies only as a trusted contact. While Lane was not told the source of the money, the residency suspected that he might have guessed where it came from; it was also concerned that the secret subsidy might be discovered by the The same intermediary provided 500 dollars to pay for a trip by Lane to Europe in 1964. While there. Lane asked to visit Moscow in order to discuss some of the material he had found. The Centre regretfully concluded that inviting him to Russia would reveal its hand in too blatant a way and his proposed trip was “tactfully postponed.” Trusted contacts were, however, selected from among Soviet journalists to encourage him in his research. Among them was the KGB agent Genrikh Borovik, who later maintained regular contact with Lane. Lane’s Rush to Judgment, published in 1966, alleged complicity at the highest levels of government in the Kennedy assassination. It was top of that year’s hardback bestseller list and went on to become the bestselling paperback of 1967, as well as enjoying what Lane modestly describes as “enormous success around the world” and causing “a dramatic change in public perception” of the assassination.^^ During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Lane’s success was less enormous. The most popular books on the assassination were now those that exposed some of the excesses of the conspiracy theorists.^ ^ CPUSA leaders who visited Moscow in 1971, though describing Rush to Judgment as “advantageous to the Communists,” claimed that Lane’s main motive was his own self- aggrandizement.^^ In the mid-1970s, however, the dramatic revelations of real conspiracy in the Nixon White House and of CIA assassination plots against several foreign statesmen gave the conspiracy theorists a new lease on life.^^ The KGB, predictably, was anxious to lose no opportunity to promote active measures which supported the increasingly popular theory that the CIA was behind Kennedy’s assassination. Its chief target was the former CIA officer turned Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt (sometimes confused with the Texan oil millionaire H. L. Hunt), who had been wrongly accused of being in Dallas on the day of the assassination. The centerpiece of the active measure against Howard Hunt, codenamed ARLINGTON, was a forged letter to him from Oswald, allegedly written a fortnight before the assassination. The letter used phrases and expressions taken from actual letters written by Oswald during his two years in the Soviet Union, was fabricated in a clever imitation of his handwriting. Dear Mr. Hunt, I would like information concerning my position. I am only asking for information. I am suggesting that we discuss the matter fully before any steps are taken by me or anyone else. Thank-you. Lee Harvey Oswald^^ The implication, clearly, was that Oswald wanted to meet Hunt before going ahead with the assassination. Before being used, the forgery was twice checked for “authenticity” by the Third Department of the KGB’s OTU (operational technical) Directorate. In 1975 photocopies of it were sent to three of the most active conspiracy buffs, together with covering letters from an anonymous wellwisher who claimed that he had given the original to the Director of the FBI, Clarence Kelly, who appeared to be suppressing it. The Centre was doubtless disappointed that for almost two years its forgery received no publicity. In 1977, however, the letter was published by Penn Jones, the retired owner of a small Texas newspaper and self-published author of four books about the assassination. The New York Times reported that three handwriting experts had authenticated the letter. Oswald’s widow also identified her husband’s handwriting. Experts summoned by the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978 concluded more prudently that they were unable to reach a “firm conclusion” because of the absence of the original document.^^ The Centre was somewhat put out, however, by the fact that initial press reaction to its forgery centered chiefly on the likelihood of the letter being addressed to the late Texan oil millionaire H. L. Hunt (the central character in its own original conspiracy theory), rather than the KGB’s current intended target, the Watergate conspirator Howard Hunt. Service A believed there had been a CIA plot to disrupt its own plot. The KGB reported that an “orchestrated” American press campaign was seeking to divert public attention from Oswald’s connections with the American intelligence community by concentrating on H. L. Hunt instead. In April 1977, soon after the publication of the forged letter, the KGB informed the Central Committee that it was launching additional active measures to expose the supposed role of the “American special services” in the Kennedy assassination.^^ By 1980 Howard Hunt was complaining that, “It’s become an article of faith that I had some role in the Kennedy assassination. By the late 1970s the KGB could fairly claim that far more Americans believed some version of its own conspiracy theory of the Kennedy assassination, involving a right-wing plot and the US intelligence community, than still accepted the main findings of the Warren Commission. Soviet active measures, however, had done less to influence American opinion than the Centre believed. By their initial cover-ups the CIA and the FBI had unwittingly probably done more than the KGB to encourage the sometimes obsessional conspiracy theorists who swarmed around the complex and confusing evidence on the assassination. Allen Dulles, the recently retired DCI on the Warren Commission, had deliberately not informed the commission that the CIA had plotted the assassination of Castro. On the very day of Kennedy’s assassination, the Agency had supplied an agent with a murder weapon for use against Castro. J. Edgar Hoover too had held back important information. He discovered, to his horror, that Oswald had not been included on the FBI’s security index of potentially disloyal citizens, despite having written a threatening letter to the Bureau after his return from Russia and subsequently making an appointment to see a KGB officer in Mexico City. After reading a report on “investigative deficiencies in the Oswald case,” Hoover concluded that, if it became public. the report would destroy the FBI’s reputation.^^ The information withheld by Dulles and Hoover would have been most unlikely to undermine the Warren Commission’s conclusion that Oswald had been a lone assassin. But, when it became public in the mid-1970s, it inevitably encouraged the belief that there had been other cover-ups which pointed to the involvement of the intelligence community. The Watergate scandal, and the revelations of intelligence abuses which followed, created a perfect breeding ground for the spread of conspiracy theories. Though most of the major abuses had been ordered or authorized by successive presidents, the belief grew that, in the words of Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, the CIA had been “behaving like a rogue elephant on the rampage. SERVICE A SEIZED eagerly on Church’s ill-chosen metaphor. The KGB’s most valuable asset in its active measures to discredit the Agency was an embittered former CIA operations officer in Latin America, Philip Agee (codenamed PONT),^^ who had been forced to resign in 1968 after complaints at his heavy drinking, poor financial management and attempts to proposition wives of American diplomats. Though he remained in the West, Agee became, in effect, the CIA’s first defector. In 1973 he approached the KGB residency in Mexico City and offered what the head of the FCD’s Counter- intelligence Directorate, Oleg Kalugin, called “reams of information about CIA operations.” The suspicious KGB resident, however, found Agee’s offer too good to be true, concluded that he was part of a CIA plot and turned him away. According to Kalugin: Agee then went to the Cubans, who welcomed him with open arms ... The Cubans shared Agee’s information with us. But as I sat in my office in Moscow reading reports about the growing list of revelations coming from Agee, I cursed our officers for turning away such a prize.^^ In January 1975 Agee published an uncompromisingly hostile memoir of his career in the CIA entitled Inside the Company: CIA Diary, which identified approximately 250 Agency officers and agents and claimed that “millions of people all over the world had been killed or had their lives destroyed by the CIA and the institutions it supports. The self-congratulatory KGB file on the book claims, doubtless with some exaggeration, that it was “prepared by Service A, together with the Cubans. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate exactly what the KGB and its Cuban ally, the DGI, contributed to Agee’s text. As Agee himself acknowledged, however: “Representatives of the Communist Party of Cuba [the DGI] ... gave important encouragement at a time when I doubted that I would be able to find the additional information I needed. While Agee was writing his book in Britain, the KGB maintained contact with him through its co-optee, Edgar Anatolyevich Cheporov, London correspondent of the Novosti news agency and the Literaturnaya Gazeta.^^ At Service A’s insistence, Agee removed all references to CIA penetration of Latin American Communist parties from his typescript before publication.^^ Because of legal problems in the United States, Inside the Company was first published in Britain, where it was an instant bestseller. The London Evening News called it “a frightening picture of corruption, pressure, assassination and conspiracy.” The Economist commended it as “inescapable reading.” Probably most valuable of all, from Service A’s viewpoint, was a review in the Spectator by Miles Copeland, a former CIA station chief in Cairo, who described Inside the Company as “as complete an account of spy work as is likely to be published anywhere.” With enthusiastic support from a number of journalists, Agee then set about unmasking the members of the CIA London station, some of whom were surprised emerging from their homes by press photographers. An American theater director staged a production satirizing the Agency in front of a number of CIA officers’ houses. “For a while,” claimed Agee, “the CIA in Britain was a laughing stock.” The left-wing Labor MP Stan Newens promoted a Commons bill, signed by thirty-two of his colleagues, calling for the CIA station to be expelled. Encouraged by Agee’s success in Britain, there was a rush by the media in other parts of Europe to expose the CIA stations in their own capitals. The six-month delay between the publication of the British and American editions of Inside the Company, and the associated legal difficulties, merely served to increase media interest in the United States and ensure its place high on the bestseller list. A review of Inside the Company in the CIA’s classified in-house journal. Studies in Intelligence, acknowledged that it was “a severe body blow” to the Agency: “A considerable number of CIA personnel must be diverted from their normal duties to undertake the meticulous and time-consuming task of repairing the damage done to its Latin- American program ’’51 On November 16, 1976 a deportation order served on Agee requiring him to leave England turned his case, much to the delight of the Centre, into a cause celebre. According to one of the files noted by Mitrokhin: The KGB employed firm and purposeful measures to force the Home Office to cancel their decision ... The London residency was used to direct action by a number of members of the Labor Party Executive, union leaders, leading parliamentarians, leaders of the National Union of Journalists to take a stand against the Home Office decision. On November 30 the first in a series of well-publicized meetings to protest against the deportation order was held in London, with speakers including Judith Hart, former Labor Minister of Overseas Development, the leading Labor left-winger Ian Mikardo, Alan Sapper of the film and TV technicians union and the distinguished historian E. P. Thompson. An active defense committee^^ based at the National Council of Civil Liberties organized petitions, rallies and pickets of the Home Office. In the Commons Stan Newens sponsored a protest supported by over fifty MPs and led a delegation to see the Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees. Agee addressed sympathetic meetings in Birmingham, Blackpool, Brighton, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Coventry, London, Manchester and Newcastle. At his appeal against deportation in January and February 1977, Agee’s character witnesses included Stan Newens, Judith Hart, former Home Office minister Alex Lyon, former US Attorney- General Ramsey Clark, Kissinger’s former aide Morton Halperin and Sean MacBride, Nobel Peace Prize winner and UN High Commissioner for Namibia. Hart and another ex-Labor minister, Barbara Castle, sponsored a motion, supported by 150 MPs, to reform the appeals procedure. According to Agee’s KGB file, “Campaigns of support for PONT were initiated in France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Holland, Finland, Norway, Mexico and Venezuela.” After Agee’s appeals had failed, the final act in the long drawn-out protest campaign was a Commons debate on May 3. The Guardian, which supported Agee’s appeal, commented: When Merlyn Rees ... decided that Philip Agee and [American journalist] Mark Hosenball must go, he must equally have known there would be a fuss. But did he realize the endlessly stretching, deeply embarrassing nature of that fuss — the evidence at a length to rival War and Peace, the press conferences, the parade of fervent witnesses?^^ Though Agee was eventually forced to leave England for Holland on June 3, 1977, the KGB was jubilant at the “deeply embarrassing nature of [the] fuss” his deportation had caused. The London residency’s claim that it had been able to “direct” the campaign by prominent Labor politicians and others in support of Agee was, however, greatly exaggerated.^^ It doubtless did not occur to the vast majority of Agee’s supporters to suspect the involvement of the KGB and the DGI.^^ After Agee’s well-publicized expulsion from Britain, the KGB continued to use him and some of his supporters in active measures against the CIA.^^ Among the documents received by Agee from what he described as “an anonymous sender” was an authentic copy of a classified State Department circular, signed by Kissinger, which contained the CIA’s “key intelligence questions” for fiscal year 1975 on economic, financial and commercial reporting. KGB files identify the source of the document as Service In the summer of 1977 the circular was published in a pamphlet entitled “What Uncle Sam Wants to Know about You,” with an introduction by Agee. While acknowledging that it was “not the most gripping document in the world,” Agee claimed that it demonstrated the unfair assistance secretly given to US companies abroad by the American intelligence community. In 1978 Agee and a small group of supporters began publishing the Covert Action Information Bulletin in order to promote what Agee called “a worldwide campaign to destabilize the CIA through exposure of its operations and personnel. Files noted by Mitrokhin claim that the Bulletin was founded “on the initiative of the KGB” and that the group running it (collectively codenamed RUPOR), which held its first meeting in Jamaica early in 1978, was “put together” by FCD Directorate K (counterintelligence). The Bulletin was edited in Washington by Bill Schaap, a radical lawyer codenamed RUBY by the KGB, his wife, the journalist Ellen Ray, and another journalist, Louis Wolf, codenamed ARSENIO. Agee and two other disaffected former members of the CIA, Jim and Elsie Wilcott (previously employed by the Agency as, respectively, finance officer and secretary), contributed articles and information.^^ There is no evidence in Mitrokhin’s notes that any member of the RUPOR group, apart from Agee, was conscious of the role of the DGI or KGB. The first issue of the Covert Action Information Bulletin was launched by Agee and the RUPOR group at a Cuban press conference on the eve of the Eleventh World Festival of Youth and Students, held to coincide with the Havana carnival in the summer of 1978. Agee also produced advance copies of another book. Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe, coauthored by himself and Wolf, which contained the names and biographical details of 700 CIA personnel who were, or had been, stationed in western Europe. “Press reaction,” wrote Agee, “was not disappointing. In the next few days we learned by telephone from friends in the States and elsewhere that most of the major publications carried stories about the Bulletin and Dirty Work. Perfect. The Centre assembled a task force of personnel from Service A and Directorate K, headed by V. N. Kosterin, assistant to the chief of Service A, to keep the Covert Action Information Bulletin supplied with material designed to compromise the CIA. Among the material which the task force supplied for publication in 1979 was an eighteen-page CIA document entitled “Director of Central Intelligence: Perspectives for Intelligence, 1976- 1981.” The document had originally been delivered anonymously to the apartment of the Washington resident, Dmitri Ivanovich Yakushkin, and at the time had been wrongly assessed by both the residency and the Centre as a “dangle” by US intelligence.^^ Agee’s commentary on the document highlighted the complaint by DCI William Colby that recent revelations of its operations were among the most serious problems the CIA had to face.^^ Kosterin’s task force, however, became increasingly concerned about the difficulty of finding enough secret material for the Bulletin, and recommended that it look harder for open-source material, ranging from readers’ letters to crises around the world which could be blamed on the CIA — among them the Jonestown massacre in Guyana, when 900 members of the American religious cult the “People’s Temple” had been persuaded to commit mass suicide or had been murdered. Following what Service A believed was the success of Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe, Agee began work with Wolf on a sequel. Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa. Early in 1979 Oleg Maksimovich Nechiporenko of Directorate K and A. N. Itskov of Service A met Agee in Cuba and gave him a list of CIA officers working on the African continent. Shortly before Dirty Work II was finished, Agee decided not to be publicly identified as one of the authors for fear that he might lose his residence permit in Germany, where he now lived. He also changed his official role on the Covert Action Information Bulletin from editor to “editorial adviser.” “How that would save my residence in Germany,” Agee later acknowledged, “was a little obscure ... but such was my fear that I was barely rational — at least on this point.”^^ Nechiporenko and Itskov agreed with Pedro Pupo Perez, the head of the DGI, that publication of Dirty Work II should be timed to coincide with the conference of ninety-two heads of non- aligned nations to be held in Havana, presided over by Fidel Castro, in September 1979.^^ By Agee’s own count. Dirty Work II brought the total number of CIA officials exposed by him and the RUPOR team to about 2,000. For the KGB it had been a remarkably effective active measure. The Senate Intelligence Committee reported in 1980: In recent years members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees ... have become increasingly concerned about the systematic effort by a small group of Americans ... to disclose the names of covert intelligence agents ... Foremost among them has been Philip Agee ... The destructive effect of these disclosures has been varied and wide- ranging ... The professional effectiveness of officers who have been compromised is substantially and sometimes irreparably damaged. They must reduce or break contact with sensitive covert sources and continued contact must be coupled with increased defensive measures that are inevitably more costly and time-consuming. Some officers must be removed from their assignments and returned from overseas at substantial cost, and years of irreplaceable area experience and language skills are lost. Since the ability to reassign the compromised officer is impaired, the pool of experienced CIA officers who can serve abroad is being reduced. Replacement of officers thus compromised is difficult and, in some cases, impossible. Such disclosures also sensitize hostile security services to CIA presence and influence foreign populations, making operations more difficult. All thirteen members of the House Intelligence Committee sponsored the Intelligence Identities Protection Bill, popularly known as the “Anti- Agee Bill,” which eventually became law in June 1982. Agee himself had been deprived of his American passport in 1981 and traveled over the next few years on passports issued by, successively, Maurice Bishop’s Marxist-Leninist regime in Grenada and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. His influence, by now, was in sharp decline. As he complained, “My 1983 call for a continent-wide action front against the CIA’s people in Latin America went nowhere. People had other preoccupations and priorities.”^ ^ LIKE THE CIA, the FBI was inevitably a major target of KGB active measures. Until the death of J. Edgar Hoover in 1972, many of these measures were personally directed against the Bureau’s long-serving, aging and irascible director. Service A employed three simple and sometimes crude techniques. The first was to portray Hoover as in league with extremists such as the ultra right-wing John Birch Society, whose founder regarded even the former Republican president Dwight D. Eisenhower as “a dedicated conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy.” Service A had acquired both some of the society’s stationery and samples of its leaders’ signatures from its California headquarters to assist it in its forgeries. In November 1965 it fabricated a letter of good wishes from Hoover to the leader of the John Birch Society, reminding him that the FBI funds put at his disposal would enable the society to open several more branches. A second, more sophisticated form of active measures concerned alleged FBI abuses of civil rights. Operation SPIRT was designed to demonstrate that the head of the Passport Office in the State Department, Frances Knight, was a secret FBI agent whose loyalty was to Hoover rather than to the Secretary of State. In 1967 Service A forged a letter from Ms. Knight to Hoover and arranged for it to be sent to the celebrated columnist Drew Pearson, who published it in the Washington Post on August AP The fabricated letter reported that a situation of “extreme urgency” had arisen as a result of press enquiries about an alleged FBI request to her for information on Professor H. Stuart Hughes, a Harvard critic of American policy in Vietnam: I am seriously afraid that this may indicate preparations for a sustained press campaign against us. We have already discussed the attitude of the Secretary of State towards the long-established practice of the department making inquiries at the request of the FBI ... Forgive me if I sound alarmist, but I am quite certain from what I have heard that a principle of vital importance is at stake which affects the whole conduct of the government and, in particular, the effectiveness of the Bureau. Ms. Knight told Hoover she was unwilling to commit too much to paper and suggested an urgent meeting with him.^^ Knight and Hoover both dismissed the letter as a forgery, but the fact that neither denied the FBI’s contacts with the Passport Office persuaded the KGB that at least some of its mud had stuck. A third line of attack deployed by Service A against Hoover was to accuse him of being a homosexual. The truth about Hoover’s probably severely repressed sexuality is unlikely ever to be known. Later, much- publicized claims that he was a gay cross-dresser whose wardrobe included a red dress and boa, which made him look like “an old flapper,” and a black dress, “very fluffy, with flounces, and lace stockings,” which he wore with a black curly wig, rest on little more than the discredited testimony of a convicted perjurer, Susan Rosenstiel, who claimed to have seen Hoover so attired. Nor is there any reliable evidence that Hoover and his deputy, Clyde Tolson, who shared his house, ever had a homosexual relationship. But attempts to portray him as a heterosexual are also less than convincing. Hoover had no known female liaisons. As his staunchly loyal number three, “Deke” DeLoach, acknowledges, probably the only person he had ever loved was his mother: “Hoover’s capacity to feel deeply for other human beings [was] interred with her in the Old Congressional Cemetery near Seward Square. The later commercial success, admittedly in a more prurient period, of fanciful stories of Hoover at gay transvestite parties suggests that in fabricating stories of his homosexual affairs in the late 1960s Service A had hit upon a potentially promising active measures theme. DeLoach was later depressed to discover how readily such stories were accepted as “undeniable truth:” “Tell us about Hoover and Tolson,” people would say. “Was it obvious?” “Did everyone know what was going on?”^^ As sometimes happened, however, Service A spoiled a plausible falsehood by surrounding it with improbable amounts of conspiracy theory. It sent anonymous letters, intended to appear to come from the Ku Klux Klan, to the editors of leading newspapers, accusing Hoover of personally selecting for promotion in the FBI homosexuals from whom he expected sexual favors. Not content with turning the FBI into “a den of faggots,” Hoover had also allegedly been engaged for several decades in a larger gay conspiracy to staff the CIA and the State Department with homosexuals. The national security of the United States, claimed the letters, was now seriously at risk.^^ Service A’s belief that major newspapers would take seriously nonsense of this kind, especially emanating from the Ku Klux Klan, was graphic evidence of the limitations in its understanding of American society. The letters had, predictably, no observable effect. THE MOST CELEBRATED victim of the FBI’s own active measures was the great civil rights leader Martin Luther King. Hoover’s obsessive belief that King was “a tom cat with degenerate sexual urges” and his simmering resentment at King’s criticism of the FBI led him to make the preposterous allegation to a group of journalists in 1964 that “King is the most notorious liar in the country.” When his staff urged him to insist that his outburst was off the record, Hoover refused. “Feel free,” he told the journalists, “to print my remarks as given.” The active measures against King were organized, apparently without Hoover’s knowledge, by FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan. In December 1964 Sullivan sent King a tape recording of some of his adulterous sexual liaisons which the Bureau had obtained by bugging his room in Washington’s Willard Hotel. With the tape was an anonymous letter which purported to come from a disillusioned former supporter: King, look into your heart. You know you are a complete fraud and a great liability to all of us Negroes ... You could have been our greatest leader. You, even at an early age, have turned out to be a dissolute, abnormal moral imbecile ... You are finished. You will find on the record for all time ... your hideous abnormalities ... What incredible evilness. It is all there on the record. King was probably the only prominent American to be the target of active measures by both the FBI and the KGB. By the mid-1960s the claims by the CPUSA leadership that secret Party members within King’s entourage would be able to “guide” his policies had proved to be hollow. To the Centre’s dismay. King repeatedly linked the aims of the civil rights movement not to the alleged worldwide struggle against American imperialism but to the fulfillment of the American dream and “the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.” He wrote in his inspirational “Letter from Birmingham Jail” in 1963: I have no despair about the future ... We will reach the goal of freedom in Birmingham [Alabama] and all over the nation, because the goal of America is freedom ... We will win our freedom because the sacred heritage of our nation and the eternal will of God are embodied in our echoing demands. Having given up hope of influencing King, the Centre aimed instead at replacing him with a more radical and malleable leader. In August 1967 the Centre approved an operational plan by the deputy head of Service A, Yuri Modin, former controller of the Magnificent Five, to discredit King and his chief lieutenants by placing articles in the African press, which could then be reprinted in American newspapers, portraying King as an “Uncle Tom” who was secretly receiving government subsidies to tame the civil rights movement and prevent it threatening the Johnson administration. While leading freedom marches under the admiring glare of worldwide television. King was allegedly in close touch with the President. The same operational plan also contained a series of active measures designed to discredit US policy “on the Negro issue.” The Centre authorized Modin: • To organize, through the use of KGB residency resources in the US, the publication and distribution of brochures, pamphlets, leaflets and appeals denouncing the policy of the Johnson administration on the Negro question and exposing the brutal terrorist methods being used by the government to suppress the Negro rights movement. • To arrange, via available agent resources, for leading figures in the legal profession to make public statements discrediting the policy of the Johnson administration on the Negro question. • To forge and distribute through illegal channels a document showing that the John Birch Society, in conjunction with the Minuteman organization, is developing a plan for the physical elimination of leading figures in the Negro movement in the US.^^ Service A sought to exploit the violent images of the long, hot summers which began in August 1965 with race riots in Watts, the black Los Angeles ghetto, which resulted in thirty-six deaths, left 1,032 injured and caused damage estimated at over 40 million dollars. The Centre seems to have hoped that as violence intensified King would be swept aside by black radicals such as Stokeley Carmichael, who told a meeting of Third World revolutionaries in Cuba in the summer of 1967, “We have a common enemy. Our struggle is to overthrow this system ... We are moving into open guerrilla warfare in the United States.” Traveling on to North Vietnam, Carmichael declared in Hanoi, “We are not reformists ... We are revolutionaries. We want to change the American system.”^^ King’s assassination on April 4, 1968 was quickly followed by the violence and rioting which the KGB had earlier blamed King for trying to prevent. Within a week riots had erupted in over a hundred cities, forty-six people had been killed, 3,500 injured and 20,000 arrested. To “Deke” DeLoach, it seemed that, “The nation was teetering on the brink of anarchy. Henceforth, instead of dismissing King as an Uncle Tom, Service A portrayed him as a martyr of the black liberation movement and spread conspiracy theories alleging that his murder had been planned by white racists with the connivance of the authorities.^^ Simultaneously the Centre implemented a series of active measures designed to weaken the internal cohesion of the United States and undermine its international reputation by inciting race hatred. In 1971 Andropov personally approved the fabrication of pamphlets full of racist insults purporting to come from the extremist Jewish Defense League, headed by Meir Kahane, calling for a campaign against the “black mongrels” who, it was claimed, were attacking Jews and looting Jewish shops. Thirty pamphlets were mailed to a series of militant black groups in the hope of producing “mass disorders in New York.” At the same time forged letters were sent to sixty black organizations giving fictitious details of atrocities committed by the League against blacks and calling for vengeance against Kahane and his chief lieutenants. Probably to the Centre’s disappointment, Kahane was assassinated some years later, not by a black militant but by an Arab. On at least one occasion, the Centre ordered the use of explosives to exacerbate racial tensions in New York. On July 25, 1971 the head of the FCD First (North American) Department, Anatoli Tikhonovich Kireyev, instructed the New York residency to proceed with operation PANDORA: the planting of a delayed-action explosive package in “the Negro section of New York.” Kireyev’s preferred target was “one of the Negro colleges.” After the explosion the residency was ordered to make anonymous telephone calls to two or three black organizations, claiming that the explosion was the work of the Jewish Defense League. The attempt to stir up racial tensions in the United States remained part of Service A’s stock-in-trade for the remainder of the Cold War. Before the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, for example. Line PR officers in the Washington residency mailed bogus communications from the Ku Klux Klan to the Olympic committees of African and Asian countries. Among the racial taunts devised by Service A for inclusion in the mailings was the following: THE OLYMPICS^FOR THE WHITES ONLY! African monkeys! A grand reception awaits you in Los Angeles! We are preparing for the Olympic games by shooting at black moving targets. In Los Angeles our own Olympic flames are ready to incinerate you. The highest award for a true American patriot would be the lynching of an African monkey. Blacks, Welcome to the Olympic games in Los Angeles! WeTl give you a reception you’ll never forget! This and other active measures on the same theme made front-page news in many countries. When Attorney- General William French Smith denounced the letters as KGB forgeries, Moscow predictably feigned righteous indignation at Washington’s anti-Soviet slanders.^^ THE CENTRE’S ASSESSMENT of “anti-Sovietism” in the United States changed radically at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1968 the Kremlin had been so anxious to prevent the election of the veteran anti-Communist Richard Nixon that it had secretly offered to subsidize the campaign of his Democratic opponent, Hubert Humphrey.^^ Once in office, however, Nixon rapidly emerged as the architect of detente. More Soviet- American agreements were signed in 1972-3 than in the entire forty years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Washington. Nixon’s resignation in August 1974, under threat of impeachment for his involvement in the Watergate scandal, caused both dismay and deep suspicion in Moscow. Seen from the Kremlin, Nixon’s attempts to conceal the use of dirty tricks against his opponents were, as Dobrynin later acknowledged, “a fairly natural thing to do. Who cared if it was a breach of the Constitution?” The conspiracy theorists in the Centre convinced themselves that Nixon’s dramatic fall from power was due far less to public indignation over Watergate than to conspiracy by the enemies of detente — in particular the “Jewish lobby,” who were campaigning for unrestricted emigration by Soviet Jews to Israel, and the military-industrial complex, which was anxious to prevent lower arms expenditure.^^ The key figure in holding together the anti-Soviet coalition, in the Centre’s view, was the liberal Democrat, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Kissinger too regarded Jackson as “the indispensable link between the liberals, preoccupied with human rights [in the Soviet Union], and the conservatives, who became anxious about any negotiations with the Soviets.” “Jackson,” one commentator has written, “was not the type of leader who needed an impassioned aide to tell him what to think, but he had one anyway: Richard Perle, an intense, razor- sharp scourge of the Soviets who, despite his cherubic smile, earned the sobriquet Prince of Darkness from the legions he had engaged in bureaucratic battle.” Perle was the leader of what the KGB saw as a particularly dangerous part of the Jewish lobby: an informal group on Capitol Hill which included both paid Israeli lobbyists and congressional staffers. Jackson was propelled into battle in August 1972 by the Soviet announcement of an exit tax on emigrants, theoretically designed to repay the costs of their statefunded education but whose main practical effect would have been to reduce Jewish emigration to a trickle. In October Jackson introduced an amendment to the Nixon Trade Reform Bill barring the Soviet Union from receiving most-favored nation status and trade credits until it had lifted restrictions on emigration. Though Moscow quickly dropped the exit tax, Jackson maintained his amendment. For the next two years Kissinger conducted a shuttle diplomacy between Moscow and Jackson, trying vainly to obtain enough Soviet concessions on Jewish emigration to persuade Jackson to back down. “For a long time,” said Kissinger later, “I did not realize that Jackson could not be placated.”^^ Dobrynin reported to Moscow that Jackson “kept escalating his demands” in order to win the backing of the Jewish lobby for his attempt to win the Democratic nomination at the 1976 elect! on.^^ The New York resident, Boris Solomatin, informed the Centre that Jackson appeared to be in a strong position for the presidential primaries: Jackson’s strong point is the fact that, during his nearly thirty-five years in Congress, he has never been involved in any sort of political or personal scandal. In the post- Watergate period the personal integrity of a presidential candidate has had exceptionally great significance. It is necessary to find some stains on the Senator’s biography and use them to carry out an active measure which will compromise him. We must discuss with the American friends [the CPUS A] the most effective ways and means of opposing Jackson’s plans to become president of the USA. Others in the Centre cynically concluded that Jackson’s reticence about his private life “probably points to the existence of compromising information which could be used to discredit him and his family.” The KGB’s search for “compromising information” was extraordinarily wide-ranging. Despite the fact that Jackson’s parents had left Norway as long ago as 1885, the Oslo residency was ordered in 1974 to make a detailed investigation of his Norwegian relatives. As the American residencies examined Jackson’s long political career with a fine toothcomb, the most promising area which seemed to emerge was his sexuality. Jackson’s file in the Centre records that his marriage at the age of forty-nine “amazed many of his colleagues, who had considered him a confirmed bachelor.” Intensive KGB research, however, found no more incriminating evidence of homosexuality than the fact that for many years Jackson had shared an apartment in Washington with a male childhood friend. Lacking any proof that Jackson had ever been a practicing homosexual, the Centre decided to fabricate it in an active measure codenamed operation POROK. In 1976 Service A forged an FBI memorandum, dated June 20, 1940, in which Hoover reported to the Assistant Secretary of Justice that Jackson was a homosexual. Photocopies of the forgery were sent to the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the Topeka Capital and Jimmy Carter’s campaign headquarters. Service A also sought to exploit a number of incidents during the 1976 primary campaign. After an argument with a gay rights activist at a press conference in March, Jackson told him that he did not want his vote. During a television appearance in April, Jackson declared that “homosexuality leads to the destruction of the family.” The KGB sent these statements, together with bogus documents purporting to show that Jackson and Perle were members of a gay sex club, to, among others: Senator Edward Kennedy, who was thought “personally hostile to Jackson;” the columnist Jack Anderson; and the magazines Playboy and Penthouse. Because of Jackson’s continuing influence on the ratification of Soviet- American arms limitation agreements, operation POROK continued long after he had failed to gain the Democratic nomination. One of the aims of the operation during 1977 was to incite the gay press into attacking Jackson as a closet gay who hypocritically attacked homosexuality in public for his own political advantage. Early in May a Service A officer in New York posted a forged FBI document to the California-based magazine Gay Times reporting that Jackson had been an active homosexual while working as a state prosecutor in the early 1940s. Handwritten on the forgery was the heading “Our Gay in the US Senate.” Like the rest of operation POROK, the forgery had no discernible effect on Jackson’s career. THE CENTRE’S MAIN target within the Carter administration, which took office in 1977, was the Polish- bom National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, previously an ill-chosen KGB target for cultivation.^^ As Brzezinski later acknowledged, he and Secretary of State Cyms Vance engaged in a “prolonged and intense” debate over policy to the Soviet Union. The result, according to Vance, was an unstable balance between the “visceral anti-Sovietism” of Brzezinski and his own “attempt to regulate dangerous competition” between the superpowers.^^ “When Carter spoke on foreign affairs,” complained Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador, “we tended to hear echoes of the anti-Sovietism of Brzezinski.”^^ The aim of Service A was to diminish Brzezinski’s influence relative to Vance’s and, if possible, to engineer his dismissal. The Centre ordered its American residencies to begin a trawl for potentially damaging information on Brzezinski as wide-ranging as that which preceded operation POROK. Was Brzezinski concealing Jewish origins? Was he having an affair with the actress Candice Bergen? Was there any compromising material on his relations with, among others, his deputy David Aaron, his special assistant Karl Inderfurth, Ambassador Richard Gardner and the Polish emigre community? Though muckraking in the United States appears to have proved unproductive, the Centre was supplied with what it believed was sensational evidence of Brzezinski’s secret career in the CIA by the Bulgarian intelligence service. Probably under pressure from his interrogators, Henrich Natan Shpeter, a Bulgarian economist who had confessed to working for both American and Israeli intelligence, produced a bizarre account of a visit to Bulgaria in 1963 by Brzezinski, then a professor at Columbia University, as a guest of the Academy of Sciences. Shpeter allegedly claimed that Brzezinski was a CIA officer who contacted him by using a password, received intelligence from him and gave him further instructions for intelligence operations. In addition, even in 1963, according to Shpeter, Brzezinski had a major role in framing US policy towards the Soviet Bloc. Shpeter’s story, in short, was strikingly similar to those expected of defendants in Stalinist show trials. The Centre, however, was easily seduced by attractive conspiracy theories and used Shpeter’s bizarre tale as the basis of an active measure code-named operation MUREN. Service A drafted a bogus report on Brzezinski by an Israeli Zionist organization which included allegedly authentic details of his involvement in Shpeter’s espionage. The report went on to denounce Brzezinski as “a secret anti-Semite” and declared that the Zionists had compromising information on his private life which would seriously discredit him. The Centre decided to deliver this bizarre document to the US embassy in Israel, convinced that its contents were so sensational that they would be brought to carter’s as well as Vance’s attention. On August 20, 1978 the report was inserted through the half-open window of a car parked by an American diplomat on a street in East Jerusalem. In all probability, the US embassy dismissed the document as the work of a mildly deranged conspiracy theorist. Service A, however, persuaded itself that it had succeeded in putting Brzezinski ’s career in jeopardy. It seized on press articles during and after the negotiation of the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel in September 1978 — which appeared to show that Vance had established himself as Carter’s main foreign policy adviser — as proof that Brzezinski had been demoted. In November 1978 the deputy head of Service A, L. F. Sotskov, proudly reported to Andropov that operation MUREN had been successfully completed. Though the MUREN file fails to mention it, that judgment was doubtless revised the following year. The hardening of Carter’s policy to the Soviet Union was evident even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979_io3 PROBABLY NO AMERICAN policymaker at any time during the Cold War inspired quite as much fear and loathing in Moscow as Ronald Reagan during his first term as president. Active measures against Reagan had begun during his unsuccessful bid for the Republican nomination in 1976. The Centre had no doubt that Reagan was far more anti-Soviet than either the incumbent president, Gerald Ford, or the Democratic contender, Jimmy Carter. As in the cases of Jackson and Brzezinski, Service A was ordered to embark on a remarkably wide- ranging quest for compromising material. The Centre ordered, inter alia, an investigation of reports that Reagan’s health had been affected by his father’s alcoholism. During his childhood Christmases, Reagan later recalled, “there was always a threat hanging over our family. We knew holidays were the most likely time for Jack [Reagan senior] to jump off the wagon. But such painful childhood memories were not the stuff of which successful active measures were made. Apart from confirming Reagan’s reputation as a Cold War warrior, Service A seems to have discovered nothing more damaging than alleged evidence of his “weak intellectual capabilities.” Service A successfully planted anti-Reagan articles in Denmark, France and India, where they found more fertile soil than in the United States, but it is barely conceivable that KGB active measures had any influence on Reagan’s failure to win the Republican nomination in 1976. The Centre was less involved in trying to influence the 1980 presidential election than it had been four years earlier. Moscow saw little to choose between what it now saw as a Carter administration dominated by Brzezinski’s hard line policies and Reagan’s long-standing anti- Sovietism. “Fed up with Carter and uneasy about Reagan,” wrote Dobrynin, “it decided to stay on the fence.” After Reagan’s election, Moscow quickly regretted its fence-sitting, convinced that the new administration represented “the most conservative, chauvinist, and bellicose part of American politics ... pressing for the restoration of American world leadership after the defeat in Vietnam.” To Dobrynin’s dismay, the Kremlin succumbed to a “paranoid interpretation” of Reagan’s policy, fearful — ^particularly during 1983 — that he was planning a nuclear first strike. Dobrynin discovered from the Washington resident, Stanislav Andreyevich Androsov, the instructions for the vast KGB-GRU operation RYAN designed to detect Reagan’s non-existent preparations for the surprise attack. But RYAN remained so secret that most Soviet ambassadors were kept in ignorance of it.^^^ It was probably the extreme priority attached by the Centre to discrediting the policies of the Reagan administration which led Andropov to decree formally on April 12, 1982, as one of the last acts of his fifteen-year term as chairman of the KGB, that it was the duty of all foreign intelligence officers, whatever their “line” or department, to participate in active measures. Ensuring that Reagan did not serve a second term thus became Service A’s most important objective. On February 25, 1983 the Centre instructed its three American residencies to begin planning active measures to ensure Reagan’s defeat in the presidential election of November 1984. They were ordered to acquire contacts on the staffs of all possible presidential candidates and in both party headquarters. Residencies outside the United States were told to report on the possibility of sending agents to take part in this operation. The Centre made clear that any candidate, of either party, would be preferable to Reagan. Residencies around the world were ordered to popularize the slogan “Reagan Means War!” The Centre announced five active measures “theses” to be used to discredit Reagan’s foreign policy: his militarist adventurism; his personal responsibility for accelerating the arms race; his support for repressive regimes around the world; his administration’s attempts to crush national liberation movements; and his responsibility for tension with his NATO allies. Active measures “theses” in domestic policy included Reagan’s alleged discrimination against ethnic minorities; corruption in his administration; and Reagan’s subservience to the military- industrial complex. Reagan’s landslide victory in the 1984 election was striking evidence of the limitations of Soviet active measures within the United States. Even on university and college campuses Reagan was surprised by the (admittedly less than unanimous) “outpouring of affection and support:” “These students in the eighties seemed so different from those that I’d dealt with as governor a decade earlier.”^ Though Service A was never willing to admit it, there was little it could do to undermine a popular president. Its attacks on Reagan fell on much more fertile ground in Europe and the Third World, however, where his populist appeal to the American way was frequently ridiculed. ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST the Main Adversary were usually more effective outside than inside the United States. One of Service A’s most successful tactics was its use of forgeries of US documents shown in confidence to Third World leaders to alert them to supposedly hostile operations against them by the CIA and other American agencies. Since most of these forgeries were never made public, the United States was not usually able to challenge their authenticity. One characteristic example in the files noted by Mitrokhin was operation KULBIT in the Republic of Guinea in 1975. The operation was based on three French language leaflets attacking the government of President Sekou Toure, allegedly produced by the CIA station in the Guinean capital, Conakry, but in reality fabricated by Service A in Moscow. To heighten the dramatic impact of the forgeries, the Soviet ambassador in Conakry telephoned the Minister of Security, Mussa Diakite, at 6 p.m. on October 16, 1975 to tell him that a special emissary had arrived from Moscow with top secret information for the President of great importance. At 9 p.m. the ambassador and O. A. Seliskov, deputy head of FCD Directorate K, were ushered by Diakite into the presence of Sekou Toure. Seliskov handed the President the three fabricated CIA leaflets, the first of which began with an attack on the high level of Guinean unemployment. According to the KGB file on operation KULBIT, on seeing the reference to unemployment, Sekou Toure turned to Diakite, waved the pamphlet in his face and angrily exclaimed, “The filthy imperialists!” Seliskov then described various alleged plots by the CIA station to overthrow the President, making the plots appear all the more convincing by incorporating into them various pieces of information which he knew were already known to the Guinean security service. Sekou Toure, by now “in an emotional state,” pounded the table and declared, “We will take decisive action against the US intelligence officers you have identified. They will be expelled within twenty- four hours!” When he calmed down, the President observed, as Service A had intended, that some of Seliskov’s information coincided with intelligence already in the possession of his security 111 service.^ Sekou Toure was profuse in his thanks for the KGB disinformation: “We highly appreciate the concern shown by our Soviet comrades. This is not Chile, and we are not going to allow the same events [the overthrow of the President] to happen in our country.” He asked Seliskov how his top secret information on the machinations of the CIA, supposedly obtained from “important and reliable sources in the United States,” should be handled. “At your own discretion,” replied Seliskov graciously. Sekou Toure asked him to convey his “deepest gratitude” to the appropriate Soviet authorities and asked to be kept informed about future imperialist threats to the security of the Guinean Republic. The fabrication of compromising US documents and imaginary CIA plots continued into the Gorbachev era. In addition to the “silent forgeries” shown privately to Sekou Toure and other gullible political leaders around the world, forgeries were used to promote media campaigns: among them, in 1987, a forged letter from the DCI, William Casey, on plans to overthrow the Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi; in 1988, bogus instructions from Reagan to destabilize Panama; and in 1989, a fabricated letter from the South African foreign minister, “Pik” Botha, referring to a sinister but non-existent secret agreement with the United States. Probably the most successful anti-American active measure of the Gorbachev era, promoted by a mixture of overt propaganda and covert action by Service A, was the story that the AIDS virus had been “manufactured” by American biological warfare specialists at Fort Detrick in Maryland. An East German, Russian-bom physicist. Professor Jacob Segal, claimed on the basis of “circumstantial evidence” (later wholly discredited) that AIDS had been artificially synthesized at Fort Detrick from two natural viruses, VISNA and HTLV-1. Thus fortified by spurious scientific jargon, the AIDS fabrication not merely swept through the Third World, but took in some of the Western media as well. In October 1986 the conservative British Sunday Express made it its main front-page story. During the first six months of 1987 alone, the story received major news coverage in over forty Third World countries. At the very height of its success, however, the AIDS fabrication was compromised by a combination of Western protests and “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy. “We tell the truth and nothing but the truth,” Gorbachev proudly proclaimed at a Moscow press conference in July 1987. Faced with official American protests and the repudiation of the AIDS story by the international scientific community, the Kremlin for the first time showed signs of embarrassment at a successful active measures campaign. In August 1987 US officials in Moscow were informed that the story was officially disowned and Soviet media coverage of it came to an abrupt halt. The AIDS fabrication, however, was swiftly followed by other, equally scurrilous anti-American active measures in the Third World, some of which also seduced sections of the Western media. Among the most successful was the “baby parts” story, alleging that rich Americans were butchering Third World children in order to use their bodies for organ transplants in the United States. In September 1988 a motion in the European Parliament condemning the alleged trafficking in “baby parts,” proposed by a French Communist MEP, passed on a show of hands in a poorly attended session. Even the end of the Cold War did little to diminish the enthusiasm for active measures of both Kryuchkov, who became chairman of the KGB in 1988, and Leonid Shebarshin, who succeeded him as head of the FCD. Shebarshin, who had made his reputation as resident in India from 1975 to 1977 in part by the success of his active measures operations, was wont to speak “nostalgically about the old days, about disinformation — forging documents, creating sensations for the press. Not all KGB personnel, however, shared their chiefs’ continuing enthusiasm for active measures. Kryuchkov complained in September 1990 that some FCD officers in both Moscow and foreign residencies “underestimate the importance and the role of measures designed to promote influence.” He issued a formal “Order of the Chairman of the KGB” requiring “refinement of the work of the foreign intelligence service in the field of active measures” and insisting that “their importance in intelligence work is continuing to grow:” In effect the joint political and operational scenario and the interests of the Soviet state and its society require the KGB foreign intelligence service to introduce active measures with greater ingenuity, inventiveness and secrecy which will enhance the level of their effectiveness ... Work on active measures is to be considered one of the most important functions of the KGB’s foreign intelligence service. The FCD training school, the Andropov Institute, was instructed to prepare new “specialist courses in active measures.” Among the most important “themes” for active measures was to frighten off support by the West — in particular the United States — for nationalist movements in the Baltic republics and other parts of the Soviet Union: In Western government and political circles and in influential emigre groups, it is important ... to strengthen the conviction that an adventurist gamble on the disintegration of the Soviet Federation and statehood would lead to a disruption of contemporary international relations with the attendant unpredictable consequences.^ Amid the active measures promoted by the SVR in the mid-1990s there remained some echoes of its KGB past. Yeltsin’s memoir, The View from the Kremlin, published in the West in 1994, ends with an appendix which contains two specially selected examples of KGB documents in the secret archives of the Russian president. One concerns the assassination of John F. Kennedy. The KGB documents on this topic, probably drawn to Yeltsin’s attention by the SVR (then headed by Yevgeni Primakov), support the theory formerly propagated by Service A that Oswald had been selected as the assassin by “a group of Texas financiers and industrialists headed by millionaire Hunt:” Oswald was the most suitable figure for executing a terrorist act against Kennedy because his past allowed for the organization of a widespread propaganda campaign accusing the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the US Communist party of involvement in the assassination. But ... Ruby and the real instigators of Kennedy’s murder did not take into account the fact that Oswald suffered from psychiatric illness. When Ruby realized that after a prolonged interrogation Oswald was capable of confessing everything, Ruby immediately liquidated Oswald. No conspiracy theory of the Cold War era seems to have greater staying power than that generated by the death of President John F. Kennedy. FIFTEEN PROGRESS OPERATIONS Part 1: Crushing the Prague Spring The KGB and its predecessors had played a crucial part in the creation of the Soviet Bloc after the Second World War. Throughout eastern Europe, Communistcontrolled security services, set up in the image of the KGB and overseen — except in Yugoslavia and Albania — ^by Soviet “advisers,” supervised the transition to so-called “people’s democracies.” Political development in most east European states followed the same basic pattern. Coalition governments with significant numbers of non- Communist ministers, but with the newly founded security services and the other main levers of power in Communist hands, were established immediately after German forces had been driven out. Following intervals ranging from a few months to three years, these governments were replaced by bogus, Communist-mn coalitions which paved the way for Stalinist one-party states taking their lead from Moscow. ^ The German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht announced to his inner circle on his return to Berlin from exile in Moscow on April 30, 1945: “It’s got to look democratic, but we must have everything under our control.”^ Because a democratic facade had to be preserved throughout eastern Europe, the open use of force to exclude non-Communist Parties from power had, so far as possible, to be avoided. Instead, the new security services took the lead in intimidation behind the scenes, using what became known in Hungary as “salami tactics” — slicing off one layer of opposition after another. Finally, the one-party people’s democracies, purged of all visible dissent, were legitimized by huge and fraudulent Communist majorities in elections rigged by the security services.^ During the early years of the Soviet Bloc, Soviet advisers kept the new security services on a tight rein. The witch-hunts and show trials designed to eliminate mostly imaginary supporters of Tito and Zionism from the leadership of the ruling Communist Parties of eastern Europe were orchestrated from Moscow. One of the alleged accomplices of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Laszlo Rajk, in the non-existent Titoist plot for which Rajk was executed in 1949, noted how, during his interrogation, officers of the Hungarian security service “smiled a flattering, servile smile when the Russians spoke to them” and “reacted to the most witless jokes of the [MGB] officers with obsequious trumpetings of immoderate laughter.”^ Even after Stalin’s death, any Soviet Bloc intelligence officer of whom the KGB disapproved became a marked man. Among them was Ernst Wollweber, head of the East German Stasi from 1953 to 1957, whose long connection with Soviet intelligence went back to his years as an NKVD agent in the 1930s, specializing in marine sabotage. Wollweber, however, had come to dislike Moscow’s habit of issuing peremptory orders and resented the fact that the KGB kept him ill-informed on its operations in West Germany. The KGB also distrusted Wollweber’s current mistress, Clara Vater, a German Communist who, like many of her comrades, had been unjustly imprisoned during Stalin’s Terror.^ Remarkably, it placed both her and her daughter, whom Wollweber had adopted, under surveillance inside East Germany. Wollweber was succeeded in 1957 by the sycophantically pro- Soviet Erich Mielke, who remained in office with Moscow’s blessing until 1989, becoming one of the world’s longest serving intelligence chiefs.^ ON EACH OF the three occasions when the Red Army intervened to restore pro- Soviet orthodoxy in a wayward Communist state — Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979 — the KGB played a prominent part in what was euphemistically termed the process of “normalization.” When the Hungarian uprising began in October 1956 with mass demonstrations calling for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the KGB chairman. General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, flew to Budapest to take personal charge of KGB operations. At an emergency meeting of security and police officers in the interior ministry, Serov denounced their reluctance to fire on the demonstrators: “The fascists and imperialists are bringing out their shock troops into the streets of Budapest, and yet there are still comrades in your country’s armed forces who hesitate to use arms!” Sandor Kopacsi, the Budapest chief of police, who was soon to side with the freedom fighters, replied scornfully: Evidently the comrade adviser from Moscow has not yet had time to inform himself of the situation in our country. We need to tell him that these are not “fascists” or other “imperialists” who are organizing the demonstration; they come from the universities, the handpicked sons and daughters of peasants and workers, the fine flower of our country’s intelligentsia which is demanding its rights . . J A quarter of a century later Kopacsi still vividly recalled the long, withering glare in his direction from Serov’s steel-blue eyes. Shortly before Kopacsi escaped to the West, Serov told him, “I’m going to have you hanged from the highest tree in Budapest!” On the evening of November 3, 1956 a Hungarian delegation headed by Pal Maleter, the minister of defense, was invited to Soviet military headquarters at Tokol to discuss final details of the Red Army’s withdrawal from Hungarian soil. At midnight, while toasts were being drunk, Serov, brandishing a Mauser pistol, burst into the room at the head of a group of KGB officers and arrested Maleter and his colleagues. A series of mock executions over the next few hours convinced each member of the Hungarian delegation that all his colleagues had been shot.^ At 4 a.m. on November 4 the Red Army began the suppression of the Hungarian uprising. Serov and his deputy, KGB General K. Grebennik, who became military commandant of Budapest, stayed on to supervise the “normalization.”^ Though it was not until after the Prague Spring of 1968 that the Red Army intervened again to enforce Soviet ideological orthodoxy, Moscow showed growing anxiety during the 1960s at increasing Western influence within the Soviet Bloc. The KGB reported that the West was engaged in wide-ranging “subversive activity in the political and ideological sphere against the socialist countries ... seeking to persuade the population of the superiority of the Western way of life.” The “subversion” took many forms: broadcasting, propagandist publications, information distributed by Western embassies, East- West cultural and scientific exchanges, tourism and letterwriting. In the Centre’s view. Western radio stations such as the BBC World Service and Radio Liberty threatened to cause “immense harm” by broadcasting propaganda designed to weaken the fraternal ties between the Soviet Union and the socialist states of eastern Europe. What most worried the KGB was that “the broadcasts were popular with the intelligentsia and young people.” According to statistics probably obtained from its Hungarian ally, the AVH, over 20 per cent of young people in Hungary listened to Western radio stations. During 1964 approximately fifty million postal items were exchanged between Hungarian citizens and the West, eight million more than in 1963. The KGB was also exercised by the growth in east European visitors to the West, who were in danger of returning with subversive ideas. In 1964 168,000 Hungarians and 150,000 Czechoslovaks visited Western countries. Worse still, in the Centre’s view, many were unsupervised during their visits. The KGB complained that its Polish ally, the SB, had no officers in its foreign residencies who were responsible for monitoring the behavior of Polish tourists and Poles studying abroad. In 1964 34,500 Poles traveled to the West as individuals rather than as members of groups. The KGB kept somewhat bizarre statistics of “harmful attitudes” and “hostile acts” in the Soviet Bloc, which it tended to lump together: such disparate phenomena as enthusiasm for Western pop music with cases of ideological deviation. In both 1965 and 1966 Hungarian young people were said to have been guilty of approximately 87,000 “harmful attitudes” and “hostile acts.” According to classified official statistics, the figure fell reassuringly, if somewhat surprisingly, to 68,000 in 1968 and remained at about that level for the next decade. Disturbingly, however, about 30 per cent of the cases recorded concerned members of the Communist youth organization, Komsomol. “The West’s subversive activities,” complained one KGB report, were “harming the cause of Socialist construction” throughout the Soviet Bloc, encouraging nationalist tendencies in the states of eastern Europe and damaging their ties with the Soviet Union. The greatest harm was being done among the intelligentsia and young people. The KGB noted “an unhealthy tendency” among writers towards “ideological co-existence” with the West and a growing belief that literature was no business of the Party. Students showed a worrying tendency to set up independent non-Party organizations for “free discussion on the model of English clubs.” One undated KGB report picked out two subversive texts currently attracting “growing interest:” The New Class by the heretical Yugoslav Communist Milovan Djilas, and the works of the late nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. It is easy to see why Djilas’s devastating expose of the Soviet system as a co-optive oligarchy run by a privileged Party nomenklatura should have been seen as so subversive. In 1963 the twenty-year-old Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky was sent to psychiatric hospital for possessing a copy of it. Even for KGB officers The New Class was seen as a potentially dangerous text. When General Oleg Kalugin finally read the book in the KGB library in 1981, twenty- four years after its publication in the West, he found himself secretly agreeing with it.^^ Why Nietzsche should have been mentioned in the same breath as Djilas is more puzzling. His call for a “revaluation of all values” so that the life force of the strongest should not be hampered by the weak, though bearing some relation to the actual practice of Stalinism, was ideological anathema. But the works of Nietzsche, unlike those of Djilas, were scarcely likely to subvert the youth of the Soviet Bloc. The author of the KGB report probably knew no more about the great German philosopher than that he was a well-known enemy of Marxism. The first stirrings of reform in Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960s, however, caused relatively little concern in the Centre. The chief target of the reformers, the aging and truculent Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) leader, Antonin Novotny, was increasingly regarded in Moscow as a neo- Stalinist nuisance rather than as a bulwark against revisionism. In December 1967 Brezhnev made an unscheduled one-day visit to Prague at the request of Novotny, who was under pressure to relinquish the post of First Secretary, which he had hitherto combined with that of president. Brezhnev refused to intervene, telling Novotny bluntly to deal with the problem himself. Deprived of Soviet support, Novotny gave way to the reformers. The election of the 46-year-old Alexander Dubcek as the new First Secretary on January 5, 1968 initially aroused no disquiet in either the Kremlin or the Centre. Dubcek had spent most of his childhood in the Soviet Union, graduating with honors from the Moscow Higher Party School in 1958, and was condescendingly known within the KGB as “Our Sasha.” When the Czechoslovak attempt to create “Socialism with a human face” began, the FCD Eleventh (East European) Department at first concluded that “Our Sasha” was being cleverly manipulated by “bourgeois elements” in the CPCz. Once it became clear that Dubcek was himself one of the moving forces behind the reforms, the Centre felt a sense of personal betrayal. Dubcek believed, in retrospect, that Moscow took a secret decision to use the Red Army to crush the Prague Spring little more than two months after he succeeded Novotny: Under Novotny and his predecessors, the Soviets had been permitted to control the Czechoslovak armed forces and secret police in various ways, which included an implicit “right” to approve key appointments. It was apparently not until mid-March that they realized that their proxies might be fired and replaced without their consent and decided to step in.^^ In reality Brezhnev remained unsure about the wisdom of military intervention until almost the eve of the August invasion. The Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin, shared some of Brezhnev’s doubts. Both, however, gradually gave way to the hardliners in the Politburo. The case for military intervention was first put at the Politburo meeting on March 21 by the Ukrainian Party secretary, Petr Yefimovich Shelest, who declared that the fate of the whole “socialist camp” was at stake in the Prague Spring. Though it was “essential to seek out the healthy [pro- Soviet] forces in Czechoslovakia more actively,” he argued that “military measures” would also be necessary. Shelest was vigorously supported by the KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, who called for “concrete measures” to prepare for armed intervention.^^ Though as yet only a candidate (non-voting) member of the Politburo, Andropov became an increasingly influential voice during the Czechoslovak crisis, willing to challenge Kosygin and other more senior figures who appeared reluctant to use force.^^ As Soviet ambassador in Budapest in 1956, Andropov had played a key role in suppressing the Hungarian Revolution. His insistence that the threat of counter- revolution had reached a critical stage helped to persuade an initially reluctant Khrushchev to agree to military intervention.^^ An admiring junior diplomat in the Soviet embassy later recalled how Andropov had been the first to “see through” the reformist prime minister, Imre Nagy, and had seemed completely in control of events even as Soviet tanks entered Budapest: “He was so calm — even when bullets were flying, when everyone else at the embassy felt like we were in a besieged fortress. As well as being an uncompromising advocate of force, Andropov had demonstrated his mastery of deception, successfully persuading Nagy that the Red Army was being withdrawn while simultaneously plotting his overthrow. When the Hungarian commander-in-chief phoned the Prime Minister’s office early on November 4 to report the Soviet attack, Nagy told him, “Ambassador Andropov is with me and assures me there’s been some mistake and the Soviet government did not order an attack on Hungary. The Ambassador and I are trying to call Moscow.”^^ In Czechoslovakia in 1968, as in Hungary in 1956, Andropov’s strategy was based on a mixture of deception and military might. Among the main instruments of deception during the Prague Spring were KGB illegals, all disguised as Westerners. Their deployment in Czechoslovakia in the first of what were henceforth termed PROGRESS operations marked a major innovation in the KGB’s use of illegals. Hitherto illegals had been sent overwhelmingly to the West rather than the East. Most of those deployed within the Soviet Bloc had been sent on missions (codenamed BAYKAL) either to cultivate Western tourists or to monitor contacts between Soviet citizens and Westerners. In 1966 and 1967, for example, a number of illegals were sent to Bulgarian Black Sea resorts to mingle with the growing number of Western holidaymakers and look for possible recruits. The illegal Stanislav Federovich Malotenko visited tourist areas of Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia posing as a Western visitor in order to investigate, inter alia, “how willingly women agents agreed to have intimate relations with foreigners without permission” from the KGB.^^ During the Prague Spring illegals, posing as Western tourists, journalists, business people and students, were for the first time used in significant numbers in a country of the Soviet Bloc for both intelligence collection and active measures. Czechoslovak counter-revolutionaries, the Centre believed, would be much franker in revealing their subversive designs to those they believed Western sympathizers than to their neighbors in eastern Europe. Even within the FCD the PROGRESS operation in Czechoslovakia was known only to a small circle of senior officers. Initially the PROGRESS file was kept in the office of the head of Directorate S (Illegals), General Anatoli Ivanovich Lazarev, though, as operations in Czechoslovakia expanded, the group within the directorate who were privy to the secret also widened.^^ Of the first twenty illegals selected by the Centre for PROGRESS operations in Czechoslovakia during 1968,^^ at least five (GROMOV, SADKO, SEVIDOV, VLADIMIR and VLAS)^^ and probably another two (GURYEV and YEVDOKIMOV) posed as West Germans. There were also three bogus Austrians (ARTYOMOVA, DIM and VIKTOR)^ ^ and three bogus Britons (BELYAKOV, USKOV and VALYA),^^ fictitious Swiss (ALLA^^ and SEP^^), one Lebanese (YEFRAT^^) and one Mexican (ROY^^).^^ Probably in March, Andropov ordered that by May 12 at least fifteen of the illegals should be deployed in Czechoslovakia — more than had ever been despatched to any Western country in so short a period of time. Each was given a monthly allowance of 300 dollars as well as travel expenses and enough money to rent an apartment. Andropov also expanded the KGB legal representation in Prague. In addition to the KGB liaison office, headed by M. G. Kotov, which had been operating in the headquarters of the StB (its Czechoslovak equivalent) for the past twenty years, Andropov secretly established an undeclared KGB residency, headed by V. V. Surzhaninov, which began work in the Soviet embassy on April 26.^^ The deputy head of FCD Directorate S, G. F. Borzov, and another senior Line N officer, V. K. Umnov, were sent to the residency to co-ordinate the work of the illegals.^^ The main task both of the residency’s Line PR and of the KGB liaison with the StB was to identify reliable, pro- Soviet members of the CPCz to form a quisling government after a Soviet invasion. At the top of their list the KGB put four hardline members of the CPCz Presidium — Alois Indra, Jozef Lenart, Drahomir Kolder and Vasil Bil’ak — and a former minister of the interior, Rudolf Barak, who had been dismissed and imprisoned in 1962, officially for embezzlement of Party funds but in reality for using the StB to collect an incriminating dossier on Novotny.^ ^ KGB officers in Prague had little difficulty in arranging meetings with Indra, Lenart, Kolder and Bil’ak, who were regular visitors to the Soviet embassy. It was considered too risky, however, to approach Barak directly after his release from prison early in May. Instead, the KGB residency used a female illegal, Galina Leonidovna Linitskaya (codenamed ALLA), operating with a Swiss passport in the name of Maria Werner, to make the first approach to Barak. For some years the vivacious ALLA had specialized in making contact with Western visitors to the Soviet Union who were of interest to the KGB. Her KGB file primly complains that she was “too sexually stimulated” and, despite having a daughter, “not a family person” (not a criticism which appears in the files of male illegals). ALLA had first met Barak in 1961, when he was minister of the interior, and succeeded in renewing contact with him soon after his release from prison. At ALLA’s request, Barak agreed to a meeting with B. S. Ivanov of the KGB residency.^^ Indra, Lenart, Kolder and Bil’ak were all to prove stalwarts of the neo- Stalinist regime which later presided over the destruction of “Socialism with a human face.” Barak, however, proved far less useful than the Prague residency had hoped, partly because of resentment — even by some pro- Soviet members of the CPCz leadership — at his brutality as minister of the interior when he had been in charge of the StB. He was not fully rehabilitated until 1975, seven years after his release from prison.^^ THE KGB ILLEGALS deployed in Czechoslovakia had two main tasks: to penetrate the allegedly counter- revolutionary groups springing up during the Prague Spring in order to report on their subversive intentions; and to implement a series of active measures designed to discredit them. The main task of penetration was entrusted to YEFRAT, GURYEV, YEVDOKIMOV, GROMOV and SADKO.^^ Their chief targets were what the Centre saw as the main sources of subversive ideas: • the Union of Writers (in particular its chairman, Eduard Goldst Acker, and vice-chairman, Jan Prochazka, and the celebrated authors Pavel Kohout and Milan Kundera); • radical journals which had escaped Communist control such as the Union of Writers’ Literdrm Listy and the Socialist Party’s Svobodne slovo, as well as the increasingly unorthodox Communist Party newspaper. Rude prdvo; • leading reformists in television and radio (in particular Jifi Pelikan, the director-general of Czechoslovak television); • Charles University, especially its philosophy department, which took the lead in pressing for a new law protecting academic freedom, and leading student activists such as Lubomir Holecek and Jifi Mailer; • K-231, a club of former political prisoners who had been jailed under the notorious Article 231 of the Czechoslovak criminal code; • KAN, the club of non-Party activists, formed in early April to give those who were not Party members the opportunity to participate in public life and share in the building of “a new political system — hitherto never realized in history — democratic socialism;” • and the Socialist and People’s Parties, struggling to recover the independent existence they had lost after the Communist coup in 1948.^^ One of the defining moments of the Prague Spring, which epitomized the new climate of political freedom and the near-collapse of official censorship, was the May Day procession through the capital, seen on television throughout the country. Instead of the usual tedious display of sycophantic admiration for the Party leadership and platitudinous slogans celebrating friendship with the Soviet Union, there was a spontaneous celebration of popular support for the reform movement combined with irreverent messages for Moscow such as the banners proclaiming “With the Soviet Union for ever — but not a day longer!” and “Long live the USSR — ^but at its own expense!” Dubcek remembered the day “with deep emotion,” “truly touched” by the support for him from the former political prisoners of K-231 and the non-Party activists of KAN. For Moscow, however, the day was an outrageous counter-revolutionary provocation which demonstrated that the Czechoslovak one-party state was in mortal danger.^^ The danger was all the greater because, in the Centre’s view, the StB was becoming increasingly unreliable. Probably Moscow’s leading bete noire in Oldfich Cemik’s government, which took power in April, was the interior minister, Josef Pavel, who was responsible for the StB. Ironically, the KGB placed much of the blame for Pavel’s appointment on Lubomir Strougal, who later turned against the reformists and played a prominent part in the return to pro- Soviet orthodoxy. According to a report in the KGB files, Strougal came into Cemik’s office soon after his appointment as prime minister and, fearing that the office was bugged, asked him to come for a stroll by the river Vltava, which runs through the center of Prague. During their walk Strougal urged Cemik to give Pavel the interior ministry. Because Pavel had spent some years in prison during the early 1950s, Strougal argued that he could be relied upon to ensure that the police and the StB did not abuse their powers. Cerik allegedly agreed with his arguments. In late April, soon after becoming Interior Minister, Pavel announced that both the ministry and the StB were henceforth to be under government — not Party — control, and that a series of senior officials were to be sacked. Among them was the pro-Soviet head of the StB, Josef Houska, who was dismissed in June. Some weeks before he left, he handed the KGB photocopies of a series of StB personnel files. On May 1 0 Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet prime minister, sent Cerik, his Czech counterpart, an outraged letter complaining, among other things, that “agents and saboteurs” disguised as Western tourists had been able to penetrate Czechoslovakia because of poor border security.^^ What Kosygin predictably failed to mention, however, was that the most active agents and all the saboteurs with Western passports were KGB illegals. On the very day he sent his letter, GROMOV ( Vasili Antonovich Gordievsky) and GURYEV (Valentin Aleksandrovich Gutin), both posing as West Germans, were attempting to kidnap two of the most eloquent tribunes of the Prague Spring. GROMOV had recent experience in kidnapping. Only a month earlier he had been decorated for an assignment in Sweden, which involved exfiltrating another illegal, FAUST, who was considered by the Centre to have developed a persecution syndrome. Once back in the Soviet Union, FAUST had been sent to a psychiatric hospital for a year, then released and sacked from the KGB.^^ The targets selected for exfiltration by GROMOV and GURYEV in May 1968 were Professor Vaclav Cemy and Jan Prochizka.^^ Vaclav Cemy (codenamed TEMNY),^^ one of Czechoslovakia’s leading authorities on Romance literature, had been expelled from his chair at Charles University after the Communist coup in 1948 but re- emerged during the Prague Spring as a founder member of KAN and an eloquent advocate of academic freedom. At the June 1967 Congress of the Writers Union, Jan Prochizka had been one of those who took the lead in denouncing official censorship and demanding “freedom of creativity.”^^ Claiming to be concerned for his safety, GURYEV tried to persuade Cemy that he was in serious personal danger (presumably from the hardline opponents of reform) and offered to find him a temporary hiding place. GROMOV delivered a similar message to Prochizka. Once persuaded of the need to hide, both Cemy and Prochizka were to be handed over to thugs from Service V (the FCD “special actions” department), who would drive them in a car with CD plates which could cross unchecked into East Germany. If they resisted, Cemy and Prochizka were to be subdued with what the operational file euphemistically describes as “special substances.” The operation, however, was a miserable failure. After the persecution Cemy had suffered during the previous twenty years, GURYEV could not persuade him that he was in any greater danger than usual. GROMOV discovered to his dismay that Prochizka had been supplied with a bodyguard by Pavel. The Centre had also overlooked the language problems involved in the operation. Though Cemy was a good linguist, Prochizka spoke only Czech. Posing as a non-Czech-speaking West German, GROMOV found it difficult to communicate with him. Though he could probably have made himself understood in Russian, he would have risked revealing his real identity. After a few weeks GURYEV and GROMOV abandoned their kidnap attempts. In addition to their other missions during the Prague Spring, the illegals were tasked with a series of active measures collectively codenamed KHODOKI (“gobetweens”), which were intended to justify a Soviet invasion by fabricating evidence of a counter- revolutionary conspiracy by Czechoslovak “rightists” and Western intelligence services. Posing as sympathetic Westerners, the illegals tried to persuade editors and journalists to publish attacks on the Soviet Union and other provocative articles. They also attempted to interest Cemy and K-231 in accepting aid from a fictitious underground organization allegedly supplied with arms by the West. Josef Houska, the StB chief sacked by Pavel in June, was secretly informed of operation KHODOKI and agreed to co-operate with it.^^ By mid- July, as part of KHODOKI, the illegals had succeeded in planting fabricated evidence of preparations for an armed coup. On July 19 Pravda reported the discovery of a “secret cache” of American weapons near the West German border, some conveniently contained in packages marked “Made in USA,” which had allegedly been smuggled into Czechoslovakia by “revenge seekers and champions of the old order.” The Soviet authorities, it claimed, had also obtained a copy of an American “secret plan” to overthrow the Prague regime. The press throughout the Soviet Bloc followed up Pravda'^ story with reports that hidden Western weapons were being discovered all over Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously bogus intelligence was fed to the StB implicating K-231 and KAN in a counter-revolutionary conspiracy with Western intelligence services. The Soviet Politburo met to consider its next step in the crisis on the same day that Pravda produced its first report on the fictitious counter-revolutionary arms caches. Brezhnev began the meeting by proposing a final meeting with the Czechoslovak leadership to try to reach a negotiated settlement. Only if that failed should they take “extreme measures.” Andropov emerged as the chief spokesman of those who wanted extreme measures immediately. Bilateral talks, he argued, would achieve little, while any delay would increase the threat from “the rightists:” “They are fighting for survival now, and they’re fighting frenziedly ... Both we and they are making preparations, and theirs are very thorough. They are preparing the working class, the workers’ militia [for a conflict].” It was a bad-tempered meeting. Andropov became involved in a furious argument with Kosygin, whom he accused of “attacking” him, presumably because of his call for immediate military intervention. “I am not attacking you,” retorted Kosygin. “On the contrary, it is you who are attacking me!” The only full member of the Politburo who supported Andropov’s opposition to a final meeting with the CPCz leadership was K. T. Mazurov. However, the foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, like Andropov a non- voting member of the Politburo and later his close ally, probably summed up the majority view when he declared that meeting Dubcek and his colleagues was no more than a necessary preliminary to invasion: “Clearly they will not accept our proposals. But then we can move to a decision about taking extreme measures ’’60 As Gromyko had predicted, the meeting between the CPCz Presidium and the Soviet Politburo at the border town of Ciemi nad Tisou from July 29 to August 1 ended without agreement. After an StB investigation, Pavel reported to the CPCz Presidium that the alleged counter- revolutionary arms caches were a “provocation.” Though the weapons themselves were American, of Second World War vintage, some of them were in Soviet-made packaging. Other intelligence linking K-231 and KAN with Western secret services was also discovered to be fabricated. The KGB illegals behind operation KHODOKI, however, went undetected. Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files lend some, though not conclusive, support to the claim by an StB defector that the KGB planned to murder the Soviet wives of a number of Czechoslovak citizens in August and blame their deaths on counter- revolutionaries. The plan was apparently discovered by the StB and aborted. At a meeting of the CPCz Party committee of the StB early in August, the head of StB foreign intelligence, Shuoj Frouz (codenamed FARKAC), argued that the KGB advisers in the StB were violating the principles of Czechoslovak- Soviet intelligence liaison and should be recalled to Moscow. A report of the meeting, at which other StB officers supported Frouz, was quickly relayed to the KGB.^^ After the Soviet invasion, those who had demanded the recall of the KGB advisers were arrested — with the significant exception of Frouz, who may well have made the demand on KGB instructions in order to identify the main anti-Soviet elements in the StB in advance of the invasion. As well as producing fabricated evidence of a Western plot for public consumption, Andropov supplied the Politburo throughout the crisis with slanted intelligence designed to strengthen its resolve to intervene. Probably the most important accurate intelligence on American policy to reach the Centre during the Prague Spring came from the Washington residency, where the dynamic 34- year-old head of Line PR, Oleg Kalugin, gained access to what he reported were “absolutely reliable documents” proving that neither the CIA nor any other agency was manipulating the Czechoslovak reform movement. These documents, however, failed to conform to Andropov’s conspiracy theory of an imperialist plot and were thus kept from the Politburo. On returning to Moscow, Kalugin was amazed to discover that the Centre had ordered that “my messages should not be shown to anyone, and destroyed.” Instead, on Andropov’s orders, “The KGB whipped up the fear that Czechoslovakia could fall victim to NATO aggression or to a coup.”^^ At a meeting in Moscow on August 18, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the other four “reliable” members of the Warsaw Pact — Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and Poland — formally agreed on the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the biggest armed action in Europe since the end of the Second World War.^^ At 4 p.m. on August 20 a meeting of “reliable” members of the StB was briefed by Pavel’s pro- Soviet deputy, Viliam Salgovic, on plans for the invasion which was to begin that night and assigned tasks to assist the Warsaw Pact forces. Josef Houska, dismissed by Pavel two months earlier, returned to take charge of the StB. At about 9 a.m. on the morning of August 21, with Soviet forces already in key positions in Prague, the StB veteran Lieutenant Colonel Bohumil Molnir, who had been given a specially engraved automatic pistol by the former KGB chairman, Ivan Serov, for his assistance in crushing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, briefed the group of StB officers selected by the KGB to arrest Dubcek and the reformist majority on the CPCz Presidium. Escorted by KGB officers, the arrest group proceeded to Dubcek’ s office in the Central Committee building, where one of them announced in what seemed to Dubcek the “mechanical voice” of a second-rate amateur actor: “I am placing you in custody in the name of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government led by Comrade Indra.” He added, after a pause in which he seemed to be remembering his lines, that Dubcek and his colleagues would shortly be brought before a revolutionary tribunal, also headed by Alois Indra.^^ Indra and the other leading members of the quisling govemment-in-waiting selected by Moscow were already in the Soviet embassy ready to take power. But at this point the invasion plan had to be modified. Indra and his co-conspirators had mistakenly assured Moscow that the invasion would be supported by a majority of the CPCz leadership.^^ The fact that Dubcek retained a majority on the Presidium as well as overwhelming popular support forced Moscow to abandon its plan for a puppet regime and bring Dubcek and his colleagues to the Kremlin, under KGB escort, to be browbeaten into a degree of submission. Brezhnev stuck to the fabricated KGB story that “anti-socialist” forces had been preparing a coup: Underground command posts and arms caches have now come to light. We don’t want to make charges against you personally, that you’re guilty. You might not even have been aware of it ... As the discussion proceeded over the next few days, however, the Soviet Politburo passed from attempts to justify the invasion and the pretense of comradely solidarity to intimidation and coercion. Dubcek felt he had no option but to concede the main Soviet demands: “It could not have been otherwise. We were managing the affairs of an occupied country where the barrel of a Soviet gun was trained on our every move.” On August 26 the Czechoslovak delegation signed a secret protocol accepting a “temporary” occupation by forces of the Warsaw Pact. The decisions of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the CPCz hurriedly convened on August 22, which had condemned the invasion, were annulled. Some of the leading reformists in the Party, government, radio and television who had most outraged Moscow were dismissed. The Kremlin intended the Moscow protocol only as the beginning of a process of “normalization” which would rapidly turn the Prague Spring into winter. As a later official history of the CPCz complained: The Right ... still held the decisive positions in the Party, the state apparatus and the mass media ... The Marxist-Leninist forces in the Party and society led a difficult and complicated struggle from August 1968 to April 1969, characterized by the gradual suppression of the Right. Of particular concern to Andropov was the continued strength of the “Right” in the StB, despite Houska’s arrest of some leading reformists. According to KGB reports from Prague, the situation was most serious in foreign intelligence: In the [StB] First [foreign intelligence] Directorate nationalist passions were inflamed and there were acts of an anti-Soviet nature: removal of the Soviet flag, [hostile] slogans, attacks on Soviet military units sent to protect the old premises of the First Directorate, intelligence officers going underground, handing in their official passes, and stopping work in protest at the arrival of Soviet troops. The Centre was outraged by a series of resolutions passed by the plenary committee of the StB First Directorate Communist Party: 1. Communists of the First Directorate Communist Party Organization welcome the return of the Czechoslovak delegation from Moscow and express their joy that comrades Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cemik, Kriegel, Svoboda and others will have the possibility of resuming their constitutional and Party duties. [In fact, on Soviet insistence, Kriegel was sacked.] In expressing their confidence in them, the Communists of the First Directorate Party Organization will continue to give these comrades their full support in implementing the [reformist] action program of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. 2. The First Directorate Communist Party Organization expresses concern about the contents of the final communique on the talks in Moscow, which reflects the fact that the talks were held in conditions of inequality, under pressure and with occupation forces present in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 3. The Communists again express their full support for the lawfully elected leadership of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and welcome its return to carry out its duties. The Communists demand an urgent investigation into all incidents in which the orders of this leadership, and also the orders of the Minister of Internal Affairs Pavel [sacked at Moscow’s insistence], were contravened. In this connection, it is also essential to determine what role was played by officers of the USSR KGB. The Party Organization recognizes the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress [annulled by the Moscow protocol] as lawful and places responsibility for the crisis on the Soviet troops. The KGB discovered that the StB resident in New York, codenamed PATERA, was trying vainly to persuade the Czechoslovak foreign minister, Jifi Hajek, to address the United Nations Security Council on the Soviet invasion, in defiance of the Moscow protocol. “If we did not raise the Czechoslovak question in the Security Council,” PATERA insisted, “the nation would declare us to be traitors. The StB resident in Washington, his eyes brimming with tears, told Oleg Kalugin, “My children will hate you for what you’ve done to my country. They will never forgive you for what happened. It took several years for “healthy forces,” as the KGB referred to the Soviet loyalists in the StB, to eradicate all trace of revisionism. After the Soviet invasion KGB illegals remained central to Andropov’s strategy for penetrating and destabilizing “rightist” forces. PROGRESS operations in Czechoslovakia were augmented by other Soviet Bloc intelligence services. On August 25 Mielke, who had deployed East German illegals in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring, informed the Centre that he was sending a further contingent to Prague, together with Stasi officers to direct their operations and liaise with the KGB residency. In September Andropov and Sakharovsky, the head of the FCD, traveled to Warsaw and agreed a plan for the SB (the Polish KGB) to use both agents and illegals to penetrate the Czechoslovak “counter- revolutionary underground,” emigre groups and hostile intelligence services. The most valuable unwitting KGB source among the ranks of Czechoslovak “counter-revolutionaries” identified in the files seen by Mitrokhin was Leo Lappi (codenamed FREDDI), a former political prisoner and founder member of K-231. The fact that, though a Czechoslovak citizen, Lappi was an ethnic German made him far easier to cultivate than the majority of Czechoslovak citizens who were not fluent in Western languages. The first contact with Lappi was made by ALLA, posing as a German- speaking Swiss, in October 1968.^^ After about two months his cultivation was handed over to another female illegal, ARTYOMOVA, who had assumed the identity of an Austrian businesswoman.^^ From February 1969 onwards, Lappi’s case officer was FYODOROV, who, using a West German passport in the name of Walter Brade, for the next decade became the leading illegal specializing in Czechoslovak operations. Since ALLA and ARTYOMOVA had reported that Lappi let rooms to foreigners, FYODOROV made initial contact with him on the pretext that he was a businessman looking for accommodation in Prague. Lappi had no idea that ALLA, ARTYOMOVA and FYODOROV were KGB illegals sent on missions to assist in the destruction of the last remnants of “socialism with a human face.” Instead, they successfully persuaded him that they were Western supporters of the Prague Spring, anxious to do what they could to assist in its restoration. Given the almost universal revulsion in the West at the Soviet occupation, Lappi’s misplaced trust in his new Swiss, Austrian and German friends was an understandable mistake, cynically exploited by FYODOROV. Lappi’s confidence in FYODOROV was so complete that he left him in charge of his flat when he went on holiday to Romania. He introduced FYODOROV both to K-231 activists and to leaders of the Christian Democrat, People’s and Socialist Parties, which had tried to re-establish themselves during the Prague Spring. Lappi regularly acted as translator at FYODOROV’S meetings with them. Some of FYODOROV’S reports on his meetings with the counter-revolutionaries were rated so highly by the Centre that they were forwarded to the Politburo. What the KGB files do not, of course, report are the feelings of the illegals as they betrayed the sometimes heroic survivors of the Prague Spring. Unlike the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Soviet public, who had no first-hand experience of the world outside the Soviet Bloc, the illegals knew the West and the reality of life in Czechoslovakia too well to have deluded themselves into believing that they were engaged in a moral crusade to defend socialist values against Western imperialism. There were recurrent complaints in FCD Directorate S that after postings abroad illegals sometimes returned with an “incorrect” attitude towards life in the Soviet Union. Occasionally their attitudes were so incorrect that their careers were cut short. In 1966 the KGB liaison office in Budapest virtuously reported to the Centre a series of politically incorrect observations made by the female illegal ERNA while returning from leave in Moscow to her posting in Canada. Among the comments said to have “shocked” her fellow KGB officers were the following: In Moscow I was afraid to express my views frankly on certain subjects. After all, I could see that they thought that I had become more than a bit bourgeois. Why did the Party allow a second cult of personality to develop in respect of Khrushchev? I cannot understand how Khrushchev could take decisions on important Party and state matters all on his own. And what were the other members of the Central Committee doing? Were the consequences of the cult of Stalin not still fresh in their minds? What is the point now of launching so many Sputniks? Would it not be better to attend to more important things on earth? Twenty years have gone by since the end of the war, but people do not have the material goods which they need and deserve, and which the humblest inhabitants of the West have long enjoyed!^^ Very few illegals dared to voice such seditious comments openly. But the fact that some undoubtedly thought such thoughts cannot fail to have bred in them an increasing cynicism, heightened in some cases by their experiences in Czechoslovakia. Some insight into the attitude of GROMOV, one of the first five illegals assigned to the penetration of “rightist” groups during the Prague Spring, is provided by the recollections of his younger brother, Oleg Antonovich Gordievsky, who worked from 1963 to 1972 in the FCD Illegals Directorate and Line N in the Copenhagen residency. GROMOV had been bom in 1933 and, in Oleg’s view, “had grown up among boys bmtalized by war,” becoming a cynical, materialistic adult who much preferred life in the West to the relative privations of Czechoslovakia. When Oleg was informed during his training that he had to choose between learning Czech and Swedish, his brother told him he would be an idiot not to choose Swedish: “If you take Czech, you’ll spend the rest of your life sitting in the pathetic consular departments in Prague and Bratislava ... [But] Sweden’s a nice country ... From there you can go anywhere in Europe. There are signs of a less blatant cynicism towards the Czechs in FYODOROV’S reports to the Centre. He wrote of the role of the Red Army in Czechoslovakia : “The Soviet forces play the role of a policeman standing at a crossroads where there is heavy traffic; everyone notices him and this disciplines the traffic.” The Czechoslovak population, in other words, was being cowed into submission. In the case of a minority of illegals, their Czechoslovak experiences probably had more serious consequences than simply an increased level of cynicism. A few years later ALLA attempted to commit suicide. Though her KGB file attributes the episode solely to the fact that her partner had left her,^^ it is difficult to believe that the betrayal of the Czechoslovaks ALLA had befriended did not add to her emotional scars. A more common reaction by the illegals to their experiences in Czechoslovakia was probably to turn to alcohol. Unable to stop drinking even after he contracted hepatitis B during a mission in south- east Asia, GROMOV died in 1972 at the age of only thirty-nine.^^ Both BOGUN and his wife also became alcoholics. In 1976 he was admitted for “a full course of anti-alcohol therapy” at the Burdenko military hospital, while his wife was treated for alcoholism in the psycho- neurological department of the Central KGB Polyclinic. The previous few years, during which BOGUN had worked extensively on PROGRESS operations in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in eastern Europe, seem to have taken a much heavier psychological toll than his earlier period as an illegal in the United States. In the case of one member of the Illegals Directorate there is no doubt about the shattering impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. For GROMOV’ s brother, Oleg Gordlevsky, then serving in Copenhagen, “It was that dreadful event, that awful day, which determined the course of my own life.” The crushing of the Prague Spring convinced him that the Soviet one-party state was, by its very nature, destructive of human liberties. He spent much of the next few years secretly pondering how to work for its overthrow before taking the decision to become a British penetration agent within the KGB.^^ SIXTEEN PROGRESS OPERATIONS Part 2: Spying on the Soviet Bloc Dubcek later described the eight months after the Soviet invasion as “an organized retreat, in which no inch of territory was given up without calculated resistance.”^ It was a retreat, however, which was doomed to end in defeat. Dubcek’ s position and that of the other leading reformers was steadily undermined by a combination of Soviet pressure, the old guard within the CPCz and former allies who decided to throw in their lot with the invaders to save their own careers. The immediate pretext for Dubcek’ s removal was the World Ice Hockey Championship in Stockholm in March 1969. On March 21, Dubcek later recalled, “The whole country watched [on TV] as Czechoslovakia played the Soviets; it was much more than ice hockey, of course. It was a replay of a lost war ...” The national rejoicings after the Czechoslovak victory led the KGB to prepare, with assistance from its stooges in the StB, an anti-Soviet riot to follow the next match between Czechoslovakia and the USSR on March 28. Shortly before the match a team of police agents disguised as city workers unloaded a pile of paving stones in front of the offices of the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, in Wenceslas Square. Prague police documents show that the whole operation was directly supervised by a Soviet agent in the Czech ministry of the interior.^ Immediately after the Czechoslovak team had defeated the Soviets for the second time in a week, StB plain clothes personnel mingling with the celebrating crowd began to throw the conveniently placed stones at the Aeroflot office. The office furniture was dragged out on to the pavement and set alight. Moscow now had the fabricated evidence it required to demand that, “The counter-revolution must be beheaded.” Dubcek believed he had no option but to resign. “Otherwise the Soviets would set up another provocation that could lead to further public turmoil and even a bloodbath.”^ On April 17 he was succeeded as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Party by the Slovak first secretary, Gustav Husak. As Dubcek broadcast the news of his replacement, he broke down and wept. PROGRESS operations in Czechoslovakia continued. A senior officer from FCD Directorate S, Dmitri Kirillovich Vetrov, arrived in Prague to supervise and coordinate the work of the illegals as they penetrated the ranks of the unrepentant reformists.^ Posing as a Swiss sympathizer with the Prague Spring, Galina Vinogradova (ALLA) was instructed to cultivate Ladislav Lebovic (codenamed KHAN), one of the trainers of the victorious Czechoslovak ice hockey team which was viewed with deep suspicion in the Centre.^ The illegal Yuri Linov (KRAVCHENKO), who pretended to be Austrian, succeeded in gaining the confidence of the international chess grand master and sports columnist Ludek Pachman, one of the organizers of the illegal broadcasts transmitted in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. As soon as Linov had identified those of Pachman’ s friends and associates who were ready to continue “the struggle against the Soviet occupiers,” Pachman himself was arrested and imprisoned.^ Though delighted by Dubcek’s departure, the KGB liaison office in Prague remained unenthusiastic about his successor, Gustav Husak, who had been imprisoned in 1952 on trumped-up charges as an alleged Trotskyist and “bourgeois nationalist.” “Spending nine years in prison,” it reported, “has left its mark on Husak’ s psychology, in that he shows unwarranted indulgence towards clear adversaries of the Czechoslovak Communist Party line.” The KGB liaison office complained to the Centre that there was “no genuine internal unity” within the CPCz leadership, which was divided between “internationalists” such as Bil’ak and Indra, who had supported Soviet intervention in August 1968, and “realists” led by Strougal, who had opposed intervention but now accepted it as a fact of life. The two sides were engaged in a power struggle, seeking to gain key positions and place their supporters within the Party apparatus.^ Over the next year both realists and internationalists had some successes. In January 1970 Strougal replaced Cemik as prime minister. Simultaneously, however, BiTak was put in charge of an operation to purge the CPCz of all reformists during the introduction of new Party cards. ^ A fellow hardliner, Milos Jakes, head of the Central Committee’s Control and Auditing Committee, became his right-hand man and regularly reported on the progress of the purge to the KGB liaison office.^ Seventeen years later Jakes was to succeed Husak as general secretary of the CPCz. The Centre’s assessment of the work of the KGB liaison office and residency in Prague during 1970 concluded: The bloc of revisionist and anti-socialist forces in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has suffered a political defeat; the legal ideological centers of the right-wing have been eliminated; the main ideologists of Czechoslovak renewal have been removed from the political arena and expelled from the Party; and measures have been taken to purge the state apparatus of the most active carriers of the right-wing danger. However, it would not be right to suppose that with the exchange of Party cards the Czechoslovak Communist Party has totally purged its ranks of hostile and alien elements. Indra, whom Moscow had originally intended to take power after the invasion at the head of a “Workers’ and Peasants’ Government,” was reported by the liaison office to be “biding his time,” waiting for an opportunity to press his claims as general secretary. His wait was to prove in vain. KGB agents and Soviet sycophants within the CPCz continued to protest that Strougal and other former reformists retained far too much influence at the expense of the Soviet Union’s true friends. One informant in the Ministry of the Interior, Jaroslav Zeman, complained that Strougal was discriminating against the internationalists: “And what sort of person is Strougal? In 1968 he was preparing to emigrate to the West and had currency and documents ready for his escape.” While turncoats prospered under Strougal’ s patronage, “Officials who cooperate with the USSR are looked down on in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; they are kept in the dark, and are not promoted or rewarded.”^^ By January 1971 310 foreign intelligence officers had been dismissed and 170 expelled from the Party. The whole of the senior staff of the internal StB had been replaced along with many more junior officers. The Centre, however, was not satisfied. The KGB liaison office was instructed during 1971 to press the interior ministry and the StB “in a tactful manner” to carry out a thorough reorganization of Czechoslovak intelligence “in view of the fact that the central apparatus was tainted and the possibility that committed agents of the adversary were present in it.” The Centre wished for active assistance from a reformed StB in the collection of scientific and technological intelligence, the deployment of illegals and other FCD operations. Despite continuing doubts about the reliability of some StB personnel, the KGB liaison office reported that the minister of the interior, Radko Kaska, displayed a satisfactory level of subservient cooperation: We have not noticed any unjustified or non-objective information from Kaska. Up to the present he has informed us frankly and in detail about internal political processes in Czechoslovakia and about the situation within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The KGB was provided with copies of StB operational orders and reports, and proposed staff changes were submitted for its approval. At Husak’s instructions, Kaska began secretly collecting material on “leading right-wing personalities” in order to determine how many could be held to have broken state laws.^^ The KGB was. however, embarrassed to be asked by Kaska in March 1971 whether it had any “adverse information” on past contacts with the West by the chairman of the National Assembly, Dalibor Hanes. The Centre was concerned that, if it replied to Kaska’ s enquiry, it would give the (perfectly accurate) impression that “the KGB is engaged in collecting information on officials of fraternal Parties in friendly countries.” The head of the KGB liaison office in Prague, Ye. G. Sinitsyn, was instructed to reply that it had “no reports of links between Hanes and foreign intelligence,” but that, since it followed the principle of not spying on its allies, it would be unable to respond to such requests in future. Sinitsyn was privately informed by the Centre that BiTak had complained to the Soviet ambassador that Hanes had “taken up incorrect positions” during the Prague Spring and that his father had been responsible for “crushing workers’ demonstrations in Slovakia” between the wars.^^ Soon afterwards Hanes was replaced as chairman of the National Assembly by the impeccably orthodox Indra.^^ On May 4, 1971 Kaska met Semyon Konstantinovich Tsvigun, KGB deputy chairman, to report on the progress of “normalization.”^^ Tsvigun owed his job almost solely to the fact that he was one of Brezhnev’s oldest drinking partners. Kalugin found him “downright stupid but relatively harmless. Tsvigun cannot have been wholly reassured by Kaska’ s briefing. Over the past two years. Kaska told him, about 450,000 CPCz members had left or been expelled, “making contact between the Party and the population more difficult.”^^ With one exception, the heads of all directorates in the interior ministry had been replaced. In all, about 3,000 of its employees in the StB and other agencies had been dismissed. There was, however, still widespread evidence of anti-Soviet feeling. Soviet films and plays were systematically boycotted. At the Czechoslovak premiare of the film The Kremlin Chimes there were only five people in the audience; at the second showing there were only ten. There were numerous anonymous threats, malicious rumors and acts of sabotage on the railways. But there were also successes to report. The StB had succeeded in setting up a bogus organization dedicated to “socialism with a human face,” in order to smoke out secret supporters of the Prague Spring. Finally, Kaska assured Tsvigun that he and his ministry were in close touch with the KGB liaison office and its head. General Sinitsyn.^^ In the spring of 1972 Andropov had a private meeting with Kaska. His manner was more assertive than that of Tsvigun a year earlier. He insisted that opposition forces were still strong, despite the “stabilization” in Czechoslovakia and the strengthening of the Communist Party’s authority, and that they were being infiltrated by Western intelligence services. Agent penetration of the opposition therefore remained essential. The opposition source to which Andropov attached most importance probably remained Leo Lappi (FREDDI). Still posing as a committed West German supporter of the Prague Spring, the illegal FYODOROV had regular meetings with Lappi in Prague and East Berlin. On January 25, 1972 Fyodor Konstantinovich Mortin, who had succeeded Sakharovsky as head of the FCD, sought Andropov’s permission to trick Lappi into becoming a Soviet agent by a “false flag” deception which concealed the role of the KGB. Andropov gave his approval on January 29 and FYODOROV went ahead with the recruitment, claiming to be working for the West German BND. An additional reason for the Centre’s interest in Lappi was that his brother Karl was a West German citizen who, according to KGB files, was “close” to two prominent FRG politicians.^^ Despite Kaska’s personal sycophancy towards his KGB advisers and the extensive purge which he had overseen, the Centre remained dissatisfied with the ideological purity of the StB. In August 1972 Andropov reported to the CPSU Central Committee that “internal adversaries” in the StB were striving to prevent the completion of “normalization.”^^ A further KGB report to the Central Committee in November cited complaints from its agents and informers within the Czechoslovak Ministry of Internal Affairs that leading posts in the ministry continued to be occupied by “people who do not inspire political confidence. The KGB also received numerous protests from its informants that the disgraced leaders of the Prague Spring and their families were being insufficiently persecuted. Viliam Salgovic, who had assisted the Soviet invasion in 1968 and had been promoted to the CPCz Central Committee in 1970, complained that the children of “right-wing leaders” were being allowed to enter the universities. Worse still, the children of three disgraced former members of the Presidium — Dubcek, Stefan Sadovsky and Julius Turcek — had been given “excellent marks” in their entrance examinations.^^ Salgovic ’s complaint reflected the self-righteous vengefulness of the Soviet sycophants rather than any failure to purge the universities. In 1969-70 900 out of 3,500 university professors were dismissed. All Czech literary and cultural journals were closed down. Unemployed academics and writers were forced to seek new careers as lavatory cleaners, building laborers and boiler-room stokers. Soon after winning the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1972, Heinrich Boll described Czechoslovakia as “a veritable cultural cemetery. MANY OF THE reports received by the Centre throughout the period of “normalization” concerned continued covert feuding within the CPCz leadership. In December 1972 Jakes complained to the KGB liaison office that Husak had ordered the telephones of all Presidium members to be tapped. The working atmosphere within the Central Committee was now, he claimed, so poisonous that the Novotny era appeared, by comparison, a golden age.^^ In February 1973 Jakes and three other leading Soviet loyalists — Presidium members Karel Hoffmann and Antonin Kapek and party secretary Miloslav Hruskovic — again protested to the KGB about what they claimed were “attempts to squeeze out internationalist Communists from important posts. Among other intrigues within the Party leadership reported by the KGB to Moscow during 1973 was the claim that the realist Prime Minister Strougal was seeking to ingratiate himself with Husak’ s internationalist deputy Bil’ak by methods which included giving Bil’ak’s daughter a present costing 10,000 crowns, debited to the budget of the Czechoslovak television service. On February 28, 1973 Kaska was killed in an aircrash while visiting his Polish opposite number and was succeeded as Minister of Internal Affairs by Jaromir Obzina, who promptly gave a sycophantic display of his internationalist credentials. “For the CPSU and for Comrade Brezhnev,” he told the KGB liaison, he was “ready to carry out any assignment.”^^ Obzina, however, quickly became caught up in Husak’ s attempts to increase his personal prestige by combining, like Novotny before the Prague Spring, the post of President of the Republic with that of General Secretary of the CPCz. At the end of 1973, probably at Husak’s request, Obzina began trying to win over internationalists opposed to his ambitions for the presidency. According to KGB reports from Prague, a group of Soviet loyalists headed by Hoffmann, Indra, Jakes and Kapek (all in close touch with both the KGB and the Soviet embassy) continued to resist any attempt to combine the two posts. The growing senility of Ludvik Svoboda, who had succeeded Novotny as president in 1968, however, played into Husak’s hands. In May 1975 he replaced the by now demented Svoboda as head of state. Rude prdvo celebrated the occasion by publishing five large photographs of Husak, each showing him in the company of one of the leaders of the five Warsaw Pact countries who had invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968.35 At the time of Husak’s apotheosis, Dubcek was working as a mechanic with the Slovak Forestry Commission under constant surveillance and frequent harassment by the StB.^^ On October 2, 1975 the Centre reported to Brezhnev that Dubcek had sent compromising material on Husak to the Western media. Based on information supplied by Dubcek, the West German and Austrian press had reported that during the war Husak had accompanied a group of Nazi journalists to the Katyn Wood near Smolensk, where the Germans had exhumed the bodies of several thousand Polish officers shot by the NKVD (an atrocity blamed by Moscow on the Germans). Dubcek was twice summoned for questioning by the StB at the Slovakian interior ministry. The KGB was deeply dissatisfied by the outcome. “At the interrogation,” it informed Brezhnev, “Dubcek conducted himself provocatively, categorically refusing to answer questions and declaring that in future he would protest against being subjected to pressure.” Dubcek refused to sign either a denial that he had provided the information on Husak or a protest at the use of his name by the Western press, and threatened to react “decisively” if “repressive measures” were taken against him. Husak meanwhile wrote to Obzina to protest his innocence of the charges against him.^^ Despite Husak’ s success in capturing the presidency, his power was more circumscribed than Novotny’s a decade earlier. His second-in-command, the internationalist Bil’ak, enjoyed greater authority and influence than any other deputy in eastern Europe. Having rejected the idea of a regime wholly dominated by notorious hardliners, the Kremlin, with some misgivings, regarded the Husak-Bil’ak combination as the best available. A KGB report from Prague at the end of the decade reported in thinly disguised language that, despite growing friction between Husak and Bil’ak, neither was attempting to topple the other because they knew that Moscow would not allow it: Business-like relations between the leaders of Czechoslovakia are being maintained largely because of the fact that Husak Bil’ak and other members of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party know that the top leadership of the CPSU gave their full, firm and uncompromising support to Husak and Bil’ak. For both, this is a serious restraining factor for maintaining normal working relations between the two of them, and the situation in the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party largely depends on their mutual relations. Despite its jaundiced view of the political leadership, the KGB liaison office in Prague was fully satisfied with the willingness of Obzina and the StB to do its bidding. Obzina, it reported, kept it “objectively informed” both about what took place in the CPCz Presidium and about the activities of each of its members, Husak included.^^ Sinitsyn reported in 1977 that there were “operational contacts” between KGB and StB residencies in twenty-six countries. In 1975 the StB had agreed to a Soviet request to open a residency in Albania, a country which the KGB found hard to penetrate.^ ^ In 1976, when the StB discovered that Jozef Grohman, editor-in-chief of the state technical literature publishing house and the Czechoslovak representative at UNESCO, was working for West German intelligence, Obzina invited the Centre to send KGB officers to Prague to help in the investigation of the Grohman case at what he deferentially termed “a higher professional level. Sinitsyn concluded his annual report from Prague in 1977: Our friends hand over to us all their cipher traffic with the residencies, whether it is of an information nature or operational; they also hand over telegrams from ambassadors. Our friends keep practically no secrets from us.^^ The crushing of the Prague Spring and the “normalization” which followed marked a turning point in the KGB’s policy towards eastern Europe. The PROGRESS operations by illegals pioneered in Czechoslovakia were extended to the rest of eastern Europe to monitor the state of public opinion, penetrate subversive groups and watch for signs of “ideological sabotage” by Western intelligence agencies. From 1969 onwards the KGB was also allowed to recruit agents and confidential contacts throughout the Soviet Bloc. In addition to the KGB liaison offices in the countries of the Warsaw Pact, the Centre now established, as in Czechoslovakia, secret residencies operating under diplomatic cover in Soviet embassies. In March 1968, partly as a result of the Prague Spring, there had been several weeks of confrontation between Warsaw students and the police, during which the aging Polish leader Wladislaw Gomulka had seemed in danger of losing control. Gomulka survived in the short term only because of his steadfast backing for intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Kremlin’s desire to avoid simultaneous upheavals in another part of the Soviet Bloc. His position, however, was already under threat from his eventual successor, Eduard Gierek. According to reports from the KGB liaison office in Warsaw, the hardline, anti- Semitic minister of the interior, Mieczyslaw Moczar, who was responsible for the SB (the Polish KGB), feared that his own position would also be threatened under Gierek and began plotting to prevent his succession. Compromising material on Gierek was passed, on Moczar’ s instructions, to Radio Free Europe via an SB agent. Moczar also ordered the bugging of a series of leading figures in the PUWP, the Polish Communist Party.^^ Late in 1970 Gomulka’ s position was fatally undermined by a new round of public protest. On December 14 workers at the Baltic shipyards of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin struck in protest at a sudden rise in food prices. Clashes next day with security forces left 300 strikers and demonstrators dead.^^ According to KGB reports from Warsaw, the order to open fire on the shipyard workers was given by Zenon Kliszko, Gomulka’ s closest supporter on the Politburo, and General Grzegorz Korczyhski, deputy defense minister and a supporter of Gierek.^^ The KGB also forwarded to Moscow the minutes of the Polish Politburo meeting held to discuss the crisis on December 19. With Gomulka in a Party clinic suffering from nervous exhaustion, the meeting was chaired by the prime minister, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, who asked the Minister of Defense, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, to report on the situation. Jaruzelski’s assessment sealed Gomulka’ s fate. He reported that 350 tanks and 600 troop carriers had been deployed in Gdansk and Gdynia alone. If unrest on a similar scale occurred in Warsaw, he could not guarantee the security of the capital, though special measures would be taken to protect Party and government buildings. Army morale was seriously affected. On the Baltic coast it was being met with shouts of “Gestapo!” and “Murderers!” Jaruzelski was followed by Moczar, who summarized SB and other reports reaching the interior ministry. The Party, he said, has never found itself so helpless in the face of a crisis. Hitherto, even when times were hardest. Party members had felt they were fighting for “a righteous cause” — ^but no longer. In Party meetings, when the Politburo letter justifying the price increases was read out, some Communists were reduced to tears and left the room. The rise in family allowances from 15 to 25 zlotys caused derision among rank and file members, stunned by the leadership’s incomprehension of ordinary living conditions. After an agitated debate it was agreed that Gomulka should be replaced as first secretary by Gierek. There was then an acrimonious discussion about who should tell Gomulka to submit his resignation, before it was finally decided to send Cyrankiewicz and the hitherto faithful Kliszko.^^ Gomulka’ s downfall marked the first occasion anywhere in Europe since the Second World War when spontaneous working-class protest had brought about a change of political leadership.^^ The Centre was predictably alarmed at the extent and success of the popular revolt and immediately embarked on a PROGRESS operation to assess how far it had been contained. A group of illegals, posing once again as Western visitors, were instructed to investigate the role of the Catholic Church in organizing protest, its attitude towards the Gierek regime and the general mood of the population. Among the illegals was the experienced Gennadi Blyablin (BOGUN), disguised as a West German press photographer, who was given a list of five individuals to cultivate and told to persuade two or three of them to “co-operate under false flag,” in the belief that they were supplying information not to the KGB but to West German wellwishers. Probably the most important name on the list was that of Father Andrzej Bardecki, personal assistant to Cardinal Archbishop Karol Wojtyla of Krakow, whom the Centre considered the leading ideological influence on the Polish Church. The KGB doubtless did not foresee that less than eight years later Wojtyla would become the first Polish pope, but it showed some foresight in identifying him as a potential threat to the Communist regime.^ ^ DURING 1971, IN addition to the illegals sent on PROGRESS operations to Czechoslovakia and Poland, thirteen were deployed in Romania, nine in Yugoslavia, seven in East Germany, four in Hungary and three in Bulgaria.^^ Though all had broadly similar objectives, there were also specific causes of KGB concern in each country. The priority given to Romania in 1971 reflected growing Soviet displeasure at the foreign policy of its leader, Nicolae Ceau§escu, who combined a nepotistic version of neo- Stalinism at home with increasing independence from the Warsaw Pact abroad. After condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceau§escu was rewarded in the following year by a state visit from Richard Nixon, the first by an American president to Communist eastern Europe. In 1970 Ceau§escu paid the first of three visits to the United States. Moscow showed its displeasure at his visit to Beijing in 1971 by staging Warsaw Pact maneuvers on the Romanian borders.^^ KGB reports on Romania were written in a tone which combined indignation with deep suspicion: Exploiting the anti-Soviet line of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Chinese government, the Romanian leadership has set out on the path of so-called autonomy and independence from the Soviet Union ... Nationalism is flourishing in Romania. Its authors and advocates are the very same Party and government leaders. The Romanian Communist Party leadership does not openly reveal its territorial claims; but it does everything to demonstrate that historically, ethnically and in other ways Moldavia and the Chemovitsy Oblast belong to Romania. The statement made by Mao in conversation with Japanese socialists about the USSR’s illegal acquisition of Bessarabia [Moldavia] has been developed in Romania. The French newspaper Le Monde has twice published articles casting doubt on the legality of Bessarabia’s inclusion in the [Soviet] Union. It is not impossible that the initiative for publishing the articles came from Romania. The illegals sent to Romania under Western disguise in 1971 were ordered to collect intelligence on Romanian relations with the United States and China; Romanian claims on Soviet territory in Bessarabia and north Bukovina; the political and economic basis of opposition to the Soviet Union; the position of German and Hungarian minorities; the Ceau§escu cult; and the state of the Romanian Communist Party. The illegals’ main sources included staff of the Party newspaper Scintea and the German language Volk und Kultur.^^ PROGRESS OPERATIONS IN Yugoslavia during 1971 were prompted chiefly by the most serious internal crisis since Tito’s break with Moscow in 1948. The dramatic resurgence of nationalist tensions during the Croat Spring of 1971 culminated at the end of the year with Tito’s arrest of the Croat Communist leaders and 400 Croat nationalists and in his resumption of direct control over the Croat secret police. The claim that Yugoslav socialism was resolving ethnic rivalries was exposed as an illusion. The illegals were given a long list of institutions in which they were instructed to “strike up acquaintances:” the Academy of Sciences, the Public Opinion Institute in Belgrade, the editorial offices of Kommunist, Politika and Borba, the Tanjug Agency, the Institute for International Politics and Economics at Belgrade University, Zagreb University, Yugoslav businesses and the Union of Journalists (in particular, the writer Dobrica Cosic, who was believed to be close to Tito). Some of the reports sent back to the Centre by illegal courier, radio and the post were judged sufficiently important to be forwarded to Brezhnev. BY FAR THE largest KGB presence in eastern Europe was in East Germany. Ever since the Second World War there had been a large KGB enclave within the headquarters of the Soviet military administration in the Berlin suburb of Karlshorst. During the period which preceded the establishment of the GDR it had closely monitored political parties, churches, trade unions and public opinion within the Soviet zone of Germany. Though the KGB claimed after the foundation of the GDR that the role of its Karlshorst base was to mount operations against the FRG and other Western countries, as well as to provide liaison with the Stasi, it also continued to monitor developments within East Germany.^^ In 1971 the intelligence personnel stationed at Karlshorst, not including liaison officers, totaled 404, of whom fortyeight were operations officers working under cover. Another forty-seven KGB operations officers were stationed elsewhere in the GDR.^^ The advent of Willy Brandt’s socialist-liberal coalition in West Germany in 1969 offered opportunities for detente which Moscow was more anxious to pursue than Walter Ulbricht, the aging and inflexible neo- Stalinist leader of East Germany. KGB reports from Karlshorst complained that, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht was posing as the wisest and most far-sighted statesman of the Soviet Bloc, implying (probably correctly) that he had been quicker than Brezhnev to identify the subversive nature of the Dubcek regime. Ulbricht’ s refusal to abandon his commitment to a united “socialist” Germany made him unwilling to consider an agreement with Brandt involving, for the first time, mutual recognition by the FRG and the GDR.^^ By 1969, if not before, both Willi Stoph, the East German prime minister, and Erich Honecker, who had overseen the building of the Berlin Wall, were fueling Moscow’s growing irritation with Ulbricht at meetings with the KGB and the Soviet ambassador, Pyotr Andreyevich Abrasimov. Ulbricht, they reported, had described Soviet cut-price imports of East German uranium as “the plundering of the GDR’s natural resources.” When Abrasimov suggested that allowance needed to be made for Ulbricht’ s age (he was seventy-six in 1969), Stoph and Honecker retorted that he should have resigned when he was seventy. In 1971 Ulbricht was kicked upstairs to the newly created post of Party chairman, and succeeded as Party leader by Honecker. In the following year the GDR and FRG formally recognized each other’s existence as separate states. Though bickering continued within the Party leadership, the KGB’s main concern was “the impact of the adversary’s ideology on citizens of the GDR” through Western broadcasts and visits by West Germans. The Centre calculated in the mid-1970s that “500,000 citizens are hostile to the existing system and the [Western] adversary will for a long time retain a base of support in the GDR.”^^ A long-running KGB operation, codenamed LUCH, monitored opinion within the East German population and Party, contacts between East and West Germans and alleged “attempts by the USA and the ERG to harm the building of socialism” in the GDR. In 1974 the section of the Karlshorst KGB responsible for LUCH was raised in status to a directorate.^^ The majority of the Centre’s intelligence on East Germany, however, came from the Stasi, whose network of internal informers was vastly greater than the KGB’s. The GDR had seven times as many informers per head of population as Nazi Germany. In 1975 65 percent of all reports from Soviet Bloc security services received by the Centre came from the Stasi. Some of the reports were, in effect, classified East German opinion polls. In an opinion survey of factory workers in 1974, for example, 20.6 percent of those questioned “considered that friendship with the USSR restricted the GDR’s autonomy and brought more benefit to the Soviet Union than to the GDR.” A majority, when asked to explain the phrase “achieving working-class power,” claimed not to know what it meant. Some of the comments on the phrase, however, were described in the report forwarded to the Centre as “bitter, wounding and vicious.” Among them were “Working-class power is all right [in theory], but what is it like in practice?”; “This is just a slogan!”; and “Justice for every worker, not just for a newly created privileged group!” Given the inevitable caution of those questioned in expressing politically incorrect views, the real level of dissatisfaction was probably considerably higher. Both the size of the KGB’s Karlshorst base and the volume of intelligence from the Stasi made the Centre less dependent on PROGRESS operations by illegals for intelligence from East Germany than from the rest of eastern Europe. THE KGB’S MAIN concern in Hungary was the extent of Jewish influence within the Party and the AVH (the Hungarian KGB). Always prone to Zionist and anti- Semitic conspiracy theories, the Centre was deeply disturbed by Hungarian reluctance to agree in 1969 to its suggestion for holding “an anti-Zionist conference in Budapest of progressive Jews opposed to the policy of Israel” or for assisting the KGB in making an anti-Zionist film alleging cooperation between Hitler and Hungarian Zionists. “The Hungarian security agencies,” the Centre concluded, “were forced to look over their shoulder when working on the [anti-]Zionist line, as Jewish nationalists within the leadership of the highest Party organs were morbidly cautious with regard to this sector of work.” The KGB also looked askance at the number of Jews within the Hungarian interior ministry, among them — it reported — two deputy ministers, the heads of the AVH First and Third Directorates (responsible, respectively, for foreign intelligence and the surveillance of domestic political opposition), the head of the police directorate and the head of military counter-intelligence. The situation was worst of all in foreign intelligence, where, according to KGB calculations, thirteen of the seventeen department chiefs were Jewish.^^ The illegals sent to Hungary on PROGRESS operations in 1971 posing as Western visitors were sent primarily to investigate the extent of Zionist influence. They were instructed to report on attitudes to Israel and its trade and economic relations with Hungary, “the links of Hungarian organizations and individuals with Zionist circles” and the situation in the Writers’ Union and other “creative unions” (where Jewish influence was also believed to be strong). The illegals were also told to “identify anti- Semitic attitudes,” presumably in the hope that they would discover popular opposition to the number of Hungarian Jews in high places. According to an alarmist Centre assessment, “Pro-Zionist domination was entrenched in Party, state and public organizations.”^^ DURING 1972 PROGRESS operations were extended to areas of nationalist unrest within the Soviet Union. On October 4, 1972 KGB Directive No. 150/3-10807 instructed the FCD Illegals Directorate to investigate the mood of the population and the activities of Western tourists in the Baltic republics. The Centre’s analysis of the reports received from ARTYOM, FYODOROV, SEVIDOV and VLAS was uniformly depressing. Posing as Western visitors, all four illegals noted inefficient administration; an apathetic workforce “just sitting out the appointed [working] hours, with no pride in their profession;” intolerance between ethnic groups; and widespread drunkenness. The population of the Baltic republics were, however, “well informed about events in the West and in the Soviet Union.” Letters were taken to the West by foreign tourists, frequently written by people anxious to enter into marriages of convenience with Westerners to provide pretexts for emigration: “Many people of either sex marry ethnic Jews, although they themselves are not Jews; their only aim is to leave the USSR.” As frequently occurred with analyses of internal dissidence, the main scapegoats were the Jews. Because they were “conscious of the moral support of Israel and the USA and other Western countries,” they were alleged to be even more idle than the rest of the population — admitting to the illegals that “We work just enough to avoid being sacked. ALL OVER EASTERN Europe the illegals appear to have given franker, and therefore more depressing, assessments of public attitudes than the KGB liaison offices and residencies, who were under pressure to produce flattering accounts of local reaction to dreary set- piece speeches by Soviet leaders. Even in Bulgaria most of the population had lost their traditional sense of Slav kinship with Soviet Russia. According to one report: Anti-Sovietism flourishes on Bulgarian television. Though not openly expressed ... it finds a fertile breeding ground. The so-called “spots,” featuring Soviet films about the Soviet Union and Soviet life, cause the population to switch off their television sets.^^ When the illegal TANOV was sent on a two-month PROGRESS mission to Bulgaria in 1974, posing as a Western journalist preparing travel brochures, he was advised by the Centre to win the confidence of the Bulgarians he talked to by giving them presents. Everywhere he went he found resentment at the low standard of living and the well-founded conviction that Bulgaria was being pressurized by the Soviet Union to squander resources on Cuba and other profligate foreign friends, as well as on a huge police and state security system. From the Centre’s viewpoint, the only silver lining in TANOV’ s bleak report was that Bulgarians were too afraid of the DS, their security service, to grumble publicly. PROBABLY THE MOST depressing intelligence on the Soviet Bloc to reach the Centre during the 1970s came from Czechoslovakia. An illegal reported after a PROGRESS mission in 1976: The population of the country hates the Russians. The Czechs cannot even make an objective judgment of the skills of Soviet artists performing on tour in Czechoslovakia. The following is a typical comment: “It may be that the artists are performing well professionally, but because they are Russians I can’t bear to watch them.”^^ Lines in plays which were capable of being interpreted as “negative allusions” to the Soviet Union, such as “Love for the enemy is not love” in Gorin’s Till Eulenspiegel, were liable to provoke storms of applause from the audience. In view of the popular rejoicings after the Czechoslovak defeat of the Russian team in the 1969 World Ice Hockey Championships in Stockholm, there was considerable anxiety before the 1979 world championships which were held in Prague. A special commission headed by one of the leading internationalists on the CPCz Presidium, Antonin Kapek, tried to ensure good crowd behavior by introducing a variety of security measures, arranging for ticket allocations to Party organizations and conducting what was called “educational work” among both players and spectators. Most of its efforts proved in vain. Throughout the championships, which opened at the end of April, Brezhnev received regular reports from both the KGB and the Soviet embassy in Prague. They made dismal reading. Irrespective of who the Russian team was playing, the Czechoslovak spectators cheered the other side and shouted anti-Soviet insults. The United States, Canadian and West German teams, by contrast, all received a warm reception. The KGB reported that the Soviet defeat of the Czechoslovak team was “greeted coldly” even by Strougal and other ministers in the government box. After the match senior CPCz officials avoided members of the Soviet embassy. The KGB did, however, succeed in preventing one potentially acute embarrassment. After the Soviet match against East Germany, a Russian player who had taken proscribed stimulants was summoned to a drug test. Had he failed the test, as no doubt he would have done, the Soviet victory might have been annulled. The KGB reported proudly to Brezhnev that, “as a result of measures taken by the [Prague] residency,” the player concerned was let off the drug test.^^ KGB reports from Prague complained that, after the Soviet team won the world championship, the medal ceremony was conducted in English and German with no Russian translation. At the gala reception which followed, the Russians were coldshouldered. The Soviet flag was ripped from the team. Even the CPCz newspaper Rude prdvo paid more attention to the Canadian, Swedish and Finnish teams than to the Soviet world champions. The KGB was also outraged at the sometimes visible lack of enthusiasm displayed by Czechoslovak representatives at tedious official celebrations in the Soviet Union. The Centre wrote a damning report on the behavior of Miroslav Vasek, head of a delegation from the Czechoslovak ministry of culture at the Ninth Conference of Ministers of Culture of the Socialist Countries, held in Moscow in July 1978. At the end of this doubtless mind-numbing occasion, Vasek had had the impertinence to leave behind in his room at the Hotel Mir both the souvenir conference folder and a series of probably unreadable volumes solemnly presented to him by the Soviet ministry of culture: Lenin: Revolution and Art, Brezhnev: A Brief Biography, Sixty Jubilee Years: Facts and Figures about the Achievements of Culture and Art in the Soviet Union and Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments in the USSR. The KGB report insisted that these valuable items had been deliberately “abandoned, not simply forgotten.” The Centre was not prepared for this outrage to be passed over. A full report on it was sent both to Andropov and to the KGB liaison office in Prague. For all the KGB’s dissatisfaction with the state of Czechoslovak public opinion and the fractious leadership of the CPCz, the Communist one-party state in Czechoslovakia was under no visible threat at the end of the 1970s. At the beginning of 1977 a series of small dissident groups came together in “Charter 77,” which described itself as “a free, informal, open community of people of different convictions, different faiths and different professions, united by the will to strive. individually and collectively, for the respect of civil and human rights.” Within six months, over 750 courageous individuals had signed the Charter. All endured public vilification and persecution, ranging from attacks on the street to prison sentences and incarceration in psychiatric hospitals. One of the founders, the philosopher Jan Patocka, died after a brutal interrogation by the StB. The power of the StB, the sense of powerlessness induced in the mass of the population by the process of “normalization” and the presence of Soviet troops robbed Charter 77 of any chance of recapturing the mass enthusiasm generated by the promise nine years earlier of “socialism with a human face.”^^ Throughout the Soviet Bloc the KGB’s east European clones, urged on by the Centre, were among the moving forces during the decade which followed the Prague Spring in the creation of an intellectually monotone and moribund society. Vaclav Havel, one of the founders of Charter 77 (and later the first president of the post- Communist Czech Republic), wrote later of this period: I remember the first half of the 1970s in Czechoslovakia as the time when “history stopped” ... History has been replaced by pseudo-history, with its calendar of regularly returning official anniversaries. Party congresses, festivities and mass sport meetings ... Totalitarian power has brought “order” in the organic “disorder” of history, thereby numbing it as history. The government, as it were, nationalized time. Hence, time meets with the sad fate of so many other nationalized things: it has begun to wither away.^^ The clock which had stopped in eastern Europe with the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 was to start again ten years later with the election of a Polish pope. SEVENTEEN THE KGB AND WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES The KGB and Western Communist Parties Throughout the Cold War, Communist parties around the world dismissed claims that they were involved in Soviet espionage as crude McCarthyite slander. KGB files, however, give the lie to most of their denials. From the 1920s onwards Western Communists were regularly asked for help in intelligence operations, which they usually considered their fraternal duty to provide. Most leaders of even the largest Western parties equally considered it the fraternal duty of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to provide, via the KGB, annual subsidies whose existence they indignantly denied. Knowledge of the KGB connection in the fields of both espionage and finance was the preserve of small and secretive inner circles within each Party leadership. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the most active assistance in Soviet agent recruitment came from four Communist Parties which were briefly included in coalition governments: the French Parti Communiste Fran^ais (PCF), the Italian Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), the Austrian Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs (KPO) and the Finnish Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue (SKP). AS SHOWN IN chapter 9, the PCF assisted after the Liberation in a major penetration of the French intelligence community which continued for at least a quarter of a century. From July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947 the Paris residency forwarded to the Centre a total of 1,289 French intelligence documents.^ By the early 1950s the KGB’s chief collaborator inside the PCF was Gaston Plissonnier (codenamed LANG), a life-long Soviet loyalist who had established himself by 1970 as second- in-command to the Party leader.^ Though little known to the French public and a poor public speaker with a thick regional accent, Plissonnier was a master in the arcane procedures of “democratic centralism” by which the Party leadership imposed its policies on its members.^ As well as providing inside information on the PCF, he assisted the KGB in identifying potential agents and other intelligence operations.^ During the later 1970s Plissonnier also passed on reports from an agent in the entourage of President Boumedienne of Algeria.^ IN ITALY, AS in France, Communist ministers sat in post-war coalition governments until the spring of 1947. At the end of 1945 the PCI had 1,760,000 members — twice as many as the PCF. All over Italy, photographs of Stalin, affectionately known as Baffone (“Walrus moustache”), were pasted on factory walls and stuck to machinery. “We were all under the impression,” one of the Communist ministers, Fausto Gallo, later acknowledged, “that the wind was blowing our way.”^ Washington feared that Gallo and his colleagues might be right. The National Security Council concluded in November 1947, “The Italian Government, ideologically inclined towards Western democracy, is weak and is being subjected to continuous attack by a strong Communist Party.” The very first CIA covert action was an operation to aid the Christian Democrats against the Communists in the 1948 general election by laundering over 10 million dollars from captured Axis funds for use in the campaign.^ As in France, the post-war popularity of the Communist Party and the brief period of Communist participation in government created the best opportunities Soviet intelligence was ever to enjoy in Italy for agent penetration. Like JOUR, probably the most important of the post-war French recruits, DARIO, the longest-serving and probably the most valuable Italian agent, was a foreign ministry employee. Bom in 1908, and trained as a lawyer, DARIO worked as a journalist and state official in agriculture during the early years of fascist Italy. In 1932 he was recruited as a Soviet agent on an “ideological basis” but, on instructions from his controller, pretended to be a supporter of Mussolini and in 1937 succeeded in enrolling in the Fascist Party. Before the outbreak of war he obtained a job in the foreign ministry, ironically dealing with Soviet and Comintern affairs and succeeded in recruiting three foreign ministry typists (codenamed DARYA, ANNA and MARTA) who regularly supplied him with what the Centre considered “valuable” classified documents. For almost forty years DARIO was instrumental in obtaining a phenomenal amount of classified foreign ministry material.^ His remarkable career as a Soviet agent, however, was temporarily interrupted during the war. In 1942, following the discovery by the Italian police of an illegal GRU residency with which DARIO was in contact, he was arrested and imprisoned, surviving a period at the end of the war in a German concentration camp from which he was liberated by the Red Army.^ Once back in Italy, DARIO reestablished contact with DARYA and MARTA, both of whom agreed once again to give him foreign ministry documents. Probably on Soviet instructions, instead of joining the PCI he became a member of the Italian Socialist Party led by Pietro Nenni, but was expelled in 1946 after he was denounced as a former fascist and threatened with prosecution. At the request of the Rome residency, the Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, secretly interceded with Nenni and DARIO was given back his Socialist Party membership. Togliatti’s intervention, however, leaked out and DARIO was publicly identified as having links with the Soviet embassy. He succeeded, none the less, in recruiting two more foreign ministry typists: TOPO (later renamed LEDA), who for fifteen years provided what the Centre considered “valuable documents,” and NIKOL (later INGA), who also supplied “consistently valuable” information. Probably soon after her recruitment under a false flag (not identified in Mitrokhin’s notes), TOPO and DARIO were married. In March 1975, forty-three years after DARIO ’s recruitment, he and his wife were awarded the Order of the Red Star. He finally retired in May 1979 after one of the longest careers as a Soviet agent in the history of the FCD.^^ In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the Rome residency also achieved a highly successful penetration of the interior ministry, thanks chiefly to a Communist civil servant, codenamed DEMID, who acted as agent-recruiter. On instructions from the residency, DEMID left the Communist Party immediately after his recruitment in 1944. His first major cultivation inside the ministry was QUESTOR, whom he helped to obtain a job in the cipher department. By 1955 the penetration of the Italian interior ministry, begun by DEMID, was considered so important that control of it was handed over to a newly established illegal residency in Rome, headed by Ashot Abgarovch Akopyan, a 40-year-old Armenian from Baku codenamed YEFRAT.^^ THE THIRD STATE in which Soviet agent penetration was assisted by Communist participation in post-war coalition governments was Austria. Though placed under joint occupation until 1955 by the Soviet Union, United States, Britain and France (a cumbersome arrangement likened by Karl Renner, the first post-war chancellor, to “four elephants in a rowing boat”), Austria — ^unlike Germany — was allowed to govern itself. In Renner’s provisional government, formed in April 1945, the Communists were given three ministries, including the key post of Minister of the Interior taken by Franz Honner. In the November 1945 elections, however, the Austrian Communist Party (KPO), which had expected to do as well as the French PCF, picked up a mere 5 percent of the vote and was given only the comparatively unimportant ministry of electrification in the new coalition. The KPO left government altogether two years later, and its two half-hearted attempts to stage a coup d 'etat in 1947 and 1950 failed to gain serious Soviet support. Franz Honner used his seven months in 1945 to pack the Austrian federal police force (Bundespolizei) with Communist Party members. Though many were purged or sidelined by Honner’ s socialist successor, Oskar Helmer,^^ Soviet penetration of the Austrian police. especially its security service (Staatspolizei or Stapo), continued until the 1980s. In an attempt to evade Helmer’s purge, Communists in the police force were instructed to disavow or conceal their Party membership. The files noted by Mitrokhin record the recruitment of a series of major KGB police agents: EDUARD in 1945, VENTSEYEV in 1946,^^ PETER in 1952,^^ two further recruits in 1955, ZAK in 1974^^ and NADEZHDIN in 1978.^^ There may well have been others; Mitrokhin’ s list is probably not exhaustive. At least some of them took part in operations (one of them codenamed EDELWEISS) to remove and copy top secret documents held in the safe of the head of the Stapo. In 1973 Andropov personally authorized the payment to one of its Stapo agents of a reward of 30,000 Austrian schillings.^ ^ IN THREE OF the four countries of Scandinavia — Denmark, Norway and Finland — Communist ministers also served in post-war coalitions. By far the most influential of the Scandinavian Communist parties was the Finnish SKP.^^ Alone among Germany’s eastern allies, Finland was not forced to become part of the Soviet Bloc. At the end of the Second World War, however, Stalin still kept his options open. In 1945, at Soviet insistence, the SKP was given several key positions within the Finnish government, secretly instructed via a “special channel” on their relations with “bourgeois parties,” and held in readiness for a possible coup d'etat. That Finland was not in the end forced to become a people’s democracy was probably due chiefly to memories of the Winter War in 1939-40, when the greatly outnumbered Finns had inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviet invaders. Stalin was well aware that the price of Finnish incorporation in the Soviet Bloc might be another blood bath.^^ Finland was, however, deprived of 12 percent of its territory, forced to pay enormous reparations (five times those of Italy) and required to sign a non- aggression pact in 1948. In Finland, as in Austria, the Communists succeeded in 1945 in claiming the key post of minister of the interior. But whereas the Austrian Communist Franz Honner left office after only seven months, his Finnish counterpart, Yrji Leino, continued in power for three years. Leino’s aim, like Honner’ s, was “to deprive the bourgeoisie of one of its most important weapons in supporting reactionary policies, the police force.” By the end of 1945 the security police had been purged and reconstituted as a new force, usually known as Valpo. As Leino later acknowledged, “the new recruits were naturally, as far as possible. Communists. The rapidity of the purges and the inexperience of the new recruits, however, led to a good deal of confusion. According to Leino, “Valpo in SKP hands never became the kind of weapon that had been hoped for ... They did not have the skill to use it to advantage in the right way.” Leino himself found it increasingly difficult to cope. By 1947 he was drinking heavily and sometimes absent from his office for days on end. At the end of the year he was summoned to Moscow, given a severe dressing down by two senior members of the Politburo, instructed to resign from the Finnish government and told to go for a health cure in the Soviet Union. Though Leino refused to tender his resignation, he was dismissed by President Paasikivi in April 1948 on the grounds that he no longer enjoyed the confidence of Parliament. His dismissal brought to an end Communist participation in the Finnish government. Leino ’s memoirs, completed ten years later, caused such embarrassment in Moscow that, at the insistence of the Soviet ambassador in Helsinki, the whole edition was destroyed on the eve of publication, leaving only a few copies in private circulation.^^ THE REMOVAL FROM power by 1948 of all those Western Communist parties which had taken part in post- war coalitions reduced, but did not end, their ability to assist Soviet intelligence penetration of government bureaucracies. By far the biggest disappointment experienced by the Centre at the beginning of the Cold War in its relations with fraternal parties in the West, however, was the dramatic decline in the assistance offered by the Communist Party of the United States (CPUS A). From the mid- 1930s to the onset of the Cold War, Communism had been a major force in the American labor movement, a significant influence on the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and a rite of passage for several hundred thousand young radicals. During the Second World War the Party had played an important part in assisting Soviet penetration of the Roosevelt administration, the MANHATTAN project and the intelligence community. The onset of the Cold War, however, dealt the CPUS A a blow from which it never fiilly recovered. In 1949 Gene Dennis, the general secretary, and ten other Party leaders were put on trial for advocating the forcible overthrow of the federal government. Dennis and nine of the defendants were sentenced to five years in jail, the eleventh was jailed for three years and all the defense attorneys were found in contempt of court. After the Supreme Court upheld the sentences in 1951, more than a hundred other leading Communists were convicted on similar charges. For most of the 1950s the Party was forced into a largely underground existence. It was deeply ironic that when McCarthyism was at its height the CPUS A was among those Western parties which were least able to give assistance to Soviet espionage. Not till the Supreme Court backed away from its earlier decision in 1957 was the CPUS A able to regroup. By the time the Party had drawn up a new membership list in 1958, there were only 3,000 open members and a much smaller number of undeclared members left.^^ What the CPUS A might have achieved during the 1950s had it been less persecuted was well illustrated by the neighboring Canadian Party, which in 1951-3 assisted the Ottawa residency in the recruitment of Hugh Hambleton, probably the most important Canadian agent of the Cold War, and ten other agents. Like most other Western parties, the Canadian Communist Party also provided help in documenting illegals — among them Konon Trofimovich Molody (codenamed BEN), the most celebrated of the Cold War illegal residents in Britain. In 1957, with the help of the Canadian Communist Party, the Ottawa residency succeeded in obtaining a new passport for the illegal resident in the United States, “Willie” Fisher (better known as “Rudolf Abel”) in the name of Robert Callan, bom on March 10, 1903 in Fort William, Ontario. “Abel,” however, was arrested before he could adopt his new identity. The Ottawa residency was subsequently fearful that the clerk who issued the passport might recognize the photograph of “Abel” published in the press after his arrest in June 1957 as that of “Robert Callan.” Unsurprisingly, the clerk, who doubtless saw — and paid little attention to — many photographs a day, seems not to have noticed.^ ^ One of the rare cases in which the assistance given by Western Communists in fabricating the legend of a Soviet illegal became public was that of Reino Hayhanen (codenamed VIK), who was helped to adopt the identity of the Finn Eugene Maki by the Finnish Communist Olavi Ahman (codenamed VIRTANEN). When Hayhanen defected to the FBI in 1957, Ahman and his wife were secretly taken into hiding in the Soviet Union. For almost twenty years Ahman pleaded to go back to Finland, but the Finnish Communist Party insisted that he stay in Russia for fear that his return would expose it to “anti- communist propaganda.” In 1975 the Party leader, Ville Pessi (codenamed BARANOV), finally relented. Ahman was allowed back home and awarded a KGB pension of 200 roubles a month. A number of Western Communist parties were also asked to provide various kinds of assistance to KGB illegals. In 1957 a group of undeclared members of the French Communist Party, recommended by the PCF leadership, began training as radio operators for illegal residencies. Initially the new recruits found difficulty in transcribing the coded number groups broadcast in test transmissions from the Centre. By the end of the year, however, some had successfully completed their training course.^^ The files seen by Mitrokhin give no sense that the Centre’s demands on the fraternal assistance of Western Communist parties declined in the course of the Cold War. On the contrary, the KGB’s solicitations of its “friends” appear to have been greater during the 1970s than in the previous decade. The increased deployment of experienced illegals in eastern Europe after the Prague spring and the difficulty experienced by the FCD in finding enough suitably qualified and well-motivated Soviet replacements led it to seek renewed inspiration from the era of the Great Illegals, some of the greatest of whom — the Austrian Arnold Deutsch and the German Richard Sorge chief among them — had been Communists from other European countries. Deutsch’ s career, however, still remained top secret, not least because two of his most important recruits, Anthony Blunt and John Caimcross, were still at liberty in the West. Sorge, by contrast, was the best-publicized member of the Soviet intelligence pantheon, he had been posthumously declared Hero of the Soviet Union in 1964 and further honored by the first postage stamps ever issued to commemorate a spy. Sorge ’s reputation as a romantic heart-throb added to his popular appeal. His was the example chosen by the Centre to inspire a new generation of non- Soviet KGB illegals. The recruitment campaign began on the eve of the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) in April 1971. The FCD took advantage of the presence in Moscow of a large number of leaders of fraternal parties in the West to ask some of them to search out a new generation of Sorges. The files noted by Mitrokhin record meetings between senior FCD officers and six different Western Communist leaders to discuss the recruitment of illegals. There may well have been many more such approaches. Shortly before the Party congress opened, the former resident in Copenhagen, Leonid Sergeyevich Zaitsev, met Knud Jespersen, the chairman of the Danish Communist Party, at the Sovetskaya Hotel, and asked him to find “two or three” totally reliable, dedicated Communists, loyal to the Soviet Union, who could be trained to become “Danish Richard Sorges.” They should be male, between twenty and forty years of age, and preferably undeclared rather than open Party members. If married, their wives would have to meet the same conditions. Potential Danish Sorges would also need to be well educated and in a suitable occupation — such as journalist, businessman or foreign language student. According to Zaitsev, Jespersen responded enthusiastically, saying that he fully understood both the importance and the secrecy of the request, and already had one candidate in mind, whose details he would send to the current resident in Copenhagen, Anatoli Aleksandrovich Danilov.^^ Meanwhile at the Ukraina Hotel, I. P. Kisliak, a former operations officer at the Athens residency, was asking Kostas Koliannis, first secretary of the Greek Communist Party, to find “one or two” Greek Richard Sorges. Like Zaitsev, Kisliak emphasized that candidates must be “totally reliable ideologically,” but added that they also needed “charm.”^^ At a subsequent meeting with Ezekias Papaioannou, general secretary of AKEL (the Cyprus Communist Party), Kisliak was slightly less demanding. Though Cypriot candidates would require high moral. political and professional qualities, they need not necessarily be “the equals of Richard Sorge.”^^ While Zaitsev and Kisliak were approaching the heads of the Danish, Greek and Cypriot Parties, Anatoli Ivanovich Lazarev, head of the FCD Illegals Directorate, was engaged in talks with Gaston Plissonnier, the second- in-command of the French Communist Party. Plissonier agreed to select two or three undeclared members of the PCF with the potential to become French Sorges and later suggested two possible candidates. He was also asked to supply the KGB with the names of poorly paid (and, by implication, corruptible) staff in the French foreign ministry whose work included photocopying classified documents. One of the FCD’s approaches to a leading member of a fraternal delegation to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress took place in hospital. Geinrich Fritz of the Austrian Communist Party (KP6) Central Committee suffered an acute attack of sciatica shortly before the congress opened and was taken for treatment to the CPSU Central Committee Polyclinic at Kuntsevo. While undergoing treatment in Ward 103, he was visited by Ivan Alekseyevich Yerofeyev, deputy head of the Fourth (German and Austrian) Department, who raised the question of finding “one or two” Austrian Sorges. Fritz said that the KP6 chairman, Franz Muhri, refused to become involved in intelligence matters because of his precarious position within the Party. However, Fritz agreed to find suitable candidates himself and to keep N. V. Kirilenko, head of Line PR at the Vienna residency, informed of his progress. The most cautious of the Party leaders whose responses to the 1971 illegal recruiting drive were noted by Mitrokhin was the general secretary of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), William Kashtan. Though a rigidly orthodox pro- Soviet loyalist, Kashtan “made much of the practical difficulties.” The CPC had to be particularly careful to avoid any suspicion of involvement with the KGB, he explained, because of memories of the Gouzenko affair in 1945, when the Party’s only MP, Fred Rose, and its national organizer, Sam Carr, had both been exposed as Soviet agents. Kashtan was assured that he was expected only to select reliable candidates, provide character references and suggest ways of making contact with them. The KGB would do the rest and ensure that, even in the event of “complications,” he would not become involved. Kashtan is said to have replied that this arrangement “suited him completely.” During the Twenty- fourth Party Congress senior FCD officers also held discussions with at least eight leaders of Latin American Communist parties. The aim was not as yet to solicit a new generation of Latin American Sorges, but rather to identify potential agents in registry offices who could supply the documents required to support illegals’ legends. Within a year or so, however, the Centre was actively seeking Latin illegals to operate in North America.^^ In 1975 Kryuchkov personally approached the general secretary of the Argentinian Communist Party, Alvarez Amedo, to “seek help from our Argentinian friends in building up the illegal agent apparatus of Soviet intelligence.” According to the KGB record of the conversation, Amedo was “wholly sympathetic.”^^ During 1975 Andropov also gave personal instmctions for approaches to Communist Party leaders in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon as part of a quest for Arab illegals. OVER A QUARTER of a century after the collapse of the post-war coalitions which had given Communists a brief experience of office in France, Italy, Austria and Scandinavia, Communist ministers once again entered a Western government. They did so as a result of the Portuguese Revolution of April 1974, when the so-called Armed Forces Movement of young, radical officers ended over forty years of civilian dictatorship and promised both to restore democracy and to end Portugal’s colonial wars in Africa. Within days the Communist and Socialist r leaders, Alvaro Cunhal and Mario Soares, had returned from exile, standing together in front of their delirious supporters jointly clutching the same red carnation. Soares paid tribute to Cunhal, his former teacher, as “a remarkable man, with a luminous, penetrating glance that bespoke great inner strength. But Cunhal was also a hardline Soviet loyalist who in 1968 had been the first Western Communist leader to support the crushing of the Prague Spring. Though the differences between himself and Soares gradually widened, they were to serve together in a series of coalition governments until the summer of 1975. In June 1974 Portugal and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations for the first time since the October Revolution. Six months later Cunhal had his first meeting with the KGB resident in Lisbon, Svyatoslav Fyodorovich Kuznetsov (code-named LEONID), who operated under diplomatic cover in the recently established Soviet embassy. Though the meeting took place in a Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) safe house, both men were so fearful their conversation might be bugged that they conducted an entirely silent dialogue with pencil and paper. It was agreed that the KGB would train two reliable Party members to detect eavesdropping equipment so that their future discussions could be by word of mouth. Cunhal also undertook to hand over material on the Portuguese security service, NATO (of which Portugal had been a founder member) and other “matters of interest to the KGB.”^^ Shortly after the revolution of April 1974, a commission of enquiry was given access to the files of the brutal security service of the deposed regime (known successively as the PIDE and DGS), whose vast network of informers had almost rivaled those of the Soviet Bloc. Since the PCP, whose 22-member Central Committee had between them spent 308 years in jail, had been the chief target of the PIDE/DGS, it was, unsurprisingly, well represented on the commission.^^ As well as passing on large numbers of PIDE/DGS documents (some of which concerned collaboration with Western intelligence services), the PCP also provided the Lisbon residency with files from Portuguese military intelligence and the new security service established after the revolution. According to one of the files noted by Mitrokhin, the total weight of the classified material provided by the PCP to the Lisbon residency in the mid-1970s came to 474 kilograms. In January 1976 a special section was created within the FCD Fifth Department to work on the Portuguese documents which in their microfilm version filled 68,138 frames. Mitrokhin ’s summary of the Centre’s report on the material concludes: Extremely important information was obtained about the structure, methods of work and agent networks of the Special [intelligence] Services of the USA, France, the ERG and Spain on the territory of Portugal; on their cooperation with and the agent networks of PIDE/DGS in Portugal and its former colonies; on the armed forces of Portugal and of a number of other countries; on the methods of work of the Portuguese Special Services against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; on the agent operational situation in the country and at target establishments of interest to the KGB; [and] on individuals of operational interest to the KGB.^^ Service A made use of the documents, in both authentic and doctored form, as the basis of active measures designed to discredit the CIA, French and West German intelligence services.^^ In April 1975, at Portugal’s first free post-war elections, the Communists gained only 12.5 percent of the vote — one third of the support won by the socialists under Soares. Cunhal, however, shrugged off the setback, confident that real power would remain with the Armed Forces Movement, which had made the revolution a year before. “The elections,” he told an interviewer, “have nothing or very little to do with the dynamics of revolution ... I promise you there will be no parliament in Portugal.” Cunhal’ s prediction proved hopelessly mistaken. His support within the Armed Forces Movement crumbled after the failure of a left-wing coup in November, and new elections in April 1976 gave the Communists only 14.5 percent of the vote, as compared with the socialists’ 35 percent. Soares became prime minister and Cunhal led the PCP into opposition. The PCP leadership continued in opposition to talent- spot for the KGB.^^ During talks in Moscow in July 1977 the FCD asked PATRICK, a member of the PCP Politburo, to identify PCP members suitable for training as illegal agents to operate against NATO. PATRICK saw no difficulty in using experienced Party members for particular intelligence assignments, but was less happy with using them as long-term illegals since this would require them to give up their work for the PCP. Once back in Lisbon, however, PATRICK suggested the names of five possible candidates “without heavy Party responsibilities” and provided blank Portuguese passports and other identity documents to assist in the fabrication of their legends. While the FCD was holding discussions with PATRICK in July 1977, an almost identical approach was being made to the veteran chairman of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP), Ville Pessi (codenamed BARANOV), then on holiday in the Soviet Union. Pessi agreed to suggest the names of four or five undeclared members of the SKP or trusted fellow travellers to train as illegal agents who could be used against American and NATO targets in the United States, Norway, Denmark or the Low Countries. He was also asked to find another one or two potential agents in registry offices or other locations able to provide the documentation required for the fabrication of illegals’ legends. At about the same time that PATRICK and BARANOV were engaged in discussions in Moscow, Andropov authorized an approach in Dublin by the resident, Mikhail Konstantinovich Shadrin (codenamed KAVERIN), to a leading Irish Communist (codenamed GRUM), who cannot be identified for legal reasons. GRUM agreed that two undeclared members of the Party should be selected for training as the first Irish illegals. The approaches to Communist Parties outside the Soviet Bloc coincided with a series of exhortations from Kryuchkov, the head of the FCD, to residencies to improve their Line N (Illegal support) performance. Increasingly close surveillance of legal residencies by Western counterintelligence agencies made the expansion of the illegal network of increasing importance. Kryuchkov was not satisfied, however, with the efforts made by residencies to follow up recruiting leads for illegal agents provided by Western Communist Parties and other sources. He complained in a circular of April 1978: In a number of residencies Line N work has been only half-heartedly pursued on the part of residents; the deep study of those who could be utilized for illegal espionage, especially as special [illegal] agents, has not been conducted sufficiently purposefully ...^^ By the mid-1970s most Western, Latin American and some Middle Eastern, North African and Asian Communist Parties had been drawn into the quest for a new generation of illegals. There is, however, no evidence that the almost global recruiting program conducted by the KGB and fraternal parties turned up another Arnold Deutsch or Richard Sorge.^^ So far as the recruiting leads produced by Western Communist leaders are concerned, Mitrokhin’s notes reveal no major successes and a number of failures. The failures included Maria, a Portuguese Communist language teacher recommended as a potential illegal agent by PATRICK of the PCP Central Committee. The Centre planned to recruit Maria as the assistant and wife of an illegal KGB officer, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Kunosenko (codenamed YEFREMOV), who was being trained for work in Brazil. A meeting arranged between YEFREMOV and his proposed bride in East Germany, however, ended in disaster. Maria found Kunosenko physically unattractive and refused to sleep with him; her recruitment was discontinued. Without Maria’s assistance, Kunosenko failed to become sufficiently fluent in Portuguese. In 1981 plans for his posting to Brazil were cancelled and he was redeployed in Directorate S headquarters.^^ Among the more promising illegal agents discovered as a result of leads from Western Communist Parties were a French couple, LIMB and his wife DANA, who were recruited in 1973. LIMB was recommended by the PCF as a man “devoted to Communist ideals” but not to be used against French targets. After two years’ training, however, limb’s first recorded success was talent- spotting a French recruit. MARCEL, LIMB’s recruitment lead, worked in the mairie of a Paris suburb and was recruited as a KGB agent in 1975, probably to provide documentation for KGB illegals. In December 1975 LIMB (then aged thirty-six) and DANA were deployed to Belgium, where they set up a small business printing invitation and visiting cards near the headquarters of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). But their attempts over the next year to cultivate NATO personnel met with little or no success. By the end of 1976 they had returned to France, settled in the Bordeaux region and abandoned their brief careers as KGB illegal agents. Thirty or forty years before, the recruiting drive for illegal agents would doubtless have met with much greater success. Its apparent failure in the 1970s reflected the inability of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev’s geriatric leadership to recapture the idealism of an earlier generation of ideological agents inspired by the utopian vision of the world’s first worker — ^peasant state. By the mid-1970s most of the leading Western Communist Parties were tainted by what Moscow considered the “Eurocommunist” heresy, which advocated a parliamentary road to socialism within a multi-party system rather than slavish imitation of the Soviet model. Within the new generation of young Western Marxists, unconditional pro- Soviet loyalists were a dwindling breed — if not yet an endangered species. JUST AS THE Centre expected fraternal assistance from the leaders of Western Communist parties, so the parties themselves depended in varying degrees on subsidies from Moscow secretly delivered by the KGB. The subsidies, like involvement in intelligence operations, were closely guarded secrets within each Party leadership. When stories of “Moscow gold” occasionally leaked out during the Cold War, they were dismissed as McCarthyite disinformation. The Centre, however, was well aware that some details of its secret subsidies were known to Western intelligence agencies. During the late 1970s, for example, the Soviet ambassador in Ottawa, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev (later one of Gorbachev’s leading advisers), protested to Andropov, Gromyko and Boris Ponomarev, head of the Central Committee’s International Department, against the practice of Canadian Communist Party representatives — in particular the Party leader, William Kashtan — of calling at the embassy to collect funds (codenamed “US wheat”) from the resident, Vladimir Ivanovich Mechulayev. The residency had already warned Kashtan that he was taking a considerable risk. By 1980 the Centre was convinced that the Canadian authorities were aware that subsidies to the CPC were being funded by the Soviet-owned Ukrainskaya Kniga [Ukrainian Book] Company, based in Toronto. The FCD informed Ponomarev on October 20: The Canadian Special [intelligence] Services are carrying out a study of the financial situation of the Communist Party of Canada which it is proposed to complete within 15-18 months. A preliminary report prepared by the federal government quotes data based on the results of an analysis of the channels and size of the financial receipts in the CPC treasury in 1970. The Special Services have only fragmentary information about subsequent years, but these give grounds to suppose that the methods of financing the activities of the CPC remain as before. According to the data of the Special Services, the CPC budget in 1970 amounted to 158,850 dollars (according to unconfirmed reports, in 1979 it was more than 200,000 dollars). This sum is made up of Party membership dues from CPC members (13,500 dollars or 8.5 percent), receipts from legacies from “deceased loyal members of the Party” (the amount cannot be estimated), voluntary payments and also direct transfers of cash by Soviet representatives and contributions to CPC funds from the income of the Ukrainskaya Kniga Company. It is noted that the first three sources of income provide approximately 30-35 percent of the Party’s total budget. The remaining part [65-70 percent] comes from the USSR and from Ukrainskaya Kniga. The Special Services report concentrates on an analysis of the mechanism for supplying funds along the last two channels. [Canadian] Counter-intelligence concludes that the USSR finances the CPC by means of “physical transfer of cash” by officials of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, to be put at the disposal of Party functionaries under pretext of covering the expenses of Party activists on the occasion of their journeys to Socialist countries. The seizure by Boris Yeltsin’s government of the archives of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) after the failed coup of August 1991 led to the publication for the first time of documentary evidence showing that during the 1980s alone, at a time when the Soviet Union was chronically short of hard currency, the CPSU had distributed over 200 million dollars to fraternal parties outside the Soviet Bloc. The Central Committee’s International Department had tried to destroy the records of the payments shortly before the confiscation of its archive, but the metal paper clips which held the documents together jammed the shredding machines and saved some of them from destruction.^^ THOUGH THE LARGEST Subsidies for most of the Cold War seem to have gone to the French PCF and Italian PCI, the two leading Western Parties, the biggest per capita donations probably went to the Communist Party of the United States. The disproportionate share of Soviet funds channelled to the CPUS A reflected Moscow’s desire to encourage the revival of Communism on the territory of the Main Adversary after the near disintegration of the Party in the mid-1950s. The CPUSA repaid Soviet generosity with an impeccable ideological orthodoxy which became particularly valued in Moscow when the heresy of Eurocommunism later took hold of the major west European Communist Parties. In April 1958 a veteran member of the CPUSA leadership, Morris Childs (whose aliases included “Morris Summers,” “Ramsey Kemp Martin” and “D. Douglas Mozart”) was invited to Moscow to discuss financial help for his ailing party. Boris Ponomarev, the head of the Central Committee international department, offered 75,000 dollars for the current year and 200,000 dollars for 1959, initially channelled via the Canadian Communist Party.^^ From 1961 to 1980 the conduits for Soviet subsidies were Childs (codenamed KHAB) and his brother Jack (alias “D. Brooks,” codenamed MARAT), an undeclared Communist who had worked for Comintern in the 1930s. Until the late 1970s Morris Childs usually visited Moscow at least once a year to submit the CPUSA budget and request for funds, receive instructions from the International Department and the KGB and take part in discussions on American affairs. Jack acted as the main point of contact for the handover of money in the United States. The normal procedure was for the Centre to send a coded message to a CPUS A radio operator in New York containing details of the next transmission of funds. The message would then be passed to Jack Childs, who would decode it and inform his brother, Gus Hall (leader of the CPUS A from 1959 and codenamed PALM), or Hall’s wife Elizabeth that the next delivery was imminent.^^ From 1968 the CPUS A radio operator who passed messages from the Centre on to Jack Childs was another undeclared party member of Russian descent, Albert Friedman, codenamed FORD, who worked as a salesman in a Manhattan radio store on East 49th Street. Using the alias Weber, Friedman had worked between the wars at Comintern’s radio school in Moscow, training other underground radio operators. In January 1969 he travelled to Moscow for further training,^^ but performed so well that his instructor told him, “You know more than I do” and invited him to lunch. Though Friedman paid Party dues, his membership of the CPUS A was known only to the KGB and a small group within the Party leadership.^^ What neither the KGB nor CPUS A leaders knew, however, was that since the end of the Second World War Friedman had been an FBI agent in the Party, codenamed CLIP. He passed every word of the Centre’s communications on to the Bureau. By the late 1960s Soviet subsidies to the CPUS A amounted to well over a million dollars a year; a decade later they were more than two million. Jack Childs (MARAT) usually took delivery of Soviet subsidies from KGB operations officers during “brush passes” at pre- arranged locations in New York, all at precisely 3:05 p.m. During 1974, for example, money- transfer operations (then codenamed VALDAY) took place at four locations in Lower Manhattan: 10 Pine Street, 10th floor (codenamed DINO); 1 1 Broadway, 9th floor (FRED); 120 Wall Street, 7th floor (POST); and 81 New Street, 2nd floor (ROLAND). All four addresses were chosen by the New York residency because they had several entrances and exits. MARAT and the KGB operations officer chosen to hand the money over to him entered and left the building selected for their brush contact through different doors. In order to lessen the increasing bulk of the packages of money handed over in brush contacts, the denomination of the bills contained in them was raised in 1974 from 20 dollars to 50 dollars and 100 dollars. On the grounds that it was too dangerous to pass the money to Hall, who was under close surveillance by the FBI, the New York police and the Internal Revenue Service, Jack Childs gave much of it to his brother Morris for safekeeping. As well as acting as a conduit for Soviet subsidies. Jack Childs also regularly exchanged written messages with the New York residency either through brush contacts or “dead drops.” Like brush contact sites, dead drops were all given codenames; those in use in 1974 were MANDI, LYUSI, OPEY, RIBA and OVERA. Messages were normally sent on undeveloped film from a Minox camera placed in a magnetic container. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin records that between July 1975 and August 1976 MARAT took part in five VALDAY operations and nine to exchange secret messages (five by brush contact, four by dead drop). In an emergency the residency could arrange an urgent meeting with MARAT by ringing a designated telephone number at precisely five minutes past noon and asking for Dr. Albert. On being told, “There is no Dr. Albert here” the residency officer would reply, “Sorry, must have the wrong number.” He would then meet MARAT at 3:05 p.m. the same day at a Brooklyn location codenamed ELLIOT, at the entrance to the Silver Road pharmacy on the comer of Avenue J and East 16th Street, next to the subway station. MARAT identified himself by carrying a copy of Time magazine and placing a Bandaid on his left hand. The operations officer asked him, “Do you have the time?” When MARAT replied, “Ifs 3:05 sharp,” he produced a business card from one of MARAT ’s former employers with a note by KHAB, his brother Morris, on the back.^^ The elaborate security employed by the KGB in contacts with both MARAT and KHAB suffered, however, from one fatal flaw. Since the early 1950s both had been FBI agents. By 1974 the Centre had become suspicious, particularly about KHAB (Morris Childs). He had not been imprisoned during the anti-Communist witch-hunts of the 1950s, nor had he been arrested for travelling abroad on false passports (a fact of which the FBI was believed to be aware). A 1967 report by the Senate Judiciary Committee had referred to him under the names Morris Chilovsky (his name at birth) and Morris Summers (one of his aliases) and mentioned his pre-war links with Soviet intelligence. The Centre also found suspicious KHAB’s determination to accompany Gus Hall on all his trips to Russia and his “nervousness” when Moscow bypassed him and his brother and communicated directly with Hall. In March 1974 Vladimir Mikhailovich Kazakov, head of the FCD First (North American) Department, reported to Andropov and the Central Committee: Although [Morris] Childs enjoys the trust of Comrade Gus Hall, his direct involvement in the financial affairs of the US Communist Party constitutes a real threat to this special channel [for the transmission of Soviet funds]. In addition, certain doubtful and suspicious elements in M. Childs’s behavior lead one to believe that he is possibly being used by US intelligence. Kazakov also urged that Hall be persuaded to find a substitute for MARAT (Jack Childs), whom he described as absent-minded and in poor health. At a meeting with Hall in Moscow on May 8, another senior FCD officer, B. S. Ivanov, tried to persuade him that the time had come to retire both the Childs brothers, whose long involvement in secret work placed them under increasing danger of FBI surveillance. Ivanov suggested a number of alternative methods of transferring Soviet funds to the CPUS A, among them opening a Swiss bank account or using a cover business in the United States. But, though Hall said he had found a “reliable comrade” to replace Jack Childs, he took no action and the International Department, which evidently did not take Kazakov’s warning very seriously, did not insist. In 1975 Morris and Jack Childs were awarded the Order of the Red Banner; Morris received his in person from Brezhnev during a Moscow banquet. Back in the United States both brothers lived in some style, embezzling about 5 percent of the Soviet funds sent to the CPUS A as well as receiving a salary from the FBI. Morris posed as a wealthy businessman with a penthouse in Chicago, expensively furnished with antiques, paintings and oriental carpets, as well as apartments in Moscow and New York. Gus Hall, who naively believed both brothers to be independently wealthy, sometimes asked them to buy clothes for his family. Among the intelligence which the Childs brothers reported to the FBI for more than twenty years were the claims of the CPUS A leadership to influence on the black civil rights movement. In 1958 Jack Childs had reported a boast by James Jackson, Party secretary in charge of “Negro and Southern Affairs,” that “most secret and guarded people” were “guiding” the civil rights leader Martin Luther KingJ^ According to one KGB file, Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador, later asked Hall to stop bringing Jackson, whom he described as “poorly trained politically,” to meetings with him; he also requested the Soviet mission to the UN (by which he probably meant the KGB New York residency) to break off contact with Jackson.^^ There was, however, some substance to the claim that the CPUS A had penetrated King’s entourage. The Childs brothers reported that one of King’s advisers, Stanley D. Levison, a New York lawyer and entrepreneur, was a secret Party member. Levison drafted sections of King’s 1958 book. Stride Toward Freedom, and helped prepare his defense against trumped-up charges of perjury on his Alabama tax returns in 1960.^^ Levison also introduced into King’s entourage a secret black member of the CPUSA, Hunter Pitts “Jack” O’Dell.^^ The FBI, who put Levison under surveillance, reported that he was meeting Viktor Lesiovsky, a KGB officer working as special assistant to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant. It was Levison ’s alleged influence on King which in 1963 led Attorney-General Robert Kennedy to authorize the bugging of King’s hotel rooms. Though the bugs produced recordings of a number of King’s sexual liaisons, in which President Lyndon B. Johnson took a prurient interest, they provided no evidence of Communist influence on him.^^ At the beginning of the Carter administration in 1977, the CPUS A leadership made exaggerated claims of its influence over King’s former executive secretary, Andrew Young (codenamed LUTHER), newly appointed as US representative at the United Nations. According to Hall, “Young himself did not know that several of his close friends in Atlanta were covert Communists, and he listened to them. The Party, while observing the required clandestinity, would cautiously exert an influence on Young in the necessary areas. Lesiovsky’s cover as assistant to U Thant gave him a number of opportunities for discussions with Young. Though he claimed to have obtained “important information” from the discussions, he reported — less optimistically than Hall — that, while Young hoped for better US- Soviet relations, his attitude to the Soviet Union was fundamentally “negative. Though Hall tended to overstate the influence of undeclared members of the CPUS A within the Democratic Party, there was at least one to whom the Centre attached real importance during the 1970s: a Democratic activist in California recruited as a KGB agent during a visit to Russia. The agent, who is not identified by name in the reports noted by Mitrokhin, had a wide circle of influential contacts in the Democratic Party: among them Governor Jerry Brown of California, Senator Alan Cranston, Senator Eugene McCarthy, Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Senator J. William Fulbright and Congressman John Conyers, Jr. During the 1976 presidential election the agent was able to provide inside information from within the Carter camp and a profile of Carter himself, which were particularly highly valued by the Centre since it had so few high-level American sources. On one occasion he spent three hours discussing the progress of the campaign at a meeting with Carter, Brown and Cranston in Carter’s room at the Pacific Hotel. His report was forwarded to the Politburo. During the final stages of the campaign the agent had what the KGB claimed were “direct and prolonged conversations” with Carter, Governor Brown and Senators Cranston, Kennedy, Ribicoff and Jacob Javits. Andropov attached such importance to the report on these conversations that he forwarded it under his signature to the Politburo immediately after Carter’s election. IN NOVEMBER 1977 the Centre sent a memorandum to the Central Committee complaining that, despite several requests to Hall to replace the Childs brothers, they were still running the American end of the “covert channel of communication with the US Communist Party.” During Jack’s illness in August and September, Morris had replaced him as the CPUS A’ s representative at a meeting with a KGB officer in New York: His use in the special channel operation is very risky, since [Morris] Childs is known to the intelligence service — as is evidenced by the US Senate Judiciary Committee’s report for 1967, where he is referred to as a person who uses several names and has contact with the KGB. Because of this, one cannot exclude the possibility that the FBI has him under covert surveillance. On November 10 Kazakov and Ivanov raised the question of replacing the Childs brothers at another meeting with Hall in Moscow. Hall said that he had three candidates in mind as a replacement for Jack Childs — John Vogo and the Applekhoums [? Appleholmes] brothers. He would make his final choice in the near future and announce his decision by a coded telegram to Moscow reporting the completion of a draft article on colonialism. The number of the draft indicated in the telegram (first, second or third) would indicate which candidate he had selected. Jack Child’s successor would then apply for a visa at the Soviet consulate in Vienna so that he could receive one and a half to two months of “special training” in Moscow. Hall also suggested that the KGB use the wife of his personal chauffeur and bodyguard as an additional channel of communication in New York. The residency could telephone her at work, identifying itself by using the parole, “This is Mr. Budnik calling about the old furniture. My friend from Hoboken suggested contacting you.”^^ Once again, however, Hall delayed taking action. The Childs brothers continued to take part in the “special channel operation” for the remainder of the decade. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin records that during the eight months up to April 1978 Jack Childs conducted nineteen operations: three VALDAY money transfers, two meetings with KGB officers, five dead drops, six brush contacts and three operations to signal contacts. By the spring of 1980, however, the FBI had concluded that the Childs were in imminent danger of being compromised. On May 28, as a pretext for withdrawing from the “special channel,” Morris Childs told Hall that unidentified men had been calling on his neighbors making enquiries about him and he feared he might have to go into hiding to avoid arrest. He handed Hall 225,437 dollars in cash, which, he claimed, was all the money from Moscow in his possession. Jack Childs, who had been in failing health for some time, died in a New York hospital on August 12. Morris and Eva Childs retired to a luxurious condominium north of Miami with spectacular views over the Atlantic. In 1987, at a special ceremony at FBI headquarters, Morris was presented by President Reagan with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. He and his brother Jack, who was awarded the same medal posthumously, thus became the only spies ever to be decorated by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Throughout the decades when the Childs brothers operated the secret channel to Moscow, the CPUS A had been wholly marginal to American politics. In four presidential elections between 1972 and 1984 Gus Hall never received more than 59,000 votes; after falling to 35,000 in 1984, he decided to support the Democrats in 1988. After dropping well below 10,000 members in the mid-1970s, the Party staged a modest revival but in the later 1980s was only about 15,000 strong. Hall, however, continued to inhabit a fantasy world in which the CPUS A had a major influence on American politics. He wrote to Boris Ponomarev, the head of the International Department, in the autumn of 1981: More than at any moment in recent history, I am convinced that our Party can be an important factor in slowing down, stopping and reversing the present reactionary policies of the Reagan administration. Tens of millions have become disillusioned. They are moving towards mass actions, and millions are in ideological flux. Our Party can be an important and even a decisive factor in influencing and moving these masses. As on this occasion. Hall’s fantasy assessments of the CPUS A’ s growing influence were accompanied by appeals for Soviet subsidies, which for most of the 1980s ran at 2 million dollars a year. In 1987 Hall asked for a large increase: I can only argue that because our party works in the decaying heart of imperialism whatever we do in influencing events in the United States has an impact on world developments. And, because of the crisis of the Reagan presidency, which is deep and chronic now, our Party’s work has had and continues to have a growing impact on the politics of our country. Therefore, in the context of the struggle against US imperialism and the policies of the Reagan administration, our party must be seen as an important, and even indispensable, factor. The CPUSA’s subsidy for the following year was put up to three million dollars. Morris Childs believed that the remarkable generosity of Soviet donations to the CPUS A (200 dollars a member in 1987) was due partly to the fact that the Kremlin took Gus Hall’s claims at least semi-seriously and “ludicrously overestimated the influence of the American party. The generosity was also due, however, to the ideological servility of Hall and the CPUS A leadership. According to Dorothy Ray Healey, a prominent party militant for forty- five years: Under Gus’s leadership the American CP had picked up the dubious distinction of being the chief ideological sheepdog in the international Communist movement, barking on command when any of the other lambs threatened to stray from the fold. The Soviet leaders would contact Gus and tell him what they wanted him to say, he would say it, and then Pravda could run a story saying that embattled American Communists speaking from the heartland of world imperialism had thus-and-such to say about whatever issue was of particular concern to the Soviets at the moment.^^ EIGHTEEN EUROCOMMUNISM A conference of eighty-five Communist parties held in Moscow in 1960 unanimously reaffirmed loyalty to the Soviet Union as an unshakeable article of faith for Communists in both East and West: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been, and remains, the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement, being the most experienced and steeled contingent of the international Communist movement. By the end of the decade, however, the CPSU leadership was outraged to find its infallibility being called into question by the emergence of what was later termed “Eurocommunism.” The Eurocommunist heresy made its first public appearance after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, when a number of Western parties ventured some, mostly timid, criticisms of the Soviet invasion. The leadership of the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano), later the dominant force in Eurocommunism, reaffirmed “the profound, fraternal and genuine ties that unite the Italian Communist Party to the Soviet Union and the CPSU,” but denied the right of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily “in the internal life of another Communist Party or another country.”^ “The profound, fraternal and genuine ties” which bound the PCI to the Soviet Union even after Soviet tanks had entered Prague had a secret dimension of which very few Italian Communists outside the Direzione were aware. After the Colonels’ coup in Athens in April 1967, the PCI general secretary, Luigi Longo, and other party leaders had become alarmed by the possibility of an Italian military putsch on the Greek model. In the summer of 1967, Giorgio Amendola, on behalf of the PCI Direzione, formally requested Soviet assistance in preparing the Party for survival after a coup as an illegal underground movement. Politburo decision no. P50/P of August 15 authorized the FCD to draw up a program which was intended to give the PCI its own intelligence unit with fully trained staff and a clandestine radio communications system. Details of the program were agreed in talks in Moscow between ANDREA, the head of the PCI’s illegal apparatus, and senior Central Committee officials and KGB officers. Between October 1967 and May 1968 three Italian radio operators completed a four-month KGB training course. Other Party members took courses in producing bogus identity documents, following a syllabus which devoted ninety-six hours to the production of rubber stamps and document seals, six to the art of embossing with synthetic resins, six to changing photographs on identity documents, six to making handwritten entries on documents and twelve to “theoretical discussions.” These and other secret training programs continued at least until the end of the 1970s. The PCI leadership also asked the KGB to check its headquarters for listening devices.^ After the immediate PCI protest at the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, open criticism quickly subsided. Before the PCI Twelfth Congress in February 1969, both Boris Ponomarev, head of the Central Committee’s International Department, and senior KGB officers put heavy pressure on Luigi Longo and other Party leaders to tone down their comments on Cezchoslovakia in speeches to the conference. In reports to the CPSU Central Committee, Ponomarev and the KGB claimed the credit for the fact that, despite the retention of some “ambiguous phrases,” all references to “intervention” and “occupation” by the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact were removed. Nor was there any call by the PCI for the withdrawal of Warsaw Pact forces from Czechoslovakia.^ In a private discussion in 1970 with Nikita Ryzhov, the Soviet ambassador, Longo “particularly emphasized that for the Italian Communists friendship with the CPSU and the Soviet Union was not a formality but a real necessity for their existence.”^ Longo also depended heavily on Soviet subsidies. He was at his most importunate when a general election was called one year ahead of schedule in May 1972. The original CPSU Politburo allocation for the election year was 5,200,000 dollars — 2 million more than in 1971. After a further appeal from Longo, it provided another 500,000 dollars. Longo then wrote another begging letter, to which Brezhnev sent a personal reply, delivered by the Rome resident, Gennadi Fyodorovich Borzov (alias “Bystrov”), on April 4: Dear Comrade Longo, We have received your letter requesting additional assistance to meet expenses relating to the Italian Communist Party’s participation in the electoral campaign. We well understand the difficult nature of the situation in which this campaign is taking place, and the need for the intense activity which your Party must exert in this connection in order to win the elections and resist the forces of reaction. As you. Comrade Longo, know, we have already allocated an additional US $500,000 for the Italian Communist Party to take part in the electoral campaign, thus bringing the total [contribution] this year to US $5,700,000. In the light of your request, we once again carefully studied all the possibilities open to us, and decided to give the Italian Communist Party further assistance to the amount of US $500,000. Unfortunately, at the present time, there is no more that we can do. With Communist greetings, [Signed] L. Brezhnev General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee^ After handing the letter to Longo, Borzov reported to the Centre: The Ambassador [Nikita Ryzhov] declared that as we had gone behind his back he intended to telegraph Comrade Brezhnev about this. Bearing in mind Ryzhov’ s difficult character, and his extremely sensitive reaction to things of this kind, this particular incident has greatly exacerbated the Ambassador’s attitude towards us. The Centre ordered Borzov to do his best to pacify the Ambassador: Tell Ryzhov that you assumed he would be made aware in Moscow of the decision taken by the Instantsiya [CPSU leadership]. On your own behalf, ask Comrade Ryzhov to treat all this with proper understanding and not to attach exaggerated importance to what has happened; tell him that our relations with him will continue to be businesslike and that the Ambassador will be fiilly informed about all our contacts with our friends [the PCI].^ In October 1972, Borzov reported that the “friends” had handed back three 100-dollar notes which had, embarrassingly, turned out to be forgeries.^ Until 1976 the transfer of funds to the Communist Party was a far more straightforward business in Rome than in the United States or many other parts of the world. Since leading Italian Communists regularly called at the Soviet embassy, it was thought unnecessary to resort to the clandestine rigmarole of brush contacts and dead- drops. The most dependable Soviet loyalist on the PCI Direzione, who was in regular contact with the KGB, simply selected a series of emissaries who drove to the embassy and collected the money, having first checked that their cars were not being followed. The KGB residency’s KOMETA radio-listening post simultaneously monitored the wavelengths used by Italian police and security forces in order to detect any signs of surveillance. As an additional precaution, the emissary was followed to and from the embassy by a PCI car.^ Moscow provided further financial assistance through lucrative contracts with PCI-controlled companies in business ventures ranging from Soviet oil imports to hotel construction in the Soviet Union.^ The PCI’s fears of a right-wing military coup were revived by the overthrow of President Salvador Allende’s Unidad Popular government in Chile by the armed forces in September 1973. In December the PCI took secret delivery from the KGB of three SELENGA radio stations in order to enable Party headquarters to maintain contact with local branches if the PCI was forced underground. Party radio technicians were trained in Russia to operate the new system. In the aftermath of a coup the SELENGA radios would transmit messages to Moscow which would then be retransmitted to local PCI underground groups by powerful Soviet transmitters.^^ The renewed fear of an Italian putsch, however, also drove the PCI in directions which caused concern in Moscow that the West’s largest Communist Party was succumbing to ideological heresy. In a series of articles entitled “Reflections on Italy after the Events in Chile,” Enrico Berlinguer (who had succeeded Longo as general secretary in 1972) proposed, in a phrase which became famous, a compromesso storico (“historic compromise”) with the Socialists and the ruling Christian Democrats. Berlinguer was unlike any previous major Communist leader with whom the Kremlin had had to deal. His wife Letizia was a devout Catholic and he had agreed to their children being brought up in the Catholic faith. Longo had done his best to persuade Moscow that, despite his Catholic family, Berlinguer was the best available candidate and that his three main rivals, Giorgio Amendola, Gian Carlo Pajetta and Pietro Ingrao, were unsuitable for the post of general secretary. Amendola, according to Longo, “had a great deal of the bourgeois democrat about him and had too often committed revisionist errors;” Pajetta, “whose authority was dwindling, was too short-tempered and would not promote [Party] unity;” Ingrao was “superficial and given to unrealistic theoretical speculation.” Berlinguer, however, represented the new generation of Party leaders who had emerged since the Second World War.^^ Moscow was far from reassured. Berlinguer’ s original proposal for a “historic compromise” was conceived chiefly as a defense against the prospect of a right-wing coup, justified by Lenin’s dictum that revolutionaries must know when to retreat. Gradually, however, the proposal evolved into a more ambitious — and, in Moscow’s view, heretical — strategy, in which Catholic traditions of solidarity would combine with Communist collective action to produce a new political and social order. During 1975 Berlinguer emerged as the chief spokesman of what became known as Eurocommunism. The PCI joined with the Spanish PCE and French PCF in issuing what was, in effect, a Eurocommunist manifesto, distancing themselves from the Soviet model of socialism and committing themselves to free elections, a free press and a parliamentary road to socialism within a multi-party system. At a secret meeting with Ryzhov on December 12, 1975, a KGB informant on the Direzione accused Berlinguer and the Party leadership of “a cowardly rejection of Leninism” and growing hostility to the Soviet Union. He appealed to the CPSU to issue a public criticism of the PCI line: “This will almost split the party, but it is the only way to save the situation.” The informant also claimed that the PCI leadership was planning to disrupt the conference of European Communist Parties, due to be held in East Berlin in the summer of 1976, by using it as a platform for its revisionist views. During the preparations for the East Berlin conference the Kremlin issued a series of thinly veiled public warnings to the Eurocommunists not to misbehave. Berlinguer, however, was not to be intimidated. During the Italian election campaign in June, he made what Moscow considered his most outrageous statement yet. Italian membership of NATO, Berlinguer declared, was on balance an advantage: “This guarantees us the kind of socialism that we want — to be precise, socialism in liberty, socialism of a pluralist kind.” The Kremlin responded with a scathing, though secret, letter of protest. Of far more significance so far as most of the PCI Direzione was concerned, however, was the fact that the Party received a record 34.5 percent of the vote (up 7.3 percent since 1972). At the East Berlin conference on June 29-30 the clash between the CPSU and the Eurocommunists was thinly papered over by a bland communique calling for “internationalist solidarity.” The speeches of Berlinguer and other leading heretics, which drew attention to flaws in “existing socialism” (in other words, the Soviet model), were published in Pravda only in a censored version. In December 1976 the Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, always a faithful mouthpiece for the Kremlin, denounced Eurocommunism as one of the bourgeois propagandists’ “main lines of ideological subversion against proletarian internationalism.”^^ The Kremlin’s scope for a direct, frontal assault on Berlinguer, however, was limited by his immense popularity. Instead, Andropov instructed Kryuchkov, the head of the FCD, to prepare active measures to discredit him and other tribunes of Eurocommunism. A report prepared by the FCD for the Central Committee claimed that Berlinguer owned a plot of land in Sardinia, and had been involved in dubious building contracts worth tens of billions of lira. Remarkably, while hoping to destabilize Berlinguer by leaking evidence of his alleged corruption, Moscow continued to subsidize the PCI. The total subsidy for 1976 was 6.5 million dollars. According to KGB files, however, the “operational situation” for the transfer of money in Rome had become more difficult. The newly appointed resident, Boris Solomatin (previously stationed in New York), concluded in 1976 that handing over money at the embassy was insufficiently clandestine. He agreed with Guido Cappelloni (codenamed ALBERTO), head of the PCI Central Committee administration department, that it would be safest for the money transfers to take place early on Sunday mornings at pre-arranged locations in the Rome suburbs which had been carefully checked beforehand by both the residency and the PCI. The route of the car used by the “friend” who received the money was kept under careful surveillance by PCI members; he then transferred the money to another car which delivered it to a secret Party office.^^ Despite its hostility to Berlinguer and Eurocommunism, the Soviet Politburo also continued to authorize KGB training in underground operations of specially selected Italian Communists. In 1979, for example, the PCI sent three Party members to Moscow for instruction by the FCD “Illegals” Directorate S. One was trained to act as radio and cipher instructor, another as a disguise specialist and the third in the fabrication of false documents.^ ^ Not all the conflicts between the PCI Direzione and the Communist parties of the Soviet Bloc became public. The most serious secret dispute in the late 1970s concerned the covert assistance given by a number of east European intelligence services to terrorist groups in the West. East Germany became, in the words of its last, non- Communist, minister of the interior, Peter-Michael Diestel, “an Eldorado for terrorists.” What most concerned the leaders of the PCI, however, was support by the Czechoslovak StB for the Italian Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades). Their anxieties reached a peak on March 16, 1978, when the Red Brigades ambushed a car carrying the president of the Christian Democrats, Aldo Moro, in the center of Rome. Moro’s chauffeur and his police escort were gunned down and Moro himself was bundled into a waiting car. For the next fifty- four days, while Moro was held prisoner in a secret hiding place, the nation agonized over whether or not to negotiate with the Red Brigades to save his life.^^ Though the PCI Direzione publicly maintained that there could be no deals with terrorists, it was privately tormented by the fear that news of the support given to the Red Brigades by the StB would leak out. Speaking for the Direzione, Arturo Colombi complained to the Czechoslovak ambassador in Rome, Vladimir Koucky, that a PCI delegation to Prague had been fobbed off when it had tried to raise the issue of help to the Red Brigades, some of whom, it believed, had been invited to Czechoslovakia. On May 4, 1978 Amendola warned Koucky that, if Moro’s kidnappers were caught and put on trial, the assistance given them by the StB “could all come out.” On this occasion, Rhyzov, the Soviet ambassador, sided with the PCI, telling Koucky “he had warned Czechoslovak representatives about contacts with the Red Brigades, but they would not listen to him.” Rhyzov was convinced that the StB residency in Rome was still secretly in touch with the Red Brigades. “You got a pennyworth of benefit [from the Red Brigades],” he told Koucky, “but did a hundred times more damage. The Italian authorities failed to discover Moro’s hiding place in time. On May 9, 1978 he was murdered by his kidnappers and his body left in the boot of a car in the center of Rome, midway between the headquarters of the PCI and those of the Christian Democrats. In the outpouring of grief and soul-searching which followed Moro’s assassination there was — to the relief of the Direzione — no mention of the involvement of the StB with the Red Brigades. During the police hunt for terrorist radio stations over the next few years, however, the PCI leadership became increasingly anxious that their own might be discovered. In June 1981 the PCI leadership informed the Rome residency that, for security reasons, the three radio stations installed by the KGB for clandestine Party use eight years earlier had been destroyed.^^ The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland two years later destroyed any semblance of a reconciliation between Moscow and the PCI. At a meeting of the PCI Central Committee in January 1982, only the KGB’s main contact voted against a motion condemning Soviet interference in Polish affairs. Berlinguer declared that the October Revolution had “exhausted its propulsive force,” implying in effect that the CPSU had lost its revolutionary credentials. The Direzione called on the west European left to work for the “democratic renewal” of the countries of the Soviet Bloc. Pravda denounced the PCI’s declarations as “truly blasphemous.” There followed what the Italians called lo strappo — a brief but highly polemical breach of relations between the PCI and CPSU. Within the Italian Party leadership, the hardliner Armando Cossutta was a lone voice in taking Moscow’s side in the quarrel.^^ A decade later, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating, evidence leaked out that Soviet subsidies to the PCI had continued on a reduced scale in the 1980s. But, according to one commentator, “It soon became clear that if Soviet funds had been channelled into Italy, they went through the hands ... of Cossutta, either to shore up a failing newspaper with pro- Soviet sympathies (Paese Sera) or to help finance his own activities against the PCI’s leaders.” The final recorded payments — 700.000 dollars in 1985, 600,000 dollars in 1986 and 630.000 dollars in 1987 — were used solely to provide “material support” to what the CPSU International Department and the KGB (but probably not Gorbachev) considered “the healthy forces in the PCI,” chief among them Cossutta and Paese Sera?^ BERLINGUER APART, THE Eurocommunist of whom Moscow was most suspicious was Santiago Carrillo, leader of the PC